

**ON THE
SHOULDERS
OF STRUGGLE**
MEMOIRS OF A POLITICAL INSIDER

DR OBERT M. MPOFU

On the Shoulders of Struggle:

Memoirs of a Political Insider

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First published in 2020 by LAN Readers
an imprint of Leaders for Africa Network Zimbabwe

ISBN: 978-1-77925-106-0

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Preface

Ordinarily, people live to either make history or to immortalise it. Dr Obert Moses Mpofu has achieved both dimensions. With wanton disregard for the boundaries of a “single story”, Mpofu’s submission represents a construction of the struggle for Zimbabwe with the immediacy and novelty of a participant. Added to this, Dr Mpofu’s academic approach, and the Leaders for Africa Network Readers’ (LAN) interest, the synergy was inevitable.

Mpofu’s contribution, which philosophically situates Zimbabwe’s contemporary politics and socio-economic landscape, embodies LAN Readers’ dedication to knowledge generation and, by extension, scientific growth. LAN Readers is a social science research and publishing entity with the aim of contributing to emerging discourses on developmental issues of both national and regional significance.

Although the publication was initially intended as a reflection on Zimbabwe’s pre- and post- independence political journey with a focus on the impact of the liberation on contemporary politics, the November 2017 developments that birthed the “New Dispensation” necessitated a broader scope. While Mpofu’s contribution still follows the original blueprint, his book gives due regard to recent socio-political and economic developments.

Through a collaborative process with LAN Readers, the final form of the contribution took shape. It was never the author’s intention to pen a memoir. However, by contextualising the historical narrative within the personal – Mpofu breathes new life into the Zimbabwean story, colouring our history with a human element, a story with a depth and multifacetedness often absent from the standard textbook reading. This is the gift that LAN Readers presents to you.

*Pofela Ndzozi, Research and Publications Coordinator,
Leaders for Africa Network (LAN). Bulawayo*

Foreword

Throughout history, colonialists have made unrelenting efforts to decentre African national liberation movements. At present, it is the pervasive neo-liberal discourses that threaten to dismantle emancipatory causes on the continent. In the post-independence era, African sovereignty has consistently been subjected to deconstruction by the West and its imperialist proxies. It is against this background that Dr Obert Moses Mpofu's memoir mounts an African anti-colonial reconstruction agenda from a Zimbabwean perspective.

Already suffering natural attrition through the demise of elderly African national liberation fighters and leaders, the movements' atrophy has been precipitated by neo-colonial mechanisms and institutions. In the face of such protracted neo-colonial endeavours to dismantle African nationalist movements and the values they embody, an epistemic re-remembering of the liberation philosophy is called for. Indeed, in contrast to permanence, the epithet "movement" itself signifies ephemerality which warrants perpetual dialogue.

Appropriated by neo-liberally inclined non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society organisations (CSOs), African national liberation designs have been erased and supplanted by neo-liberal schemes, with Africans engrossed in empty-shell neo-liberal discourses where they should instead be focused on the reclamation of their land and other resources. Accordingly, Mpofu stresses the principal motive of the armed struggle as economic in nature - while noting that politics was, and still is, used simply as a tool for "democratising the economy."

Paradoxically, in lieu of taming neo-imperialist forces, Western CSOs have preoccupied themselves with the post-independence phase of neo-colonialism, courting citizens to pursue empty-shell neo-liberal freedoms.

Consequently, Africans have abandoned the struggle for land restitution and other resources in favour of secondary neo-liberal struggles for freedom of movement, freedom of press and so on. These neo-liberal freedoms, though significant, have been deceptively presented by global capitalism as mutually repelled from economic democratisation.

Indeed, whenever resource nationalism or other emancipatory ideas blossom in the so-called Third World, they are swiftly uprooted by the West, repackaged and branded as an affront to property rights or tyranny. Our people and their future leaders have, therefore, given primacy to comparatively immaterial ideals that serve in part to detour Africa's path towards economic liberation. In light of this, comrades such as Mpofu, whose commitment to holistic African liberation has remained consistent, are worth celebrating. In a global environment dominated by neo-liberal ideologies, Mpofu's contribution offers a relevant contemporary antithesis to a Western political doctrine that rallies African youths against their own liberators. Ironically, the same external forces that disparage African liberators and leaders, gloss over their hand in perpetuating the global status quo through their failure to restitute the victims of colonialism.

From Julius Kambarage Nyerere, Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela, Robert Gabriel Mugabe, Samora Moses Machel and Kamuzu Banda, the African national liberation agenda is being consigned to history as nationalist founding fathers depart for the next world before their wisdom has been sufficiently tapped for posterity. Thus, while African national liberation movement leaders such as Dr Sam Nujoma, Dr Hifikepunye Pohamba, Dr Kenneth Kaunda, Cde Jose Eduardo dos Santos, Dr Hage Geingob, Cde Thabo Mbeki, Cde Jacob Zuma, Cde Emmerson D. Mnangagwa and many others are still alive, African youths need to be reoriented to the African liberation agenda. Cast as mere historical trinkets, African national liberation movements must appeal to the African youths whose attention is increasingly captured by neo-liberal institutions and organisations. As it stands, the colonial appetite is not only unsatisfied by the continued looting African resources but also seeks to consume African minds and histories. To this end, Mpofu's submission offers a relevant counter-hegemonic alternative to this crisis of ideas.

