

**Reinventions and Contestations
of Thought-Power in Africa:
*Emerging Perspectives on
Pan-Africanism***



**Percy-Sledge Chigora, Richard Runyararo
Mahomva & Majahana Lunga (Eds)**

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A must read and a pithy account on emerging perspectives on pan-Africanism largely emanating from a Zimbabwean perspective.

Vongai Nyawo-Viriri,
Professor in the History Department,
Midlands State University



Pan-Africanism remains an existential imperative for an inspirational continent. This collection of essays is not only a reminder of that, but also of the centrality of the notions of emancipation and the power of agency in our development narrative. “Reinventions of Contestations of Thought - Power in Africa” provides a timely interjection by thinkers from the continent in the contemporary ideologue-industrialist globalist discourse. It goes beyond esoteric academic musings and seeks to firmly plant African thought in a practical development agenda.

Mabasa Sasa
Editor,
Sunday Mail, Zimbabwe



This is a compelling narrative of Africa’s developmental aspirations that is grounded in genuine epistemological constructions of Pan-Africanism. The book is a timely reminder of the need for the African continent to remain steadfast in its quest for sustainable development and transformation anchored in the values of Ubuntu and Africanism. The underlying themes throughout the chapters is a brave call for Africans to refuse the tag of victimhood in global socio-economic narratives around economic and political development and for the continent to begin to assert itself on the global map. The book is also a timely reminder that the struggle for emancipation is still alive especially at an ideological level as aptly reflected in the title of the book. In short, this book is a masterpiece and congratulations to the contributors of the chapters for a job well done.

David Makwerere (Ph.D)
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PREFACE

The chapters in this collection were directly conceived from Leaders for Africa Network's (LAN) twin academic colloquia series namely: *The Back to Pan-Africanism Conference and the Reading Pan-Africa Symposium (REPS)*. It is important to note that from the outset, no premeditated attempt was made by LAN or the editors to structure uniformity in the themes, and the research problems of this book project. Any form of intrinsic congruence and lucid connections in the varying subjects presented here are coincidental yet relatable.

The contributors' unity of logic in this book conveniently stimulates a multi-disciplinary debate to the existing body of knowledge and the posterity of ideas with a relevant traction to build Africa's future. In harmony with LAN's purview of spearheading scientific advocacy for socio-economic policy-making process, this book is a manifestation of the plurality in thought within the confines of pan-Africanism. As Africans re-identifies themselves in a 'modern' era, this book becomes an imperative starting point of thought. A thinking that critically gaps the processes of policy-making and citizen engagement that is afrocentric as opposed to Eurocentric. Importantly, ideas presented in this book should not be regarded as an end in themselves, but rather a means to an end. The ideas should expectedly provoke more academically guided discourses and thought.

LAN is indebted to the academic colleagues whose contributions mark the success of this publication. The immortalising of their thoughts will undoubtedly foster a new understanding of the African and panAfricanism today. The indelible editorial input by Percy-sledge Chigora, Richard Mahomva and Majahana Lunga stamps the academic noteworthiness of the precision of the contributions to this book. Knowledge seekers will indubitably benefit from the reverberating ideas presented in this book.

Pofela Ndzosi
Leaders for Africa Network
16 January, 2018

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REINVENTIONS AND CONTESTATIONS OF THOUGHT-POWER: *EMERGING PERSPECTIVES ON PAN-AFRICANISM*

INTRODUCTION

Percy-sledge Chigora, Richard Mahomva, Majahana Lunga

The Reinventions and Contestations of Thought-Power in Africa: Emerging Perspectives on Pan-Africanism was born out of a joint academic enterprise by an assemblage of academics in the humanities and social-sciences disciplines. The co-editorial undertakes a relatable enquiry on the political epistemologies currently informing the crisis confronting Africa's socio-economic landscape. This is premised on the presumption that unity embodied in the values of Pan-Africanism are crippled by war, ethnic tensions, civilian protests, social inequalities and poverty. In the absence of such an interrogation, Africans are prone to think that the interventions of the academia have not been fully explored in policy-making processes.

The submissions herein, advance that the problems confronting Africa are an inevitable output of misaligned structural thought-power inputs of the very "software" which channels the energy of governance to our public institutions. The ultimate goal of each chapter is to navigate a path for reinventions of a sustainable epistemology of developmental policy-making in all sectors of human-livelihoods. It is worth-noting that some of the issues discussed here have been central points of other academic submissions, therefore, the re-emergence privy-engaged issues which have been at the fore of the academic debates, clearly substantiate a protracted neglect of matters that have continued to compress the continent's development capacity.

As the reader would notice, the SADC region and Zimbabwe, constitute contextual setting of the themes of the book. However, the chapters also locate the addressed

concerns within the broader African scope. In the same vein, some themes highlighted in this collection also have an essentialist reach to matters of African identity with a biased interest on the questions of power, knowledge and being affecting Africans in any part of the world outside the African continent. Therefore, the thematic elasticity of the matters presented in this collection reaffirms the reality of the shared African experience born out of the Trans-Atlantic Slavery System and the incessantly reinvigorated effects of the Berlin Conference.

Key among the blind ties that have involuntary coalesced these scholars to come with this book is Africa's search for unity and prosperity in the face ethnic strives and residues of racial inequalities. Other matters that weigh into the significance of this collaborative exchange include, gender marginalities, ineptitude in policy-making and the asymmetrical distribution of development in the global system where Africa is a dependent appendage of Western domination (Gaidzanwa, 2005). Another major motivating factor to the birth of this collaborative work was the need to interrogate the problem-solution disparity gap between the academia and its various adjacent sectors whose role impacts human livelihoods. The concerns raised in each chapter of the book substantiate the fractured link between the academia and policy-making structures of the public and private sector (Moyo, 1993). It is our hope that the concerns registered here with regards to the crises of the continent's architecture of governance will find malleable lodgement among all policy actors.

While Africa has been divided as a result of the dichotomous curse of slavery and colonialism, scholars are unified by the uniformity of burdens confronting one part of the continent from another-in the same manner Africans in the Western hemisphere seek ontological and cultural restitution. This comes at a time when the continent is being problematised for having a less competent and dedicated human capital to address the institutional and technological crisis weighing down Africa's potential for growth (Mills & Herbst 2011). As a result, this has subjected the African continent to looting by countries with developed human capital; at the same time belabouring Africa's efforts to be modern (Bond, 2006). As it stands, China's rise as a global capital giant has also paved new systematic prejudice for resource governance in Africa –which now serves as a raw-materials supplier for China's new agenda to dominate the global market (Olufemi, 2014).

The ostensible parallels in the issues discussed expose the urgency for a new and a much anticipated paradigm of Africa's liberation. This is part of the rigorous intent to promote ideas which challenge the imperial condition and the limitations of

the territorial decolonisation parameters. At the same time, a highlight is made to indicate that whilst independent African nations have narrowed the sovereign stretch of their respective self-determination they still have a role to play as subsidiary drivers of Africa's ultimate attainment of development. It is on this basis that we argue that this publication is pan-Africanist in character. This is because pan-Africanism assumes a political, economic, intellectual and social consciousness built on aspirations of promoting continental and global synergies of Africans in face of deliberate imperial domination and marginalisation (Mahomva 2014).

Zezeza (2008:2) pithily describes pan-Africanism as "black internationalism, the age-old imperative for collective liberation for African peoples at home and abroad". Guided by this scope, we argue that the chapters of this book have a permeating resonance to reconstruct the values of pan-Africanism as a philosophy and its sub-versions namely Afro-centricity, Ubuntu, Decoloniality and Nationalism among other black redemptive ideologies. Consequently, the chapters provide innovative models of reinventing pan-Africanism as a normative template of grappling with realities unique to Africa's unity, prosperity, self-determination and peace.

The cross-sectional convergence in the various diagnosis of the African problem also produces a seamless conduit for reinventing the idea of pan-Africanism. This purports to enhance the continent's potential to eradicate most socio-economic and political challenges affecting it. The need to reinvent pan-Africanism is also strategic in strengthening the interactional benefits of Africans at home and those abroad in this age of globalisation. This is because pan-Africanism needs to engage the continued rejuvenation of the imperial thought-power which subjected Africa to developmental marginalisation. Pan-Africanism must be relevant enough to grapple with the shifting impacts of imperial hegemony and the paradoxes it imposes to the character of the post-colonial state.

Carving-out the essence of pan-Africanism

It is a datum, some authors of the chapters do not subscribe to pan-Africanism, nor do they ardently sympathise with its values. It is because they ideologically subscribe to different, however dovetailing social paradigms as they make their submissions, they are plainly problematising various issues that Africa is presently entangled in. Theirs, was not to address a fixated ideological question, however, as indicated in the preface, the chapters were put together under the auspices of two pan-Africanist advocacy colloquia convened by LAN, that capture a gamut of reasoning voices.

Regardless of the writers' bias towards pan-Africanism or silence/absence thereof, it is important to note that the issues presented in this publication constitute the critical challenges and prospects of advancing the primary values of pan-Africanism. This reality is informed by the view that pan-Africanism influenced the historic quest for the dismemberment of colonial supremacy as well as the preceding age's crisis of inequality which was a result of slavery.

The pragmatic value of pan-Africanism has been limited to the past's struggles for decolonisation. The unitary essence of pan-Africanism has been marginalised and substituted by Western rooted conflict arbitration terms. The role of pan-Africanism as a basis for understanding how African national consciousness was conceived has been narrowly overtaken by the monopoly of the democracy discourses which have a major leaning on the West's diagnoses and prognoses (Huntington, 1990). This limited benchmarking of democracy to the Western world-view that has been solely appropriated to define politics in Africa is buttressed in Fukuyama's thesis on the 'End of History', where he argues that the entire globe has reached apex of democratic aspirations. As such, the political culture adapted from Western liberalism now universally qualifies to give terms of social contract of the governors and the governed. As a result, our academia has failed to tap into the problem of this logic. Therefore, it is on this basis that this book expands the horizon of reason with regards to how we should conceptualise our politics.

Pan-Africanism is thus a decolonisation vehicle and a post-colonial lens of appreciating the development that Africa needs especially at a time when impoverishment and political crises structure the acute limitations progressive terms of state-craft. At the same time, social conflicts, ethnic strives, the scramble for resources and the multilateral superintended looting in Africa beg the relevance of an ideological shift. Arguably, the continued westernisation error of our professedly "liberated continent" has not been effectively addressed. This implies that the proposition of post-colonialism remains elusive and incongruous.

Beyond apportioning a bulk of the blame to those in power, it is also imperative to problematise the academia for mythologising the values of pan-Africanism instead of prescribing solutions for Africa's problems. Therefore, the templates of governance in Africa have been largely framed by ideas with a minimum contextual relevance to addressing the continent's dire need for development. The continent is plagued with a non-answerable of whether to pursue integrationist or disengagement development approaches, and the remedy appears to be afar. This is because returning to the source (pan-Africanism) has been trivialised and in

the process pan-Africanism has been disparaged as a primordial ideology with no relevance in addressing Africa's current developmental limitations.

The elbowing of pan-Africanism not only in political theory is also telling of how much African philosophies have been reduced to "alternatives". This follows the sustained tradition of giving eminence to Western thinking –such that without it any achieve or intellectual discourse is treated as insignificant. Therefore, the main objective of this work is to dispose the "alternative" misalignment of pan-Africanism and many other Global-South ideas which have been cast into the periphery in the public sphere.

This is why we coalesce the other branches of African philosophy explored in some chapters to cite the problem of Africa's ideological bankruptcy from a multi-dimensional perspective. In chapters by, Bhurekeni, Moloi and Magwa, we find exhaustive discussions on the role of Afrocentricity as a crucial philosophy for shaping the systems of learning, governance and advancing the goals of Africa's economic growth. Bhurekeni tersely highlights the role of Ubuntu in structuring power relations and social order in the interest of the continent's development aspirations.

Naturally, ubuntu provides an inclusive approach to social cohesion in motivating citizen engagement in policy-making. Guided by this desire to exploit values of Ubuntu, Africa may find a sustainable route to addressing issues of deliberate marginalisation which in some instances have produced secessionist tensions with a ripple effect on regional integration. In one of the chapters, Umali Saidi attributes the crisis of unity to the ethnic divisions that have been carried on to post-independence politics to promote the politics of divide and rule. Saidi invites political elites to create a common value for the unity based on the merits of cultural intersections which are borne out of ethnic diversity.

Samukele Hadebe takes a different point of focus in articulating the challenge of unity. In his submission, Hadebe takes the reader through a gallery tour of Zimbabwe's post-land reform archive. He points out the role of literature in promoting polarising citizen belonging and split-patriotic consciousness. The chapter deeply explores how political divisions have taken a supreme stand in defining belonging. Hadebe's analysis speaks to the burden of polemic attitudes which shape the culture of learning and reading through polarising literature. This is because literature has inherently played a vigorous role in shaping contested national narratives in Zimbabwe in the past decades.

Relatively, the chapter by Helliker and Bhatasara revisits the contributions of the Professor Terence Ranger to explain the role of nationalist historiography in mobilising citizens towards the goal of liberation and sustaining the enduring values of the liberation legacy. This perspective somehow tallies with a view posited by Hadebe in the opening chapter of the book which focuses on the need for the post-colonial state must revive the idea of pan-Africanism in order to deal with the challenges of nation-building, democracy and economic development. In line with this thought, Helliker and Bhatasara provide a discursive evolution of Ranger's work beyond 2000 and how he influenced the work of academics opposed to the ruling's economic indigenisation initiatives and "exclusive" nationalism. The problem posited by Helliker and Bhatasara offers a critical highlight of Zimbabwe's contestation for power and how they affected citizen belonging at the same time justifying the popular dismissal of the liberation legacy largely associated with the ruling's "Third-Chimurenga" propaganda.

This position is further expanded in the chapter by Mediel Hovel and Enock Ndawana who use Terence Ranger's patriotic history theoretical lens to discuss how the teaching and dissemination of history in Zimbabwe was profusely manipulated to solicit political legitimacy for the ruling party during the Mugabe era. The chapter exposes how ZANU-PF locates its legitimacy in the auto-biography nationalism to give a compelling justification for the party's stay in power. The chapter also highlights how this strategy of manipulating history for comparative political advantage neutralised the influence of the opposition; as a result furthering the political rifts experienced in Zimbabwe since the beginning of the millennium.

On a different note, Brian Maregedze pays tribute to the late Professor Vimbai Chivaura whom he believes challenged the state for maintaining residues of colonialism. His position foregoes the view that Chivaura was nothing but a pro-establishment scholar who was instrumental in driving the state motivated manipulation of nationalist historiography to build relevance for ZANU-PF. Maregedze submits that Chivaura was one of the less celebrated academics in the country's circles of anti-establishment scholarship. However, Maregedze's chapter unseals the subtle and yet grossly misconstrued role played by Chivaura in challenging the state to adopt decolonial and Afrocentric measures to run the country's systems of governance. This chapter locates Chivaura's credence within the ideological confines of Afrocentricity and decoloniality of knowledge.

Consequently, all submissions in their multi-disciplinary grounding aptly express the need for Africa to unite and develop. The unity of logic in the submissions

made in this book is part of the bigger effort to expand the cognitive limits of understanding our challenges through ideas derived from colonial epistemologies. In fact, Africa needs relevant and contextual sources of reason which inspire unity and socio-economic. Africa's hope lies in the enduring and liberating grounding of pan-Africanism to organise and centralise a path to victory. Our scholars and policy-makers have a role to play. The citizenry have a role to play as well. We all have a role to awaken the dreams of peace, unity and prosperity. This is why it is crucial for people to people, country to country unity to take the centre stage in defining favourable conditions for a post-colonial paradigm. Relics of colonialism in public institutions must be decisively dealt with in as much as the models of learning deserve restructuring. It is our hope that this publication will inform the proposed direction to redefining Africa's liberation.

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PAN-AFRICANISM AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF LIBERATION GOALS IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Samukele Hadebe

The doyen of Pan-Africanism, Patrice Lumumba, writing from his prison cell just before his gruesome murder in the hands of Africa's sworn enemies, wrote these soothingly prophetic words to his wife Pauline:

Do not weep for me...History will one day have its say; it will not be the history taught in the United Nations, Washington, Paris or Brussels, but the history taught in the countries that have rid themselves of colonialism and its puppets.

Africa will write its own history, and north and south of the Sahara it will be a history full of glory and dignity (Van Lierde, 1972: 422-423).

We also have deeply inspiring words notwithstanding the melancholic environment enveloping the newly independent Ghana, from the illustrious Pan-Africanist luminary, Kwame Nkrumah who wrote that:

Our Independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent (Twineyo-Kamugisha, 2012).

Divided we are weak; united, Africa could become one of the greatest forces for good in the world....but as a Great Power whose greatness is indestructible because it is built not on fear, envy and suspicion, nor won at the expense of others, but founded on hope, trust, friendship and directed to the good of all mankind (Nkrumah, 1961: xii-xiv]

Introduction

As one critically introspects 21st century pan-Africanism as an ideology and movement, it is imperative to not only reflect deeply on the visions of these two icons of this ideology, Patrice Lumumba and Kwame Nkrumah but to also draw from them standards with which to measure and audit all post-independence developments to date in Africa in general and in Zimbabwe in particular. It is from this perspective that this chapter interrogates the goals of African independence through the lens of the Zimbabwean context. The chapter offers a contemplative summative account of the conditions of Zimbabwe's colonial episode and further demonstrates how pan-Africanism was and is still responsive to the objectives of the liberation in relation to democracy and patriotism. The meaning of democracy and patriotism in the pan-Africanist context requires a definitive elaboration which is premised on the unique African experience; as such the chapter explores how democracy and patriotism must be domesticated within the given parameters of Africa's disentanglement from neo-colonialism. Therefore, the key submission of this chapter is to prescribe ways in which we can Africanise or indigenise the post-independence state. Put differently, the chapter proposes the need for realigning principles of democracy, governance, policy architecture and social cohesion to liberation values in a bid to reinforce the values of pan-Africanism in Zimbabwe and Africa at large.

Unpacking the Goals of African Liberation

If one were to posit the question: What were the objectives of African liberation? I suppose one can get a long list. But I would assume that some people would agree to my summary of the goals in a statement that 'African liberation' was about capturing state power. Of course, it could be said in different ways, either as one person one vote, majority rule, liberty, freedom and equality, liberation, independence, democracy, power to the people, equitable distribution of wealth and opportunities, non-racism and non-sexism, etc. All these could only be realised if state power transferred from colonialist to Africans. In the same context, the dignity of the African relied on the transfer of state-power from the colonial administration to the nationalist revolutionary movement. This was not unique to Zimbabwe, but it was the defining mark of decolonisation across the African continent.

At least both the African elites and the masses agreed that freedom, independence and self-determination could only be achieved by the control of state power. It was

also a common understanding that whoever controlled state power, be it the then educated few – teachers, doctors and lawyers; or even soldiers, did so in trust and on behalf of the African masses and future generations. The future that the likes of Lumumba braved death pangs for.

The Colonial Condition and Pan Africanist Strategy

Some scholars (refer to Grosfoguel 2007) have said that the goals of African liberation were broader and went beyond capture of state power for its sake. Liberation was supposed to be a decolonization process. Therefore, it necessitated understanding the colonial condition.

Colonial conquest was manifested physically by military and police control, administration, the control of national wealth like farms, mines, factories all public infrastructure. The symbolic features like the flag, coat of arms, currency, etc. It was relatively easy at independence to reverse control in these areas.

There is the other part of colonial conquest that has not been easy to grapple with, ideological control through religion, education, culture, literature and all the systems that perverted African values. It is this socio-psychological aggression against the African that dehumanised and characterised him as ‘savage, uncivilised, without history and infantile’. That justified the brutal dispossession of the African of land, mineral wealth and profit of his labor. Even African civilization and progress had to be denied while simultaneously being usurped. African history was stolen too as manifest in the contestation over Great Zimbabwe during colonial times.

Writing on Rhodesian novels, Anthony Chennels ‘distills the essence of white settlers’ alienation from the Africa they purport to redeem, or civilise. The Rhodesian settler novels expended enormous energy on negating, or trying to negate, the historical achievements of the Africans as revealed by the magnificent structures found at Great Zimbabwe’ (Malaba, 2007:vii. Chennels, 2007:1). Initially colonialist cast themselves with the so-called ‘civilizing mission’ but later shifted to ‘attempts to inventing African tradition’ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013:110).

Actually, this re-engineering of the African worldview did not just end in works of fiction but in supposedly objective and scientific studies like archeology. For example, the arch-imperialist Cecil Rhodes ‘hired Theodore Bent to excavate the ruins and commissioned Arthur Wilmot to search the archives and libraries of Europe for bibliographical proof that Great Zimbabwe’s builders had not originated in Africa’ (Chennels, 2007; Bent, 1893; Wilmot, 1896). It now looks senseless and a paradox that Rhodesian mythology and nationalism were parasitic to Great Zimbabwe.

It is with that background that one should understand the Pan Africanist strategy of African liberation to reclaim African heritage and history for use by Africans. It is no accident then that when nationalist decided on an appropriate name for the liberated country, the name Zimbabwe was most attractive and inspiring. The future was inspired by the history and nurtured by indigenous knowledge systems. That said, 'Zimbabwe is not of course a successor state to the pre-colonial Munhumutapa' (see Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013:189; Mudege 1988).

Pan Africanism was alive to the risks ahead after independence for example Amilcar Cabral (1969:75) became worried about the ideological deficiency of the decolonization movements. Ideally, African liberation was expected to destroy the colonial state and culminate in the creation a new dispensation of freedom, equality and justice [Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013:169] and had to struggle to transcend racism and tribalism the hallmarks of colonial ideology in Africa. This is in addition to the old problem of African collaborators.

According to David Lamb (1983:9); 'The manner in which colonial administration governed virtually ensured the failure of Africa's transition into independence. Their practice of divide and rule – favoring some tribes to the exclusion of others – served to accentuate the ethnic divisiveness that had been pulling Africa in different directions for centuries.' While the struggle for liberation was not for reverse racial discrimination [It was not a war against the British, Portuguese, Afrikaners, Spanish or Belgians as a people but the system of oppressive governments] it had a topmost agenda for solidarity amongst Africans as brethren to rid Africa of the sure danger of tribalism and sexism.

In Zimbabwe it was *Mntwana Wenhlabathi/ Mwana Wevhu/ Son of the Soil!* An injury to one was an injury to all. No African country could really be free as long as some territories were under imperial yoke, hence the songs '*Kana isati yasununguka Namibia atimbofa tagarika*' or *Lesi Isibhamu salababafana singikhumbuza uBen Bella, singikhumbuza uKaunda*. It is this spirit of solidarity that made it possible for those liberated African countries to constitute the Organization of African Unity [OAU]'s Liberation Committee that facilitated assistance to Frelimo, MPLA, ZIPRA, ZANLA, SWAPO, MK war efforts. So many Africans sacrificed even their lives for the liberation of fellow African countries, such was the level of solidarity and sacrifice inspired by the Pan Africanist spirit.

Flag Independence, the Abyss and Despair

Although from a pan-Africanist perspectives, it was clear that flag independence

was not enough the pre-eminence of nationalist priorities ensured that political independence got priority. Independence meant replacing colonialist administrators with African ones without transforming the state structure and purposes.

It is clear that African nationalism eclipsed Pan-Africanism at Independence and issues of sovereignty became the main factor. African nationalism and not Pan-Africanism led to such 'phobias as nativism and xenophobia that devoured those Africans deemed to be the toxic other' (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013:11). Since 'the postcolonial state has continued to serve the interests of global capital rather than the interests of the people of Africa because of the snares of the colonial matrices of power (Nyong'o 1987:25) we saw worsening underdevelopment, rampant corruption, poverty, violence and the dehumanization of the supposedly free Africans. Again collaborators were complicit in the continued dehumanization of Africa as was the case in selling fellow Africans to slavery.

The decolonization without Africanizing the State has led to the fall into the abyss and despair by Africans. The grim situation was expressed by Edem Kodjo, then secretary general of the then Organization of African Unity (OAU) addressing African leaders in 1978:

Our ancient continent ...is now on the brink of disaster, hurtling towards the abyss of confrontation, caught in the grip of violence, sinking into the dark night of bloodshed and death (Lamb, 1983:vi).

The question to posit now with hindsight is: Should Africa had followed the Casablanca and not Monrovia block? The Casablanca block led by Ghana under Kwame Nkrumah wanted immediate formation of the United States of Africa, while Monrovia group led by Nigeria opted for a gradual approach (Adejumobi & Olukoshi 2008:3-190).

Another perennial question is: Did the benefits outweigh the losses in the choice by Continental Pan-Africanists to preserve the colonial boundaries drawn by the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885? Reflect on the ethnic factor, viability issues and boundary conflicts. Actually with a United States of Africa did colonially drawn boundaries matter anymore?

The illusion of the nation state

Having been lured by the forceful drive of nationalism, Africa settled for the nation-state. Africa did so, in spite of her reality of colonial boundaries and pervasive ethnic factor in her politics. The nation-state is a relatively recent historical phenomenon

coming into being around the period of the French Revolution. It has since established itself such that contemporary political organization seems inconceivable without it. 'Such is the pervasiveness of the nation-state in the modern world, and so unquestioned are the political principles upon which it is predicated, that it has come to be largely naturalised and taken for granted (May, 2001:56).

As the product of nationalism, the nation-state suffered the limitations inherent in the ideology of nationalism. The ideology of nationalism can be summarised as follows:

- The nation is the sole source of political power, and the interests and values of the nation take priority over all other interests and values – loyalty to the nation is preeminent
- Everyone must belong to a nation, if everyone is to be truly free
- To realise themselves, nations must be as politically independent as possible – political autonomy, or at least some degree of self-determination, are central tenets of nationalism (Breuilly 1993, Smith 1994).

The 'state' as defined from Western social science theory in line with Max Weber 'is an entity (a) with political sovereignty over a clearly designated territorial area, (b) with monopoly control of legitimate force and (c) consisting of citizens with terminal loyalty to it (Giddens 1984, Oommen 1994).

The nation State is therefore 'the confluence of the nation and the state' Nationalism is political principle which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent (Gellner, 1993). The ideal nation-state is one nation with a common history, common culture and common language. The question then is: Can Africa afford a Nation-State?

The nation-state and nationalism that drives it denies its ethnic basis and motivation. Ethnicity is denigrated, ridiculed, banished from mainstream scholarship as something either 'invented' or primordial. This public denial contrasts to world news on ethnic cleansing and genocide (Levine, 1999) that have become common occurrences.

To pretend that this illusion of the nation-state with congruence between nation and state is real, ideological justifications and manipulation of culture are devised. Language was singled out as the most important distinguishing characteristic of nationhood – indeed its very soul. Humboldt (1767-1835) said 'the nation's language is its spirit and its spirit is its language. This was the view of the 'German

Romantics' the triumvirate of Herder, Humboldt and Fichte.

Since the nation-state is largely responsible for the creation of problems of identity, minorities and stateless nations and the accompanying religious, ethnic and sectarian conflicts witnessed the world over in Palestine, Tibet, Darfur, Kurdistan, Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, Chechnya, etc., can true freedom be enjoyed within it? Can it guarantee world peace and co-existence?

The transplant of the nation-state concept to independent Africa did not only undermine the goals of African liberation and the spirit of pan-Africanism but opened Africa to ideological prostitution and flirtation with the worst forms of western political experimentation. The result was the de-linking of the state from serving citizens' interests but to be a willing servant of hegemonic neo-colonial interests, hence the anti-people and anti-African nature and DNA of the post-independence state.

Actually one writer chided Africa with these words: 'One is tempted to say that the will to gain political independence from the coloniser in the guise of a new independent nation-state is the ultimate proof that the colonised ethnic group is thoroughly integrated into the ideological universe of the coloniser' (Slavoj Zizek in Ndlovu-Gatseni 2013). If Africans were thoroughly Europeanised ideological could they disentangle themselves from Europe and her institutions?

To break this bond, Ndlovu-Gatseni says it 'will require an epistemic rebellion that enables the formerly colonised people to gain self-confidence, enabling them to re-imagine another world free from Western tutelage ... [and]. ... free from Western hegemonic thought that was constructed on oppressive and exploitative values of slavery, imperialism and colonialism' (2013:264).

On Democracy and Patriotism

The post-independence state is a paradox in that it is doing exactly the very opposite of what it was meant to achieve – to protect the gains of African liberation, write the glorious history of Africa and restore human dignity to Africans free from bondage and poverty. By pursuing the illusory benefits of the nation-state and paying lip service to Pan-Africanist ideals that inspired masses to rise against foreign oppression, it betrays its historical mandate.

Instead of restoring human dignity to Africans by advancing them politically, economically and culturally, the post-independence era was paralysed by underdevelopment, pillaging of natural resources, diseases hunger and above all a

denial of even basic inalienable human rights. The emergence of liberal democracy and multi-party systems as panacea to Africa's political stasis covertly disguises the bond between the African state and the empire.

Because as Africans we have fallen into the abyss of despair with independence we now talk of the democracy wave as the second liberation. There is no first, second or third liberation. It is either you are free or in bondage. In the same vein, there is no partial freedom. The African liberation was to restore human dignity and democracy. Now democracy and patriotism are like gowns worn for convenience and political expediency. Patriotism can only be expressed by the living who are committed to the welfare and interests of their fellow citizens that they can even die for their cause. Patriotism is not for those in the graveyard!