In dissecting the minds of African liberation heroes and fighters such as Mpopu, African youths are reoriented to the exigencies of the struggle to free Africa from the external predatory forces which pose as the would-be liberators of the same continent that they have dispossessed and exploited for centuries. Left without land, without history, and without jobs, African youths face bleak futures unless they revert to the African liberation plans to repossess their land and use it as a source of livelihood in the emergent deindustrialised world. While African youths have been persuaded by neo-liberal ideologies to desist from repossessing their land in favour of employment, the ongoing Fourth Industrial Revolution is diminishing the very jobs which they had been promised. As such, African youths will not only confront landlessness but also utter joblessness - and it is then that they will remember their liberation heroes' calls to repossess the land.

*Artwell Nhemachena, (PhD) – University of Namibia
& Visiting Associate Professor, Kobe University, Japan*

Commendations

From the reviews of *On the Shoulders of Struggle: Memoirs of a Political Insider*.

The politics of self-writing is always a subjective enterprise. Conscious of this vice that naturally haunts autobiographical Truths, Mpfu here makes bold claims of providing a contrasting narrative – a counter discourse to the tainted official historical metanarrative and other self-written historical accounts of the Zimbabwean nation-state. Writing within the genre of self-writing, which is defined more sturdily by its paradoxes than by what binds it together, the narrative (re)configures our views of some of Zimbabwe’s exalted father figures, glorifying and challenging “grandstandings” by some of them, albeit controversial. Imbued with a politics of its own that starkly threatens any possibilities of narrating cohesive self-imaginaries of the Zimbabwean nation-state, the memoirs further espouse Mpfu’s convictions on the contexts that shaped liberation war movements during the colonial era and continue to shape contemporary Zimbabwe’s political and socio-economic landscapes. A powerful political account narrated from the perspective, for a change, of the foot soldier of Zimbabwe’s revolutionary war!

Collen Sabao, (PhD) – University of Namibia: Languages and Literature Department

Writing as an insider, Obert Mpfu brings to the fore both historical realities crucial for understanding contemporary socio-political and economic Zimbabwean realisms. The autobiography is an important “piece” of the larger Zimbabwean political and historical jigsaw puzzle. Discourses on the Zimbabwean question have been shaped by historical, political, socio-cultural and economic realities in the country, region and beyond. Thus, Obert Mpfu contributes to this Zimbabwean discourse from the perspective of an active senior political player. Directing the reader to underlying philosophical underpinnings situating not only Zimbabwe’s contemporary economic challenges but political realities as well, Mpfu’s memoir comes at an opportune time when the Second Republic is still in its infancy. Addressing fundamental aspects that are always part of the debate on Zimbabwe’s nationalism and democracy, the memoir exposes Obert Mpfu “the participant” and not “the person”, thereby unlocking as well as providing reputes of the ruling party since independence. He also projects ideologies and counter-ideologies (or lack thereof) that guided “Zimbabwe founders”, both dead and alive as led by the late Joshua Nkomo as well as Robert Mugabe, and those used (and still perfected) by Zimbabwe’s adversaries both in and outside the country. Continued debate on the Zimbabwe question is crucial and Obert Mpfu has played his card while still in service at a time when his political dusk begins to beckon.

Umali Saidi (PhD) - Senior Lecturer, Midlands State University

On the Shoulders of Struggle: Memoirs of a Political Insider is a brilliantly engaging reflection, a fly-on-the-wall as well as an inside account of a turbulent journey. It highlights a raging battle between colonial appropriation and the quest for post-colonial economic

democratisation. Mpofu extensively discusses the “constitutional illegality” of post-independence property rights emanating from the shortfalls of the Lancaster Agreement. The volume offers a thematic underscore on the democracy and human-rights discourse which raises a crucial question: Is the West’s argument on alleged flagrant abuse of the same by the state rooted in upholding fundamental rights or a deeper seeded neo-colonialist agenda? For me, this memoir presents a clarion call for the legal fraternity in Zimbabwe to proffer decolonial mechanisms for upscaling social justice, conflict resolution and transformative justice.

Rumbidzai Venge – Legal Practitioner and Current Affairs Broadcaster

On the Shoulders of Struggle: Memoirs of a Political Insider is a product of a patient introspection by an active Zimbabwean politician. To the discerning reader, the politically abstract side of the narrator is illuminated. Beyond the insights into Mpofu’s life history, the liberation struggle and the post-liberation struggles of a Zimbabwe discovering, establishing and claiming its position on the world map is widely illustrated.

Tinashe Matiyenga – PhD Candidate, Fort Hare University & Part-Time Lecturer, Lupane State University

A coherent narration of the country’s armed struggle and life of Dr Obert Mpofu. The memoirs, laced with scholarly substance and written with journalistic flair, are a great addition to our liberation and political literature. The memoirs are a must read for those in the media fraternity and academics in the field of public policy.

Mkhululi Sibanda – Assistant Editor, Sunday News

Beyond self-location and historicity, this self-written account explores critical subjects on Zimbabwe’s political economy. The narrator who is a “political insider” insightfully accounts for the post-independence state management constraints with a view to proffer lasting solutions to the Zimbabwean crises. In delineating the problems, Dr Obert Mpofu challenges the reader to appreciate the status quo beyond the tenets of neo-liberal reason. In transcending the Zimbabwean scope, the author suggests the need for Global South statecraft to counterbalance Global North hegemony. Through this autobiography an Afro-centered positioning of African political affairs is prescribed.