By Africanising the state and making it a popular institution that would make Africa truly democratic. The liberal democracy 'which takes politics away from the people by making it a permanent business of a small, indeed tiny, number of specialised personnel' (Geras, 1987:118) could not be a panacea. Of course, Africans also need to enjoy (ibid) democratic rights and liberties, basic human rights, freedom of speech and belief, assembly and organization, etc. that liberal democracy has cleverly associated itself with.

Reconnecting to the Indigenous Knowledge Systems

From where we are currently as Africans there is no doubt that we are dancing on borrowed garbs and not dancing to the rhythm of the beat of the African drum. Actually, we no longer even hear the drumbeat. We are lost in the discord of our voices singing loud a song whose language we do not understand. The dance itself has no connection to our spirituality hence it even ceases to be a dance but an uncoordinated and clumsy gyrating of the body.

For our dance to be aesthetic and spiritually pleasing, we need to listen to the African drumbeat – the return to pan-Africanism. There is an urgent need therefore to retrace our footsteps back to that liberation philosophy of pan-Africanism which inspired Africans from north to south and from east to west. That pan-Africanism was not divorced from but was strongly rooted in African culture, Ubuntu, human dignity, patriotism and sacrifice. The accompanying material and non-material culture like dress, hats, walking sticks, sandals, beads, bangles and their songs and folklore all derived from the rich African heritage. The very African heritage, like our Great Zimbabwe, that colonist sought to denigrate, deny, obliterate or usurp from our history.

Since the ideology of the nation state like that of colonialism was cultivated through mass education, it is imperative to use education as a tool for sustaining and revitalizing the African liberation agenda. We have no choice but to return to indigenous knowledge systems of Africans to draw models and frameworks from. It is not about romanticizing the past that we are ignorant of and merely fictionalizing but investigating those aspects that mold the African psyche and inspire the spirit. Indigenous knowledge systems are not opposed to or a negation of advances in science and technology – actually it is through scientific analysis of social development that Africa can truly rid herself of shackles of racist-inspired myths and falsehoods.

The education system and in particular universities as citadels of cultural preservation, progress and innovation should take their rightful duties in applying indigenous knowledge system to explain the African worldview. African history cannot be a footnote in Euro-American history but the other side of the story, the version not as told by the thief but by the owner whose property has been defiled by the robbery. Surely the narratives cannot be identical even if in reference to the same activity, place and time.

Conclusion

Africa in general and Zimbabwe in particular would benefit from the tenets of pan-Africanism in this globalizing village and its distortions of human development, freedom, people's rights and democracy. Neither Western nor Eastern prescriptions have remedied the continued underdevelopment of Africa and her political paralysis. Let that which the Africans fought to control, the state play its expected role of safeguarding the interests of Africans and their dignity as free people. Only when the African state becomes truly indigenous can 'Africa write her own history, and north and south of the Sahara it will be a history full of glory and dignity' as dreamt by Patrice Lumumba, Kwame Nkrumah, Amilcar Cabral, Frantz Fanon, Ben Bella, Abdel Naser, Agostinho Neto, Julius Nyerere, Kenneth Kaunda and Zimbabwean liberators, including Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo and fellow compatriots. 'The bigger struggle today is that of trying to revive revolutionary and liberatory politics and to originate a new language that resonated with the present generation and capture the future so as to restore lost human certainty (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013). Hope is what the new generation of pan-Africanists need. The hope that endured Mandela during the darkest days, *'even when little sunlight shined into that Robben Island cell, he could see a better future – one worthy of sacrifice'* [Barack Obama 2010:pxiii]. The cause of African Liberation is neither a lost nor a

hopeless one but it still has glimpses that inspire the future.

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PAN-AFRICANISM: LIVING THE IDEA AND THE DECRIMINALIZATION OF ETHNICITY IN AFRICA: A ZIMBABWEAN PERSPECTIVE

Umali Saidi

Introduction

Pan Africanism offers Africa and Zimbabwe an inimitable opportunity for self-definition which transcends the colonially set parameters of framing both the continent and the nation's decolonization overtures. Of note is the misrepresentation of ethnicity as the source of the conflict-ridden state of African politics. In some cases ethnicity has been abused to justify regionalism and secessionist politics. Lives have been lost—and marginalization perpetuated at the behest of irrational ethnic essentialism. Against this background, this chapter discusses the relevance of Pan-Africanism in engineering the structural basis for an all-inclusive and participatory social-conscience for inspiring unity, peace and prosperity in Africa. Contrary to the cited perversion of the ethnicity question in Africa, the chapter accentuates ethnicity's crucial role in the matrix of Pan-Africanism. This perspective facilitates the recognition of the heterogeneity derived from the diverse cultural and linguistic aesthetics that ethnicity has to offer. Therefore, this chapter calls for adherence to pragmatic Pan-Africanism as opposed to mere theoretical awareness to the ideology through revisiting the question of ethnicity and situating in the broader context of unity, peace-building and unity in Africa and Zimbabwe in particular.

The conceptual tenets of Pan-Africanism

Pan Africanism defines an epoch of collective resistance to the common enemy—colonialism or 'the problem of colour'. The basis for this resistance was to reverse the repression normalised by Africa's tragic encounter with Europe (Momoh 2003).

There are three aspects we have to focus on when we seek to discuss Pan Africanism, these are ethnicity, nationalism and Pan Africanism itself.

The emergence of Pan Africanism produced a new state of affairs in as far as nationalism is concerned in Africa and its Diaspora. At the dawn of western imperialism, Africans from various tribes and ethnic groups were recruited into the colonial education system as well as into urban areas to serve colonial regimes. Matters of ethnic concerns remained unresolved as what was important was the political ideology of Africanising, decolonising and organising Africans into action groups to which elites from different ethnic groups found themselves in solidarity with each other against western imperialism (Francis 1968).

Against the ruthlessness of Western imperialism, African people under subjugation and identified by race, the idealistic thing for them was to unite. As it were, principles of common cause and solidarity could not be realized unless a reasonably homogenous and culturally integrated society, comprising the whole population or at least a significant proportion of it, provided the ground for the formation of a general will (Francis 1968). Hence, Pan Africanism came in handy. Mazrui (1982) further comments that Modern African nationalism was born and prospered under the stimulation of racial solidarity and shared blackness (Mazrui, 1982:24).

Francis (1968) says ethnicity presupposes common descent largely identified as *ethnie* or *ethnos* and identification with *ethnos* comes essentially from a belief in a common origin as manifested by a variety of symbols such as geographic location, deities and cults; mutually intelligible vernacular languages and by cultural affinities.

It is ethnicity, which Mazrui finds as a threat to Africa's advancement. He declares that the greatest enemy of African nationhood is ethnic-consciousness (Mazrui, 1982:24) largely due to the fact that ethnicity and stratification are fundamental aspects of the social structure in African conditions (Mazrui, 1982:37). One quickly draws examples from problematic spots in Africa; the Tutsi and Hutu saga in Rwanda; unending wars in most parts south of the Sahara in notable countries like Nigeria, Rwanda, Uganda and DRC. *Gukurahundi* dismissed by some as a moment of madness is also a case in point unique to Zimbabwe.

While one may be forced to agree with Mazrui with regard to notable disturbances in Africa in general, in the Zimbabwean context, one vehemently disagrees with Mazrui (1982). As this chapter proves, ethnicity or discourses of its discouragement in favour of pure or hard Pan Africanism create a situation where modern scholars approach Pan Africanism as if trying to re-invent or resuscitate an ideology that

once worked wonders for the continent. Such an approach dis-empowers Pan Africanism when in fact scholars, politicians and activists should be redesigning Pan Africanism to be applicable and responsive to the 21st century African and Zimbabwean realities.

We should not forget that Pan Africanism as an ideology and movement started with the alienated black nationalists, what Mazrui (1982:24) has called transatlantic Pan-Africanism whose leaders are the black American W. E. B. DuBois as well as the Caribbean George Padmore and Marcus Garvey. Momoh (2003:32) hence concludes that Pan-Africanism was an ideology that had a solid intellectual basis. This is why at its origin it was very elitist and idealistic as a social movement. Indeed, one would have expected Pan Africanism to be born from the smaller units of the subcontinent south of the Sahara (Mazrui, 1982:24).

This development hence creates challenges for the ideology and the movement for nations like Zimbabwe as it appears as part of what the country has imported among its cocktail of imported ideologies, policies and so on. Against this background it is therefore submitted here that overreliance on Pan Africanism as a movement of ideas and emotions; ideology and movement from which Zimbabwe can identify with the rest of the continent and further define itself as a sovereign state, could find marginalized ethnic groups in the country such as the Tonga, Nambya, Venda, Sotho, Chewa, Kalanga, Doma to mention a few being sidelined from mainstream national participation and visibility in the name of pure Pan Africanism.

Ethnicity & Nation building in Zimbabwe

In Zimbabwe, forces emanating from concepts of family and obligations presumed to exist from both marriages are very much at play in factors of nation building. It cannot be denied that kinship is part of the social implications of human production and indeed behind human behavior in general. Hence, social and political phenomena conscious of ethnic consciousness cannot be denied to be very much central in the making of Zimbabwe. From upholding and parading totemism, alignment to seemingly common ancestry, Nehanda, Kaguvi, Mzilikazi, Lobengula as paraded in public discourses, (music, literature, education, media etc), public places (buildings, roads) are all symbols of creating and maintaining kinship ranging from concepts of fatherland and mother tongue to phenomena like cultural nationalism (Mazrui, 1982:38).

Dominant ethnic groups in the country Whites, the Shona and Ndebele seemingly create the center with Shona and Ndebele united by Pan Africanism to put in check

the former. The question hence is, for the other marginalized groups, how do they define patriotism and their role in nation building and participation? The history of the liberation struggle clearly puts the Europeans (Rhodesians), the Shona as represented by ZANU PF through ZANLA forces and the Ndebele as represented by ZAPU through its ZIPRA wing. We read today of open complains in cabinet and government appointments, political party appointments and selections, parastatal leadership selections and so on as made along partisan lines. Candidature for political office in parliamentary elections is purely based on ethnicity regardless of the nature of the political party mostly for rural constituencies given that the urban constituent is polarized. Hence, the conclusion by some that it is not about what you have, but whom do you know and whom are you aligned to? One can also further suppose that the current wave of 'factionalism' characterizing the ruling ZANU PF could also have a great deal of partisanship at its center.

We thus have the whole concept of kinship being politicized from the inside given the economic, social benefits and opportunities that come along based on proper alignment to the dominant political order. If Pan Africanism is to work holistically ethnic erosion of some kinship and loyalties aspects should be allowed to erode in favor of modernizing our economy and citizen participation.

Mashiri (2005) narrates how the Chewa have been neglected in the country and how they are looked down upon by their Shona counterparts over the years. Terms like *bwidi*, *bhurandaya*, *machawa*, *mabvakure*, *mateeranjanji*, *vechirudzi* etc (Mashiri 2001) are used to refer to Chewa people whom Mashiri (2005:2) calls Malawian Zimbabweans who over the years have become a legitimate ethnic group in the country. That the new Zimbabwean constitution now recognizes Chewa among the sixteen attests to the Chewa being recognized as Zimbabwean citizens. In popular culture the Chewa are stereotyped and further portrayed as the laughing stock, recently their Shona accent has been popularized by the likes of Macheso, Kapfupi and others in music, drama and mostly street theater. For the Tonga, the *ncelwa* smoking pipe has been used to characterize them as *mbanje/dagga* smokers catapulted by their seemingly condition of red eyes caused by heat in Binga and surrounding areas. The Ndebele continue to air various national concerns over their social and political relevance in the country. The unsolved *Gukurahundi*, and neglect of key development initiatives in their geo-social spaces.

There are a number of questions that we ought to pose to Pan Africanism. These questions are motivated by the understanding that, when Africans have to unite and fight a common enemy as was the case during the liberation struggle; Pan

Africanism came in handy to justify solidarity and provision of support. Assuming attainment of independence and self-rule and in post-independence if an African oppresses another African what does Pan Africanism recommends the oppressed African should do? If an African genuinely criticizes the unruly behaviours of his Kin not based on ethnicity but on Africanness, is Pan Africanism supportive of the criticism; and if the constructive criticism is made but the seemingly African oppressor ruthlessly silences the critic, where is Pan Africanism?

To attempt answers means we should revisit ethnic realities in Zimbabwe. One assumes that through the weaknesses of Pan Africanism the West penetrates and further creates commotion by sponsoring chaos (Tutsi, Hutu scenario), creates opportunities of their philanthropic, charity as well as humanitarian work to make recipients beggars with dependence syndromes. Conclusively, the West is fueled enough to create discourses of Africa being poor, governments being corrupt, undemocratic, greedy, authoritarian, ones that follow no rule of law and so on. Lessing (1992) even warned on visits to Binga because it would break one's heart. She was pointing to the 'underdevelopment' and economic neglect years after independence and decades after their forced displacement to the arid areas in the late 1950s.

To borrow from Mommoh (2003:34) Africa is poor because it is rich and Africa is portrayed as a poor continent so that Africans will continue to be hapless and hopeless about Africa. Hence, Zimbabwe is poor because it is rich and it is portrayed as a poor, corrupt undemocratic country so that Zimbabweans continue to be hapless and hopeless about their country. The result is obvious, desires to emigrate by able bodied and skilled Zimbabweans to other countries mostly the West where they end up becoming victims of immigration laws and consequently subjected to the most bestial and inhuman treatment (Mommoh, 2003:33).

To ignore and fail to redress visibility and participation by marginalized ethnic groups in the mainstream Zimbabwean culture is to make it difficult to argue for a universal Zimbabwean matrix from which we may hope to take the culture history as the bedrock for our identity as a nation. Shakespeare once declared that the world is a stage where everyone plays a part. Indeed, Zimbabwe is a stage where we observe three active characters in history, popular culture etc. these are the Whites, the Shona and the Ndebele.

The history of Zimbabwe as recorded would not have been without colonialism to which the Whites in their minority dominated Africans prompting the Shona, Ndebele, the Tonga and other ethnic groups to respond in the *Chimurengas*!

Umvukhelas. We sadly have no equivalent terms from the Nambya, Tonga, Chewa, the Coloreds etc. who seemingly were victims too of western imperialism. When we approach Pan Africanism, these realities should be reflected by an ideology or movement that seeks to respond to the 21st century Zimbabwean realities without having the dominant groups continuing to justify their dominance even through ideologies supposedly designed to be all encompassing. If this is allowed to continue, Pan Africanism in the country will be spearheaded as a smokescreen behind which the inequalities inherited since the time of colonialism perpetuate themselves.

Wamba dia Wamba (1996:12) claims that the nature of human interdependence has led to new claims of human rights, there have been technical advancement of modern telecommunications and the end of the Cold War, Pan Africanist struggles, cultural and scientific productions all have considerably undermined the race-based global consciousness. Instead, he says, a new global consciousness is on the rise which stands against ethnic discrimination, gender discrimination, and fundamentalism among other things and challenges the building of democratic multiethnic states. Therefore, Pan Africanism in Zimbabwe, if it is to work, must internalize these gains to be able to become a truly emancipatory political and social ideology and movement (Wamba dia Wamba, 1996:15) in the 21st century.

We should also note that ethnicity is not a natural cultural residue but a consciously crafted ideological creation (Welsh, 1996:5). Citing Bayarat (1993:15 in Welsh 1996:479) when Europeans made moves to administer colonial policies, it created rural areas –reserves, where randomly picked Africans or existing chiefs were appointed as leaders of their people with incentives. For this elite group and the ruralised populations, they came,

to think of themselves as belonging to particular ethnic groups ...not because being a member of the group made them feel good, but also because the ethnic apparatus of the rural area the chiefs, traditional courts, petty bourgeois intellectuals, and systematised traditional values of the tribe as embodied in the ethnic ideology all worked to preserve the very substantial interests which these men had in their home areas. Without ethnicity...the migrants would have been less able the control that was necessary for them to ensure continuation of their positions in rural societies (Bayart, 1993:15 in Welsh 1996:480).

Welsh maintains that colonial rule did have a great deal to do with the making of ethnicities and that the contribution of colonial rule to ethnogenesis was direct (Welsh, 1996:481). The Igbo of Nigeria, Kikuyu (Kenya) Ovambo (Namibia),

Shona (Zimbabwe), Xosa (SA) are some examples. Hence, colonialism created ethnic groups for they do not refer to internally monolithic, solitary groupings but broad, fissile categories (Welsh, 1996:481). We could make a reasoned conclusion that ethnic imagined communities in Africa are recent developments, partly produced in the context of colonialism and associated with the rise of individualism, capitalism and the state. But at independence Zimbabwe, like most African nations, inherited these ethnicities and identities and went on further to leave less developed ethnic groups at the time of independence to their demise in history recording, development and general national participation. A visible example is the case of the Tonga people of Zimbabwe as well as the Nambya or Venda to mention a few whose linguistic recognition by the constitution had to come more than three decades after independence.

This explains why Mazrui (1982) finds ethnicity as a threat to Africa's nationalism as the once neglected ethnic groups begin to negotiate for space in the African countries. In Zimbabwe, we are lucky to have ethnic groups that are less or of no militancy in their negotiation for space in the country and it should be commended. Ultimately, however, we intend to achieve collective identity and everything else follows. Collective identity is now a negotiable commodity within which ethnicity can be viewed as a paradigmatic prerequisite for nationhood. We will fail, in my opinion, to achieve meaningful social development in Zimbabwe if certain corners of our society are fundamentally neglected on ethnic basis.

We commend the country however for trying to uphold collective identity through its national rituals. During state sponsored celebrations for instance, people in various areas express their celebrations as how they can be organized locally, ethnically; entertainment purely local although at times the speech is crafted by the head of state and read on his behalf in a language foreign to the ethnic group on assumption that the English language being the official language and the language of government will adequately address everyone yet the elite are the ones who benefit from the speech. BaTonga at one time are said to have expressed disgust at the importation of independence celebrations when they would have preferred their *buntibe* and locally made beer and elephant meat.

Conclusion

Pan Africanism is a very crucial ideological driver for unity in Africa as it traces its significance to broad based resonating perspectives of a shared history and identity. In the case of Zimbabwe, pan-Africanism is an important source of social integration

as it links diverse identities to a common history of liberation and aspirations of unity. In the 21st century where Zimbabweans like most Africans have accepted some western established systems of life and being like the geopolitical boundaries and systems working within them, ethnic fusion is required in the redesigning of Pan Africanism so that it can directly respond to 21st century Zimbabwean realities. Zimbabwe is fortunate to have a generally peaceful people where most ethnic groups are accommodative than militant hence the country, scholars, activists and politicians should utilize this natural advantage to forge a multiethnic approach in all national matters which include visibility and participation on merit than on partisan grounds in order to create an inclusive created identity. Our unity of purpose will increase cooperation and minimize intrusion by forms of western imperial moves thereby defining patriotism.

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UNPACKING THE ROLE OF LITERATURE IN NATION-BUILDING IN ZIMBABWE: 2000-2016

Samukele Hadebe

Introduction

The role of literature in ‘nation-building’ or more aptly in State building in Africa has been assumed as a given. In reality, the very notion of ‘the nation as an imagined community’ is even perceived to be the creative genius of men and women of letters. Writing on the relationship between literature and the nation, Huxley (1959:50) claimed that: ‘nations are to a very large extent invented by their poets and novelists.’ Indeed, writers do ‘play a role that is confirming of the nation as a political or cultural entity, (*emphasizing*) its uniqueness and its right to a state of its own’¹. Understandably, Corse (1997:24) states that ‘national literatures have become essential characteristics of a nation-state’. In addition to the positive potential contribution of literature to the nation, like identity creation, national consciousness, shared memory and loyalty; ‘literature can be used to deconstruct, or even subvert, a national project in favour of an alternative ...’ (Suleiman 2016:2). According to Mangena (2015:6), ‘major Zimbabwean writers write against both colonial oppression and the challenges of the Zimbabwean post-colony.’ That Zimbabwean literature is a site of contest over liberation history, memory, national identity and the post-independence trajectory of the country should not be surprising but expected. Unfortunately, the contestations and accompanying internal contradictions have not been motivated or grounded in Pan Africanism and class consciousness to result in either the reconnecting to the ideals of liberation or a revolution in a Marxist sense. The chapter is divided into three focus areas. The first section unpacks the role of literature and the writers to society; the following sections highlights the aspects of State and or nation-building in Zimbabwe. Last but not least, is the discussion on Zimbabwe post 2000, focussing on the images in literature.

1 Suleiman, Y. and Muhawi, I. (eds.) (2016) *Literature and Nation in the Middle East*

The Significance of the Periodization

In Zimbabwe, the year 2000 or thereabout is associated with progress or decline, depending on which side you are in the polarized national discourse. On the one hand, it relates to the fast track land reform or the ‘*Third Chimurenga*’ and on the other the democratization wave also referred to as “*the second liberation*.” The first group perceived itself as having been patriotic by reclaiming land to the people while *othering* its competitors as typical traitors and local instruments at the service of imperialism. In return the other side perceived itself as human rights defenders championing the cause of democracy that was seen to be under the threat of a violent dictatorship. Also, during this period of extreme dissonance that saw rise of ‘patriotic history’² and its counter discourse³ and counter-discursive texts (Derrida style). Zimbabwe found herself at crossroads with dire consequences for whichever option taken, so we believed.

Role of Literature in Society

It has often been claimed that literature is a mirror of society, however, Marxists have disputed that ‘as a defective theory on the relationship between literature and nation’ (Albrecht 1954). Not only does reflection

deny the multiplicity of meanings ..., but it further denies readers their role as active creators of meaning who can interpret and reinterpret the text concerned⁴. Thus, literature goes beyond a reflection of society but also serves as a corrective mirror in which members of the society can look at themselves and find the need for positive change. In the words of W. H. Hudson, “literature is a vital record of what men (and women) have seen in life, what they have experienced of it, what they have thought and felt about those aspects of it which have the most immediate and enduring interest for all of us.” What is undeniable is that there is ‘a reciprocal relationship between a literary phenomena and social structure’ meaning that the study of literature proves very useful to understanding the socioeconomic situations, political issues, the world view and creativity of the writers.

The Writer’s Responsibility to Society

The possible functions of literature and its relevance to society are better understood in the context of the writer’s responsibility and historical period. However, before understanding the writer’s responsibilities it is essential to understand the identity

2 Terence Ranger (2010) *Constructions of Zimbabwe*

3 Tendai Mangena (2015) *Counter Discourse in Zimbabwe Literature*

4 Suleiman, Y. (2016) *Literature and Nation in Middle East: An Overview*

of the writer. So our question is: Who is the Zimbabwean writer? Is a Zimbabwean writer any traveller who marvels at the beauty of our flora and fauna and writes about it? Is it anyone in Bangladesh or Canada who is fascinated with anything about Zimbabwe and writes on it? Is it anyone born in Zimbabwe or resident in Zimbabwe who writes anything?

While we speculate on who is a Zimbabwean writer, we may also reflect on the perennial language question. Are you a Zimbabwean writer because you write in Shona or Ndebele or English or chiVenda or in Nambya? How is the choice of language playing out in Zimbabwean literature and its impact on nation building? Chiwome and Mguni-Gambahaya (2016) have demonstrated the connectedness between literature in Ndebele and that in Shona. With new status for the other national languages, we hope comparisons would be made with Zimbabwean literature in Tonga, in Kalanga, in Shangani, or in Venda.

These are questions that cannot be answered with simplistic responses. But let us first interrogate the rise of the African writer in general and of the Zimbabwean one in particular. Two major catastrophes in history permanently dented Africa; almost shattering her image to a point of erasing from history. First it was slavery where millions of African men and women were carted to plantations, mines and even bedrooms of white people in the Americas and Europe. Second, it was colonialism which combined political subjugation with cultural obliteration rendering the African a paradox of being a 'present – absent' and an 'absent – present'.

The African writer emerged during the fight against colonialism; belatedly reacting to both slavery and colonialism whose underlying ideology was imperialism anchored in racism. Understandably, 'after four centuries of suffering without a name, the western educated African elites lend their voices to their voiceless forbears'. According to Achebe (1964), the African writer must help restore the dignity and self respect of his people. Thus, the 'injured' Africa was brought to her senses and made aware of their power as 'a people' through the mighty pens of her writers.

Achebe (1964) further encouraged the African writer to play many important roles in his society: '– as a cultural nationalist, as teacher, a social critic, an actor rather than a reactor, and as a literary critic'. The writer had to be 'an involved participant in his society's destiny' and Zimbabwe writers are no exception.

The very first works of literature in Ndebele and Shona, Ndabaningi Sithole's *AmaNdebele kaMzilikazi (Umvukela wamaNdebele)* (1956) Solomon Mutsaers's

Feso (1956) and Peter Mahlangu's *Umthwakazi* (1957) were meant to restore the dignity and respect of Africans as having had history predating colonial contact. These works were about remembering what colonialism had either perverted or sanctioned to be forgotten. These works were in a way combating the colonially imposed absentification of the African in history and culture. Actually, the imagery of Africa as the dark continent; implied a wilderness empty of humans. Zimbabwean writers saw their duty as reclaiming space for Africans who had been emptied from history.

Literature and Nation-Building in Zimbabwe

Literature as Fiction and Non-Fiction

Most often in our schooling system we differentiate works of fiction and those of literary non-fiction, and hence ascribing factuality and truth to the latter. While novels, poetry and drama are said to be fiction and non-factual while history, religious studies, sociology, archaeology, anthropology are thought of as factual since they are non-fiction.

‘Works of literary non-fiction may be defined as those that aspire to be factual and true. Works of fiction are not factual, but they can be true in that they represent a state of affairs that we recognize as potentially, perhaps profoundly, true. On the other hand, a work of fact can distort the truth...’ (John Warnock 1989). The elements of fiction can be found in non-fiction.

For example, the site of contestation in Zimbabwe has not been confined to fiction but in non-fiction work too, the ‘patriotic history’. It is the underlying ideology informing one’s writing that matters regardless of whether the product is referred to as poetry, history or sociology.

For the record, Rhodesian literature aimed at erasing African footprints of civilization was both fictional and non-fictional. The colonial project of re-engineering of the African worldview did not just end in works of fiction but in supposedly objective and scientific studies like archaeology⁵. For example, the arch-imperialist Cecil Rhodes ‘hired Theodore Bent to excavate the ruins and commissioned Arthur Wilmot to search the archives and libraries of Europe for bibliographical proof that Great Zimbabwe’s builders had not originated in Africa’ (Chennels, 2007; Bent, 1893; Wilmot, 1896). African writers in response must harness both fiction and non-fiction too, as cultural tools for emancipation.

5 Hadebe, S. (2014) The Relevance of Producing Patriotic and Indigenous Knowledge Systems

State Building as Nation-Building in Zimbabwe

One of the architects of the unification of Italy in 1860 (Massimo d'Azeglio) famously remarked that:

*"Italy has been made; now it remains to make Italians."*⁶

The expression aptly captures the process of nation-building in the European context then, but can that be applicable to Zimbabwe or any African country? More often writers claim to write about nation-building, but in fact their emphasis is really on state-building⁷. In "nation-building" the process leads to the formation of countries in which the citizens feel a sufficient amount of commonality of interests, goals and preferences so that they do not wish to separate from each other⁸, whereas, in State-building focus is on strengthening the capacity of State institutions. The Zimbabwean situation is more of State-building than nation-building, although there are intersecting aspects.

For the record, State & Nation-building in Zimbabwe cannot be said to be different from that of any African country. Unfortunately, that is the case, not out of Zimbabwe's choice but the choice and wisdom or lack of it of the founding fathers of African liberation in the 50s and 60s. Africans leaders then made a choice between the Casablanca and Monrovia group options. The Casablanca block led by Ghana under Kwame Nkrumah wanted immediate formation of the United States of Africa, while Monrovia group led by Nigeria opted for a gradual approach (Adejumobi & Olukoshi 2008:3-190). Actually, Pan-Africanism lost to the illusory nationalism with its narrow claims to sovereignty within colonially crafted boundaries.

It is with that background that one should understand the Pan Africanist strategy of African liberation to reclaim African heritage and history for use by Africans. It is no accident then that when nationalists decided on an appropriate name for the liberated country, the name Zimbabwe was most attractive and inspiring. That was inspired by the all-embracing Pan African ideals as opposed to narrow and often chauvinistic interpretations of ethnic nationalism which reduces it to a successor to a pre-colonial empire [see Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013:189; Mudege 1988].

Pan Africanism was alive to the risks ahead after independence, for example Amilcar Cabral (1969:75) became worried about the ideological deficiency of the

6 Alberto Alesina & Bryony Reich (2016:2) Nationbuilding

7 Steven Van de Walle and Zoë Scott (2009) The Role of Public Services in State- And Nation-Building: Exploring Lessons from European History for Fragile States

8 Alberto Alesina & Bryony Reich (2016) Nationbuilding

decolonization movements. Ideally, African liberation was expected to destroy the colonial state and culminate in the creation of a new dispensation of freedom, equality and justice [Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013:169] and had to struggle to transcend racism and tribalism the hallmarks of colonial ideology in Africa.