Teddy Ncube – Political Scientist and Policy Analyst

Dr. Obert Mpofu’s contribution is a welcome contribution to the narratives of liberation war memory as he belongs to the generation which fought for Zimbabwe’s freedom. The author’s experiential account on several political issues transcends the narrow routines of third-person accounts of the Zimbabwean story. Coming from an active political player, this memoir is a significant alternative contribution to the mainstream political discourse.

Brian Maregedze – Author, Historian & Columnist

Abbreviations

AAG	Affirmative Action Group
ANC	African National Congress
APs	Assembly Points
AU	African Union
BMATT	British Military Advisory Training Team
CAZ	Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe
CSC	Cold Storage Company
CSOT	Community Share Ownership Trust
CCJPZ	Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe
CSOs	Civic Society Organisations
DIMAF	Distressed Industries and Marginalised Areas Fund
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FLMs	Former Liberation Movements
FRELIMO	Mozambique Liberation Front
FROLIZI	Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe
FTLRP	Fast-Track Land Reform Programme
GNU	Government of National Unity
IFI	International Financial Institutions
IUEF	International University Exchange Fund
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MK	Umkhonto We Sizwe
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
PAIGC	African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde
PF	Patriotic Front
POLAD	Political Actors Dialogue
RF	Rhodesian Front
SADC	Southern-African Development Community
SDA	Seventh Day Adventist
SRANC	Southern Rhodesia African National Congress
UANC	United African National Congress
UK	United Kingdom
USA	United States of America
ZANLA	Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
ZANU PF	Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union
ZDF	Zimbabwe Defence Forces
ZIDERA	Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act
ZNA	Zimbabwe National Army
ZNLWVA	Zimbabwe National Liberation War-Veterans Association
ZNP	Zimbabwe National Party
ZPRA	Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army
ZRP	Zimbabwe Republic Police

To the Living and Departed Anti-colonial Freedom Fighters.

Introduction: Obert Mpofu and Self-Writing in Zimbabwe

Richard Runyararo Mahomva

The Tradition of Self-location

Auto/biographies belong to the self-writing genre. The key authorship motivation for memoirs and biographies is premised on direct and self-experiences of certain socio-economic and political actors (McArthur, 1992; Gusdorf, 2001). Historical location of the narrative actor(s) forms the bedrock of self-writing. The foregrounding to self-write is to trigger intended audiences to make sense of the present and assert the future from the perspective of the narrative insider. With political self-written accounts, authors share lived experiences of their interaction with power at varying levels. In Zimbabwe this has seen political players across the institutional and ideological divide actively involved in writing their autobiographies and, in the process, “writing the nation”.

Through political life-narratives, the contestation of ideas has been deeply explored. This way, it can be concluded that political self-writing has a tendency to galvanise the authors’ ideological biases and the political organisations they represent. Political auto/biographies have also been used to deconstruct the ideological positionality and political credentials of authors’ opponents. Therefore, like any other literature, biographies are written from a locus of ideological interest. By design, self-recollection must either compliment or defy the given mainstream historicisation of socio-economic and political events and processes (Woodward, 2002). Over the years, self-reminiscence has contributed to national historiography. In the same light, memoirs are a source of reference for political and economic science knowledge generation.

Usually, memoir authorship is premised on the normative ambition of recreating the self (storyteller) from the 'other'. The effect of self-remembering which informs memoir-making either associates or disassociates the narrator with a particular set of ideas or certain fraternal leanings. In the process, autobiographies underscore their storytellers' sympathies and intolerances on various issues.

Self-Writing and the National Question

This is a political account of the Zimbabwe's liberation story based on perspectives and lived experiences of Obert Moses Mpofu. His connection to Zimbabwe's political history dates back to 1967 when he joined the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZPRA). The author's self-attachment to the history of Zimbabwe is prominently located in the country's post-independence politics. The interwoven connection of Mpofu's transition from being a liberation combatant, high-ranking official in the cooperate-world to a senior Government official and a leader in the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) offers a multi-dimensional critique of Zimbabwean politics from a deep-rooted nationalist perspective. The author's participant grounding as mentioned above authoritatively informs this submission which transcends the generic historic elasticity of self-writing to claim space in the humanities and social sciences.

The reminiscences are largely confined to Mpofu's views on Zimbabwe's political culture, the philosophy of the nation's liberation, particularly how it has been conserved as a moral premise for Former Liberation Movements (FLMs). The themes of this book respond to some pertinent enquiries which dominate political theory, historiography and hagiography in Zimbabwe:

What has been the thought-premise of Zimbabwe's revolution?

What has it achieved and what does it stand to achieve?

In response to these two critical questions, Obert Mpofu retrospectively accounts for his involvement in the struggle against colonialism since 1967, at the early age of 16. Through an exhaustive pensive glance to Zimbabwe's political history from Obert Mpofu's perspective, the reader

re-encounters Zimbabwe's journey before and after independence. As such, this contribution tackles the history of internal contradictions within the nationalist movement. He illuminates the enduring values of Zimbabwe's anti-colonial project. The mainstream narrative on *Gukurahundi* is also deconstructed in this account. The topical issues of democracy, human rights, property rights and other freedoms are also discussed. The author also highlights the profound influence which the late Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe had on his political career. The author's involvement in the birth of the "New Dispensation" is also articulated. In every chapter, the author forecasts the future of ZANU PF and other liberation movements in the region and across Africa. This serves as a deliberate attempt to remind those who sympathise with liberation movements to work hard for the reinvention of the tenets of Africa's freedom, given the persistent strategies deployed by imperialists forces to dominate Africa.