Most often Zimbabweans forget that the Empire prepared for the decolonization process, of course under duress. As noted by David Lamb (1983:9); 'The manner in which colonial administration governed virtually ensured the failure of Africa's transition into independence. Their practice of divide and rule – favouring some tribes to the exclusion of others – served to accentuate the ethnic divisiveness that had been pulling Africa in different directions for centuries.' The tribal identity and its romanticized memory, which Africans sometimes take pride in, were in fact created and conditioned by the colonial mindset. The grip of tribalism and its sexism threaten the stability of the fragile African nation-states.

The Nation State therefore attempts to be 'the confluence of the nation and the state'. The ideal nation-state is one nation with a common history, common culture and common language. Does Zimbabwe or any African country fit in this nation-state model? Therefore, nation-building constitutes contradictions associated with identity issues and coercing citizens to submit to a State more often captured by elites.

The Significance of the Period from 2000 in Zimbabwe

As already alluded to, the period from 2000 has been described differently by various people. What is therefore notable is the consensus at least on two things, firstly, that 2000 was a turning point in Zimbabwe and secondly, the irreversibility of the land reforms.

In my considered view, what came to be known as the Zimbabwe crises was in fact typical experiences of neo-colonial nation-state. Perhaps, the difference was that Zimbabwe received exaggerated international media coverage. That attention was absent during the conflict immediately after Independence, perhaps civil society actors then, especially labour and the church were still under the grip of Independence euphoria.

The Rise of Patriotic Writing

Commenting on the '*Third Chimurenga*' and the genesis of what he termed 'patriotic history,' Ranger wrote that:

There is a public history in Zimbabwe that is still insistently propagated on state-

controlled television, radio and in the state-controlled daily and Sunday press. This version of the country's past – now generally described as 'patriotic history' – assumes the immanence of a Zimbabwean nation expressed through centuries of Shona resistance to external intrusion; embodied in successive 'empires'; incarnated through the great spirit mediums in the first Chimurenga of 1896–7; and re-incarnated by means of the alliance between mediums and ZANLA guerrillas in the second Chimurenga of the liberation war (Ranger 2010:505).

Proponents of patriotic writing may have different explanations on the advent of this public history. Ranger (2010:505) further states that, 'Patriotic history, then, is broadcast and enacted. But it is not embodied in a book. It has to be lived, not read. There is no published patriotic history text.' According to Muponde and Primorac (2005:pxii), 'through a series of omissions the patriotic historiography builds and departs from the previous nationalist discourses.' They furthermore accuse it for excluding some significant events of the first decade of independence.

What is not doubted is that the Zimbabwean State was under siege politically and economically from both internal and external factors, a situation that left most of those obliged to defend the status quo to believe that its very existence was under threat. Whether the threat was real or imagined, efforts were made to win hearts locally and sympathisers abroad while deflecting counter narratives to the official line. The intensification of patriotic writing was in that sense a response to perceived threat to Zimbabwe's sovereignty. Many writers contend that the relation between Africa and the West is that of imperialism, and as such, it is a relationship where one society dominates the other. Its mechanism is essentially exploitation and also penetration, fragmentation, and marginalization. Literature is awash with themes depicting this exploitation, penetration, fragmentation and the resultant despair.

The Post 2000 Themes and Other Narratives

It would not be entirely correct to say new themes have emerged or are discernible since 2000. Perhaps it is still too early to say. What seems to have happened are instances of increased focus on specific issues; namely, the issue of national identity and belonging, violence and suffering, land and economic inequalities, gender inequalities and women oppression, etc. Notably, narratives to either counter or correct the patriotic history have equally proliferated. Historians in particular have contributed profusely to this debate. Some notable publications include, *Becoming Zimbabwe: A History From the Pre-Colonial Period to 2008* by Mlambo & Raftopoulos (2009) and *Do 'Zimbabweans' Exist? Trajectories of Nationalism,*

National Identity Formation and Crisis in a Postcolonial State, by Sabelo Gatsheni Ndlovu (2009). In the response, Ranger claims that these works restore excluded actors from the patriotic narrative.

On the fiction side, Tendai Mangena (2015) writes of 'Democrat writers' who began to challenge nationalists' glorified narrations of especially the liberation struggle, citing inadequacies and biases. He talks of feminist writers revise the 'revised-nationalist' discourse on the liberation struggle. According to Mangena (2016) 'Vera in *Without a Name* rewrites land politics in the context of the liberation and demonstrates that women cannot understand land just as a cultural artefact that blacks should fight to repossess. Yvonne Vera demonstrates this through Mazvita who is critical of Nyenyedzi's unquestioned attachment to land. Mazvita's position is influenced by a personal sexual violation where the land is an accomplice'

Of note, the writers post 2000 explore sensitive topics like Gukurahundi, for example, Mlalazi's *Running with Mother* (2012) and Murambatsvina, like Kilgore's *We are Now Zimbabweans* (2009). Similarly, in *The Stone Virgins* (2002) or its translated version *Intombi Zamatshe Ezimsulwa*, Vera refuses to be silenced on the emotive theme of Gukurahundi. Jonathan Maphenduka (2015) *The Rule by Conquest: The Struggle in Mthwakazi*, raises very important questions for nation building but the writer is very angry; perhaps too angry to even care about the implications of his intended message.

The Murambatsvina operation has permeated both fiction and non-fiction alike. In Tagwira's book, *Uncertainty of Hope* the character Onai's victim status emanates from her poverty, being a street vendor and a woman. Like all other vendors, Onai is a victim of Murambatsvina state violence. As a wife she is also a victim of her husband's abuse (T. Mangena 2015:8). These are writers who no longer conform to tradition or official line in their artistic expressions. They subvert and shock the status quo.

While the biography as a genre in Zimbabwe predates 2000, it has interesting developments as it has furthered the plural narratives of not only the post 2000 period but the liberation memory as well. Recently, the media was the arena of heated arguments deriving from David Coltart (2016) biography, *The Struggle Continues: 50 Years of Tyranny in Zimbabwe*. Coltart's book came before controversies had ebbed from an earlier biography by the late Cephass Msipha (2015) *In Pursuit of freedom and Justice, A Memoir*. Other biographical works of the period of focus include; *Tsvangirai: At the Deep End*, Edgar Tekere, *A Lifetime of Struggle* (2007), Bhebe (2004), *Simon Vengayi Muzenda & the struggle for and*

Liberation of Zimbabwe, Fay Chung, *Re-living the Second Chimurenga: Memories from Zimbabwe's Liberation Struggle*.

A more interesting development within the political biographical works on Zimbabwe are the portrayals of President Mugabe. In 2002, David Blair's *Degrees in Violence: Robert Mugabe and the struggle for Power in Zimbabwe*, Martin Meredith, (2007) *Robert Mugabe: Power, Plunder and the Struggle for Zimbabwe*, Peter Godwin (2010) *The Fear: The Last Days of Robert Mugabe*, Heide Holland (2008) *Dinner with Mugabe: The untold story of a freedom fighter who became a tyrant*, and Paul Moorcraft (2012) *Mugabe's War Machine*, and many more others.

The interest in President Mugabe in literature has even permeated into the realm of literary criticism. In a review to the Mugabe biographies Eliakim Sibanda (2016) asks: 'If Postcolonial Zimbabwe is imbricated in Mugabe's life as leader what does that say about the utility of biography method of research? Is biography a useful method in understanding broader trends?'⁹ He goes on to illustrate the limitations of biography and how at certain times it was even banished academically. However, in Zimbabwe, political biography as a genre seems to be on the ascendancy.

Implications for Literature and the Nation-State of Zimbabwe

What could be the implications for Zimbabwe, especially post 2000? The question brings forth the issue of the writers' commitment and responsibility to society. The Zimbabwean writer cannot afford to be neutral or indifferent in the face of this contestation over issues of national identity and the country's future trajectory. The writer cannot be blind to economic inequalities. Neither can writers afford to pay lip service to gender oppression and the feminization of poverty and HIV/AIDS. Above all, Zimbabwean writers must not give up nor betray their liberating role and anti-imperialist struggle. Neo-colonialism, inequality, disease, ignorance, division and poverty have not yet been defeated and these are still the greatest threats to Africa in general and Zimbabwe in particular.

Conclusion

In conclusion, there is a nexus between literature and nation in Zimbabwe. Literature continues to be the cultural binding force¹⁰, it arouses and sustains patriotism and is even a necessary tool in times of crisis to offer moral guidance. Literature between 2000 and 2016 has reflected the deep polarization among the elite, especially writers as cultural nationalists. It is perhaps too early to say which

9 Sibanda E. (2016) Mugabe: Snakes and Ladders

10 U Tin Htway, (1998) The Role of literature in nation building

side between those for the status quo and those against could be state building. However, the bigger struggle today is that of trying to revive revolutionary and liberatory politics and to originate a new language that resonate with the present generation and capture the future so as to restore lost human certainty (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013]. The Zimbabwean writer needs to reconnect with the historic destiny of ordinary masses if she is to fulfil her mandate. The writer as a cultural nationalist and a political activist but not a politician or in pursuit of a partisan agenda should speak truth to power without fear or favour.

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THE PAST AND LEGITIMACY IN ZIMBABWE'S POLITICS: REFLECTIONS ON PATRIOTIC HISTORY.

Mediel Hove & Enock Ndawana.

Introduction

The making of history in any given context sustains the teaching and dissemination of narratives framed in favour of the interests of the political elite class. History can be used for public discursive orientation to the values of those in power. In the same vein, monolithic and alternative narratives of the past support the propagation of communal or contested emotions and attitudes of a particular polity. Exploiting the patriotic history perspective by Terence Ranger (2004), this chapter analyses how Zimbabwe's ruling Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) has valorised the past to motion a vigorous production of historiographies, collective memories and public narratives including visual representations perceived as 'national history'. In Zimbabwe, the past has been exploited a resource for ruling party to assert legitimacy, as well as grounding the nationalist ideology as a universal benchmark of framing the country's political culture. In the process, this has been used to extricate the discourse of 'democracy and human rights' which emerged as a counter narrative to the fast-track land reform sponsored rhetoric propagated through various national memory repositories owned and managed by the state. The chapter posits that this approach offered a narrow, divisive and retrogressive approach to nation-building; particularly the principal edits of reconciliation which ushered the country into independence in 1980. On the other hand, this gave birth to reactionary narratives which largely focused on disseminating alternative truths to the mainstream representations of the past to sustain the legitimacy of the ruling. The alternative to the state sponsored perspective also had a strong grounding in articulating the disfigured state of affairs from a contemporary spectrum so as to denigrate the relevance of the past as a source of political legitimacy. The major foregrounding of this chapter is that the past (herein referred to as patriotic history) has been crucial in sustaining the ruling party's legitimacy. In this regard, the

chapter discusses the various strategies employed by ZANU-PF through history to sustain its public popularity through history. This position is deliberately engaged to substantiate the significance of history (not only as a post-colonial African political phenomenon) for harnessing political power. In the same manner, the chapter substantiates that history is a significant tool for political relevance in African politics, thus validating the need for investing in archiving all political experiences by political actors as a way of gaining sustainable consolidation of power.

Understanding Patriotic History

Patriotic history derives from Ranger (2004)'s definition of Zimbabwe's state orchestrated dissemination of selective narratives bent on asserting the supremacy of the ruling party under the rule of Robert Mugabe. Ranger situates the emergence of patriotic history in the beginning of the millennium as a strategy deployed to manufacture appeal and relevance for ZANU-PF whose legitimacy could be mainly harnessed from the party's nationalist milestones as the country's liberation movement. ZANU-PF's turn to the past was catalysed by the prominence of the neo-liberal regime-change plot bent on facilitating an end to ZANU-PF's hold onto power. During this period under study, opposition politics gained prominence under the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) following the nationwide spread of the land grabbing by peasant rural communities with the help of the country's war veterans. Therefore, ZANU-PF and MDC's fractious discord between nationalist justifications and neo-liberal contestations of the land reform raised the need for ZANU-PF to turn to its liberation legacy anchored legitimacy to justify its stay in power. This turn to the past in explaining state policies constitutes what Ranger (2004) defines as patriotic history –which forms the lenses of analysis for this chapter.

Patriotic history was established to proclaim the continuity of the Zimbabwean revolutionary tradition which was being challenged by trade-union and civil society narratives aimed lobbying regime change. Patriotic history was created to orient the youths to be vanguards of the country's revolutionary past. The logic for targeting the youth was to ensure that they become correctional points of reference to win their parents and teachers to the liberation revolutionary values which they had long abandoned (Ranger 2004). Through the advent of patriotic history, the aspects and events not serving the agenda of ZANU PF were downplayed and misrepresented (Tendi 2010). Therefore, patriotic history in Zimbabwe is a 'coherent but complex doctrine':

...propagated at many levels - on television and in the state-controlled press; in youth militia camps; in new school history courses and textbooks; in books written by cabinet ministers; in speeches by Robert Mugabe and in philosophical eulogies and glosses of those speeches by Zimbabwe's media... (Ranger 2004: 215)

The concept of patriotic history originates from "nationalist historiography" which is history for serving the purposes of nationalism, celebrating aspiration, modernisation and resistance, but it is narrower than it as it largely views 'as irrelevant any history that is not political' and is opposed to academic historiography (Ranger 2004: 218).

Moreover, Tendi (2009) noted that patriotic history focused on four themes namely "...land; no external interference based on 'Western ideals' such as human rights; race; and a 'patriots' versus 'sell-outs' distinction" all related to themes in the speeches and writings made by Mugabe. This is revealed in Mugabe's *Inside the Third Chimurenga* (2001) which portrays ZANU PF as the sole custodian of Zimbabwe's past, present and future. It serves and supports the nationalist status quo. Ranger (2004) adamantly asserts that ZANU PF started repackaging history in 2000 due to the declining electoral support which the party experienced due to socio-economic decline; as well as the growing centrality of a hegemonic political culture in the Zimbabwean political landscape (Tendi 2010).

Apparently, ZANU PF used history particularly the liberation war history of the country in a monolithic way aimed at maintaining state power and monopoly over state politics and defining patriots and heroes. The liberation war history was used for the purposes of legitimating ZANU PF's continued hold on power (Krieger 2003)

It should be noted that contestations of the state's monopoly of history as alternative perspectives of the liberation struggle have been published a patriotic history of the state. Among these alternative texts is a publication by the Zimbabwe Women Writers in 2000 titled: *Women of Resilience: the Voices of Women ex-combatants*. This book revitalizes gender as a political resource in contesting historical tyranny and configuring differently political and historical discussion. Added to the list of the historical accounts that seek to erase the singular and monolithic explanation of the liberation war history sponsored by the state include but not limited to: *Pawns* (1992) a novel by Samupindi, *Echoing silences* (1997) a novel by Kanengoni, *Zimbabwe: Struggles Within the Struggle* (1999) by Sithole, *For better or worse? Women and ZANLA in Zimbabwe's liberation struggle* (2000)

by Nhongo-Simbanegavi, *Guns and Guerrilla girls: Women in the Zimbabwean liberation struggle* (2004) by Lyons, *Re-living the second Chimurenga: Memories from Zimbabwe's liberation struggle* (2006) by Chung, *A lifetime of struggle* (2007) by Tekere and Mhanda's *Dzino: memories of a Freedom Fighter* (2011). These narratives largely undermine the authoritarian nationalist state sponsored history discourse by exposing the nationalist history's ugly side. The alternative to patriotic history portray nationalism as an accomplice in the removal of womanhood, exploitation and elimination of perceived competitors within the nationalist movement and other ill-represented categories in the state sponsored histories. This sect of scholars further divulge that the guerrillas used force during recruitment as well as war operations contrary to state-sponsored narratives which argue that they used persuasion (Krieger 1992; Zimbabwe Women Writers 2001). Among other works, this literature focuses on the shortcomings of ZANU PF's tactic of blaming race and outsiders, and perceiving all the violence during the liberation war as perpetrated by the Rhodesian soldiers yet the violence committed by the nationalist armies to the masses is deliberately omitted. These narratives are critical because they are more inward looking, demeaning ZANU PF's popularized notions of viewing the perceived enemies of the state as anyone outside the party and the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and the West (Muwati, Mheta and Gambahaya 2010). The counter-narratives to patriotic history although existing in books cannot make a huge impact given that television, radio and the press are more influential in the country (Ranger 2004).

Typifying patriotic history was bemoaned by Morgan Tsvangirai in 1997 when he expressed:

...the need for a 'more open and critical process of writing history in Zimbabwe' and to 'remind the victors in the political arena that the struggle for independence was a broad, uneven process, with many unsung heroes and unintended effects.' Moreover, he advised that the 'history of a nation-in-the-making should not be reduced to a selective heroic tradition, but should be a tolerant and continuing process of questioning and re-examination' (Raftopoulos and Mlambo 2009: xxx).

Apparently, the above citation demonstrates that state sponsored history in Zimbabwe took multiple forms to the extent where the state in the hands of ZANU PF monopolised the views of the past and the present for the purposes of maintaining state power. To this end, Chirimambowa (2008) asserts that Zimbabwe is a fine case in point of a regime trying to find a way out to divert attention from

its malfunctioning by reiterating anti-imperialist oratory.

Invention of heroism and patriotism

As one of its tactics, ZANU PF since independence in 1980 vigorously monopolized state politics and defined heroism and patriotism in its own terms. Terms such as 'enemies of the people', 'puppets of the West' and 'saboteurs' were used against anyone who attempted to contest the ZANU PF's (nationalist party) monopoly over the liberation war's history and state power (Muwati, Mheta and Gambahaya 2010). All opposition parties (including ZAPU before its absorption into ZANU PF in 1987, the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) and the MDC since 1999 and its various formations since 2005 but with special reference to the formation led by Morgan Tsvangirai which had strongly challenged ZANU PF monopoly over the nation and its history) were portrayed as lacking history and aimed at reversing history (Muwati, Mheta and Gambahaya 2010: 171). Added to this, all Zimbabweans perceived as ZANU PF's opponents were classified as 'pro-colonial', 'puppets', 'un-African' and 'sell-outs' and 'patriots' were only those who supported ZANU PF (Tendi 2009). This categorization was used by ZANU PF to justify its racist attacks on whites. This was in sharp contrast to Mugabe's 1980s proclamation of reconciliation between erstwhile enemies black versus white people which ended in 2000 as opposed to black versus black reconciliation which saw the emergence of the Matabeleland disturbances (Gukurahundi) which was just blamed on the newly independent state (Muchemwa, Ngwerume and Hove 2013; Kilgore 2011).

The sell-out and patriot distinction is believed to have its roots in the late 1950s urban politics. It was constantly used since the beginning of nationalist politics and the sell-out tag changed over time. During the liberation war, a sell-out referred to any informant of the colonial Rhodesian government and a supporter of a competitor nationalist party. After 2000, opposing land seizures, valuing civil and political rights over economic rights and abandoning ZANU PF's central role during the liberation struggle meant one was a sell-out (Tendi 2009). Thus, the major 'legitimate' targets of violence were the MDC and civil society institutions (Tendi 2010, Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2008).

This focus on the past was marked by a shift from national development to emphasis on nationalist revolution, evidently dealt with through increasingly intensifying dictatorship (Hammer and Raftopoulos 2003: 38-39). It involved the reconfiguration of race narrowing the principles of inclusion in relation to national belonging, access to land, security and citizenship. People in towns were viewed as

‘unrooted’, ‘totemless’ and unpatriotic in press articles. Despite a huge role trade unionism played in Zimbabwean nationalism, it did not find any space in patriotic history since independence. The situation was even worsened by the rise of the MDC from the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions and the opposition gained a lot of support from urban dwellers (Ranger 2004: 233-234). Castigating those who opposed ZANU PF’s Operation Murambatsvina one of its supporters the then strongman Didymus Mutasa said that the country was better off with only six million people who support the liberation struggle (Bracking 2005) in pursuit of patriotic history. The Operation was justified in the media on the basis that it was designed to clean up Zimbabwean towns of thieves and troublesome poor people. Justification was also drawn from the British where the UK ordered the demolition of 400 000 illegal houses in the UK Midlands and North to give the country a new outlook (Bracking 2005). However, in Zimbabwe, Operation Garikai (designed to house victims of operation Murambatsvina) instead of benefiting the displaced people benefited civil servants and the politically connected (Ploch 2009: 21). Again, even black capitalists (including Strive Masiyiwa) entrepreneurs without any party connections were viewed as linked to white and imperialist interests and therefore sell-outs (Bracking 2005).

In addition, real and perceived non-ZANU PF sympathizers in urban areas and descendants of Africans from Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique were categorized as non-citizens because they supported (or were perceived to support) the MDC. In ZANU PF’s view, legitimate citizens were only those who were loyal to the liberation tenets as articulated in the party’s perspective (Nyamunda 2014).

More so, even academics (not excluding Kriger) and other writers critical of the government or the violent and reactionary tendencies within ZANU PF during the liberation struggle and in post-independence Zimbabwe were dismissed by ‘progressive’ scholars in Zimbabwe as sellouts. Kriger was castigated as a ‘White South African reactionary’ and ‘sellout’ bent on betraying the revolution following her 1992 publication which argued guerrillas used coercion and violence to recruit peasants (Robins 1996). Many patriotic texts prior to her publication had emphasized that peasants participated voluntarily during the liberation war as they were radically conscious (Ranger 1985; Lan 1985). However, Robins (1996: 75-76) differs from these scholars and Kriger (1992) too arguing that the local people’s responses to the guerrillas varied over time and place, and concludes that the local villagers had complex, contradictory and ambiguous relationships with the guerrillas. This is because the villagers deployed various survival tactics in their

encounter with different dangerous and violent outsiders namely the Rhodesian Security Forces, the two guerrilla armies and their youthful 'messengers' (the mujibas).

The patriot versus sell-out distinction shifted with time. This is because patriots at one point are re-branded as sell-outs and vice versa as in the case of the 2004 ZANU PF defectors who include Jonathan Moyo and Emmerson Mnangagwa among others who were labeled sell-outs and just suffered misfortune materially or financially and not physical assault (Tendi 2010). The late Retired General Solomon Mujuru was also labeled 'sell-out' and 'counter-revolutionary' following his call for new leadership in the party hence patriotic history was used as an instrument to forbid alternative point of views (Tendi 2010: 10). Those who appeared victors and patriots during the 2004 debacle in ZANU PF (including the former Vice President Joice Mujuru and Didymus Mutasa among others) were attacked as sell-outs since December 2014 for harbouring interests to succeed the position of presidency (Chidza 2015; Sunday Mail Reporter 2015).

In addition, the same media has also been used to reverse and denigrate the former Vice President Joice Mujuru's known role during the liberation war. Her known heroic exploits during the liberation war (the shooting down of a Rhodesian Air Force plane) was rubbished as a propaganda creation by Webster Shamu (Gumbo 2014; Mbiba 2014; Mutizwa 2014). Moreover, supporters of the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) in 1999 following its success in campaigning for the rejection of the government sponsored Constitutional Commission were labeled 'puppets' of the West (Tendi 2010: 5). Again, during the tenure of the Government of National Unity (GNU), the MDC factions and their supporters were condemned as sell outs (Tendi 2010: 10).

Eulogizing the role of ZANU and Robert Mugabe and denigrating the role of ZAPU and its leader Joshua Nkomo

As one of its tactics the government of Zimbabwe sponsored the writing of history which culminated in patriotic history. It promoted the role of ZANU and its military wing the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army's (ZANLA) whilst downplaying the role of Joshua Nkomo and ZAPU plus its military wing the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZPRA). This is clearly revealed in the foreword written by Robert Mugabe in Martin and Johnson's (1981) book titled, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe: The Chimurenga war* where the ZANU PF leader writes contemptuously about the contributions of ZAPU and its military wing to

Zimbabwe's war of liberation. He noted that:

In writing the history of this struggle, the authors are compelled by historical reality to trace the revolutionary process through ZANU's history. This is unavoidable because the armed struggle pace of the revolution was set by ZANU and ZANLA, while credit must be given where it is merited to ZAPU for their complementary role (Martin and Johnson 1981: v).

The above citation illustrates beyond doubt the form and extent to which the state saw the importance of state sponsored history where ZANU and ZANLA attempted to glorify its role at the expense of that played by ZAPU and ZIPRA which made huge contributions to the liberation of the country (Bhebe and Ranger 1995; Dabengwa 1995). Possibly, as in many cases and has been the case with ZANU PF, history has been used to discredit ZAPU given that a fearsome civil war ensued between the former ZANLA and ZIPRA guerrilla forces between 1982 and 1987 culminating in the death of over 20 000 people (CCJPZ 1997: 18). In fact, between 1980 and 1987 Nkomo was portrayed by the Mugabe-led government as 'Father of Dissidents' and enemy of Zimbabwe. the rivalry between ZANU and ZAPU dates back to the liberation struggle when ZANU discredited ZAPU and its leader Nkomo as indecisive, inconsistent and cowards unwilling to embrace confrontational politics hence were 'stooges, sell-outs, dissidents and counter-revolutionaries' (Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Willems 2010: 196). To this end, Robins (1996) correctly observes that the official and academic silence on these atrocities (the Gukuruhundi) was equally devastating and disturbing respectively. The academic silence started breaking in the early 1990s with Werbner's (1991) and Ranger's (1992) works.

Apparently, the state led by ZANU PF and Mugabe wanted to create an image of themselves as the major contributors to the country's independence in historical narratives. Among such textbooks include the book written by Seidman, Martin and Johnson in 1982 titled: *Zimbabwe: A New History: History for Upper Primary School* which like many such official textbooks focuses on the triumphant and heroic liberation narrative that resulted in ZANU's victory. Consequently, the state to further entrench the cause of patriotic history incorporated influential academic narratives of the guerrilla war including the works by Ranger (1985) and Martin and Johnson (1981) incorporating them into a mythology of nation-building by way of the privileged role these works assign to ZANU during the war of liberation. In these accounts, the guerrilla violence is presented in a sanitized manner as heroic acts of resistance with omitted references to the torture and killing of suspected

'witches' and 'sell-outs' (Robins 1996: 74). These works (together with Lan's (1985) work), present a celebratory African nationalist history with Martin and Johnson's (1985) publication being incorporated into school textbooks as it is an unmistakably heroic account (Robins 1996). The authors of these texts were dubbed 'commissar' intellectuals as they reduced nationalism to the liberation struggle only (Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Willems 2010: 192) although some later on changed their praise for the nationalist cause including Ranger.

ZANU PF and Mugabe found these 'praise' texts handy when they faced the MDC as an opposition political party. This was consistent with the often used slogan by ZANU PF that 'Zimbabwe will never be a colony again' leading to the election campaigns in the 2000s. Mugabe largely campaigned against the British Prime Minister at the time, Tony Blair instead of Tsvangirai, his rival (Ranger 2002: 3).

Furthermore, Kaarsholm (1991) states that the colonial era defined ethnicities persisted to shape the writing of history after independence because research from Mashonaland provinces dominated publications on colonial and liberation war history and the political traditions flowing from them ignoring Matabeleland and Bulawayo. To worsen matters, ZAPU archives and ZIPRA papers were seized and not returned by the government during the course of the Gukurahundi making research about it difficult. Additionally, the one-sidedness of state sponsored history production was made possible by the results of the Oral History Project of the National Archives of Zimbabwe rooted in the colonial era work of the Native Affairs Department. The project in post-independence Zimbabwe had an English, Shona and Ndebele language section and was prioritized since independence to collect wartime experiences of various groups of the population. However, the Shona section dominated as very few interviews were done in Matabeleland and this meant the war memories of the people from this part of the country were not captured when they were still fresh (Kaarsholm 1991).

It is important to point out that former ZIPRA cadres including those who had the privilege to serve in the ZANU PF government after the Unity Accord in 1987 like Dumiso Dabengwa actually bemoan the lack of truth in Zimbabwe's liberation war history and post-independence developments because only half truths are being told for the purposes of patriotic history. He noted:

For too long historians have failed our people because of their timidity, sectarianism and outright opportunism. Conditions should be created in Zimbabwe wherein a new breed of social scientist... can emerge. This class of scholars should be capable of withstanding threats and intimidation and will rise above those racial, ethnic

and tribal considerations [and] oppose the suppression of any information . . . A complete history of the struggle for national liberation is a long way from being produced and will only be achieved when the chroniclers of the struggle are no longer afraid to confront the truth head-on and openly, and have rid themselves of biases resulting from our recent political past — a past which saw the brutal killings of innocent people in the name of unity, peace, stability and progress. Unless our scholars can rise above the fear of being isolated and even victimized for telling the truth we shall continue to be told half-truths, or outright lies which will not help unite our nation . . . Anything short of a tradition of selfless inquiry and exposure of the truth will certainly lead to a nation of sycophants and robots who do not possess the power of independent thought which we should all cherish . . . (Dabengwa 1995: 24).

The above citation importantly exposes some of the effects of patriotic history because nation building will not happen in a country without unity resulting from the lack of truth about its past.