Obert Mpofu's long service in the cabinet under the late Robert Mugabe corroborates his self-location in the political-economy debate of Zimbabwe. The memoir is more organic in as much as it is informed by his intimate interaction with high-level detail of statecraft issues. Moreover, his leadership ascendancy in the ruling ZANU PF as a Central Committee member in the late 90s and his subsequent elevation to the Politburo over the years, as well as his current position as ZANU PF Secretary for Administration, gives the authorship of this self-account a high discursive authority on Zimbabwean politics. Indubitably, the substance of this account accurately reaches out to aspiring national leaders.

This text reminisces the path of political survival by perhaps one of Zimbabwe's political doyens. In this turn of personal recollections, the author is holding the political aspirant (now as a teacher) by the hand in writing himself back to history. Touring through a life passionately lived for the love for Zimbabwe, the reader sees through the gaudy images of young Obert Mpofu joining the armed struggle up until to this day where the man stands as a grandmaster of political craft.

Self-Narratives and Alternative Inventions of Memory

By their very nature of self-representation, auto/biographies are inherently identity-centred. In this way, auto/biographies stimulate debate between those who identify or dissent with the ideas of self-location as presented by the memoir protagonist/narrator (Smith and Watson 2001). In inventing oneself as a protagonist, alternative representations of those who identify with characters projected as antagonists in a memoir – or the said antagonists – are then bound to create counter-narratives. In this sense, when reading Edgar Tekere's *Lifetime of Struggle* (2007), and Joshua Nkomo's *The Story of My Life* (1984), one cannot miss apparent efforts in both memoirs to de-centre Mugabe as a betrayer of the values of the liberation struggle.

Dr Joshua Nkomo's autobiography, published in 1984 while he was in exile in the United Kingdom (UK), captures his disgruntlement emanating from his political alienation and the political violence inflicted on his supporters between 1982 and 1987 by the state. Having been a victim of public castigation by Robert Mugabe the then Prime Minister of Zimbabwe (1980-1987), Nkomo's autobiography becomes an influential counter-narrative. This aptly expresses the role of political memoirs as the authors' responses to external representations by their political opponents (Smith and Watson 2001). This view asserts that memoir writing is usually grounded on the need to respond to external representations of the self. This entails the inevitable facet of subjectivity associated with autobiography authorship and its responsiveness to the public construction/representation of the concerned narrator. To this end, self-writing is usually immersed not only in historical self-location, but it seeks to expose personal achievements, ideological convictions and other direct self-appraisal viewpoints. When put into perspective, one can note that the public disparagement of Nkomo's liberation credentials as the "Father of Dissidents" by Mugabe might have influenced the authorship of Nkomo's autobiography.

As a way of confronting the public ridicule, Nkomo engaged in an exercise of historically writing himself in a bid to negate the undermining of his notable legacy to Zimbabwe's liberation. To this effect, a cross-

cutting theme in Nkomo's *The Story of My Life* (1984) is that of his grand political credentials which had been dismissed. Nkomo's emphasis on political seniority in his memoir is deployed to substantiate his long and uncontested walk in the fight for Zimbabwe's liberation. The book projects Nkomo as a circumstantially marginalised master-builder of the nationalist movement. Through this writing, Nkomo, re-centres himself into the history he had been politically de-centred from after losing the country's first election into independence in 1980 and being subjected to persecution.

The memoir vividly points out to Nkomo's legitimate entitlement to power though he suffered political victimisation at the time the book was published. After the signing of the Unity Accord in 1987, with Nkomo now part of the Government he had expressed resentment towards, it becomes evident that memoirs harbour subjective political realities. Self-representative prejudice is put to test by changing dynamics of power. The irony of Nkomo's self-representation as an isolated political figure is whitewashed by his role as the Vice President of Zimbabwe after the signing of the Unity Accord in 1987. He was also accorded the national fatherhood status as "Father Zimbabwe" after being referred to as the "Dissident Father" at some point. In December 2013 the state-sponsored immortalisation of Joshua Nkomo through the erection of a statue in his honour outlives his self-presentation as a political victim in his memoir.

The subjectivity of the account of the life and experience of the narrator sometimes serves as a locus to self-exaltation at the expense of the credentials of one's fellow counterparts historically located in the epoch of the narration. This is aptly validated in Tekere's memoir, *A Lifetime of Struggle* (2007). In his book, Tekere (2007) presents himself as the most brilliant military and political stalwart of the liberation struggle. He boasts of his ability to sail across the chasm of the tense military and political structures in the armed struggle. In his life-account, Tekere is postured as ZANLA's military reformist. He is presented as a meticulous military strategist, the most radical nationalist and Mugabe's top ally. He even attempts to diminish Robert Mugabe's liberation credentials as he argues that Mugabe could not even use a gun even though he was a leader of a guerrilla movement. Therefore, political memoirs as crucial sites of

personal reflection which are linked to narrating the nation may either immortalise political contestations or catalyse national healing. I am optimistic that this personal reflection by Obert Moses Mpofu will solely contribute to the latter.

Due to memory loss, sometimes selective amnesia, expedient and self-serving truths, memoirs may fall short of factual consistency. This inevitably necessitates the need for filling the knowledge gaps which each auto/biography presents in articulating issues aligned to a certain time and space. Therefore, auto/biographies, especially from political luminaries like Obert Mpofu, are not exhaustive of absolute political truth. This position is validated by Javangwe (2011:19):

The reliance on memory introduces a clear problematique in the study of political auto/biography as it implies recreating the past events, experiences, history and perspectives from it. Memory has its inherent politics of deliberate or inadvertent omissions and commissions, falsifications and reconstructions to suit present circumstances. All this means that sources in auto/biography writing are only useful to the extent to which they coincide with the act of the writer's remembering, or preferred memories.

However, such contributions are welcome to the body of knowledge as they offer a space for a robust exchange of counter-narratives which defy the linear historicisation of Zimbabwe's political evolution. I am confident this publication will inspire further national dialogue(s) beyond the limitations of the linear representations of nationhood. Undoubtedly, this submission will incite the much needed intellectual vigour for the reproduction of more national chronicles by Zimbabwe's prominent political actors. Mpofu's thought fluidity in critiquing some official narratives makes this publication a sterling input in the pool of unconventional national memories. This book gives a fair share of Mpofu's nod to some given truths in the public domain but goes further to question some 'habitual-truths' associated with the anti-establishment academic world. In Chapter 9, he discusses the neo-colonial genesis of Zimbabwe's economic crisis by historically locating the patrimonial and predatory economic governance challenges faced by Zimbabwe today.

In Chapter 10, using the contested Zimbabwean land question, Mpofu unpacks the neo-colonial linkages between the democracy and power contestations in Zimbabwe:

The convenient argument of corruption, bad governance, deteriorating human-rights and collapse of democracy has been massively deployed to authenticate the neo-liberal ideological existentialism of the regime-change project in Zimbabwe. As such, the major polarity of our politics has been divided along ZANU PF aided ‘authoritarian patronage’ and the opposition-driven fight for ‘democracy and upholding of human rights’ (p 146).

Mpofu further posits that “the academia and civil society have been a convenient and an indirect ally of the opposition in the deliberate manoeuvres to clamp ZANU PF’s hold to power” (p 147). Therefore, the thrust of self-location and its dislocation effect to a particular branch of ideologically dissenting actors will certainly attract a vigorous contestation of ideas.

The constant penchant to rethink mainstream discourses linked to Zimbabwean politics in every chapter generates affluent controversy. At the same time, the deliberate approach applied by the writer to “go against the grain” subtly responds to polemic neo-colonial reactionary narratives against ZANU PF. Mpofu locates the significance of this controversy in the need to challenge Zimbabwe’s demonisation by those “serving imperial interests”.

Also noteworthy is that most political autobiographies have been produced by former ZANU PF insiders or some leaders who were temporarily isolated by circumstances from ZANU PF. Disgruntled former colonial farm owners and their proxies have also been actively involved in auto/biography writing mainly after the post-land reform programme. Such auto/biographies are widely celebrated by neoliberal institutions because of their thematic denigration of Zimbabwe’s land redistribution exercise. Therefore, over the years, the Zimbabwean knowledge landscape has been awash with auto/biographies of politically marginalised characters, hence in ‘writing themselves’ into mainstream politics they

engaged in self-re-centring and locating their historical contributions to political legitimacy in the court of public opinion. In the process of this self-re-centring, those in the centre have become marginalised.

The politics of nationalist historiography in Zimbabwe

Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Willems (2009), building upon Ranger (2004)'s castigation of nationalist historiography submit that the state deployed 'commemorative nationalism' and made it the core of ZANU PF's hegemony to conceal Zimbabwe's post-2000 economic decline. ZANU PF has been castigated for monopolising its predominant connection to nationalist memory for political expedience. However, several historians and political academics have ignored how the post-land reform era has produced neo-liberal inclined academia. The post-land reform era resulted in hyped global market-oriented writing which was aimed at "exposing" Zimbabwe as a failed state. Those who have attempted to locate the protagonist role of the liberation movements have been labelled "regime enablers" bent on promoting what Ranger (2004: 220) classifies as "patriotic history":

The history instructors in the youth militia camps are war-veterans and it has been suggested that 'patriotic history', with its focus on violent resistance, is the result of the re-emergence of the ex-guerrillas at the centre of Zimbabwean politics... The rhetoric of patriotic history displays 'the same dynamic that I have shown characterised the relationship between veterans and the ruling party in the context of working out the legacies of the [1980] peace settlement: often simultaneous conflict and collaboration as party and veterans manipulate one another, using violence and intimidation and a war discourse, to advance their respective agendas.

The reference to the National Youth Service (NYS) as a militia initiative is indicative of an affirmative stance to deconstruct efforts by ZANU PF to create platforms for nationalist re-membling. The position further affirms the Western-instigated characterisation of ZANU PF as a violent political institution founded on crushing dissent. The continuous focus on the internal contradictions within the nationalist movement has

been used by those opposed to ZANU PF to castigate the ruling party's inclination towards ideological proliferation and its mantra of national unity. The incessant problematisation of the liberation movement is somehow selectively ignorant of the points of triumphs in the liberation movement. This is where this publication comes in handy as the author reflects on major battles which were fought in Wankie and Sipolilo. Here, Mpofu is reasserting the exigent task of not only exposing the successes of the nationalist movement, but he is calling the need to rationalise the Western impositions of democracy and economic policy designs.