The teaching of the past in the classroom

History is a discipline extremely susceptible to the cause of nation building and political elite interests (Ndlovu 2009). Hence history is prone to manipulation in hegemonic projects by political regimes. Accordingly, between 1980 and 1990 the secondary schools retained the pre-1980 Rhodesian syllabus used since the 1970s with few books focusing on Africa recommended (Barnes 2004). Consequently, Western politics and culture were lauded to the disadvantage of African politics and culture. The year 1982 saw the release of the African Heritage book series exclusively for all Zimbabwean secondary schools written by leading historians like Henry Moyana and Misheck Sibanda. Whilst departing from the Rhodesian history, Kaarsholm (1991: 167) notes that history taught in secondary schools advanced Shona nationalism as opposed to being central in promoting inclusive national unity. Consequently, history teaching during the first decade of independence failed to be of assistance in encouraging reconciliation and nation-building because the “ethnic” rivalry sowed by the colonial governments was consolidated instead of reversing and vehemently critiquing it.

Starting in 1991 and ending in 2002, the government introduced a nationalist syllabus. The syllabus did not critically interrogate race relations although it got rid of the racism of the Rhodesian curriculum. Accordingly, the new history of Zimbabwe was told in a racially polarizing account, filled with authoritative notions

of ethnic inclusion and racial exclusion. However, the nationalist syllabus was credited for its promotion of diverse history teaching methodology "...involving problem-posing, problem-solving, role play, written exercises and discussions..." and by encouraging critical thinking it was an antithesis to the Rhodesian syllabus which emphasised rote-learning (Barnes 2004). According to Moyo (2014), the nationalist syllabus was intended to be in line with the replacement of capitalism with socialism as per state ideology hence the state's attempt to promote it in writing, language and teaching of history uncritically celebrating the history of the nation.

Race or racism is not discussed as separate historical topics in any of the books and the terms 'white', 'European' and 'settler' are synonymously used with each other the same way as were the terms 'people' and 'African'. Apparently, the nationalist syllabus failed to promote racial harmony and understanding and despite the recommended books' repealing of colonial representation of the ruthless Ndebele victimizing the Shona, the syllabus and the texts did not address the Gukurahundi and its socio-economic and justice problems (Tendi 2009). Overall, the nationalist syllabus and the texts published in its support failed to do much to promote national healing, reconciliation and justice.

The period after 2002 experienced the radical modification of the nationalist syllabus that glorified ZANU PF and requested students and teachers to have pride in ZANU's role during the war of liberation. Among the historians who put great deal of effort in championing patriotic history's cause include minister Aeneas Chigwedere in Mugabe's government. Whilst Chigwedere authored many books on pre-colonial Zimbabwe, it was those which he wrote contributing to the present debate particularly his 2001 publication entitled: *British Betrayal of the Africans. Land, Cattle and Human Rights: Case for Zimbabwe* that he largely contributed to the cause of patriotic history as much as he could assisted by his position as Minister of Education, Sport, Arts and Culture. In his 2001 publication, Chigwedere strongly divulged that Britain was primarily responsible for the alienation of African land effectively using the 1919 Privy Council decision that all the land in Rhodesia was owned by the Crown revealing the trickery and violence of the British. According to Ranger (2004: 225), the Herald after seeing the book for the first time in June 2003 commended it as a marvelous book designed to give readers the 'true history of Zimbabwe highlighting the real facts as done by the British imperialists' and concluded that the book was an asset for all Zimbabweans including future generations.

In pursuit of patriotic history and nothing else, the syllabus that was introduced since 2002 among other weaknesses:

...was a hurriedly produced and less comparative Zimbabwe-focused syllabus that the ZANU PF government did not put up for debate or assessment by history experts and teachers. In addition to being less comparative than its nationalist predecessor, the Patriotic syllabus did not prioritise the testing of students' ability to interpret and critically evaluate history but sought to engender learning by rote instead, which was a step back to the old teaching methods of the Rhodesian syllabus. Furthermore, 'recent ['O' level] examination questions included questions about the farm invasions and the so-called 'hondo yeminda' or 'fast-track land reform', referring to them in an approving way' (Tendi 2009).

Sharing the same sentiments, Moyo (2014: 13) notes that the objectives of the patriotic syllabus after 2002: "...privileges simple recall and comprehension skills and eschews the higher order skills of analysis, evaluation and synthesis that are central to an understanding of history as contested and contestable". However, Moyo (2014: 11-12) citing the example of Ukraine asserts that the (mis) uses of the history curricula is not peculiar to Zimbabwe but signifies the instrumentalisation of school history prevalent worldwide. Be that as it may, tolerance, reconciliation, justice, national healing and nation building are hard to come by in the absence of the knowledge about human rights among other pertinent issues at secondary schools in Zimbabwe and beyond.

Iconising Nationalists in Service of Patriotic History

The success of patriotic history was also catalysed through memorial reconstruction of heroes of Zimbabwe's war of independence. These heroic figures include Hebert Chitepo, Joshua Nkomo and Josiah Magama Tongogara. Their contribution to the country's liberation struggle has been mainstreamed in a bid to associated ZANU-PF's political interests within the aspirations of the country's respected founding figures. Part of this exercise has been initiated through the christening major roads and streets in every town centre after these heroes. This has been generally presented as a way in which the Government honours illustrious contributions by gallant fighters in the country's war of liberation. In the public discourse, the honour to national heroes has been portrayed as a state-led initiative to foster national cohesion. In the case of Bulawayo, a statue was erected in honour of Joshua Nkomo. In the same manner, the then Bulawayo International Airport was renamed the J.M. Nkomo International Airport. Likewise, a street was named

after Joshua Nkomo and today the polytechnic college in Gwanda has also been named after Joshua Nkomo. The state's contested conferment of tribute to Joshua Nkomo who was Zimbabwe's Vice President is part of the patriotic history agenda in forging national unity particularly in Matebeleland considering the region's callous past with the ruling party against a background of the gukurahundi disturbances. Therefore, Nkomo represents as symbol of reconciliation considering that Matebeleland harbors the post-gukurahundi solicit public discontent. The honour to Joshua Nkomo found its premise the fatherly public affection attributed to his contribution to the liberation struggle through his ZAPU party which has been mainly perceived as being progressively Ndebele. Therefore, he is idolized in Matebeleland as the political god-father of the region.

More so, music concerts in the form of galas and bashes in commemoration of the Unity Accord and the death of some of these national heroes including Nkomo have also been held annually and used for promoting patriotic history. Nkomo's emerge has been revitalized "...as the authentic African leader; as the originator of the liberation struggle and as a symbol of unity; as the committed nationalist and pan-Africanist; and as the advocate of post-independence unity" In this regard, the Umdala Wethu Music and Cultural Gala ('Our Father' in Ndebele) which was held since 2001 rotated across all the country's provinces starting with its launch in Harare in 2001 going to "...Manicaland (Mutare) in 2002, Midlands (Gweru) in 2004, Matabeleland South (Beitbridge) in 2005, Bulawayo in 2006 and Mashonaland East (Marondera) in 2007" all serving to reinforce the description of Nkomo as the Father of the Nation (Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Willems 2010: 204). The biting economic crisis in 2008 marked the end of the holding of the Nkomo the bashes.

On the contrary Mugabe's 21st February Movement is celebrated without failure reflecting on his Pan-Africanist stance and his exalted contribution to Zimbabwean nationalism before and after the liberation struggle (Teya 2014). Mugabe conscious of the essence of patriotic history just indirectly expressed regret by referring to the events of Gukurahundi as 'a moment of madness' and nothing more (Muchemwa, Ngwerume and Hove 2013).

Media Censorship

Furthermore, the period after 2000 resulted in increased censorship of the private press seeking to offer a plural or alternative view to the condensed perspectives paddled by the public media. The control by ZANU PF of all television and radio

stations in the country and the closure of the Daily News among other private media during that period promoted polarization which sustained a problematic 'patriotic' narrative. In this case, it was difficult if not impossible for the development of counter-narratives in a methodical way by critics as the rigid legislation including the Public Order and Security Act and Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act was meant to muzzle the media (Manganga 2012: 103). Among other things rigid legislation made it difficult for the MDC to win political power through the polls (Chibuwe 2013) and avoided the potential of people power (Makumbe 2011: 10-11). ZANU PF government saturated the public sphere with its propaganda messages as it monopolized the flow of information to the majority of people in the rural areas (Raftopoulos 2004).

Therefore, public media, both print and electronic were instrumental in propagating ZANU PF's version of history central to the party's continued stay in power. Observing this during the run up to the 2002 Presidential elections, the late Terence Ranger:

... spent four days watching Zimbabwe television which presented nothing but one 'historical' programme after another; the government press - the Herald and the Chronicle- ran innumerable historical articles ... Television and newspapers insisted on an increasingly simple and monolithic history ... Television constantly repeated documentaries about the guerrilla war and about colonial brutalities; there were nightly discussions of 'heritage' presented by UZ lecturers in literature or sociology, gesturing over piles of history books. The *Herald* and the *Sunday Mail* regularly carried articles on slavery, the partition colonial exploitation and the liberation struggle (Ranger 2002: 1-2).

In addition, the history of the liberation struggle is propagated at different levels and with simplicity but with convenient crude racist overtones and articles to that effect have appeared numerous times in the state press. Presidential candidates were implored by state sponsored journalists to bear in mind that the armed struggle is the guiding spirit during presidential elections and beyond (Ranger 2002: 2). Additionally, Primorac (2005) observed that towards the parliamentary elections in 2005:

In government-sponsored media, the relentless stream of anti-western rhetoric and home-grown nativist nationalism increased its pitch: the ZANU (PF) pre-election adverts, for example, insisted on reducing the nation's entire post-independence history to a stream of glorious opportunities to vote for Robert Mugabe and his party (Primorac 2005:132).

This condensed type of history undoubtedly served its intention of maintaining ZANU PF as the only party that must rule in perpetuity.

However, bemoaning the continued bombarding of the public by repetitive and exclusive liberation war films and documentaries Innocent Chifamba Sithole cited by Ranger (2004: 220) protested the narrow definitions provided for Zimbabwe's nationalism noting that:

Big Brother has wrenched open the archives and history cringes into the vulnerable system of mere signs and symbols of ink on paper, of recorded image and sound on films. The nation is daily bombarded with grim images of grotesquely mutilated and decomposing black bodies from the liberation war, falling like boulders from the cliff of the television screen. [It is] an attempt to edit the nation's collective memory in order to rewrite the history of the struggle for independence... By virtue of being the government of the day ZANU/PF has access to and control over the recorded signs and symbols that denote and connote our history as a nation. .. Central to ZANU/PF's election campaign is the political commodification of the legacy of the liberation war. Amid the choking fumes of aggressive political campaigns, history lets out a piercing wail as Big Brother relentlessly attempts to weave past, present and future into his person (Ranger 2004: 220).

The above was due to the work of Jonathan Moyo (academic-turned-politician) during his tenure as the Information minister before his sacking in 2005. He offered the public intellectuals platforms to air Zimbabwe's history from a ZANU PF viewpoint. Furthermore, the media portrayed ZANU PF as exclusively responsible for 'securing independence, justified land seizures, highlighted colonial atrocities, and erased personalities and events from the historical record'. Moyo also made the state-run radio air catchy jingles and many were his own compositions in the form of reworked liberation war songs that celebrated the achievements of ZANU-PF. Tendi (2010) holds the view that this strategy paid dividends, but Hove and Mukurunge (2014) are of the view that the playing of anti-imperialist revolutionary songs aimed at influencing the public towards the party agenda failed. Rather, some listeners were opposed to the unending war of liberation mantra which they perceived as irrelevant as it could not address bread and butter issues.

Civic Education Initiatives

In 2001, the Zimbabwean government established youth militia camps for carrying out a National Service training programme that was compulsory. Unmistakably, the

chief function of these camps was to teach 'patriotic history' as a way of mobilising the youth to subscribe to the logic of nationalism as advocated by the ruling. Evidently, a series of projects that were done at the University of Zimbabwe in the 1990s including under the 'Democracy and Human Rights' theme led by Professor Ngwabi Bhebe and the post-nationalist historiography that was starting to emerge in the early 21st Century at the university (Tendi 2009) were seen as unpatriotic. Therefore, the National Youth Service training programme was meant to counter the "the impact of international media, the introduction of foreign cultures and the increasing urbanisation" which weakened the Zimbabwean youths' sense of national pride (Solidarity Peace Trust 2003). Besides the content of patriotism, this training programme was also meant to promote the: "...teaching on the prevention of HIV-AIDS and drug abuse, fostering national pride, creating opportunities for youth self-employment and participation in national development, gender equality, education, and promotion of environmentally friendly practices" (Tendi 2009: 15).

Mugabe harboured plans to set up a compulsory civic education course from nursery to tertiary level as early as 1985 but the implementation of such plans were beset by the high financial costs and the fear of militarizing his government (Tendi 2009). The issue of financial costs was real as many of the established National Youth Training centres after 2001 had become rundown by 2005 (Tendi 2009). Additionally, the government made it clear that the youth training programme which was to be compulsory to all school leavers was meant to inculcate a history of Zimbabwe which was unbiased (Ndlovu 2009: 73). The so called unbiased history of Zimbabwe taught to the youths through the National Youth Service Training made them warriors of the third Chimurenga and were empowered to discipline all perceived enemies of ZANU PF ranging from their own parents, MDC leadership and supporters, teachers as well as other learned civil servants in the country (Ranger 2004).

Crude rudimentary teaching was the order of the day in the militia training camps as revealed by a report by the Solidarity Peace Trust (2003) on the youth training camps which notes:

...there is overwhelming evidence that the youth militia camps are aimed at forcing on all school leavers a ZANU-PF view of Zimbabwean history and the present. All training materials in the camps have, from inception, consisted exclusively of ZANU-PF campaign materials and political speeches. This material is crudely racist and vilifies the major opposition party in the country ... The propaganda in the training camps appears to be crude in the

extreme...if anyone voted for the MDC, then the whites would take over the country again. They were also told that the whites used to kill black people in the 1970s by pouring boiling beer onto them, and this would happen again if the MDC won the election. A youth militia history manual called 'Inside the Third Chimurenga' gives an idea of the type of 'patriotism' that is instilled in the camps. The manual is historically simplistic and racist and glorifies recent ZANU-PF National Heroes along with the land resettlement programme. It consists entirely of speeches made by President Robert Mugabe since 2000, among them his addresses to ZANU-PF party congresses, his speech after the 2000 election result, and funeral orations for deceased ZANU-PF heroes ... The opposition is repeatedly vilified in this compilation, and referred to as imperialist and neocolonialist. Supporters of the opposition are described as "rough and violent high-density lumpen elements"... The MDC is said to be driven by 'the repulsive ideology of return to white settler rule' ... According to youths trained in the camps, apart from ZANU PF campaign pamphlets, this was the sole source of written information on Zimbabwean history used in the training process... (Solidarity Peace Trust 2003: 10-20).

From the preceding citation, it is evident that Zimbabwean youths were molded to do anything to defend the 'patriotic' cause of ZANU PF. This demonstrates the extent, form, state of affairs and goal of patriotic history inculcated by war veterans in Zimbabwe after 2000. In reality the training "...was about vandalism... We were used to do the things the State does not want to do themselves. Then they can just say it was just the youths, not us" (Solidarity Peace Trust 2003: 4).

Introduction of National Strategic Studies

National Strategic Studies (NASS) course was introduced and made compulsory to all tertiary level students in 2003 in order to inculcate patriotism in the students. The course was introduced amid heightened conflict between the MDC and ZANU PF when the latter even perceived colleges and universities as anti-Government factories whose history became largely suspect in the countryside (Solidarity Peace Trust 2003). According to Tendi (2009), the Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education said the NASS course was introduced to "'provide an all-round education to young people in tertiary institutions', 'foster a desire to contribute towards national development and equip students with relevant skills', and 'instill in the young people an appreciation of their national heritage.' The NASS course was crafted to cover topics on the liberation war history, nationalism, other matters including the importance of the land reform. NASS was rejected

at the Bulawayo Polytechnic as students boycotted all classes and called on other tertiary institutions to support them following an attempt to introduce it in March 2003 (Ranger 2004). Accordingly, Harare Polytechnic students also boycotted NASS lectures and examinations (Tendi 2009). Notably, all universities did not teach the NASS course although attempts were made to introduce it including at private universities.

The NASS syllabus whilst not specifying the sources to be used recommends the reading of Mugabe's *Inside the Third Chimurenga* and the NASS syllabus included four core themes that include entrepreneurship studies; legal and parliamentary studies; international relations and development studies; and Zimbabwean history and heritage studies. However, absence of human rights in the NASS syllabus with special reference to Zimbabwe is also another aspect demonstrating the determination of the government to pursue patriotic history.

Conclusion

The chapter has successfully substantiated the role of history in Zimbabwe's nation making and state architecture processes. First, it has been submitted that history plays a crucial role in bringing collective memories of nationhood. In the context of Zimbabwe, this has been achieved through state-led dissemination of the nationalist legacy. While this welcome in facilitating a preservation of lasting memories the chapter problematizes the extent to which the nationalist legacy has been inclined to promoting the legitimacy of the ruling ZANU PF. In the process, this has conceived deliberate silence on the role played by other equal contributors to the struggle for liberation who were not part of ZANU-PF. As such, ZANU-PF has been presented as a political party precast in the country's past with absolute legitimacy considering the protagonist credentials it derives from history. To explain this position reference was made to the concept of patriotic history coined by Terence Ranger to explain the evolution of historiography in Zimbabwe. According to this concept, state-craft has been embedded on history characterized by the representation of the establishment as an institution whose existence stems from the past; thus its validation in its pursuit for power in the face of new opposition actors. This indicates that the teaching and production of history must not be narrowly regarded as a mere exercise to encountering classical and antiquated experiences of a particular group of people. History serves as a media from which power can be derived.

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WRITING THE CHIMURENGAS: LOCATING THE CONTRIBUTION OF TERENCE RANGER IN THE MAKING OF ZIMBABWEAN HISTORY

Kirk Helliker and Sandra Bhatasara

Introduction

Terence Ranger made a significant contribution to the literature on the war of liberation (or 2nd Chimurenga) in Rhodesia in the 1970s, as he did also with regard to nationalist struggles in the 1950s and 1960s and earlier periods of the colonial history of Zimbabwe, including the 1st Chimurenga or original struggles against colonial dispossession in the late 1800s. Though Ranger wrote about post-2000 Zimbabwe, he did not provide a detailed analysis of what Minister of Information (2000-2005) Jonathan Moyo coined the 3rd Chimurenga, that is, the land occupations which took place nation-wide in primarily the year 2000. Of course, labelling the land occupations as the 3rd Chimurenga has not gone unchallenged, as this notion is seen regularly as part of a problematic ZANU-PF ruling party narrative about the ongoing presence of colonial conquest and anti-colonial struggles well into the post-independence period since 1980. Indeed, contestations around the existence or at least character of the 3rd Chimurenga are central to the prevailing literature on the land occupations and subsequent fast track land reform restructuring, yet various renderings of the 2nd Chimurenga also exist. The main purpose of this chapter is to provide a comparative understanding of (a selection of) the literature on the 2nd Chimurenga and 3rd Chimurenga and, in this light, to identify and assess Ranger's overall contribution to such a comparative understanding.

Nationalist Historiography, History of Nationalism and Patriotic History

The most appropriate way of pursuing this purpose is by first presenting and indeed adopting the heuristic categories used by Ranger himself in reflecting upon and trying to make sense of the war of liberation literature and post-2000 ruling party narratives. In an article in 2004, Ranger offered a critical analysis of “a new variety of historiography” (2004:218), namely, the ‘patriotic history’ increasingly propagated since the year 2000 by the ruling ZANU-PF party and its public intellectuals, a monolithic history based on a narrow and exclusive form of nationalism which erases alternative histories and paints ZANU-PF as the sole embodiment of truth. It is this kind of history which led to the depiction of the land occupations as the 3rd Chimurenga. Ranger contrasts this history with both ‘nationalist historiography’ and the ‘history of nationalism’ (see also Ranger 2005).

Nationalist historiography presents nationalism as “inclusive” and “emancipatory” (Ranger 2005:8) with Ranger citing his earliest work (including *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia, 1896-1897* on the 1st Chimurenga, published in 1967) as exemplifying this kind of historiography. This romanticised historical understanding of the nationalist movement is different to patriotic history as the latter – according to Ranger – goes to the extreme in its logic of excluding alternative understandings of the past and present: “It is a doctrine of ‘permanent revolution’ leaping from *Chimurenga* to *Chimurenga*. It has no time for questions or alternatives. It is a doctrine of violence because it sees itself as a doctrine of revolution” (Ranger 2005: 8). This doctrine of revolution appears, Ranger argues, in ruling party justifications of the land occupations or 3rd Chimurenga (Ranger 2002). He goes on to argue that “[m]ost ... people, including those who, like myself, were sympathetic to the ‘second chimurenga’ of national emancipation, believe this anachronistic re-rerun (or ‘3rd Chimurenga’) threatens to plunge the country into chaos” (Ranger 2002: 25). The content and form of patriotic history has been unpacked quite extensively by Tendi (2010), with Ranger writing a foreword in Tendi’s book on the subject. The differences between nationalist historiography and patriotic history though need to be more forcefully made, as it is not entirely clear why the latter is not simply the logical outcome of the former under post-2000 conditions in Zimbabwe.

For Ranger, the history of nationalism, compared to nationalist historiography and even more so to patriotic history, offers a critical and pluralist account of nationalism (including contestations within it), with the idea of histories of nationalisms being important in this regard. Ranger here cites his work on Matabeleland (Ranger 1999,

Alexander, McGregor and Ranger 2000) as illustrations of this. Remarkably, Ranger does not position explicitly his key text – *Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe* (1985) – on the 2nd Chimurenga in his typologies of historiographies but it is clear that it falls within nationalist historiography.

Terence Ranger and the 2nd Chimurenga Literature

In *Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe* (1985), Ranger provides one of the first accounts of the 2nd Chimurenga (war of liberation during the 1970s) in Rhodesia, and one which was extremely influential. This account was in certain ways uncritical of the guerrilla struggle and hence, as indicated, forms part of nationalist historiography. His later work, on Matabeleland (an area of the country which had not received any sustained attention by the mid-1980s as a site of guerrilla struggle) moves away from this historiography and falls more firmly within a historiography of nationalism or nationalisms. But, in his 1985 book, Ranger suggests that the ZANLA guerrillas when entering Matabeleland tended to be insensitive to local histories and cultures and ended up acting perhaps coercively against the peasant population (Ranger 1985: 216).

In his 1985 book, Ranger examines peasant consciousness, peasant activism and guerrilla struggle in Makoni District in Manicaland, a province that borders Mozambique. He emphasises that his analysis cannot be generalised in any simplistic manner to the Rhodesian countryside as a whole (Ranger 1985: ix), though he at times seems to claim otherwise (for example, Ranger 1985:182). His account of the guerrilla struggle is rooted in the agrarian history of Makoni, including a history of sustained land evictions and resettlement by the Rhodesian state and the consequent discontent and resentment amongst peasants around their agrarian livelihoods, which led to sustained peasant protests and radicalism or a “peasant nationalism” (Ranger 1985:145). In this context, ZANLA guerrillas (linked to ZANU) infiltrating the area in the 1970s were readily welcomed and “peasant support for the guerrillas did not flag” (Ranger 1985:181). The central message of the guerrillas was the “claim to the lost lands” (dating back to the late 1800s) which resonated with the experiential consciousness of the Makoni peasants, such that land was “both the ideological and practical focus of resistance” (Ranger 1985:170).

Ranger brings to the fore the active agency of peasants in supporting the guerrillas in Makoni as “the people were able to contribute much of their own experience and ideology” (Ranger 1985:214). As well, he highlights the significance of spirit

mediums in asserting the rights of peasants to lost land and in forging crucial linkages between peasants and guerrillas – and sometimes peasant elders (chiefs and headmen) – as “one community of resistance” (Ranger 1985:206). The spirit mediums also were able, at least potentially, to restrain the guerrillas from any arbitrary punishment of innocent people in the countryside and, indeed, Ranger provides no significant evidence of coercion and violence enacted against peasants by guerrillas in Makoni.

Finally, Ranger recognises the existence of social stratification along class lines within the Makoni rural populace (including elites such as Purchase Area farmers, Master Farmers in Tribal Trust Lands, businessmen and entrepreneurs, teachers and so forth) but notes that Rhodesian state policies undercut the possibility of significant rural accumulation and differentiation. This meant a “united countryside” (Ranger 1985:269) in support of the guerrillas. Class differentials were thus not “determinant” but “one of many forces operating to shape the course of the guerrilla war” (Ranger 1985:230). As “the war hotted up” (Ranger 1985:269) from the mid-1970s, agrarian class differences became more important with uncooperative elites becoming subject to guerrilla punishment. Age differences and religious affiliation are also highlighted at times, but there is a near silence about the patriarchal structuring of Makoni communities and of the guerilla movement itself.

By the time Ranger’s seminal work (based originally on a series of seminars from 1983) was published in 1985, other accounts of the nationalist struggle and the war of liberation in the 1970s had been published. And Ranger himself had also published articles, including on Mugabe, ZANU and the old guard (Ranger 1980) and spirit mediums and guerrillas (Ranger 1982). In 1983, Masipula Sithole (in the journal *Zambezia*) offered a review of six recent publications on the liberation struggle, including the insider autobiographies by Abel Muzowera and Maurice Nyagumbo, as well as Michael Raeburn’s *Black Fire* originally published in 1978 and *The Struggle for Zimbabwe* by Martin and Johnson (Sithole 1983). In his 1985 book, Ranger had used all these sources. Oddly, though, he never referred to Sithole’s own work published as *Zimbabwe: Struggles within the Struggle* (Sithole 1979) in which Sithole details the complex tensions and conflicts within the nationalist movements with a strong emphasis on ethnic battles (see also Sithole 1980). Admittedly, though, Ranger was more concerned about guerrillas on the ground than about nationalists beyond the battlefield. Ranger had though referred to the broad arguments of Lan about spirit mediums and guerrillas, based on Lan’s PhD (completed in 1983) which was later published as *Guns and Rain* in the same

year as Ranger's book (Lan 1985).

To reiterate, *Peasant Consciousness and Guerilla War in Zimbabwe* fits neatly into a nationalist historiography of triumphant guerillas and nationalists, with the war of liberation in the 1970s understood as a continuation of the 1st Chimurenga and deriving in large part from the "consistency of peasant consciousness" around land dispossession (Ranger 1985: 139) as manifested in local resistance and opposition to Rhodesian state agrarian restructuring over a number of decades prior to the arrival of the guerrillas. This, we would suggest, is an argument which is not readily dissimilar to patriotic history about the historical roots of the 3rd Chimurenga. Nevertheless, as he recognised years later, Ranger was simply reproducing, and dressing up intellectually, the rhetoric of the nationalist movement and specifically of ZANU as propagated during the 1970s. This nationalist historiography is also vividly evident in the work by Martin and Johnson (1981) (which has an approving foreword by Mugabe), including stressing the cooperative relationships between peasants and guerillas. The book by Martin and Johnson, like Ranger's work, was used by the post-independence government as a legitimising basis for recounting the heroism of the guerrilla and nationalist struggles (and particularly of ZANLA and ZANU specifically). The study by Lan (1985) of spiritual mediums, peasants and guerrillas in Dande in northeastern Zimbabwe, in discussing in great detail the important theme of spirituality and the ways in which guerrillas embedded themselves in the worldview of local peasant populations ultimately also provides a similar romanticised view of the 2nd Chimurenga.

The most controversial dimension of the early nationalist historiography of the guerrilla struggle was undoubtedly the character of the relationship between peasants and guerrillas, particularly questions around the forms and levels of coercion enacted by the guerrillas against peasant villagers. It was mainly the work of Norma Kriger (1992) which led, if only unintentionally, to important reinterpretations of the guerrilla struggle by offering a significantly more critical analysis. Kriger had completed her PhD in 1985 (the year of Ranger's book) and had published articles (for example, Kriger 1988) prior to her book coming out. In her book, she seeks to "deromanticise or demythologise the existing portrait of ZANU's successful politicalisation of the Zimbabwean countryside during the liberation war" (Kriger 1992:45). In her study of Mutoko district, she concludes that (more than any other action) coercion and violence against peasants by guerrillas were the key defining markers of the relationship between guerrillas and peasant populations. Thus, "I reject the concept of sustained popular support or voluntary cooperation between

guerrillas and peasants” (Kriger 1988: 306). This also leads her to adopt a version of Sithole’s ‘struggles within the struggle’ argument but, in this case, with reference to the internal dynamics of peasant society itself. More specifically, peasants, as in the main coerced rural dwellers, were motivated to cooperate with ZANLA guerrillas not on the basis of a nationalist notion of seeking to recover lost lands but because of local inequalities and grievances, with resentment often directed against the African political and economic elites or other local forms of hierarchy (including gerontocracy and patriarchy) in Mutoko. In other words, peasants “used the guerrillas for their own non-nationalist, locally-centred interests” (Kriger 1988: 317). This clearly involves a profound criticism as well of Ranger’s view of the long-standing and deepening radical peasant consciousness focusing on land alienation and recovery.

In reviewing Kriger’s book, Ranger (1994) notes in the preceding years a noticeable shift in Zimbabwean literature away from a nationalist historiography to a historiography of nationalism, arguing that “the age of heroic interpretation is over” (Ranger 1994:142) and thus he accepts – at least tentatively – Kriger’s stress on guerrilla intimation and coercion at least in the case of ZANLA. He claims though that Kriger fails to provide sufficient evidence for the existence of internal tensions and horizontal cleavages within Mutoko peasant society in terms of their impact upon relationships between peasants and guerrillas, again without denying that these were likely of some importance. In this respect, crucial spatial and temporal questions arise around the character of the liberation war and specific relationships between guerrillas and peasants. For instance, even Martin and Johnson (1981) speak about press-ganging by ZANU and ZAPU in the early years of guerrilla recruitment and Ranger (1985) highlights increasing internal class-based conflict within rural society as the war intensified. Similarly, Ranchod-Nilsson (1994: 63) argues that the war unleashed class, generational, lineage and gender tensions within the peasantry which all contributed in specific ways to shaping the trajectory of the guerrilla struggle. Kriger (1992) also notes that guerrilla coercion was more likely in non-liberated zones in the Rhodesian countryside, a point which she reiterates in introductory comments to her later study of ex-guerrillas (or war veterans) in post-1980 Zimbabwe (Kriger 2003: 27). Further, in his study of guerrilla-peasant interaction during the war in northern Nyanga, Maxwell (1993:386) argues that there was a “diverse range of ‘mobilisation’” of peasants undertaken by guerrillas, and understanding this diversity requires recognising heterogeneity amongst both guerrillas and peasant communities as well as changes as the war progressed. Overall, then, it would appear that a full analysis of the war of liberation

necessitates a sensitivity to complex processes occurring at national and local levels in understanding peasant motivations and mobilisation.

Ranger's later work on the war of liberation and specifically in the Shangani area of Matabeleland fits more readily into a historiography of nationalism (Alexander, McGregor and Ranger 2000), a historiography of the guerrilla war which emerged from the 1980s. This historiography brings to the fore the existence of alternative historical narratives of the 2nd Chimurenga to that propagated consistently by the ruling party. In this case, the guerrilla struggles in Matabeleland (involving primarily ZIPRA) varied in important ways from the ZANLA struggles in the western part of the country. In this respect, Ranger argues that there is a deep history of local and rural nationalisms including an enduring presence of ZAPU in the countryside, which further complicates the relationships between ZIPRA guerrillas and local peasant populations. He thus emphasises "the importance and depth of explicitly nationalist commitment, and the crucial role of the rural party [ZAPU] in mediating between guerrillas and civilians; nationalism was the legitimising ideology of the war in the Shangani, and nationalist identifications and institutions were strengthened and broadened over time....[But] there were important divisions and differences among rural social groups, between them and guerrillas, and within guerilla ranks (Alexander, McGregor and Ranger 2000:160). The basis for these differences, and the ways in which they were handled, had important and varied implications for the kinds of relationships formed between specific rural groups and ZANLA guerrillas.

Patriarchy and Other Themes in the 2nd Chimurenga Literature

There are wide-ranging themes which have arisen about the 2nd Chimurenga since Ranger's major contribution in 1985 which, combined, provide a much wider, more in-depth and finely-balanced understanding of the ambiguities and complexities of the war of liberation. One theme includes the importance of 'struggles within the struggle' in shaping the trajectory of the war of liberation, with particular reference to struggles between nationalists, between guerrillas, and between nationalists and guerrillas, with the literature written by ex-guerrillas being particularly revealing and insightful in this respect (Sadomba 2008, Mhanda 2011a). These struggles do not downplay the important forms of collaboration and cooperation between guerrillas and nationalists, but questions arise as to which group was dominant in the nationalist-guerrilla alliance during different phases of the liberation war (Mazarire 2011). Other themes include the tension-riddled position of African police and soldiers in the Rhodesian army during the war (Stapleton 2011), and the

activities – including resistance – of inmates and detainees of the Rhodesian state, mainly nationalists and their supporters (Munochiveyi 2013, 2014, Alexander 2011).

The theme we want to consider more fully is gender and patriarchy. In the 1970s, the nationalist movement (at least ZANU) regularly portrayed women as playing a crucial and at times equivalent role in the guerrilla struggle – as guerrillas – during the 2nd Chimurenga, though acknowledging that women guerrillas were far less in number than male guerrillas. In large part, these claims were highly propagandist in character. In 2000, Ranger thus wrote that “during the 1970s the problem of gender was never analysed or confronted within ZANU PF ideology or guerilla education” (Ranger 2000: xvii). But the early work on the war of liberation (including Ranger’s work), though at times raising questions around gender (Kriger 1992), was itself in large part silent on the gendered and indeed patriarchal character of the war of liberation. Fortunately, there has been a burgeoning literature on women in the 2nd Chimurenga, including with reference to the guerrillas themselves, but also in relation to women in refugee camps (in notably Mozambique) and the experience of women civilians in the Rhodesian countryside (including in protected villages) during the war. This literature clearly fits within the historiography of nationalism because of its critical edge.

In her important work on gender and the war of liberation, Nhlongo-Simbanegavi (2000) examined the motivations for females joining the guerrilla armies (mainly ZANLA) and their experiences in base camps outside the country and the operational areas inside. She concludes “[a]s young women joined the armed struggle they passed over to the patronage of a new set of patriarchs, the nationalist leaders” (2000:17) and “[a]s in the camps, women in the operational zone remained in spaces carved out by men” (2000:83). In the end, patriarchal practices were not significantly challenged, as other literature readily confirms, though there may have been differences between ZIPRA, ZANLA and the short-lived ZIPA in this regard. The motivations for females becoming guerrillas were highly diverse and complex. Lyons (2004) for example argues that some women joined the liberation war as guerrillas for ideological and nationalist reasons (noting the case of Margaret Dongo) but others did so “to facilitate their own agency as women or for personal reasons” (Lyons 2004:114). Likewise, O’Gorman (2011) – in her study of Chiweshe – refers to the importance of women’s “personal awareness and experience” and how the “political slogans of the [nationalist] revolutionaries ... tapped into the felt grievances of black women living under colonial rule” (2011:83). But “their

motivations for participation were mixed” and included “personal struggles that are not directly, or necessarily, anti-colonial, for example, family and household tensions” (2011:85).

The work of Ranchod-Nilsson (2003) provides important perspectives in this respect. Thus she notes how the agency and agendas of women, multiple and inconsistent as they might be, were an integral part of the national liberation struggle which itself was not unified or characterised by clear goals. In her earlier work, she observed that rural women’s agendas were rooted in the reconfigurations of gender relations during the colonial period, as interwoven with their class circumstances as peasants (Ranchod-Nilsson 1994: 64). Based on fieldwork in Wedza district, she later reiterates that “women had their own imaginings about the nation that suggested they had clear visions regarding how they wanted their lives to change as a result of their involvement” (2003: 170). Importantly, she also provides a temporal analysis of the struggle and how different categories of women participated. For instance, during the early phases, wives of nationalists were very active in affiliate organisations but, as the liberation war gained momentum, young women crossed borders, at first simply carrying supplies and later trained as armed combatants. Added to the temporal analysis, her work additionally exposes the spatial peculiarities that shaped how different women participated. For illustration, Wedza district had high rates of male out-migration such that guerrillas relied on women not only to cook and clean but to ferry supplies and weapons and act as informants.

In the case of refugee and guerrilla camps in Mozambique, Chung (2006) paints a disturbing picture of the lives of women, with women being subjected to the “traditional feudal [gender] attitudes” (2006:125) of ZANLA guerilla commanders. Citing the case of Pungwe III military camp specifically, she argues that commanders used young women as “warm blankets” (calling them to their accommodation for “night duty”), such that commanders were “regarded with revulsion by many women guerillas” (2006:126, 127). Guerrillas in the operational zones often performed stereotypically-defined womanly roles, such as carrying weapons and ammunition for male guerrillas, or cooking and doing laundry for them. This is a far cry from the way in which “women’s frontline roles” were “glorified” (Lyons 2004: 161) by nationalists. The role and activities of civilian women in operational areas was also similarly structured, as these (particularly older) women became the “mothers of the revolution” as defined in a traditional gendered sense. But women were often caught between the demands of guerrillas and Rhodesian security

forces and, in this context, Chadya (2007) highlights the flight of civilian women from rural areas to Harare during the war, as a form of “gendered war-induced migration” (2007:32) arising from the militarisation of the countryside. Women became “agents of their own survival” (2007:45) by moving, often with children, to Harare for a complex array of reasons which were often very personal (including leaving behind a troubled or broken marriage).

Finally, Kesby (1996) considers the position of women in protected villages during the war with specific reference to Chiweshe, and how this challenged local patriarchies and especially “the masculinity of adult village men” (Kesby 1996:573) as these men lost their authority over young women given the Rhodesian state’s system of controls within the villages. In a similar vein, this happened to male patriarchs outside the protected villages, with the presence of young male guerrillas in operational zones in effect acting as a challenge to male elders and empowering young women (including young female guerrilla collaborators called *chimbwidos*) by giving them autonomy of movement and control “over their own sexuality and behavior” (Kesby 1996: 580). The overall conclusion of the literature on patriarchy and the 2nd Chimurenga is that women were not mere victims of, but active participants in, the war of liberation. Though women sought in many ways to reposition themselves and use social spaces opened up by the war to their advantage, this did not necessarily involve any meaningful undercutting of systems and practices of patriarchy.

The 3rd Chimurenga – Accounts and Themes

Unlike the 2nd Chimurenga, no significant body of literature has yet to emerge on the 3rd Chimurenga, at least literature grounded firmly in empirical research. In this respect, empirical and analytical work has focused instead on fast track land reform and developments on fast track farms post the widespread occupations in the year 2000. Accounts of the 3rd Chimurenga (the nation-wide land occupations underpinning fast track land reform) in post-colonial Zimbabwe have in large part been highly critical of the war veteran-led land occupations in the year 2000 and beyond, amounting to a historiography of nationalism. Some scholars (notably Sam Moyo) though have provided a more sympathetic interpretation which might be seen as falling within nationalist historiography. Some of the key themes found in the 2nd Chimurenga literature are also found in the 3rd Chimurenga literature, including the relationship between the war veterans (ex-guerrillas) and ruling party (ex-nationalist movement), as well as the forms of mobilisation undertaken by the ex-guerrillas in leading the occupations.

In a sense, though, the literature on the 3rd Chimurenga has taken a different historical course compared to the 2nd Chimurenga literature. Insofar as it can be argued that a nationalist historiography was pervasive in the early period of writings about the 2nd Chimurenga, and that writings since then fall within a historiography of nationalism, the temporal sequence of 3rd Chimurenga literature has been different. Undoubtedly, from the beginning, the dominant analysis of the fast track land occupations (which have been examined as part of a broader critique of state authoritarianism in post-2000 Zimbabwe) has been a historiography of nationalism highly critical of the occupations, with the specific claim being that the war-veteran led occupations were marked first and foremost by coercion and violence (Raftopoulos 2006, Raftopoulos and Phimister 2004). This has also entailed a particular argument about the relationship between the war veterans and the ruling party, namely, that the war veterans acted not only on behalf of an increasingly beleaguered ruling party but at its behest.

Angus Selby, who wrote his doctorate on the history of commercial farming in Zimbabwe, therefore argues that the occupations (as led by war veterans) were centrally-coordinated by the ruling party involving the “orchestration of the land invasions using the state apparatus” (Selby 2006:286). In this regard, the kind of nuanced claims about the complex and shifting relationships between guerrillas and nationalists which is now evident in the 2nd Chimurenga literature is missing from such analyses. At the same time, because of its condemnation of patriotic history (which justifies the 3rd Chimurenga), this historiography would likely emphasise the significant divisions which exist amongst the ex-guerrillas, such that only those aligned steadfastly to ZANU-PF became involved in the occupations. The study by Zamchiya (2011) in Chipinge reveals for instance that war veterans were reluctant to join the land occupations citing their allegiance to ZANU-Ndonga, rather than the ruling party, ZANU-PF. Likewise, the war veterans’ association (Zimbabwe Liberators Platform) not aligned to the ruling party explicitly criticised the occupations and claimed that the war veterans involved were not authentic veterans in that they undermined the principles and aspirations of the war of liberation (Mhanda 2011b). Thus, there were “some rogue war veterans” (Mhanda 2011b:13) used to further the partisan interests of specifically ZANU-PF.

During the course of the unfolding of this dominant historiography, a second type of analysis (a seemingly nationalist historiography) has been present concurrently, mainly in the work of Moyo. This – less common – analysis, which the main narrative argues is highly romanticised, first emerged with an article by Moyo soon

after the occupations began (Moyo 2001; see also Moyo and Yeros 2005, 2007) and it has been taken up by others (Sadomba 2011, Masuko 2011). Rather than seeing the 3rd Chimurenga as emerging as a directive from the ruling ZANU-PF party, it sees the occupations as initiated by war veterans independently of the party and as horizontal and decentralised in form, with the war veterans at times in tension with the ruling party but seeking to mobilise people on the nationalist basis of land dispossession and recovery.

Perhaps the most in-depth study of the occupations – and one undertaken by an ex-guerrilla or war veteran engaged in the occupations (in Mashonaland Central) – is by Wilbert Sadomba. Sadomba, in his doctorate, concludes that the land occupations were not centrally initiated or organised (by ZANU-PF or even its aligned national war veterans' association) and argues that the occupations “were organised horizontally rather than vertically, with each local group employing its own tactics, determining its own boundaries of operation, and mobilising its own manpower and resources” (2008:150). There is no doubt though that party leaders and state functionaries at local level played a crucial role in supporting the occupations (including providing food and transport) but not necessarily in their official capacity (Sadomba 2008:133). Though Ranger never offered a comprehensive account of the 3rd Chimurenga, his writings on post-2000 Zimbabwe (including on patriotic history) indicate quite clearly that he would be critical of this understanding of the land occupations and would in fact deny the legitimacy of the notion of 3rd Chimurenga in characterising the occupations (Ranger 2003).

In his recent study on landscapes in the Mutirikwi area in Masvingo Province, Fontein (2015) argues for diversity and complexity when it comes to understanding the motivations of those who occupied farms. He thus claims that “[p]eople engaged with a myriad of different discourses and practices... The complex aspirations, motivations and subjectivities of people involved in land occupations matter” (Fontein 2015: 30). Unlike the historiography of nationalism narrative pertaining to the 3rd Chimurenga, this claim implies that the wide range of social groupings which became involved (to varying degrees) in the occupations did so on the basis of a multiplicity of motivations which are irreducible to being hoodwinked by the grand nationalist rhetoric of the ruling party. Led by war veterans, these groupings included male and female communal farmers, farmers from old resettlement areas (established in the 1980s), urban workers, the urban unemployed, agricultural labourers and civil servants. An understanding of these diverse motivations still

requires in-depth case studies.

In our study of occupations in Shamva District (Bhatasara and Helliker 2016), we found that the occupiers (mainly from communal areas) invoked historical grievances of both a broad nationalist and specific experiential kind. They were clear on their memories of initial land loss and related colonial practices as well as on-going post-colonial dispossession. Occupiers were thus not simply responding to the nationalist-inspired rhetoric of war veterans but also to localised encounters characterised by racism, discrimination, abuse and aggression stretching back to colonial times. Such encounters included displacement and relocation into Tribal Trust Lands and the practice of *chibharo* (forced labour). As well, Nyandoro (2012) found that, in Gowe-Sanyati, the 2000 occupations were a response to frustrations instigated by the 1950 Rhodesdale evictions, the Native Land Husbandry Act of the 1950s and overall past disruption of livelihoods. In many other areas, restitution-based arguments underscored land occupations. As noted by Marongwe (2003:184) “restitution claims based dispossessions were a strong rallying point for participants in the occupations”. Wolmer et al. (2004) also found that the occupation of Save Conservancy and Gonarezhou National Park in 2000 was partly motivated by the fact that the Gudo and Chitsa people deeply resented their earlier eviction and that independence did not bring restitution of their ancestral land.

Understanding the sequence of farm occupations and the organisational dynamics of the occupations in specific locales is also critical but this has yet to be pursued vigorously in empirical research, such that any possible parallels with local guerrilla structures during the war of liberation remain unclear. Certainly, in the case of Shamva, it is possible to discern though some semblance of order regarding, for instance, the sequence of occupations (Bhatasara and Helliker 2016), which counters the image of chaos and anarchy embodied regularly in the historiography of nationalism. Further, every occupied farm had a base camp (or local authority structure) involving a Committee of Seven which was led by a base camp commander or chairperson, who was invariably a war veteran (and a male war veteran in the vast majority of cases). The committee coordinated the activities and tasks on the farms such as food provisions, transport and pegging of plots as well as security and maintaining discipline (Chaumba 2003 et al.).

But, in occupying farms and even subsequent to the initial occupation of a particular farm, violence, intimidation and coercion were very common, with white farmers and their agricultural labourers bearing the brunt of this. Further, as the occupations progressed, tactics of intimidation and disruption widened to include for example

local government offices and schools, as McGregor (2002) highlights with reference to areas of the country, such as northern Matabeleland, where the opposition party was particularly strong. In referring to the land occupations as the 3rd Chimurenga and in representing them as heralding the completion of the unfinished business of the 2nd Chimurenga, the ruling party in effect invoked the language, images and symbolism of the 2nd Chimurenga and thus violence became legitimised. The pervasiveness of violence by occupiers during the occupations is undoubtedly a point which the nationalist historiographical version of the occupations regularly underplays.

In Shamva district, reports of violence by war veterans and other occupiers included disruption of farm operations, blockades, barricades, beatings of farm workers and vandalism. For instance, the manager of Dawmill Farm was beaten up; farm owners and workers on a number of farms were harassed for being perceived as opposition party supporters; and both the owner and manager of Beaconhill farm were assaulted by war veterans in July 2000. All work using combine harvesters was stopped on Lion's Den, Annandale and Rutherland farms (because of threats to burn them) and farmers – in late spring of 2000 – were ordered to stop land preparation for wheat. Also, war veterans locked up the farmer's cattle on Glencairn Farm and then released them into the wheat. But there was acknowledgement on the part of Shamva white farmers that they also participated in violence, including using youth members of the opposition party in Harare to attack occupiers on Ceres Farm. In fact, more broadly, the perpetrators of – and reasons for – violence during the occupations appear more complicated than analyses emanating from the historiography of nationalism allow. As Marongwe (2014) shows in his study of Shurugwi, the violence during the occupations is irreducible “in a simple manner” (Marongwe 2014:77) to the machinations of the ruling party. Like the more refined understandings of the 2nd Chimurenga, he argues for moving beyond national-level politics to localised histories and dynamics in examining violence, noting in the case of Shurugwi the importance of “local politics and contradictory interests” and “petty jealousies” in fuelling violence (Marongwe 2014:77, 92).

At the same time, though, farm labourers bore the main brunt of the violence in many areas of the country. Agricultural labourers were caught seemingly between the occupiers and the white farmers, in a situation which may have parallels with the position of peasant civilians in the Tribal Trust Lands during the war of liberation. By the year 2000, farm labourers were still structurally located in a highly subservient and dependent relationship vis-à-vis white farmers under

quasi-feudal 'domestic government' (Rutherford 2001). A social distance existed between farm labourers and the occupiers (who mainly came from communal areas), with the two groupings having different sets of working and living experiences as well as community and personal histories. Added to this was the close relationship established between white farmers and the main opposition party, such that defending the occupations against white farmers (who at times enacted violence against occupiers and with the support of their labourers) led to suspicion by occupiers about the political loyalties of farm workers (Rutherford 2013). All this tended to compromise any collaboration between farm workers and the occupiers, and led to violence against labourers (Sachikonye 2003, Chadya and Mayawo 2002). Like those held during the 2nd Chimurenga, farm occupiers also felt compelled to hold all-night vigils (or *pungwes*) with farm labourers in seeking to propagate and justify the reasoning behind the occupations, with these rallies regularly entailing nationalist propaganda and tactics of intimidation. There was however some variation between farms in terms of relationships between labourers and occupiers. Magaramombe (2010) argues that most farm labourers opposed and even resisted the land occupations (as the occupations threatened their livelihoods) (see also Hartnack 2005), but some also welcomed the occupiers and were active in the occupations as a possible basis for accessing land. Though most agricultural labourers remained on the farms during the occupations, tens of thousands soon became internally displaced.

Patriarchy in the 3rd Chimurenga Literature

Ranger, in a foreword to the book by on Nhlongo-Simbanegavi (2000: xvi-xvii) notes: "Many people have asked, as they read reports of attacks on opposition supporters or of farm occupiers, 'Where are the women?'... [H]ardly any female ex-combatants have been involved at all. The women one sees on television have been bussed in to dance and sing; none of them has taken a decision; ... Why is this? ... One answer is that women were never allowed to make policy during the liberation war nor to take command of men. Another answer is that most women were 'demobilised' after the war, returning to civilian life and the 'command' of their husbands". Ranger's key argument, which has significant validity, is that the fundamental basis for systems of patriarchy remained intact after in 1980. Kesby (1996: 581) makes a similar argument: "The post-independence restructuring of society removed the arenas in which local agendas [involving challenges to local patriarchs] could readily be pursued and opened the way for patriarchal agents to reassert their masculinity in their homes and communities". Thus, there was a "a

return to normality” (Kesby 1996:582) for female guerrillas and women in general after the war of liberation, with any possibilities for women to reshape gendered practices during the war eventually undermined by post-1980 restructuring.

In this context, a crucial question becomes the patriarchal character of the land occupations during the 3rd Chimurenga, which was led by male war veterans. Overall, women normally played a subservient role in the occupations, much like they did during the liberation struggle in the 1970s. But, in certain instances, women led the occupations or occupied farms on their own in the absence of men (Chingarande 2010). Marongwe (2008:49) argues that the participation of women was varied with “some farms, particularly those close to communal and resettlement areas” showing “balanced numbers of male and female occupiers”. Moyo (2001) as well acknowledged an active role of women in land occupations that took place in Svosve, Goromonzi, Murewa and Insiza. Also, in Mazowe some women played a leading role in the mobilisation campaigns during the land occupations as compared to other districts as noted by Sadomba (2008). Considering that women are not a homogenous category, and also recognising the role of political patronage in the land occupations, Chiweshe (2011) highlights the lead role undertaken at times by women war veterans in particular. However, in her study of Mwenezi district in Masvingo province, Mutopo (2011) shows that women were not able to engage fully in occupying farms because of family responsibilities in the nearby communal areas. There is evidence however that many single, divorced and widowed women did occupy farms (Scoones et al. 2010:52). While some women, especially young unmarried women, joined land occupations in their own right, most married women did so on behalf of their spouses who were away at work or attending to other commitments.

Perhaps more importantly, the men-women relationships, in terms of social reproduction activities, tended to confine women to the domestic sphere. In relation to Masvingo Province, Scoones et al. (2010:55) note that women “often took on highly gendered roles in the base camps [on the occupied farms] (including cooking, collecting firewood and water), and were rarely in top leadership positions”. Similarly, in our study of Shamva, we observed that women’s work on the occupied farms was limited and related to reproductive roles such as cooking and cleaning as well as singing and dancing during the *pungwes* (Bhatasara and Helliker 2016). As Marongwe (2013) notes with regard to specifically Shurugwi District, the dancing and singing of women “served only to glorify ... the country’s male political leaders” (2013:466). The land occupations hence did not entail

any restructuring of the kinds of social relations (including patriarchal relations) existing in communal areas. Though patriarchal traditional authorities were not in place on the occupied farms, hierarchies at district and farm level existed with male war veterans being particularly prominent whilst women war veterans were in large part absent.

Despite these challenges, certain groupings of women clearly used the openings provided by the occupations to maneuver, *as women*, for purposes of advancing their social security. The position of unmarried women – divorced, widowed or single – is particularly important. Many unmarried women from communal areas took advantage of the movements onto commercial farms during the year 2000 to gain access to land which was not available to them (or which they had lost) in communal areas because of their unmarried status. In this respect, it is quite common for widows and divorcees in communal areas to be accused of witchcraft and causing the death of husbands by in-laws (particularly in HIV and AIDS cases), and they are frequently even chased away by their in-laws (Chaumba et al. 2003). Hence, for some women, embedded in the occupations were the “emancipatory potentials of joining a new community” (Scoones et al. 2010:52) in which some degree of socio-economic independence from local patriarchies could be attained. In that regard, although war veterans used various means (and notably nationalist discourses around land) to mobilise people to occupy farms, women (perhaps more than men) had their own very personal reasons for occupying farms which may not be tied directly to the broader historical grievance over land (Bhatasara and Helliker 2016).

In our Shamva study, personal challenges were articulated by women from communal areas as reasons for occupying farms. To quote one occupier:

We decided to join the war veterans in land occupations because my husband's father has a polygamous marriage so there is no land for farming. We have been farming on a very small piece of land.

Another woman occupier indicated:

I came to the farm in Shamva in April 2000 with my two neighbours. I came to take part in the land occupations because I was facing problems. My husband and I had no land of our own, as we were living with my parents. I did not feel okay staying on my parents' land whilst my husband was away working at the mine.

In the first case, the woman was living with her husband at the latter's parents' homestead, which is standard patriarchal practice subsequent to marriage.

Additionally, the existence of a polygamous marriage complicated matters, with polygamy associated with masculinity and the right of men to have more than one wife. In the second case, the woman and her husband were in fact living at her parents' home, an unusual situation about which she was uncomfortable given her husband's absence. In both cases, though in different ways, the dilemma faced by the women arose from patriarchal arrangements. In this sense, their motivation for occupying farms did not fit tidily into the strictly racialised nationalist rhetoric of the ruling party based on patriotic history.

Conclusion

This chapter sought to examine the contribution of Terence Ranger to the 2nd and 3rd Chimurenga literature and, in doing so, it provided a comparative analysis of selected literature on the war of liberation from the 1970s and the nation-wide land occupations from the year 2000. It should be remembered that Ranger's corpus of work on Zimbabwe goes far beyond any contribution to the 2nd and 3rd Chimurenga literature, spanning as it does diverse spatial sites (both urban and rural) throughout the history of pre-independence and post-independence Zimbabwe. More specifically, and despite its many weaknesses, Ranger's *Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe* raised a range of themes which became the foundation for intense debates about the 2nd Chimurenga. Of particular significance are issues around the diverse bases for mobilisation, the prevalence and forms of violence, the relevance of nationalist sentiments and more local concerns (including contestations at local levels) and, as we emphasised, the patriarchal structuring of both the war of liberation and the nation-wide land occupations. Further, though Ranger did not write directly about the land occupations, his categorisation of different kinds of historiography becomes a useful platform – as we tried to show – for understanding the recent work on the 3rd Chimurenga. If he had examined the 3rd Chimurenga, Ranger would have offered an understanding within the confines of a historiography of nationalism. In making sense of the occupations, there is no doubt that Ranger would have done so through intensive archival and fieldwork research, unlike a significant part of the literature which has been written particularly from within this historiography. Hopefully, all further writings about the 3rd Chimurenga will be based firmly on such research and also draw upon important themes from the 2nd Chimurenga literature, while also being able to identify and explain parallels and differences between the two so-called Chimurengas.

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BEYOND THE PROPAGANDA: EXPLORING VIMBAI CHIVAURA'S ORGANIC AFROCENTRIC AND DECOLONIAL CREDENCE

Brian Maregedze

Introduction

The life and times of Vimbai Gukwe Chivaura has always attracted various narratives among academics and beyond. Despite having received western education, Chivaura belongs to a rare breed of organic intellectuals with strong anti-colonial sentiments and decoloniality. Popularly known through Zimbabwe Broadcasting corporation when hosting African Pride (*Zvavanhu*) among others from which many themes on resocialising the African, delinking from 'Euro- North American' thought systems where dissected with other like-minded thinkers such as Claude G. Mararike, Tafataona Mahoso, Sheunesu Mpeperekwi, Godfrey Chikowore, and Aeneas Chigwedere. From the Patriot Zimbabwe Newspaper, Chivaura's voice still lives on and to other disciples of Afrocentricity, Pan-Africanism, African Renaissance and thought systems challenging western hegemonic structures. Echoes of decolonizing the university, knowledge systems and liberation of the African personality are such sources of knowledges to be extracted from Chivaura's works. This tribute among other reasons critically assesses the relevance of Chivaura's decolonial thinking and the complex matrices of power in which he fought 'Euro-North American' thought systems. Criticisms leveled against Chivaura are interpreted within a society unwilling to radically confront the structural forms of coloniality in which the African personality finds himself/herself entrapped in. The role of public intellectuals in Zimbabwean politics, religion and life in general has been a topical issue among academics. More notable is that, the intellectuals have ended up being divided with the dichotomy of pro-status quo and anti-establishment. A critical

reading of Chivaura's contributions in *The Patriot Zimbabwe Newspaper* however goes beyond those confines. A nuanced reading of Chivaura proffers a refreshing analysis altogether.