In Ranger's "coloniality-of-knowledge" implied perspective, the production of history must be only done by history academics. ZANU PF apologists, including war veterans who were directly involved in the armed struggle, must not participate in the dissemination of history as Ranger (2004) criminalises them for being agents of repressing liberal (opposition-linked) narratives which tend to contest and undermine liberation chronicles. Most scholars who subscribe to Ranger's narrow "patriotic history" argument seem to only disapprove those whose self-narrations are situated in the pro-ZANU PF/ZANLA liberation legacy. However, Zimbabwean history is littered with auto/biographies which challenge ZANU PF but were not written by professional historians as Ranger (2004) recommends. Surprisingly, such auto/biographies are not subjected to the "patriotic history" vilification. There is surely no doubt, this particular publication will be criticised on this basis since the author is a member of the ruling ZANU PF.

There have also been determined efforts to effectively silence liberation theologies by the anti-establishment academia on the claims that ZANU PF has been at the centre of producing a linear and hegemonic liberation memory since independence. This epistemic collective has also been at the fore of disapproving all historical accounts with a link to the establishment. As a way of positing a counter-narrative to the alleged liberation memory monopoly of ZANU PF, some historians have developed a new affinity for ZAPU/ZPRA history which in the past they abhorred in favour of ZANLA's contribution to the armed struggle. The same historians were equally collaborating in the creation of what they now problematise as an imposed ruling party narrative of the national memory. This is evidence

of the extent to which writing the past has been manipulated in mapping the various dimensions of political contestations in Zimbabwe. However, this seminal contribution to Zimbabwe's political debate foregoes this selective silencing of memory since the author's past can be traced to Zimbabwe's major liberation movements; ZPRA, ZAPU and ZANU PF. Mpofu locates his contributions in the margins of history because a greater part of ex-combatant memoirs have been written by those who were in lines of command in the armed struggle:

However, not much has been said by those cadres who bore the brunt of the real combat operations against the vicious enemy. I represent that group of liberation fighters whose story of involvement in the fight for independence and the consolidation of its values has not been fully chronicled. Not much has also been exhaustively recounted about the countless men, women and children who came face to face with the full wrath of Rhodesian violence directed at obliterating the continuity of the nationalist struggle (p. 7).

Mpofu's self-location to other luminaries of the struggle serves as the author's tactful way of avoiding an excessive construction of self-heroism. The profound humility of this narrative demonstrates that the struggle for independence was led by modest men and women in society. Therefore, this book calls all ranks and strata of our society to define the national narrative and not be intimidated by any circumstance to collate all memories which have a unifying outcome to our nation.

Whilst the systematic silencing of those who fought in the armed struggle on the side of the masses continues, enablers of the colonial system are praised as heroes of reinventing ZANU-PF's monopoly to history. David Coltart (2016), a former serviceman of the repressive apparatus of the Rhodesia regime and a founding member of the opposition MDC has written a nationalist white-washing autobiography. In his book, *The Struggle Continues: 50 Years of Tyranny in Zimbabwe*, Coltart writes extensively about the post-independence political violence particularly the events of 1982 to 1987 to depict ZANU PF's supposed traditional entrenchment in the culture of disrespecting human-rights. Automatically, in the face of those disturbances, self-location ensues as Coltart projects himself as

a benevolent human-rights lawyer who was defending ZAPU politicians who were being annihilated at the time. He also refers to his efforts in securing legal protection for MDC supporters who faced violence from ZANU PF.

Coltart's protagonist self-location in Zimbabwe's post-independence conflicts is meant to nullify his role in the Rhodesian security system. Through self-representation, he is transformed into a political saint with an unquestionable morality to challenge what he expediently terms "The 50 Years of Tyranny in Zimbabwe." This opportunistic self-representation buttresses the proverbial representation of White involvement in politics as agents of human rights and democracy. This perpetuates the old colonial narrative of projecting Christian missionaries as 'saviours'. This is not to disregard the sincerity of one's benevolence based on their skin colour, as the author also acknowledges how some missionaries were actively involved in contributing to his childhood political radicalisation:

Father Cunwell and Father Renatto were among the key Catholic figures we relied on for supporting our fight against the colonialists. These two Catholic Priests were of Spanish origin and their role gestured that emotive reality of how the fight for independence transcended race. Their support for our cause displayed the logical reality of the need for Rhodesia to fall. In the same spirit of the race-blind brotherhood to the liberation agenda, Russia became a strong ally of ZPRA (p 17).

On the other hand, a majority of auto/biographies about the former President of Zimbabwe Robert Gabriel Mugabe uniformly characterise Mugabe as a dictator. These were mainly produced by White writers whose clear race-centred line of thinking was meant to associate Mugabe's economic indigenisation trajectory with post-independence racial retribution. Such auto/biographies include Martin Meredith's *Robert Mugabe: Power, Plunder and Tyranny in Zimbabwe* (2002) and *Our Votes, Our Guns: Robert Mugabe and the Tragedy of Zimbabwe* (2002); David Blair's *Degrees in Violence: Robert Mugabe and the Struggle for Power in Zimbabwe* (2002); Stephen Chan's *Robert Mugabe: A Life of Power and Violence* (2003); Andrew Norman's *Robert Mugabe and the Betrayal of Zimbabwe* (2004); Geoff Hill's *What Happens*

After Mugabe (2005); Heidi Holland's *Dinner with Mugabe: The Untold Story of a Freedom Fighter Who Became a Tyrant* (2008); Daniel Compagnon's *A Predictable Tragedy: Robert Mugabe and the Collapse of Zimbabwe* (2011); David Coltart's *The Struggle Continues: 50 Years of Tyranny in Zimbabwe* (2016).