A number of works have been written engaging programmes and or initiatives made by Vimbai G. Chivaura in his life as an academic, educator, lecturer, Television Host and Traditionalist. Upon his death, he was declared liberation war hero at the age of 64 in 2015. At the University of Zimbabwe, he joined the academy with other academics such as Dr. Thorel Tsomondo, Dr Rino Zhuwarara, Dr. Ranga Zinyemba, Ngugi WaThiong'o among others. Chivaura served in the Faculty of Arts at the University of Zimbabwe. He was also part-time lecturer at the Zimbabwe Defence College, Film and Television School of Southern Africa and Trust Academy. He attended his secondary education at Mpompoma High School.

Blessing Miles-Tendi (2010) focusing on the role of public intellectuals in Zimbabwean politics made reference to Chivaura. More clear in this literature has been a narrow view of Robert Mugabe and the government of Zimbabwe in addressing various problems which were affecting the country. Chivaura was interpreted within narrow constructs of an apologist of the Robert Mugabe led government. Chivaura's contributions challenged a narrow nationalists' decolonization project which did not confront issues of the African personality in the decolonization agenda.

Explaining the theoretical models

"Coloniality" is defined in this essay as espoused by Maldonado-Torres (2007:243):

Coloniality, instead, refers to long-standing patterns of power that emerged as a result of colonialism, but that define culture, labour, intersubjectivity relations, and knowledge production well beyond the strict limits of colonial administrations. Thus, coloniality survives colonialism. It is maintained alive in books, in the criteria for academic performance, in cultural patterns, in common sense, in the self-image of peoples, in aspirations of self, and so many other aspects of our modern experience. In a way, as modern subjects we breathe coloniality all the time and every day.

Latin American scholars identified Coloniality of power in relation to power inequalities existing in post-colonial countries particularly those who had experiences of colonialism (Andrea Komlosy et.al 2016). The theoretical model responds to aspects dealt with in the life and times of Vimbai G. Chivaura. Although he was perceived in some circles as a loyalist to the political establishment, he was in fact

mis-read in that he was also critical of the status quo. Chivaura's works particularly unpacking from his writings in the Patriot Newspaper, he was conscientising the establishment on the existing structures of inequality way after Zimbabwe attained its independence.

Euro/Western-centrism involves a "civilizational chauvinism" privileging European cultures and their inheritors (e.g., settler states) as bearers of "reason," "superior culture," "civilization," "modernity," "ethno-racial supremacy," (Gruffyd-Jones, et.al. 2006).

More interesting are Chivaura's interventions on Euro/Western-centrism as he delved into all their facets challenging Androcentrism as well. Androcentrism entails power relations that privilege human life-forms manifesting male attributes and masculine behaviors over non-male and non-masculine attributes/behaviors (L. E. F Helland and Lindgren, 2016:439).

Dismantling 'Invented traditions' and re-naming African landscapes

In calling for national unity in Zimbabwe to achieve full decolonization, Chivaura argued for the need to have a mentality and or thought system crafted beyond the colonial residues of 'invented traditions' as T. O Ranger coined. This implies having alternative interpretations of independent Zimbabwe landscapes outside the confines of such names of provinces as Mashonaland, Manicaland, Matabeleland north and south among others. Continuous usage of those divisive terms results in conflicts, divisions, chaos founded with the constructs guided by Eurocentric narratives. Names can be understood within discourses of power from which they are emblems used to legitimise power (Mamvura 2014: ii).

Decolonial thinking can be extracted from Chivaura in that he was feeding in the calabash of African thought conscious on the impact of colonial encounters. The missionaries as agents of colonialism developed the grammar from which the indigenous people in present Zimbabwe continue to feed on that is dictionaries and bibles which Africans uncritically feed on as reference in knowledge production. Far from romanticizing the everyday life of precolonial Africa, the need to dismantle 'invented traditions' are pivotal. In the quest to become Zimbabwean, politics of inclusion and exclusion have manifested the ugly face of independent Zimbabwe partly due to the colonial residue which nationalists did not commit to dismantle. In some sections of Zimbabwe's societies, calls for secession have been noted being resultant of the realities of different naming practices.

In addition to that, the re-naming of schools, institutions and organisations were articulated by Chivaura (The Patriot, 2014). The Roman Catholic Church that established its centre at Chishawasha was responsible for naming 'Zezuru' for the people of Murenga who lived in the Highveld during the colonial period. More notable was the writing of history of the Rhodesians in present day Zimbabwe and unfortunately, missing the opposite that should have been taking shape. A decolonial appreciation of Chivaura's academic submissions exhibit an effort grounded not in nationalism or Marxism but that challenges the established order in independent Zimbabwe as well as the Euro-North American centric hypocrisy.

Genuine decolonization demands the need to re-name more landscapes. In his *Fine Madness*, Mashingaidze Gomo (2010) articulates how naming practices by the colonialists worked to dis-member African personalities. Robert Mugabe due to the winds of time, in decolonizing universities, knowledge systems which swept across South Africa with the Rhodes Must Fall Movement, renamed Rhodes Primary School to Matopos Primary School. In various places in Zimbabwe, schools with colonialists' names still exist in their numbers. Buildings have been renamed in that effort to decolonize landscapes such as Mukwati Building, Mbuya Nehanda road, Kaguvi road among many. However, a lot still needs to be done especially when drawing lessons from Chivaura. It is no coincidence that Chivaura is a liberation hero. Chivaura's heroism is that of an intellectual who sought to see the African personality liberated from the presence of structures which obscure 'real' liberation. This is liberation espoused by other decolonial thinkers such Ngugi wa Thiongo.

Deconstructing Christo-centrism

Christo-centrism is a doctrine which assumes that the humanity assumed by the Son of God is in all its mysteries, from the incarnation to the ascension into heaven, efficacious for the salvation of humankind and for the radical renewal of creation (*New Catholic Encyclopedia*, 2003). The colonization of Zimbabwe did not only encompass political domination but also imposition of spiritual dogmas from the western world. In 2012, I attended some of V.G Chivaura's lecture series, *Resocialising the African* which were held at the NLT 400 Building at the University of Zimbabwe. Academic engagements on who is an African, the place of the African/s in knowledge production, issues of spirituality and governance among others were discussed. Forms of resistance to colonial encounter have been grappled with among the Ndebele people when they had interaction with the missionaries (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009). The tendency to undermine the value of Indigenous religion in Zimbabwe's education system were observable. The

Nziramasanga Commission of Enquiry serves to inform on the dilemmas of colonial education. Chivaura critically accounted for the gendered interpretation of God in Christianity with 'male' characterization whilst simultaneously demonstrating that the Supreme Being in indigenous religion was no equivalent (The Patriot, April 2015). Within the same realm of religion, *Mwari* is not equivalent to God from an indigenous perspective. To translate *Mwari akasika munhu* to "God created the man" is tantamount to misrepresentation of the African view of God and gender.

Mwari is not gendered.

Munhu is not gendered.

To create is not the same as '*kusika*'

The Zimbabwe's New Curriculum guided under the Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education was positioned in a way offering the multi-faith approach in the study of Family and Religious Studies. Chivaura's narratives although in some circles were labelled nativist in a way exposed fissures of coloniality of power which the everyday discourses did not encounter.

In espousing the relevance of decoloniality, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013:11) argued that;

Decoloniality is born out of a realisation that ours is an asymmetrical world order that is sustained not only by colonial matrices of power but also by pedagogies and epistemologies of equilibrium that continue to produce alienated Africans who are socialized into hating the Africa that produced them, and liking the Europe and America that rejects them.

The old curriculum that the Ministry of Primary and Secondary education (formerly Ministry of Education, Sports, Arts and Culture) operated particularly in Religious Education was with Christo-centric biases. The study of indigenous religion was relegated to primary education. The Divinity advanced syllabi of the old curriculum can be viewed as indicative of coloniality of knowledge. Worse still, demonization of the New Curriculum in general as observed from local newspaper reports, Christo-centrism dominates in Zimbabwe. Chivaura's interventions were implicitly and explicitly in tandem with the demands of the New Curriculum which he did not see materialize.

In addition to that, in the age of globalization, Chivaura's submissions called for the positionality of the African spirituality. Far from a stance of equating the African indigenous spirituality to Western-centric view, Chivaura dismissed the distortions

created by such. 'A white male God, who creates a white male as his image on earth, is not the God of Africans,' echoed Chivaura in his newspaper instalments. Taringa Nisbert (2006) in *African Metaphors of God*, argued for a view which examined the various ways in which Africans perceived their supreme being well beyond western-centric gendered constructs.

Furthermore, Chivaura grappled more with the language aspect; *English versus African Worldview* (The Patriot, 2015). Language is undisputedly a carrier of culture and existence of humanity. Chivaura adds that, when a language dies, a whole world dies with it. This was in relation to socializing young children into using their vernaculars. The habit of teaching young children to speak English in their daily conversations was cautioned since the tendency to erode the local languages was at play.

In light of the above, it is notable that Chivaura was a voice whose relevance is immortal in retelling the story of the African personality.

Decolonizing the mind

Receiving western education among Africans had far reaching consequences. Franz Fanon talked of 'the black skin, white mask' in which colonial education translated to a software and a mentality grounded in western thought for the Africans. This education was meant to socialize the African in western patterns of thought and dislocate them from their daily routines. Chivaura remains a unique personality whose thoughts were beyond the tropes of coloniality.

Organic intellectuals were people educated in western systems during the colonial encounters but used that knowledge to reconstruct and construct their pasts based on their own experiences. Above all, the quest for positioning their culture, agency and reclaiming their identity were vital. The colonial matrices of power operate in such a way that those from the Global South begin to celebrate and perceive the Global North as centers of knowledge. The story of Chivaura demonstrates a different narrative which moved beyond 'Euro-North American' thought systems.

In a book chapter, *European Culture and Human Factor Underdevelopment* (2014), Chivaura lived up to his calling like other scholars with Third World leanings advancing the position of Africans in the world systems. In doing so, he was also unmasking coloniality of power in world systems. Chivaura attached Africa's underdevelopment to its failure to delink with Europe. This resonates well with dependency theorists such as Walter Rodney with his *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* and other scholars like Samir Amin and Andre Gunder Frank. In a way,

Chivaura implicitly opens up to the relevance of African culture, Africa's pasts which when recovered well and imparted to young children can be sources of creativity to the future generations. More interesting is that, global trends are still designed in a way which favours imperial designs. Talks on globalization position the Euro-North American centric notions whilst peripheralization of the Africans is at play. In calls for globalization, the African personality is demanded to imitate the *modus operandi* of the Global North.

Conclusion

The life and times of Vimbai Gukwe Chivaura when critically assessed beyond the dichotomy of pro and anti-establishment result in a nuance analysis of his positive contributions which are immortal and everlasting for generations to come. Despite receiving western education, the selected analysed newspaper articles from the Patriot Newspaper espoused by Chivaura opens up refreshed analytical positions to the academic, traditionalist and champion of African personality, culture as well counter arguments to coloniality of power are well posited. In as much criticisms are leveled against some of his works, it remains uncontested that, Chivaura's articulations are relevant to contemporary academics, cultural experts and or the general public. The need to decolonize landscapes, re-naming of schools among others alluded above demand the attention of policy makers as well heritage experts among others. Chivaura was a fighter against Euro-North American centric forces and his legacy lives on. Academic never die!!!

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EPISTEMOLOGICAL ACCESS AS AN OPEN QUESTION IN THE AFRICAN RENAISSANCE AGENDA.

John Bhurekeni

Introduction

The conversation on Africa's development particularly its asymmetrical correlation with the 'developed world' has been premised on issues around the economy and democracy. Less attention has been committed to understand the nurture of learning which provides the institutional foundation for development. As such the chapter attributes the challenges confronting Africa to the burden of epistemological access. On the one hand the crisis of epistemological access has been sustained by centuries of structured exclusion of continental wisdoms and epistemology by former colonial powers and other global giants with interests in Africa. On the other hand, the market commodification of knowledge has accelerated the restrained access to redemptive lens of knowing which can enhance Africa's development. In the process, certain African knowledges have suffered exclusion owing to the burden of centuries of prejudice towards Blackness; including Black ideas. It needs no special mention that Western education took the centre stage in Africa, debasing, challenging, and supplanting the Africa education system along with its cultural foundations. Chimombo (2005) presents this crisis of pedagogy as a major restraint to achieving Education For All (EFA) in the developing world, in which epistemological access to knowledge has become a principal transactional currency.

The concept of epistemological access further relates to the conditions and the environmental factors that promote wide dissemination of sustainable socio-political and economic pedagogy. To this end, epistemological access must be a conduit to which the education system must provide relevant knowledge which is responsive to needs of socio-economic development from grassroots to national level. Such an education system must also foreground the wisdom and traditions of the communities that benefit from it and whose resources nourish the learning institutions. This pathway to knowledge generation and meaning-making is proposed as a model to guarantee Africa's comparative beneficiation in the global political-economy.

Therefore, Africa must confront the painstaking task to dismantle the epistemological divisions emanating from various epochal links with imperialism including the continent's experience with neo-colonialism. This perspective negates any unifying ethic in thinking about global economic, ecological, social and political changes. Morrow (2007) states that this epistemological muddle results in the dominance of an empiricist epistemology in education. The dominance of one epistemological system in education negates the creation of teaching and learning communities in which knowledge is actively co-constructed. This dovetails with the assumption of this chapter that Africa is still entangled and entrapped within the colonial matrix of power which includes control of knowledge systems and values. This is so as education in postcolonial Southern Africa has continued to be steered by a succession of externally framed abstractions that have been implemented within the prevailing hegemony of Western modernization. The result of this is that the obtaining education systems in many African countries is one that does not foster thinking outside the natural ecology of the classroom. Moreover it does not open a third space aimed at transformative change, that is tilted towards achieving a more contextually oriented approach to teaching and learning, enabling a paradigm of 'learning as connection' (Lotz-Sisitka, 2009). In working out a possible solution to this disorder, a combination of cultural and historical aspect of curriculum formulation is prescribed.

This is because knowledge is a contested/bounded commodity. Enhancing epistemological access to knowledge will help restructure and refocus the education system to enact a learner centred pedagogy that will empower the novice learner to participate as an equal citizen to transform society towards a sustainable development. The cross fertilisation of Pan Africanism with other philosophical practices has being projected as a situated capital for the promotion of an

intergenerational philosophy essential for African renaissance. The chapter proceeds by, first giving a brief background and meanings of the key concepts. The second part interrogates the reasons behind Europeans epistemologies' predominance in Africa and makes a detour into some of the postcolonial educational challenges with Zimbabwe. Reflections are also made on the urgency to deconstruct the West's epistemological dominance in Africa and how that has served as a foundation to promoting epistemological access. Generally, the chapter looks into the issue of epistemological access from a more situated and emergent vantage point within Pan Africanism.

Contextualising Epistemological Access

For us to understand the concept "epistemological access". It is best to first unpack what is meant by the term epistemology. Epistemology is best understood if we consider it not only as a branch of philosophy, but as the study of theories about nature and scope of knowledge, the evaluation of presuppositions and bases of knowledge, and the scrutiny of knowledge claims (Noddings, 1995). In this chapter, though epistemology is a universal concept I situate it within an African cultural context. This is so as the chapter is focused at African articulation and formulation of knowledge and how this can help her develop. Focus also is on those aspects of life that constitute rationality in the African context. This is important particularly in this chapter as it builds the framework within which we interpret and understand our actions and the behavior of others, it also help us to negotiate the immediate physical environment.

The concept "epistemological access" was borne out of a need to democratise access to higher education (Marrow 2007; Plooy and Zilindile 2014). In the same context, one of the ideas around epistemological access is the concern about production of relevant knowledge which is strongly anchored on promoting development at all levels of society. Moreover the generated knowledge/s should empower the previously excluded learner in ways that will see him/her gaining confidence and participate as an equal player and knower of knowledge in "naming the world". Guided by this perspective, the subject of epistemological access entails the burdens and the strength of methodologies used in learning. It further maps challenges and prospects to education as a public need which catapults socio-economic and political development.

Drawing from the perspectives of Marrow (2007), Lotz-Sisitka (2009); Plooy and Zilindile (2014) epistemological access could be understood as physical access to

formal education (enrolment into educational institutions) and goes beyond that to include schooling activities and outcomes (post-enrolment). I also consider epistemological access to be access to a variety of knowledges; knowledges that bridge the gap between the learner's everyday praxis and formal education without privileging the monoculture of an empiricist knowledge.

To ensure effective epistemological access the post-enrolment goods; educational policies, content of the curriculum, pedagogues, and learning environments should aim at fostering 'thinking outside the natural ecology of the classroom'. That's allowing learners to develop critical reflexive thinking skills. By critical reflexive thinking I mean capability to think critically with reason and practice through meaning making, reasoning, challenging assumptions, seeking truth, interpreting and evaluating evidence, and engaging critically with evidence and counter-arguments. I consider these goods as stepping stones to quality education, and by quality education I refer to an education system that ensures an all-round development of the learner (physical, social, emotional, and cognitive development). Such an education system is capable of empowering the learner to think ahead of time in searching for solutions on issues of personal, communal, national, regional and global concern. Since learning is a social activity (as it is never confined solely to an institutionalized classroom/ lecture room), quality education therefore is a social construct whose outcomes are reflected in the wider social community through social activities which could be involving human beings and human beings and nature. Thus, our efforts in enabling or rather the educator's efforts on enabling epistemological access which is a pivotal point in socio-economic development should be anchored on deliberative social learning activities, for it is through social learning that pillars for life-long learning & co- engaged reflexive processes of learning-led change are developed. As we discover the learning that takes place through social activities we are bound to create learning communities capable of finding solutions to their problems, rather than literate communities limited to thinking inside-the-box. To be more precise access to knowledge and engagement in meaning-making should be understood as an experience that enriches life in its entirety.

The efficacy of epistemological access

The concern for the enhancement of learners' epistemological access to knowledge which itself is an essential component in the development of critical reflexive thinking skills, transcends culture and geo-political boundaries. This coincides with Okere (2005)'s observation that the desire to know is natural to all humans.

In Zimbabwe the need to enabling epistemological access to knowledge is clearly spelt in the Zimbabwe Education Blueprint 2015-2022. The projected future education as elucidated in the 2015-2022 Blueprint is expected to foster lifelong learning in line with the emerging opportunities and challenges of the knowledge society among other aims. Here, one may surmise that hope is on producing a graduate equipped with the tools for facing a globally competitive, but also globally predatory world system (Odora Hoppers (2007). Furthermore, the Curriculum Framework endeavours to prepare graduates of the Zimbabwean education system to demonstrate critical thinking and problem solving skills as their exit profiles. This shows the country's strong drive for quality education. Also the current focus on the inclusion of previously silenced knowledges is proof that educators and policy makers are aware that instead of considering a particular cultural/ knowledge praxis in solitude, we must consider diversity of ideas with some understanding of how cultural practices make sense together in dynamic constellations (Rogoff, 2011). However, there are manifold challenges and dilemmas facing developing countries like Zimbabwe in providing educational standards which ensure epistemological access.

Locating the primacy of European epistemologies in Africa.

Given the Egyptian sphinxes and pyramids, the Tunisian city of Carthage and the Great Zimbabwe, the ancient universities of Alexandria of Egypt, Fez of Morocco, the timeless wildlife conversation and ecological skills of the Khoisan people, developing expertise in mining and production of finished products (iron mining and smelting in the Munhuomotapa and Maphungubwe States) and well organised economies and socio-political governance as exhibited by the Timbuktu of Mali, Azana of Aksum, Cetshwayo Kampande of Zululand and Tangwena people of Southern Africa, one can surmise that Africa was becoming a great power in the civilisation of the world. However, the Europeans sort after destabilising Africa. Mandela in 1994 explicitly explained the destabilisation of Africa thus:

In the end, Carthage was destroyed. During the ion interregnum, the children of Africa were carted away as slaves. Our lands became the property of other nations, our resources a source of enrichment of other peoples and our Kings and Queens were mere servants of foreigner's powers. In the end we were held out as the outstanding example of the beneficiaries of charity, because we became the permanent victims of famine, of destructive conflicts and pestilences of the natural world" (Mokgoba 1999:10-11).

To achieve their colonization agenda in Africa the colonial masters embarked on a massive epistemic-warfare whose agenda was making the colonised see themselves through the hegemonic memory of the colonising centre (Wa Thiong'o 2003). Epistemic-warfare is a process where knowledge systems of other cultures are forcefully excluded from the education system. This often led to the perpetuation of the knowledge system of the dominant culture as a common culture of the whole, regardless of it being a culture of a fraction of the whole. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013) emphasizes this by saying: one of the terrible consequences of colonialism was to destroy the full gamut of alternative modernities together with alternative imaginations of the world that were not necessarily influenced and unleashed by Protestantism, European renaissance, Enlightenment and Industrial revolution.

African colonisation and the colonial system of education was a well thought out plan for the underdevelopment of Africa. Rodney (1972:26) posits that, "colonial education/schooling was education for subordination, exploitation, and the creation of mental confusion and the development of underdevelopment". In the colonial context the indigenous ways of knowing were forcefully replaced with the western ways of knowledge formation and transmission. Apart from it being an inscriptive marginalising of indigenous peoples and their culture, colonial education presented African life as grotesque and unrefined (Hapanyengwi 2012; Chitumba 2013). Thus, for African people and European people colonial education represented a clash of traditions, pedagogies and epistemologies. As a result the African unhu/ubuntu philosophical aspects of education were engaged in a duel with the imported ideologies and philosophies from the West. According to Chitumba (2013) insofar as Africans were concerned, educational traditions were violated and epistemological and pedagogical codes were ignored or destroyed. The indigenous people's living philosophy of Unhu/Ubuntu, their knowledge systems and the supporting pedagogies were relegated to the historical epistemological dust bins. Chung posits that the most visible symptom of this western orientation was the rejection of a role in the education system for African languages (in UNESCO 1996). In short, colonialism led to the negation of indigenous philosophies of education and the values inherent in them.

The ripple effect of the colonial pedagogisation project was the creation of an African with an identity crisis, one who years after the political independence of her motherland is still tied to a foreign philosophical umbilical cord and suffers from cultural and intellectual servitude. In light of this Ramose (1999:24) lamented: 'why is it that in the bottomless depth of learning and the limitless horizons of

knowledge, the African appears at best, only as an afterthought: a foot note with no significant relevance to the main body of the text.’ What is made poignant here is the fact that Africa is still hostage to Western epistemologies, and as such the African particularly African graduates had bifurcated consciousness due to their pedagogical socialisation. Rodney points out that: The educated Africans were the most alienated on the continent. At each further stage of education, they were battered and succumbed to the White capitalist, and after being given salaries, they could then afford [if ever they did] to sustain a style of life imported from outside ... That further transformed their mentality. (Rodney, 1982: 275). Thus, perpetual domination by an elitist education modeled on foreign epistemologies has led to cultural dissonance forcing learners into a state of bewilderment.

Read in simplifying terms, colonial education was not an education system that grew out of the African environment or one that was designed to promote the most rational ‘epistemological access to knowledge’ by the African child (Lotz-Sisitka 2009) and a sustainable use of material and social resources. Colonial education, with its inappropriate epistemology, rendered these children useless in their communities since they were unable to be self-employed. For Rwomire (1998:19), the role of colonial education in the service of imperial domination and economic exploitation caused a number of undesirable effects, such as economic inequality, social stratification, cultural and intellectual servitude, devaluation of traditional culture, and curricula that were irrelevant to the real needs of society. Colonial education created a knowledge myth which left most African learners suffering from intellectual poverty. Shizha and Kariwo (2011) are of the view that the knowledge myth was produced, reproduced and reinforced leading to Eurocentric knowledge attaining a whole repertoire of social, cultural and political superiority.

Postcolonial educational challenges: The Zimbabwean experience

Zimbabwe like most postcolonial African countries inherited a dysfunctional education system, far removed from the needs and expectations of an independent state. Upon attaining political independence the new government of Zimbabwe was faced with many challenges mainly to do with the social conditions of the majority who anticipated better social services and improvements in areas such as health and education. Shisha and Kaiwo (2011) state that in 1980, the new government inherited a system of education that was racially biased and unequal in both governance and quality. Notably the colonial bottleneck system in education was designed only for those intended to create the black middle class suited for colonial

administration. In the early years of political independence government policies in education focussed on both quantity and quality. The National Development Plan elucidates that:

Government recognizes that education is a basic human right. It also recognizes that education is an investment in human capital, which sustains and accelerates the rate of economic growth and socio-economic development. The challenge for Zimbabwe is not only one of redressing the educational qualitative and quantitative imbalances in the inherited system but also that of meeting the exceedingly large demands with limited resources. (Shizha and Kariwo; 2011:6)

During the first two decades of independence there was an assumption that tackling the quantitative expansion first would be followed by qualitative improvements, as a result there was a boom in school enrolments at all levels of education. Notably the number of out-of-school children declined and even to date the number is relatively low. This situation of expanding enrolments resulted in an over-burdened education system which has not been able to cope with the issues of educational equity. The shortage of teaching and learning resources and poor infrastructure particularly in the rural areas has caused an ever-ending rural-urban division. Chitumba and Chingombe (2013) observe that even to-date the urban-rural divide is still rife. Hence given the plethoric rural-urban divide it needs no special pleading to imagine the place of the newly established resettlement annex schools which the government has not even managed to register as fully established schools. The drive for the tremendous expansion was necessitated by the previous exclusions of the majority of Zimbabweans during the colonial era and also the need by the ZANU PF government to impress the electorate and garner more votes during election time. In light of this Chapman and Austin observe that, “there is a general tension and sometimes a direct trade-off between the political necessity to expand enrolments, the moral imperative to increase equity, the educational desire to raise quality and the overwhelming need to control costs”. Given the poor funding and understaffing of some schools in the nation one can surmise that the educational expansions Zimbabwe has witnessed in the past years has only been due to the political necessity to expand enrolments.

The agrarian advent of resettlement schools which were mentioned earlier-on has posed new challenges to epistemological access particularly at primary and secondary level. Resettlement schools in Zimbabwe come as a result of the hastily instituted compulsory acquisition of land, which left the ZANU PF government with the problem of what to do with the education of children of new farmers who constitute

the majority of the ZANU PF support base. Mavhunga and Mazodze (2014) elucidate that the government had to fast-track the establishment of resettlement schools because it was politically inexpedient not to accommodate the demands for education for the new farmer's children. After the compulsory acquisition of land the government was again faced with the challenge of building new schools to enable resettled farmer's children access to education. The government also had to supply teaching and learning materials to these schools to ensure quality, on top of these challenges there was need to improve staffing of teachers in these schools. The latter challenge was exaggerated by the massive exodus of teachers from the nation going to other countries in search of greener pastures. Shisha and Kariwo (2011) observes that the brain drain caused by the flight of teachers and lecturers has left the education system in a dilemma.

To deal with the problems the government introduced the 2-5-2 teacher training programme which is almost similar to the Zimbabwe Integrated National Teacher Education Course which was directed by Dr Chung in the 1980s. Teachers trained under this programme spent two terms at college, five terms of teaching practice and then two terms in college to complete their teacher training education. Critics of this programme have questioned the teacher professional standards, given that the lecturers at most teachers colleges lack teaching experience at tertiary level as they were hastily employed to cover the gap which was left open as the experienced lecturers moved to look for new employment outside the country. Moreover the government did not take adequate time to reorient the teacher training curricula to meet the demands of the new schools particularly resettlement schools. In light of this one can surmise that government efforts were in ignorance to the warning given by the Williams' Commission (1989) that quality should not be compromised by rapid expansion despite the need for widening access. The commission reasoned that:

Our first main concern is that the necessary expansion should not be at the expense of quality, and that the new institutions and programmes which we suggest Zimbabwe should now establish should be of a high standard, but we also regard it as crucial to ensure that in a proper enthusiasm for creating new structures and institutions, the authorities do not overlook the current needs of existing institutions or neglect to strengthen and consolidate what is already in place. (Williams' Commission Report in Shizha and Kariwo 2011).

Calls for Deconstruction of Western Epistemologies.

Considering that Africa is still entangled and trapped within the snares of the colonial matrix of power which includes control of knowledge systems and values, it is reasonable for us as Africans to come up with ways of liberating ourselves. Chung eloquently states that ‘the inherited colonial system of education have been preserved more or less intact, generally with the rationale of ‘preserving standards’, although these so-called standards were more illusory than real, with a very small elite enjoying exactly the same education as in the metropolitan country and the vast majority being deprived of any form of education at all’ (UNESCO 1996). Chung’s observation tallies with Zvobgo (1994)’s analysis that African governments have failed to dismantle the colonial systems of education. Aware of this observation and analysis we cannot afford in the 21st century to wait for our political leaders to chart the way to liberty, what is needed is a collaborative approach to our challenges. In the education sector which is the focus of this chapter it is necessary to deconstruct the present empiricist monoculture of knowledge and find alternatives for the inclusion of other forms of knowledge. This section therefore fosters the deconstruction of western epistemologies. It is envisaged in this chapter that the deconstruction theories were and are made with the hope that Africa will not be the ‘wretched of the earth in perpetuity’ (Mbeki 1998). The thinking in this chapter is rooted in the rich soils of Pan-Africanism, as such deconstruction ideas considered here are those that are in line with the pan-Africanist ideology.

It is upon the realisation that Zimbabwe has not yet been ‘Zimbabwe’ in a true, liberation sense, just like most African States. In fact we have not yet reached our supposed goal of real liberation because we are not fully liberated within, our knowledge systems are still at the periphery in the wider ecological system of knowledge. As Zimbabweans we are living in a new dysfunctional, super-capitalist version of Rhodesia, and what’s worse is our educational institutions are still privileging a monoculture of empiricist knowledge and also the graduates from these institutions are more steeped in Christian values a situation which reflects that the education system is not representative and reflexive of the multicultural status of the country. Deconstruction thinking invites us to think of new ways of liberating ourselves from the vestiges of western epistemological thinking. However, in advancing deconstruction thinking, I stand guided by Tanggaard (2014) warns us that ‘finding credibility for non-scientific knowledge does not entail discrediting scientific knowledge. It implies, rather, using it in broader context of dialogue with other knowledges (Valsiner 2014; 189). Thus, deconstruction-reconstruction thinking should help us create a situation where seemingly contending world views

are allowed to participate in the same process, much like bringing Eurocentric, Asiatic and Afrocentric ideas and epistemologies and synthesising them to create a cosmologic philosophy. This process assumes the form of what Santos (2012) termed 'diatopical hermeneutics'. 'Diatopical hermeneutics' according to Santos (2012) consists in interpreting two or more cultures (and also knowledges), aiming to identify isomorphic concerns among them and the different answers they provide. Such thinking stems from the idea that all knowledges/cultures are incomplete and may, therefore, be enriched by engaging in dialogue with or in confronting other knowledges/cultures (Santos 2012; Valsiner 2014).

Calls for African renaissance by intellectuals like Ngungi Wa Thiong'o (2009), Ramose (1999) Thabo Mbeki (1998), Bewaji (2010) and others who envision that African education should answer its purpose and respond to the needs of the times while at the same time giving forethought for the future, inspire and motivate the ongoing discussion. I consider Khoza (2007)'s reasoning that 'Our debates in this arena are informed more by our reaction to perceived intellectual imperialism and neo-colonialism and in our quest to assert our 'Africanness', our propensity has been to challenge and reject that knowledge whose heritage we could not claim as our own'. What has to be noted however is the fact that asserting our 'Africanness' we do not have to discard everything that comes from the West but retain that which is worthy-while and infuse it with our knowledge for the betterment of our continent. Deconstruction within the thinking framework of pan-Africanism enables us to value our thinking against that of others. This is so because deconstruction as argued by Santos (2012) contains an ethical imperative both to question our own beliefs and to understand the situation and views of others.

In this chapter deconstruction thinking is useful as a method/theory of epistemological critique, because epistemologies often operate by privileging some knowledge systems, values and culture while deemphasizing some. As Africans we have to critique some practices that were forced on us during colonialism, while during the same process bring to light some of our valuable knowledges which were devalued and dismembered during the dehumanising epochs of slavery and colonialism. Chitumba (2013) reasons that, we should be fair on ourselves and endeavour to qualify, quantify and distil the African ideas, so that we could also in future use them to contribute to the global village's philosophy basket which in this chapter is envisaged to also constitute the global epistemic-basket. Arguably approaches and programmes on issues of epistemological access in Africa would only succeed if they take due account of their unique historical, cultural and social

tradition. In a capsule, deconstruction thinking fosters social justice as well as cognitive justice, a situation where epistemological access to knowledge is made fair to everyone, where one can access all forms of knowledge not a monoculture of knowledge; and it should help us as African to look into ourselves and see what we can offer to the global community for a common sustainable future.

Given the arguments adduced in this section of the chapter the author wishes to stress the point that deconstruction thinking helps us to pave way for the grounding of epistemological access and education for African renaissance within an Afrophilia framework. The coming section discusses the idea of situating epistemological access and education for African renaissance within an Afrophilia framework.

Situating Epistemological Access and Education for African Renaissance within an Afrophilia Framework

“Education for an African Renaissance seeks to raise issues that education in a democratic, non-racial, non-sexist society should address. Issues such as a collective sense of efficacy; the positioning of nationhood at centre-stage; and the shaking off – once and for all – of Africa’s inferiority complex” (Khoza 2007). Most importantly it should be an education that answers Chung’s question: ‘can Africa reach a high level of industrialisation that will give it the level of economic independence that it has so far failed to attain and at the same time can it develop a successful socio-political system that preserves the best of the past while incorporating the universal values that will characterise the 21st century’ (UNESCO 1996). To achieve Khoza (2007)’s expectations which are synonymous with the expectations of many African educators and thinkers and also answer Chung’s highly penetrating question it is imperative to situate Africa’s education for African renaissance within the framework of an Afrophilia foundation. The philosophy that lends itself as a worthy philosophy is the Unhu/Ubuntu philosophy which embodies the African ontology, epistemology and axiology, and is also compatible with African socio-political ideology pan-Africanism.

Furthermore, if epistemological access to knowledge in Africa is to be conceived as a reality, there is need for a philosophical framework that recognises, represents and respects the indigenous people’s lived experiences. As mentioned earlier on the philosophy that lends itself as an adequate and competent indigenous philosophy of life for Africans is unhu/ubuntu philosophy. This is so for in the words bequeathed to us by Ramose (1999) ubuntu is simultaneously the foundation and edifice of African philosophy; it reflects the people’s daily lived experiences.

Ramose (1999) further reasons that ubuntu is the root of African existence and epistemology. In line with Ramose is Broodryk (2002:13) who elucidates that ubuntu, 'is a comprehensive ancient African worldview based on the values of intense humanness, caring, sharing, respect, compassion and associated values'.

Dewa (2010) reasons that, African communities should be encouraged to leverage their knowledge based on the solid foundation of Ubuntu, which our ancestors crafted over centuries. Arguably approaches and programmes on African contemporary education would only succeed if they take due account of the unique historical, cultural and social tradition of the new context. There is no need however for wholesale adoption of unhu/ubuntu (as the bag that holds all) neither should unhu/ubuntu be cast in a mythical past which is unresponsive to the exigencies of the present, but careful adaptation should be the watch word. Epistemological access to knowledge through the localised and globalised lens of unhu/ubuntu philosophy favours pedagogies that strike a balance between the past and the present in a gradual effort to create an informed future. It is an education set to inter-chain the unearthed valuable historical aspects of African culture with the precious aspects of modernity. The thesis that runs through this section is that, Africans should understand that being modern is not a question of sacrificing the past in favour of the new, but of maintaining, comparing, and re-membering values and knowledges created by their ancestors, so as to make them valuable to modernity. This conservative stance is taken to avoid engaging the historical in a duel with modernity; it should help Africans to aggressively and intelligently borrow technological knowledge and situate it within indigenous knowledge systems and then translate it into local languages for the purpose of education and development.

Proceeding with the ongoing discussion, it has to be noted that, allowing the African learner access to knowledge as anchored on an Afrophilia foundation and informed by the pan-Africanist ideology which is not frozen in space and time but rather pragmatic and living negates the advocacy for education to be primarily about revisionism. The author regards this new form of access to knowledge as the solution to a need of co-ordinating the old and the new modes of knowledge construction and transmission in order to maintain harmony between both. In other words education for an African Renaissance as Khoza (2007) clearly states is about how to visualize and create a future for Africa and her people, as opposed to how to recall and recreate Africa's great past. In this chapter knowledge not only indigenous knowledges but all knowledges are regarded as perishable, they could

be obliterated by new challenges and new understandings of the world around us. Thus we should aim to create a cosmologic philosophy of education which has the potential to allow our learners to constantly and consistently apply higher-order thinking, and such reasoning is not removed from the learner's environment and culture. Teachers therefore are invited to constantly engage in a continuous search for a new ways of teaching that liberate the learner to be an independent thinker and activity participant in achieving the African renaissance agenda.

Conclusion

The thesis that runs in this chapter is that acknowledging the residence of other epistemologies, particularly African epistemologies in the global education sector is the solution to a need of co-ordinating the Western and African modes of knowledge construction and transmission in order to maintain harmony between both. Hence a salient point raised in this chapter is that methods of learning that naturally unfold at home could be replicated at school with a recognition of the intergenerational methods, techniques, practices and the learning values in a critically constructive manner that narrows difference and othering. The role of pan-Africanism as an intellectual movement that aim to encourage and strengthen bonds of solidarity between all people of African descent and that of Unhu/Ubuntu philosophy as the African philosophy which embodies the African ontology, epistemology and axiology should not be under estimated in the reconstruction of African education and ensuring relevant and meaningful epistemological access necessary for African Renaissance. Finally, my parting shot is a quotation from Hooks (2003) who cited Parker: "education at its best – this profound human transaction called teaching and learning- is not just about getting information or getting a job. Education is about healing and wholeness. It is about empowerment, liberation, transcendence, about renewing the vitality of life. It is about finding and claiming ourselves and our place in the world".

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AFROCENTRIC DEVELOPMENT: THE MODEL WHICH MATTERS FOR AFRICA

Rich Moloi

Introduction

I begin with this quote from Afigbo (1993: 11):

“Why is it that almost every major situation so far known in history appears to have placed an African, his historians, sociologist and other cultural interpreters to invest him with the responsibility for what happens to and around him. The central peg in which many scholars.....have hung the African history is....’a race under perpetual siege’.....it means an African is an ‘effect’ rather than a cause, an object on which things act rather than a subject that act on things.”

How do Africans make themselves the subjects of development rather than its objects? In responding to this critical question which informs the basis of this submission, it is imperative to historicize the African development predicament resulting from a history of European colonization of Africa and the resultant effect of coloniality. Any attempt to de-historicize or pay no attention to the background of the African development predicament can only result in misleading and decontextualized analyses. Africa’s experience of colonialism was not merely an episode, but it was a process which safeguarded the systematic and well-orchestrated exploitation of the African continent and its people by Europeans. The legacy of colonialism in the post-independence era ushered a mammoth task to the newly established African governments to restore the humanity of the African peoples eroded through colonialism. Sadly the post-colonial state missed the mandatory liberation facet of decapitating institutional colonial legacy in all the nation-states in the continent. . In reality, African development project is not controlled by the general African populace. The African masses and their governments remain the subjects of programmed Western development processes and yardsticks. This clearly reflects that African governments’ respective decrees of sovereignty are concealments borrowed and misnamed political-economy autonomies which only translate to normalised post-colonial under-development frameworks guided by Western prejudice and development parameters.

Maldonado-Torres (2007), a leading philosopher in decolonial thought, explains the differences between colonialism and coloniality to create an impeccable understanding of how Africa as a continent and its people are trapped within complex colonial matrices of power. He articulates these two concepts as follows:

Colonialism denotes a political and economic relation in which the sovereignty of a nation or people rests on the power of another nation, which makes such a nation an empire. Coloniality, on the other hand, refers to long-standing patterns of power relations that emerged as a result of colonialism, but that define culture, labour, intersubjectivity relations, and knowledge production well beyond the strict limits of colonial administration. Thus coloniality survives colonialism. It is maintained alive in books, in criteria for academic performance, in cultural patterns, in common sense, in the self-image of peoples, in aspirations of self, and so many other aspects of our modern experience. In a way, as modern subjects we breathe coloniality all the time and every day (Maldonado-Torres 2007: 243).

In order for colonization to appear as a noble undertaking to Europeans' conscience and perception, it needed justification by appropriating the African people and cloning their minds into European subjects through a Eurocentric education system. For instance, the Bantu Education System which was instituted in apartheid South Africa. The violent and brutal nature of the invasion of Africa by Europeans enabled the dehumanization which gave birth to the enslavement of the African people for the sole reason of economic exploitation and the perpetuation of racial and cultural stereotypes. Viriri & Mungwini (2010: 28) argue that this violent encounter rendered Africans as embodiments of barbarism and other dehumanizing hierarchies of being. Mengara (2001: 1) further buttresses this view by stating that Africa was not only viewed as the Dark Continent. Africa was also perceived as the land of the despotic civilizations with no legacy of those democratic principles that have been enshrined in the West's self-image. This Eurocentric perspective prefacing Africa asserts that the rain began to officially precipitate in the continent during the (1884-1885 Berlin Conference) that signaled what many scholars refer to as the 'Scramble of Africa'. Otto von Bismark, the chancellor of Germany and the Chairman of this conference invited major western powers to decide on the fate of the 'barbaric' people of Africa. Plaatjie (2013:123) highlights that many scholars argue that the conference began a process of imperial domination, which was to open Africa, its people and natural resources to untold exploitation and domination for years to come. The Berlin Conference invitation letter reads:

The Conference Commission requests your immediate presence in Germany as a delegate to the Berlin Conference. You and your delegation, experts in the areas of economics, geography, ethnic, military history, and international negotiations, have been appointed by your government to represent them in this process. Each nation present will be allowed to participate in a three-day review and deliberation to determine the fate of the African Continent. Your timely presence in Berlin by 15 November 1884 will allow your country to be heard. As a Chairman of the Berlin Conference I assure you that your task will be difficult, but of supreme importance to the future of Africa, Europe, and the entire world (Bismark's Letter of Invitation 1884).

Africans did not know that their lives and future were being decided in their absence, let alone the unspeakable atrocities that were to befall them. The aftermath of the Conference enabled European powers to re-map, re-shape, re-name the present-day Africa according to how they viewed the world. Viriri & Mungwini (2010) mention that the indigenous African standards were replaced by monolithic African identities as was specifically reworked by the European empires, that is, names of towns, streets and institutions bore foreign designations and the physical environment was also not spared. The invasion left Africa and its diaspora wrecked psychologically, economically, culturally, politically and otherwise. In fact, the colonizers destroyed the philosophical and religious base of Africa and foisted the European system as a definitive cord of the colonised (Chukwuolo 2009: 29). Colonialism left two broad legacies on Africa, namely, denial of African identity and the foisting of western thought and cultural realities and perspectives on Africans.

Against this background, this work provides a critique to the Eurocentric conception of development, particularly, the modernization development theory, which is viewed to be a Euro- ethnocentric view of development. The submission is premised on Afrocentricity as a proposed alternative theoretical framework to the mainstream imposition of Western dictated terms of development in Africa. Apart from Molefi Asante's Afrocentricity theory, the research converses with other thought perspectives particularly, the post-development theories which challenge the hegemonic nature of the European defined ideas of development.

Eurocentric conception of Development: The idea of Modernization

The contemporary ideas and practice of development can be traced to the late

1940s through to the 1950s, and development studies as an interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary field of enquiry has been around for about approximately fifty years (Buch-Hansen and Lauridsen 2012: 293). Although scholars do not provide the exact date around which the discourse of development studies emerged, many seem to agree that the 1949 inaugural speech by U.S president Harry S Truman was a defining moment in the history of the present development discourse. An excerpt of his speech reads:

We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas. More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery. Their food is inadequate. They are victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas. For the first time in history, humanity possesses the knowledge and the skill to relieve the suffering of these people. The United States is pre-eminent among nations in the development of industrial and scientific techniques. The material resources which we can afford to use for the assistance of other peoples are limited. But our imponderable resources in technical knowledge are constantly growing and are inexhaustible. I believe that we should make available to peace-loving peoples the benefits of our store of technical knowledge in order to help them realize their aspirations for a better life. And, in cooperation with other nations, we should foster capital investment in areas needing development (Truman's Speech 1949).

It is without a doubt that 'development' in Truman's terms was seen as a "Euro-American missionary task of saving and developing the global south in general and Africa in particular" (Mkandawire 2011: 7-8). This Eurocentric narrative of development as an exogenous process perpetuates the colonial idea of portraying Africans as objects of European development. Daniel Lerner (1958: 1) affirms this view in his book entitled: *The passing of traditional society: Modernizing the Middle East*, when he writes: 'the only hope for non-European nations is to be modernized by an injection of Western values and expertise. He further states that the dissemination of Western values and ideas through Western mass media could help transform countries of the Middle East from traditional and primitive nations into countries with modern forms of social, economic and political organization (1958: 2).

Modernization theory, sometimes called developmentalism or development

doctrine which emerged around the 1950s supplied the working concepts through which Western Europe understood 'its obligation' towards those it considered unindustrialized, underdeveloped newly independent nations in the last half of the twentieth century (Cullather 2002:1). According to modernization theorists, their episteme is based on a conscious, purposeful, nonviolent change (Stewart 2010:22). In their perspective, modernization involves changing social structures, changing people's behavior and leading them to a new sense of what should be done. It is an all-encompassing process, which, in the general perception of these theorists proposes that developing states have to undergo for development to occur (Du Pisani 1980:67). Modernisation focuses on the deficiencies of countries viewed as less developed according to Eurocentric standards. Therefore, modernisation prescribes how developing countries can overcome their deficiencies to assume an accepted standard of development. (Joshi 2015).

Development in this context simply meant an effort for the underdeveloped to catch-up with industrialized Western world. This catch-up doctrine is indeed traceable amongst others to Rostow's growth stages (Rostow, 1960), and has recently been articulated by leading African intellectual voices such as Thandika Mkandawire(2011:13):

The idea of 'catching up' entails learning not only about ideas from abroad but also about one's capacities and weaknesses. 'Catching up' requires that countries know themselves and their own history that has set the 'initial conditions' for any future progress. They need a deep understanding of their culture, not only for self-reaffirmation, but in order to capture the strong points of their culture and institution that will see their societies through rapid social change (...). The real issue about 'catching up' is not that of simply taking on every wretched instrument used by their pioneers to get what they have- wars, slave labour, child labour, colonialism, Gulags, concentration camps- but of finding more efficacious and morally acceptable ways of improving the life chances of millions of poor people. (...) There would be no point in investing so much in the study if it involved simply regurgitating scripts that countries must follow.

The modernization theory was challenged from the Global-South particularly by leading Latin American dependency theorists, such as Prebisch (1959), Galtung (1971), Wallerstein (1974), Duvall (1978) & Ritzer (2007) who argued that what looked like development was actually a process of 'development of underdevelopment or of dependent development' (Buch-Hansen & Lauridsen 2012: 293; Stewart 2010: 39). The primary argument advanced by these theorists

was that the more powerful states (the centre, Global-North) took wealth from the weaker states (the periphery, Global-South). They believed that weaker states were funding the growth of the stronger states. The very idea of development assistance from wealthy states was seen as exploitative, paternalistic and coercive on the side of dependent states. Modernization theory was also challenged by critical counterpoint approaches, which criticized modernization process taking a form of large scale industrialization, urbanization and bureaucratization. Instead, these approaches suggested 'another development' with diverse need and equity oriented development strategies rooted in local cultures and local thinking, that emphasized self-management and participation, and that built upon small men and small enterprises (Hettne, 1990:152ff). Pieterse (1996: 3) states that the 1970s dissatisfaction with mainstream development further crystallized into alternative, people-centred, participatory approaches to development. However, Pieterse (1996) argues that the alternative development approach failed to offer a real alternative as it was also trapped within prescriptions of Western modernity. The only thing different was that it proposed the attainment of these Western ideals through a different methodology.

It is against these ideas that I argue that the notion and practice of development is entrapped within the imperialist project that seeks to justify colonialism of the non-Europeans, Africans in particular. Moreover, what I find to be more perplexing with this view of development is its inability to historically account for the immorality of European colonization and abuse of others in the attainment of their development status. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012:6) accedes that the Eurocentric notion of development meant opening up the African continent for untold economic exploitation and the permanent settlement of Europeans through force on the African occupied land. "Development meant the dispossession of Africans, forcing them off the land and transforming them into peasants, workers and domestic servants for European masters. Development meant the rearrangement of African agrarian systems to make sure they produce the cash crops needed in Europe and America" (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2012). This nature of development is established through dominating and taking from others, thus impoverishing them to the establishment and empowerment of Europeans. Plaatjie (2013:124) supports this view by stating that while the mantra of the 15th century was to civilize and to enlighten the 'soul-less' subalterns of the globe and to rescue them from their barbarity, which from a European perspective was seen as development, at the same time the worst form of barbaric acts were being committed to the colonized, and this is the darker side of this notion of development.

The ground-breaking book by Walter Rodney entitled “*How Europe underdeveloped Africa*” first published in 1972, also exposes how European colonial regimes deliberately exploited and underdeveloped Africa. Rodney in this book shifted the geography of analysis by clearly articulating the rippling effects of colonialism from Africa’s viewpoint. Rodney (1972) shows the comparative nature of the concept of development by which Africa, Latin America and Asia are only viewed as underdeveloped in comparison to Europe. The unbalanced pattern of development is created by the fact that Europe as the ‘exploiter’ becomes developed, while the ‘exploited’ become underdeveloped. The very vocabulary of describing others as developed and others as underdeveloped embraces a discriminatory and racist worldview which is premised on European hegemonic standards.

It is therefore my contention that modernization theory has nothing to do with development, conceived as philanthropic handouts towards the non-Europeans, instead this theory peddles coloniality anchored perspectives of conceptualising development. The weight of this perspective’s hypocrisy is its concealment of Europe’s under-development effect to Africa. The modernization theory also smokescreens European racism against the non-Europeans – who are misrepresented as beneficiaries of European development’s benevolence. In essence, the modernization theory represents a Eurocentric fundamental order and its exclusionists’ insinuations suggesting Europe is the epitome of modernization and a barometer apex of civilization. As such, Europe has the right to violently impose its autonomy on those it categorizes as under-developed in a bid to redeem them from their primitivism and traditionalism. It is in this context that Aime Cesaire’s *Discourse on Colonialism* (1972: 2) speaks of western civilization as colonialism, in fact, Cesaire’s question about what fundamentally colonialism is, unmasks such rhetoric as development, moreover as a cover-up for deeper forms of colonialism. These forms of colonialism go into the psyche of the colonized subjects while affecting and re-articulating their power, knowledge, being and nature. With this said, the question remains, should African governments still look to European countries for a development model? Or should they begin to think about the models that best suit their local circumstances? It is my argument that the idea and practice of development should not be divorced from the aspirations of the beneficiaries; instead it should be drawn from historical trajectory of the people intended to be the beneficiaries and elevate their living conditions.

An Afrocentric Development Paradigm

Against the background of European conceived development ideas and practices this chapter takes as its point of reference the idea of development as articulated by the Bandung Conference of 1955, whose point of departure is decolonization. This conference understood development to be an emancipatory counter epistemic route from political, economic, ideological and social domination that was installed through Western colonialism and coloniality (Makandaweri 2011:7). The essence of this delineation is, development entails outwitting the stumbling blocks to human happiness, attainment of material welfare, civil and political liberties, social peace and human security (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013). This objectively entails that Africa as a continent has a right towards self-determination and it must not be at the mercy of European states nor receive hand-outs in the form of development aid to attain its development status. While cooperation between African states and European states is necessary for development, it should not victimize African states as it has been the case historically. To this effect decolonization remains an unfinished task which requires deep commitment from African leaders. To substantiate the validity of this position I employ the theory of Afrocentricity drawing close perspectives from the theory's leading scholar, Molefi Kete Asante.

The Theory of Afrocentricity

Although the idea of Afrocentrism is a creation of numerous scholars, Molefi Kete Asante is credited as its leading proponent (Schrieber 2000: 653). The Afrocentric idea is employed on various levels, as an ideological standpoint (Karenga, 1993), a philosophical movement (Anderson, 1995), a nationalist movement (Collins, 1998; Cobb, 1997), as well as an epistemological and methodological approach to African studies and cultural phenomena Karenga, 1988, Akbar, 1998 & Asante 1983b, 1990b). This chapter engages with Afrocentricity as a worldview, paradigm and a standpoint from which the researcher engages with the world and interprets social realities. At the heart of Afrocentricity is the rejection of European particularism as a universal point of reference from which non-Europeans should interpret their realities. In the words of Walter Mignolo, geo-politics of knowledge goes hand in hand with the politics of knowing, as such all knowledges are situated within a given episteme residence and every knowledge is constructed (Mignolo 2009: 160). As such, Afrocentricity seeks to transcend the ontological, epistemological and methodological hegemony of Eurocentric social-sciences, through expressing an African-centered viewpoint.

In this regard, Afrocentricity aspires to overcome the tendency to interpret social

phenomenon from the colonizer's precepts (Western Europe) and to assess Africa's development needs and path based on the colonizers' agenda. The broader objective of Afrocentricity is to deal with the question of African identity from the perspective of African people as centered, located, oriented, and grounded (Mkabela 2005: 179). African people from the viewpoint of Afrocentricity should be re-located historically, economically, socially, politically, and philosophically. In this way they will overcome the syndrome of merely viewing themselves as a footnote in the script of European history or objects of European experimentation waiting to be developed. In his own words Asante asserts:

To say that we (Africans) are decentered means essentially that we have lost our own cultural footing and become other than our cultural and political origins, dis-located and disoriented. We are essentially insane, that is, living an absurdity from which we will never be able to free our minds until we return to the source. Afrocentricity as a theory of change intends to re-locate the African person as a subject. As a pan-African idea, Afrocentricity becomes the key to the proper education of children and the essence of an African cultural revival and, indeed, survival (Asante 1995:1).

The Afrocentric paradigm is a revolutionary shift in thinking proposed as a constructional adjustment to African disorientation, decentredness, and lack of agency. It is a paradigm based on the idea that African people should reassert a sense of agency in order to achieve sanity (Asante 2009:1). In Asante's words, 'Afrocentricity represents a deepening of the conceptual frames which brings us (Africans) close to ourselves and a sharpening of the distractions which will help us rid ourselves of the peripheral vestiges of a Eurocentric reality' (Verharen 1995:99). This suggests that African people should project their experiences in their own terms. As such, these experiences should produce paradigmatic scholarly discourses that are rooted in the consciousness of existential conditions (Asante 2007). On that note, Mazama (2007: 2) also asserts that Afrocentrism is not just a theory, but it is a liberating paradigm which emphasizes the need for reconceptualization of the social and historical realities of African people. Centeredness involves the centering of Africans in their own historical context, reality and time. This serves to demarginalize knowledge that has been marginalized as a result of Eurocentric dominance. Viewing Africans through European lenses results in an inaccurate and misleading interpretation of their social realities. Therefore, Eurocentrism as a paradigm although relevant in the study of European experiences should not be applied in a generalized manner to interpret non-European experiences, as this

would lead to a defective view of other realities.

It is on this basis that the discourse of development should be rescued from euro-ethnocentric bias of privileging the views of European scholars and social-scientists, rather it should be localized.

This is where Afrocentricity comes in as a redemptive epistemic tool for African scholars and practitioners of development to ground the understanding of development within the living realities of the African people. This approach creates a convergence point for meeting desirable solutions for development problems. These particular solutions are rooted within the local context, thus overcoming what Chambers (1983: 2-3) refers to as the 'outsiders perspective'. To this effect, Archibald Mafeje, an African scholar and a social anthropologist argued that social science disciplines suffer from 'epistemology of alterity', which refers to a scholarship rooted in a Western thought (Dastile 2013: 97). Mafeje emphasized the 'insistence on Africans to think, speak, and do things for themselves in the first place. This does not imply an unwillingness to learn from others, but this is rebellion to domination by others, irrespective of color or race (Mafeje 2007: 71). In essence, Africans must define development for themselves and determine what best suits African circumstances, thus overcoming European paternalism. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012: 21) also attests that for a meaningful and systematic decolonization of Development Studies to take place, there is a need to shift the geo-and bio-graphy of knowledge and begin to articulate the experience of development from Africa as a privileged epistemic site capable of formulating its own development trajectory.

Towards an Afrocentric Development Paradigm

Having articulated the intellectual determinations of Afrocentricity in respect to the development epistemic crisis, it is relevant to examine what should constitute an Afrocentric development paradigm. Afrocentricity proposes that we transcend the narrow Eurocentric framework in our interpretation of the idea and practice of development in Africa. Afrocentricity challenges all faculties of social-science and policy-making to shift the geography of reason and analysis from Euro-centeredness to African-centeredness. This means that the idea and practice of development should be engaged from the position of Africans as centered and rooted within their own existential realities. Africans should engage with development not as dependent beneficiaries of European conceived ideas of development, but as people capable of defining their needs and solving their own challenges.

This means the idea of development should not be interpreted solely to mean

economic freedom and overcoming the scourge of poverty in Africa, as this would be a narrow interpretation. Modernization perspective has used wealth (economic indicator) as a primary indicator to determine the level of the country's progress (Regan 2006: 22). This way of measuring development failed to account for social, political and cultural aspects of development. This gave way to the Human Development Index (HDI), which was devised by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and is now employed as a measure of development or human progress and quality of life by many countries. This indicator among other things looks at life expectancy, education and income (Regan 2006). On the other hand, there is an emerging pan-African centred perspective focusing on the 'human-factor' approach to development (Chivaura & Marariki 1998). This view states that human capital is a valuable asset of promoting development. Therefore, development practitioners and participants must have a self-driven attitude and positive orientation towards a particular angle of development they expect in critical areas of their respective communities' needs. As such, the pace of any development prospect must be determined by localised expectations of the world-view of the communities in concern. Then it is mandate of the human-factor (practitioners and participants) approach to correlate its expected function with societal growth in critical gaps of promoting sustainable human-livelihood. The human-factor approach and its Afrocentric underpinning is more relevant to Africa than the modernization model. This is confirmed by the continent's multifaceted repression to develop beyond economic limitations which the modernisation perspective to development seeks to address. As such, the relevance of the modernization theory is curtailed by realities of the multiple destructive effects of colonialism and slavery. These effects were not only economic and politically catastrophic to Africa's growth, but directly stagnated the gradual sustainable human livelihood pacing of the continent. The milieu of this reality confronting the development question in Africa validates the need for an epistemic transition from the modernization articulation of development towards an Afrocentric paradigm. This position is informed by the merits of Afrocentricity's inclusive character in unpacking the African development agenda beyond narrow Eurocentric/economic centred aspects of development as espoused in the modernization theory (which is negligent of the human-factor question). While the modernization school of thought indicators sought to account for the level of development of those considered as 'developing nations', this chapter problematises its narrow Eurocentric prescriptions to development. For this reason I argue that using these Europe determined standards would be misleading and building on stereotypes of what progress and development are in

multicultural societies of Africa. To this effect, Asante (2010: 2) asserts that the Eurocentric view has become an ethnocentric view which elevates the European experience and downgrades all others.