In the Mind of this Self-Narration

This book critiques the independence state's stalled efforts to deliver equitable access to the national economy. The adoption of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) and excruciating strikes of austerity are discussed extensively to substantiate the coloniality of the bloodline of Zimbabwe's post-independence economy. This book makes a very perfect read for decolonial economic policy researchers.

This profound personal historical account provides a close-fitting assortment of rare facts to what has aided political transitions in Zimbabwe between 1980 and 2020. This is mainly because Obert Mpofu has been an inside actor in innumerable and noteworthy power-shifts in Zimbabwe starting from the inaugural and most significant transition from colonialism to independence. In 1980, like any other Zimbabwean, Mpofu was a witness of the transfer of power from the settler regime to the ruling ZANU PF. In the same year, he left ZAPU and joined ZANU on purely ideologically driven motivations which he exclusively reveals in Chapter 5.

Mpofu's crossover to ZANU in 1980 symbolically heralded the unity of the two liberation movements following the signing of the Unity Accord between Dr Joshua Nkomo and Cde Robert Gabriel Mugabe in 1987. This modelled the early hybridisation of his political credentials as a product of Zimbabwe's most prominent liberation political powerhouses led by the two founding fathers of the republic. Therefore, the memoir is also a philosophical expression of his loyalties to Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe:

I am a proud product of the iconic leadership credence of Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe. My political vocation is indebted to these founding patriarchs. As a direct beneficiary of their political orientation, they certainly built my political personality. My involvement in the struggle for Zimbabwe is an appendage pursuit

of Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe's selfless sacrifices to fight for the freedom of Zimbabwe (p. 2).

However, when assessed closely, Mpfu's move from ZAPU to ZANU instinctively brings to display the man's sense of political foresight and precision because he symbolically initiated the anticipated unity of Zimbabwe's largest liberation parties. Mpfu further highlights his active, but "behind the scenes" involvement in setting up the roadmap and the modalities which led to the realisation of the 1987 ZAPU/ZANU pact which then conceived the present-day ZANU PF. This places him at the centre of the post-independence unification of Zimbabwe which was an outcome of the Unity-Accord. Therefore, at the heart of this memoir is an interwoven set of national aspirations which cut across the diverse and unifying memories of our past.

Based on Tendi (2020)'s life-account of the late General Solomon Mujuru, a former security officer alongside Obert Mpfu in ZPRA, Mujuru (*nom de guerre* Rex Nhongo) crossed over to ZANLA due to lack of proximity to power while in ZPRA:

Nhongo and Machingura's varying dispositions towards promotion to the High Command reflected a key difference between both guerrillas at this stage. Machingura's point that he felt divorced from 'murky' Lusaka politics was a reasonable one since he was mostly based in Tanzania. But Nhongo was not seriously acquainted with Lusaka politics either because the majority of his time since 1971 had been spent in Nehanda sector as a field commander.

Just like Mpfu who argues that his "political worth" was "discovered" and more acknowledged in ZANU after independence (p. 61), Tendi (2020: 33) indicates the same about Mujuru's political career after exiting ZPRA:

Furthermore, Nhongo only joined ZANLA in March 1971, as an ordinary soldier from ZAPU, but being a Johnnie come-lately from a rival liberation army did not make him reticent about higher politics. Nhongo was attracted to spaces of influence. The 1973 Lusaka conference marked the beginning of Nhongo's meteoric rise in ZANLA's top hierarchy.

The coincidental recollection on loyalty defections in both Mpofu and Mujuru's memoirs proves the existence of organisational pitfalls which were inherent within nationalist movements. This was also substantiated by the mass defection in both ZANU and ZAPU leading to the establishment of the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI), hence Mpofu (p 36) submits that:

The ideological disenchantments emanating from the ZAPU and ZANU's divided tackle of the struggle resulted in the emergence of Formation of the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI) in 1971 by James Chikerema. To those of us who belonged to the main-wing movements, FROLIZI was a reactionary movement whose intention was to capitalise on the ZAPU-ZANU contradictions to take charge of the liberation struggle. Among others, FROLIZI was led by Nathan Shamuyarira, George Nyandoro, Stephen Parirenyatwa, Ambrose Mutinhiri, Charles Goromonzi, Shelton Siwela, Zebediah Gamanya and Enoch Dumbujena.

The shared perspective in both Mpofu and Mujuru's books is that partisan loyalty shifts were based on the broad and contested aims of the liberation struggle. However, this does not dismiss that self-interest was also at the centre of these inter-party loyalty shifts amongst the nationalists.