Afrocentric development should enable the relocation of Africans in their own cultural context. From that context they are able to become their own agents and subjects, rather than objects in a European frame of reference. With this said, I propose that development, as also suggested by Chukwuokolo (2009) be understood to involve a holistic evaluative process of the epistemic, cultural, economic, political, religious, normative, psychological and sociological stance of African people. Chukwuokolo's view affirms the expressions of the Bandung Conference of 1955, which perceive development as a redemptive human aspiration; development should promote the attainment of freedom from political, economic, ideological, epistemological and social domination installed through colonialism and coloniality. This conception of development offers a more holistic picture and seeks to outwit the reductionist tendencies which have measured development as solely an economic project, to the disregard of other contributing aspects.

Such a conception of an Afrocentric development paradigm should be framed from a clear understanding of African history, pre-colonial, colonial period and postcolonial. A historical view of the African continent would enable a proper account of the factors that have limited African people from realizing their dreams of a better quality of life. In the words of Ali Mazrui (1986) what Africa knows about itself, what different parts of Africa know about each other, has been profoundly influenced by the West. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2015: 485-486) highlights six long-term impacts of colonialism in Africa as identified by Ali Mazrui (1986): Firstly, colonialism and capitalism forcibly incorporated Africa into world economy, beginning with the slave trade. Secondly, the exclusion of Africa from the post-1648 Westphalian sovereign state system and the physical scramble of Africa after the 1884-1885 Berlin Conference, and the incorporation of Africa into the post-1945 United Nation state system. Thirdly, the incorporation of Africa into the Euro-North American-centric world culture and European languages. Fourthly, the incorporation of Africa into a heavily Euro-North American-centric world of international law. Fifthly, the incorporation of Africa into modern technological age, including being enmeshed into the global system of dissemination of information. Lastly, the swallowing of Africa into a Euro-North American-centric moral order dominated by Christian thought.

The unmasking of the above factors would enable a logical explanation of why

Africa as a continent is less developed in comparison to the European counterparts. The historically based account would dispel the mythologies imposed by Europeans scholars such as Hegel who propounded that 'Africa only hears the echo of the majestic march of world civilization across Europe and through which the absolute spirit fulfils and realizes itself' (Hegel, cited in Chukwuokolo 2009:29). Such revelations would deconstruct the negative images that have been implanted to see Africans as zoo-bound people who lack philosophy which is mankind's greatest intellectual achievement. Moreover, the historical analysis of the continent would end the tendency to teach half-truths, which is deliberately done by the euro-centrists as a strategy to suppress Africans not to know themselves so as to ensure that they never rise to oppose their oppressors. In the same way, European colonization indulged in dismembering Africa to be the replica of Europe and planting its memories in the psyche of Africans to reproduce itself, an Afrocentric development paradigm must do the re-membling of Africa and improve Africans quality (Bhabha 1994). An Afrocentric development idea should end the alienation of Africans and re-orientate them to themselves. It is within this context that Ngugi Wa Thiong'o in *Moving the centre: the struggle for cultural freedoms* (2008) argues that the center should be moved from the assumed location in the West to a multiplicity of spheres in all the cultures of the world. What this means for the study of development is that the African worldview must inform how Africans conceptualize their own development, thus overcoming the hegemony of Euro-centeredness.

Conclusion

In order for Africa to experience its own development path, Africa should be free to define and map out its key development priorities without the dictatorship of European countries. The legacy of colonialism which is continued by coloniality has ensured that Africa remains in the subservient position in relation to Europe even in the so called post-independence period. The pervasion of Eurocentric thought in socio-political and economic spheres has entrapped African governments from experiencing progress. It will take an Afrocentric thought to counter the negative effects of a Eurocentric thought which has contributed to the denigration of African voices. The discourse of development needs to be rescued from colonial entrapment in which Africans came to be viewed as dependent beneficiaries waiting to be developed. Instead, meaningful development should start with the local context; it must be relevant to the people and add value to their living realities. African-centered paradigms should take priority in the articulation of the development agenda, this agenda should be mapped from a clear understanding of the African

political history that privileges African people. The ideas about development and progress should not be defined by external bodies who serve their own hegemonic interests; this will ensure contextual relevance and will indeed contribute to justice and liberation of those who were marginalized.

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THE POST-COLONIAL STATE AND THE SEARCH FOR A NEW AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT PARADIGM: A VOICE FROM ZIMBABWE¹

Wiseman Magwa

Introduction

African countries are battling to find a suitable development model for the broader social and economic transformation of their people. Living conditions in most African countries are far worse than they were during the colonial era under the European nations in the 1960s and 1970s. For over two centuries now, Africa is not yet certain as to which path to follow as its people march towards the development destination. The continent has therefore to make a rational choice and select a development model that is appropriate for Africa. This chapter critically discusses the concept of development in an African context and the author argues in the chapter that discourse on African development for a very long time has tended to overemphasise concerns with Gross National Product(GNP), Gross Domestic Product(GDP) and Per Capita figures at the expense of non-economic criteria. The author asserts that development does not just involve the narrow minded calculation of GDPs, GNPs and Per Capita incomes but complete transformation of the socio-cultural, political and economic belief systems of a particular society to suit its present needs. In conclusion, the author recommends an ideological paradigm shift for the African continent so as to embrace a relevant development model for Africa which is likely to bring positive growth on African economies. The need for African leaders and their governments to move away from merely paying lip service and seriously start to promote African languages and cultures through real policies that restore dignity to African languages and cultures is finally emphasised.

1 This chapter is an adaption from Magwa W. & Magwa S. (2014) In search of a new paradigm for African development: Voices from Zimbabwe. *International journal of innovative social sciences & humanities research*. Volume 2 (4), pp. 19-27.

Background

It is no secret that Africa is wallowing in extreme poverty, well behind other developing nations in Asia and South America, and definitely centuries behind the Western civilizations namely United States and Europe (Nyikal, 2005:1). Africa's external debt has increased by more than 500% since 1980 to \$ 333 Billion today. In the past decade alone, African countries have paid their debt three times over yet they are three times as indebted as ten years ago. Africa the world's poorest region pays the richest countries \$ 15 Billion every year in debt servicing. This is more than what the continent gets in aid, new loans and investment. The debt burden is a new form of slavery which is as vicious as the slave trade. Africa spends four times more on debt interests payment than on health care. The World Bank debt on the African continent has increased to \$ 542 Billion in year 2013, an increase of 28% from 2012. Many scholars argue that the condition in Africa today is in fact far worse than it was during colonialism under the European nations in the 1960s and 1970s.

The author, in this chapter totally but painfully agrees that living conditions in Africa are far worse now than they were in the 1960s. However, it should be noted that colonialism in its new forms is the cause of all this. We are now experiencing a new form of colonialism, by the same western countries masked under the pretext of economic support for Africa through the World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The policies enforced on poor African countries through these organisations have chained Africa to continued dependency on western economies for mere subsistence, by preventing self help or self reliance to the continent's economic problems. In my opinion, the African debt problem and African mindset are the two biggest hindrances to sustainable development because the amount of debt in Africa has been constantly rising from the day African countries gained their independence resulting in African governments spending huge chunks of their annual revenue just to service loans, money that could go quite a distance in developing their economies. Fig 1, 2 and 3 show how external debt in Africa has grown between 1971 and 2010.

African Debt in Billions of US Dollars





Fig 1. Growth of Debt in African Countries
(Source: World Bank Development Finance, 2000)



Sources: World Bank Debtor Reporting System, International Monetary Fund, and Bank for International Settlements.

Fig 2: Growth of Debt in African Countries

The African debt from the World Bank has continued to grow over the years despite proclamations of independence and sovereignty by Heads of State as shown in Fig 2 below.




Fig 3. Net Equity Flows to Developing Countries, 2001-2010
(Source: World Bank, 2015)

The problem however lies in Africa's inability to service this debt. It is important to note that African countries are no longer able to service the huge debts and at the same time build their economies and fight poverty. It goes without saying therefore that the debt burden in sub-Saharan Africa is growing faster than the economy can handle. At present and in the near foreseeable future, there are no encouraging signs or any indicators to show that African countries will do better in servicing these loans. Indeed, poverty is on the increase as the debt burden

continues to grow bigger and heavier.

It is again common knowledge that most African countries are battling to find a suitable development model for the broader social and economic transformation of their people. Years have gone by and African nations have experimented with various economic/development models without tangible results (e.g. ESAP, ZIMASSET in Zimbabwe). It is evidently clear to all and sundry that Africa is trailing behind the rest of the world in terms of economic well being. Even though global poverty is declining due to rapid economic growth in India, China and other parts of the world, absolute poverty in many of the African nations is in fact rising (Sachs, 2005).

The Zimbabwean economy in particular, is in a freefall mode and life for millions of ordinary Zimbabweans is worsening by the day. The economy is in a very bad shape hence we need to join hands with a view to save our country. It is now a fact that our economy has changed from a manufacturing one to a retail economy. Real economic growth is estimated to have declined to 3% in 2014, 4,5% in 2013 from 10.6 % in 2012. Therefore the domestic economy continues to face a number of challenges including persistent liquidity shortages, declining productivity and output levels across key sectors of the economy, low foreign direct investments (FDI) and external lines of credit. The widespread closure of companies has also resulted in substantial job losses in the formal sector. According to the Employer's Confederation of Zimbabwe (EMCOZ), a total of nearly 4 000 employees were retrenched in 2013 as shown below.

Quarter	No of Retrenchees
January-March 2013	494
April-June 2013	585
July-September 2013	491
October-December 2013	806
January-March 2014	1326

Source: Retrenchment board

Table 1: Retrenchment Statistics (2013)

Source: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Quarterly Review, June 2014.


The country has also witnessed an increasing number of firms being placed under judicial management in the last two years. According to data obtained from the Master of the High Court, companies placed under judicial management rose from 9 in 2010 to 37 in 2013. The table below shows companies that were either placed under judicial management or liquidated.

Year	2010	2011	2012	2013
Companies Under Judicial Management	9	11	20	37
Applications for Winding Down	50	73	149	n/a

Source: Master of High Court, 2014

Table 2: Companies under Judicial Management & Liquidation

A significant number of companies are also failing to pay their staff on a regular basis, accumulating salary arrears and further adversely impacting on aggregate demand. The government in particular is heavily burdened by employment costs as shown below.




Source: Ministry of Finance, June 2014

Figure 4: Government Expenditure for the First Half 2014* (In 2015 the wage bill rose to 80%)

The Zimbabwean government announced in April 2015 that it will not be paying civil servants annual bonuses for the next two years as a way of creating fiscal space to stimulate full economic recovery (*The Herald* 14/04/15). Minister Chinamasa said the economy had been experiencing structural changes with most people venturing into the informal sector and this translated to a shrinking tax base.


As for the total exports from January to June 2014, these amounted to \$ 1 228.4 million against imports of \$ 2 996 million resulting in a trade deficit of \$ 1 767.9 million as shown below.



Source: ZIMSTAT

Figure 5: External Trade: January-June 2014 (US\$ Millions)

Against a background of reserve inadequacy and attendant resource constraints, the country has been accumulating external payment arrears as shown below.



Source: RBZ

Figure 6: External Payment Arrears (US\$ Billion)

Masvingo, for example is a province in Zimbabwe which has experienced the highest number of company closures in the country with 18.2% having been declared to be dormant (The Mirror, 2015:1). According to the Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency (ZIMSTAT) the country's economy has become more retail with the manufacturing sector shrinking to a tiny percentage of the overall economic activities. There are 700 players in manufacturing entities in Masvingo province compared to 40 000 players in the retail sector.

Questions which beg for answers are the following; What is the root cause of Africa's current state of under-development? What is the European explanation of underdevelopment in Africa? Is it poor governance, diseases such as malaria or poor approaches to development? Scholars, theoreticians and statesmen in the West and in the Communist world have propounded numerous explanations for the political, economic and social underdevelopment of Africa but few have sought to determine exactly what people of the underdeveloped countries themselves think about the problems of underdevelopment in Africa. What is the indigenous African's explanation of the causes of underdevelopment in Africa?

The Quest for a Relevant Ideological Paradigm

The seemingly insurmountable challenges in Africa naturally call for philosophical and ideological re-examining. Is Africa correctly positioned ideologically? Whose spectacles are being used to view the African world? Are people in Africa using the correct lens for 'seeing' or they are using borrowed eyes and minds to view the world? Who is at the centre of the African world view? Is it Africa or Europe? How relevant are the development models Africa is using to achieve economic growth? Certainly, there is need to push Africa to the centre of its world view and revisit everything from an African perspective.

The relevant philosophy amongst several ideological orientations such as Eurocentrism and others that should help Africa to come out of this economic mess is Afrocentricity also known as Africanism or Afrocentrism. Afrocentricity can simply be defined as a philosophical and theoretical perspective which became a growing intellectual idea in the 1980s as scores of African scholars adopted an Afrocentric orientation to data. It is a philosophy that is generally opposed to all theories that 'dislocate' Africans and place them at the periphery of human thought and experience. Afrocentricity seeks to re-locate the African person as an agent in human history in an effort to eliminate the illusion of the fringes created by Europe. For the past five hundred years Africans have been taken off their cultural, economic, religious, political and social terms and have existed primarily on the periphery of Europe (Asante, 1998). As a theory of social change, Afrocentricity intends to relocate the African person as subject thus destroying the notion of being objects in the Western project. The philosophy is the key to proper education of children and essence of an African cultural revival and

indeed survival.

All data should be examined from the standpoint of Africans as human agents rather than as objects in a European frame of reference. It's a philosophy that places Africa at the centre of all human activities carried out in Africa (Mazama, 2003). It is not a matter of colour but of culture that matters in the orientation to centeredness. An Afrocentric perspective should be able to provide contemporary Africans with new insights and dimensions to the understanding of phenomena. Afrocentrists are people who are not ashamed to claim their own cultural heritage because they are people who view the world using African eyes i.e. from an African perspective e.g. defining beauty using African criteria. Why should an African see himself or herself through someone else's perspective? A Chinese national does not view the world from an African perspective neither does a European views the world using an African perspective. Even an American will not do it. Why then should an African do it?

The central concern of Afrocentricity is to advance the position of African people in the world by affirming their identity and contributions and by unmasking the biases and limitations of Western culture. The goal is not to replace white history with black history or white mathematics with black mathematics, but rather to promote a more plausible view of the arts, humanities, social sciences and physical sciences as products not of white culture only but of human culture in plural form. There is need therefore for racial pluralism hence Afrocentric scholars espouse a much more inclusive valuation of human diversity, that rejects the exclusive, imperialistic and dehumanizing aspects of Eurocentric claims to universalism in cultural and intellectual life. In other words Afrocentrism means re-establishing Africa and its descendants as centres of value, without in any way demeaning other people and their historic contribution to world civilization.

The Meaning of Development: An African Perspective

The general contemporary discourse by Europeans on African development has tended to overemphasize concerns with Gross National Product (GNP), Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Per Capita figures at the expense of non-economic criteria. Development thinking particularly in Africa has been largely influenced by perspectives and models from the North, which view development in the context of the catching up, trickle – down and modernisation theories or westernisation (Harrison, 1980; Verhelst, 1989 & Makuvaza, 1998). These theories largely maintain that the underdeveloped nations display

backwardness in comparison with the rich countries. The poor countries need to go through the same stages of development as the rich ones. Implied in the theories is the view that the North has reached the zenith of development, hence Makuvaza affirms that:

What can further be deduced from the perspective is that development is unachievable, systematically elusive and a mirage for the not-yet developed countries. Unachievable because as the South struggles to catch up, the North continues to advance (Makuvaza, 1998:40)

Development models given to us so far by our colonial masters have not placed culture as a determining and essential factor in economic development. There is need therefore for Africa to re-examine current dominant paradigms and perspectives of development with a view to moulding a new model, which evolves from African cultures. We hold the view that development is total, processual, multifaceted, concrete, empowering, and also that “the purpose of development should not be to develop things but man” (Harrison, 1980:41).

Africa needs home based strategies and models of development thus it should therefore desist from continuously turning to the west, which may be quite underdeveloped in terms of human values. There is neither reason nor justification for Africans to continue copying models from Europe and America. The usual questions to ask about a country's development are the following:

- What has happened to poverty?
- What has happened to inequality?
- What has happened to unemployment? (Seers 1999:3)

If all three of these have declined, from high levels, then beyond doubt, this has been a period of development for the country concerned. If one or two of these central problems have been growing worse, especially if all three have, it would be strange to call the result development even if Per Capita Income doubled.

The World Bank took a broader perspective of the term development when in its 1999 World Development Report, it stated that development should be perceived as a multidimensional process involving major changes in social structures, popular attitudes and national institutions as well as the acceleration of economic growth, the reduction of inequality and the eradication of poverty.

In essence, it must represent the whole gamut of change an entire social system turned to that is moving away from a condition of life widely perceived as unsatisfactory toward a situation or conditions of life regarded as materially and spiritually better (Todaro & Smith, 2003). Economic growth cannot be sensibly treated as an end in itself, thus development according to Sen (1999) has to be more concerned with enhancing the lives we lead and the freedoms we enjoy. Sen further argues that values such as, being adequately nourished, being free from avoidable disease, being able to take part in the life of the community and having self-respect are basic elementary components of development. Development does not just involve the narrow-minded calculation of GDPs GNP's and Per Capita Incomes, but the complete transformation of the socio-cultural, political and economic belief systems of a particular society to suit its present needs (Fishman, 1989). From an African viewpoint, development should be complete, total and should affect the basic structures of society. The tendency to develop is inherent in all societies since every nation strives after development of one form or another. National development should always respond to the existential and expectations of society.

The Role of Language in Development

Africa appears to be a peculiar continent in that although for several thousand years it has communicated with languages indigenous to Africa, currently its dominant languages are not African in origin. While having achieved political independence and striving for economic self-reliance, African countries have remained very much dependent on foreign languages in communication (Bruthiaux, 2002:276).

Practically, all former colonial countries continue to carry out official communication with a foreign language and this is more of a de facto situation than an outcome of conscious political decision. As a result, Africans in general, all over, have a very low esteem of their own languages yet at the same time an incomprehensibly high esteem of languages such as English, French and Portuguese. A large number of post independence African governments have found it easier to agree on the former colonial language as the official language and this became the basis of terminologies we often hear about African countries such as 'Anglophone', 'Francophone' or 'Lusophone'. These terms mask the reality that more than 90% of people in Africa use African languages in their day-to-day activities and it is only about 10% of the elite who use European languages profusely in their day-to-day affairs. It is these 'chosen few' who

find it more appropriate to refer to African countries as 'europhones'. Chumbow 1987:19) and Herbert (1992:1) assert that most African nations have the overall structure of the language policies, which they have inherited from the respective colonial powers.

It is also poignant to note that many African nations are in the process of self-colonisation in the name of empowerment, access to education and globalisation. Namibia as an example has a predominant Ovambo population and its second most frequently spoken language is Afrikaans (Moodley, 2000:109). Though the country never was an English colony; English is nevertheless the only official language. There is mental self-colonisation among Africans, which leads to a dependency syndrome. African governments are the ones that sabotage their own languages by affording more attention to foreign languages like English. The ruling elite feels safer by simply doing nothing to promote or develop the main languages of their own country although these may be called national languages. African governments now need to realise that as long as African languages are restricted to oral use while children continue to learn in foreign languages, underdevelopment will remain a living reality on the continent. Chimhundu (1997) asks very interesting questions as shown below.

How can you guarantee democracy where the law of the country is not understood in the language of the people? How do you abide by what you do not know? How can you use information to which you have only limited access? How can you fully participate in anything or compete or learn effectively or be creative in a language you are not fully proficient or literate in? Above all, how can a country develop its human resource base to the full without the language of the people? (Chimhundu, 1997:7).

It is now time political leaders moved away from paying lip service to the promotion of African languages and cultures and come up with real policies that can restore the dignity of Africans, their languages and cultures. Development in Africa can never be achieved without serious considerations of the role of African languages in the development process. The Dutch scholar Hilbert Kuik cited in Prah (1993) aptly expresses absence of serious considerations of the role of African languages in African development saying that when people speak of developing countries, they immediately think of economic backwardness. This implies the elevation of African languages to a vehicular position in the exercise.

African development cannot obviate African culture, the culture of the

masses; rather it must sustain it and build on it. Scientific knowledge and practice must build on what has been formed within the culture of African people and failure to do will reduce Africans to mere consumers of artefacts produced in the Developed World (ibid). Since the rural masses do not know European languages, obviously the best way of reaching them for purposes of science and technological development is in their languages. Concepts and terminology in science should be constructed within indigenous languages and should engage the reality in which the rural population lives. Knowledge for the masses, must be knowledge which speaks to the masses in an idiom they know well, an idiom which is native to them. While reality itself is universal, the world of affective reality and the language in which it is expressed and perceived is historically and culturally bound. Each language it should be noted has its own audience who are the ultimate population base of the culture which that language defines.

A specific language provides the key with which the speaker unlocks the heritage of a particular culture within which a language is constructed. Languages are thus specific cultural packages with relevance tied to definite histories and societies (Prah, 1993). Language and development are so interrelated that it is impossible to talk about development without a mention of language. This is because language is often regarded as an integrating force, a means by which participation is facilitated or prevented and it is a vital tool in the promotion of nationalism. As such, it holds the key to the establishment of true democracy and equality (ibid). Since development is a process that involves the entire spectrum of the society with each individual making a contribution, the transfer of skills, new knowledge and any other vital information desired to effect production of quality goods and services can best be delivered to the target group through a person's first language.

Bamgbose (1991) points out that language is a powerful symbol of society, particularly if its potential is fully recognised and exploited. It can be a key contributing force towards nationhood and national development if properly managed. African indigenous languages can be used as vehicles of national development if put into proper use and these languages need to be looked at not as stumbling blocks but as potential national resources. As with all other resources, they need to be allocated in areas where they can render the optimal utility (Fishman, 1971; Jernudd & Das Gupta, 1971). In this way, each nation should look for the optimisation of the use of its national linguistic resource at the least possible cost. A language can contribute in at least two possible ways to

nation building. First, it can serve as a symbol of a particular national political identity and helps to establish and promote a national consciousness. A national language is like a national flag, anthem or dress in that it is a symbol of the political nation.

Secondly, a national language can contribute to nation building when it makes political integration possible both horizontal and vertical integrations, through facilitating communication between groups of people and between the elites and non-elites (the masses) thereby breaking down the barriers which keep these entities apart (Webb, 2002). A language can be a facilitator within which national objectives may be realised. The power relations in any country can only be addressed in a meaningful way if its citizens can communicate effectively with one another and this is the only way in which social transformation can really occur (i.e. through communication and the consequent establishment of a commonality of values and norms, points of view, attitudes, loyalties and social practices). National communication can only become a reality if the citizens of a country know each other's languages. African languages can also play a role in a country's democratisation process. Participation in the political life of the state implies that citizens are (i) involved in decision making (ii) being consulted about issues that concern them (iii) being kept informed by politicians and (iv) being able to communicate their views to political leaders.

In Zimbabwe for example, the language set up does not allow for satisfactory citizen participation in the political life of the country because of the following reasons. First, the language of political debate in the country is mainly English, which means that more than 75% of the population cannot follow the arguments of politicians, evaluate their views or hope to influence political decisions in any way. Secondly, effective communication between the citizens and the state administration is not possible since the official language of state administration is also English, which once again heightens the marginalisation of the majority of the country's citizens.

At its most elementary level, communication, using language can ensure a flow of information on various aspects of a country's socio-economic life. An increased flow of information in a nation provides a climate for national development, and this flow of information makes expert knowledge available where it is needed and provides a forum for discussion, leadership and decision-making. In agriculture for example, there is need to disseminate information on fertilizers, pesticides, high yield varieties of crops, appropriate

planting seasons, irrigation and preservation as well as marketing outlets. In health programmes, indigenous languages could be used to disseminate information on environmental sanitation, nutrition, preventative measures, first aid, immunisation, family planning, antenatal and child care (Rao, 1966).

Conclusion

It is evidently clear that Africa needs to re-examine current dominant paradigms and perspectives of development with a view to moulding a new model which should emerge from African cultures. Africa needs home-based models of development and should therefore desist from continuously turning to the West, which might be quite underdeveloped in terms of human values. African leaders must take every step necessary to resist any attempt by former colonial masters to reimpose a schoolboy-schoolmaster relationship. Through unity and a true belief in themselves, African people can realise genuine self-determination. Development in Africa will not be forthcoming until African government systems start using indigenous languages as official languages of instruction. Therefore, if Africa and Zimbabwe in particular is to make strides in economic development, then its people must participate in the development process through the use of indigenous languages and cultures.

I therefore would like to urge the Zimbabwean government to quickly put in place a culture policy and language policy in accordance with the provisions of the new constitution. The language policy that we would recommend for Zimbabwe could be code-named 'Integrated Multilingual Policy' (IMP) which will make it possible for Zimbabwe to accommodate all its languages, using them as essential tools of communication for development irrespective of their numbers of speakers.

The policy begins by recognising the fact that the Zimbabwean society is broad and diverse and it also recognises the diversity and socio-linguistic peculiarities of each speech community in the country, thus it does not attempt to specify a particular and specific mother tongue for all people at all times.

Furthermore, I would urge language and culture experts to spearhead the formation of the Zimbabwe National Language and Culture Council (ZNLCC) with a view to promote and develop indigenous languages and cultures of Zimbabwe. Use of indigenous African languages can only enhance people's participation in national development if the Government establishes a National Language and Culture Council (NLCC) as recommended by the National

Language Policy Advisory Panel (NLPAP) in 1998. The ZNLCC shall be a regulatory council with a national character and it shall be set up by an Act of Parliament. The main responsibility of the ZNLCC shall be to advise on language planning, policy, standard forms, use, promotion and development of national languages and cultures. The Council shall operate at the national level and shall have special responsibility to monitor the implementation of national language policy with respect to the languages spoken in the country and in the manner that is described in the constitution of Zimbabwe.

It is envisaged that each of the several indigenous ethnic groups in Zimbabwe shall have a National Language and Culture Board (NLCB) of its own name. At the level below the different National Boards there shall be Local Language and Culture Committees (LLCCs) which shall operate at the level of local community where any language group of any size can form such a committee at the local level. Above all these national language boards shall be the mother council, the Zimbabwe National Language and Culture Council (ZNLCC) that will be set up by an Act of Parliament.

The National Council shall have various technical committees to fulfil functions considered necessary by Council. On the other hand, the main responsibility of the LLCCs shall be to make recommendations for adoption by the respective NLBs to the National Council. In the case of minority groups which do not have national character, the LLCCs may make recommendations direct to the ZNLCC. Zimbabwe has after a very long time managed to develop its own constitution that gives respect to people's cultures and languages. The new constitution recognises and accepts that language and culture are basic human rights which are enshrined in the United Nation (UN), African Union (AU), Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Commonwealth Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) protocols. Provisions in the new constitution will definitely make Zimbabweans feel proud of their nationhood and more importantly enhance their participation in national development.

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This publication is a product of a joint academic enterprise by a cohort of emerging and well accomplished academics from diverse humanities and social-science disciplines. The collection is a landmark proof of the contributors' avid and mutual interests in grappling with the contested question of knowledge production, the challenges in governance and issues around citizen belonging in Africa.

The book sets out a pertinent enquiry to trace the source of our distressed political and socio-economic environment. The submissions posit that the problems confronting Africa are an inevitable output of misaligned structural thought-power inputs of the very "software" which channels the energy of governance to our public institutions. However, the ultimate goal of each chapter is to navigate a path for reinventions of a sustainable epistemology of developmental policy-making in all sectors of human-livelihoods. Key among the blind ties that have involuntary coalesced these scholars coming up with this book is Africa's search for unity and prosperity in the face ethnic strives and residues of racial inequalities.

Other matters that weigh into the significant of this collaborative exchange include, gender marginalities, ineptitude in policy-making and the asymmetrical distribution of development in the global system where Africa is a dependent appendage of Western domination.

The ostensible parallels in the issues discussed expose the urgency for a new and a much anticipated paradigm of Africa's liberation beyond the limitations of the territorial decolonisation parameters set by the very same systems of colonialism which Africa is still fighting to this day. At the same time, a highlight is made to indicate that whilst Independent African nations have narrowed the sovereign stretch of their respective self-determination they still have a role to play as subsidiary drivers of Africa's ultimate attainment of development.