In this account, Mpofu acknowledges that the land reform agitated colonial capital. After realising that their chokehold on the political economy was being loosened as a logical outcome of the war of independence, the colonial forces aided the creation of an opposition political party to remove ZANU PF out of power. In chapter 10, he posits that when the land returned to its rightful owners –the Black majority, ZANU PF faced all sorts of antagonism from the West which had already planted an opposition party which conveniently served its regime-change interests. The birth of MDC under its late leader Morgan Tsvangirai was a continuation of the West's propensity to have indirect control of the Zimbabwean political space. The birth of a Western directly funded opposition served as a culmination of colonial forces' efforts to castrate the nationalist movement in Zimbabwe. More CSOs which were proxies of the opposition were formed to advance the Western hegemonic hold

in the internal affairs of Zimbabwe against the clearly defined parameters of our sovereignty.

In pursuit of this line of thought, the account contends the ahistorical discourse of the property and human-rights which forms the political locus of validation for the opposition and its Western-funded political pressure groups:

The subject of human-rights in post-independent Zimbabwe must not be disconnected from this historical reality to be selectively arrogated in defence of a fallen oppressive system and a minority it protected. Therefore, a candid reflection on this subject must facilitate an appreciation of how history conceived the fragilities of our diverse national belonging (p 133).

Serving the Republic

The author projects himself as a product of Zimbabwe's post-independence democratic political culture as he reflects on his 1985 election defeat and his later election as a Member of Parliament (MP) in 1995 for Bubi-Umguza Constituency. This elevation was a product of hard work after the then President, Robert Mugabe had previously appointed him as a non-elected MP in 1987. Mpofu was re-elected several times as MP for the Bubi-Umguza seat from 1995 to 2018. In 2018, Mpofu volunteered to relinquish his Matabeleland North senatorial seat.

In the period between 1995 and 2018, Dr Obert Mpofu has served in various Government portfolios as Deputy Minister of Industry and International Trade. In 2000, Mpofu was appointed Governor and Resident Minister for Matabeleland North Province. In 2005, he was re-assigned to the cabinet as Minister of Industry and International Trade. After the 2008 election, he was appointed Minister of Mines and Mining Development. This appointment followed the creation of the Government of National Unity (GNU) in 2009 after the contested stalemate of the 2008 Harmonised Elections –which the author extensively discusses.

After the GNU, following the 2013 Harmonised Elections, Mpofu was appointed the Minister of Transport and Infrastructural Development.

Thereafter, he was appointed Minister of Planning Development and Investment Promotion. In the ‘New Dispensation’ in 2017, he carried on as the Minister of Home Affairs and Cultural Heritage. This was after he was assigned to this post in October 2017. Apart from being one of the long-serving ministers, Dr Mpofu has worked in various capacities in the ruling, ZANU PF. He was initially elected as a member of the Central Committee in 1990. In 1998, he was appointed into the Politburo as the Deputy Secretary for Security. In 2009, he was promoted to Secretary for Economic Affairs. Mpofu has also served as the ZANU PF Secretary for Finance. Currently, he is ZANU PF’s Secretary for Administration. In this mandate, his role is to give strategic policy direction to the day to day running of ZANU PF.

Conclusion and Acknowledgements

Keen to record Zimbabwe’s post-independence history, with a strong determination to shape its future, Mpofu’s autobiography, *On the Shoulders of Struggle: Memoirs of a Political Insider*, is a significant contribution to Zimbabwe’s political literature. The book assumes the tradition of self-location within crescendos of the country’s political evolution having been written by a multifaceted Zimbabwean political figure. The memoir reaches out to various strata of Zimbabwe’s society. The author deliberately excludes some intimate details of his personal life story to draw the reader’s attention to critical political processes which Zimbabwe has gone through since the time of the armed struggle right up to the contemporary post-Mugabe era. The deliberate exclusive focus on political processes makes this account unique as it locates the narration of the author within the broader scope of national interest more than self-obsession. This makes the book one of the best political memoirs ever to come out of Zimbabwe and, as such, a worthwhile read for students of history, politics and public policy-making.

The author’s reflections are corroborated by countless interleaved perspectives of several academics and interviewees to whom we are indebted for adding value to this publication. Special gratitude goes to Prof Vongai Zvidenga Nyawo, Prof Francis Musoni, Dr Saul Gwakuba, Dr Collen Sabao, Dr David Makuwerere, Dr Umali Saidi, Dr Lawrence

Mhandara, Mabasa Sasa, Stanley Mushava, Panashe Marufu, Talent Moyo and John Bhurekeni. Without the generous input and wide-ranging contributions of the above-mentioned and many more, the contents of this writing would not be this knit-together. Special appreciation also goes to Dr Henry Mushonga for his extensive support throughout the execution of this book project. In the same token, gratitude is extended to Tatenda Manjoro for the apt supports he deposited from the beginning. To the *Sunday News* Editor, Limukani Ncube and his team we are grateful for the articles you serialised and are well contained in this volume.

The time and sacrifice dedicated by the author to narrate his politically wired personhood is highly commended as it maps the contours of alternative national memory best suited for readers with an avid interest in pre-independence and contemporary politics. Mpofu's contribution to Zimbabwean historiography is applauded as it unpacks the self-effacing "academic animal" in him. It is rare for a historical account of this magnitude to circumvent the hagiographical trend of self-writing, but the author frames his subject in a manner which embodies loyalty to the republic more than anything else.

This grandiose submission offers a highly creative and philosophical delineation of the timeless values of the liberation struggle and the continuous fight against neo-colonialism. This is a timely submission by an ex-combatant and a towering contemporary political figure acutely challenges imperialist logic. Therefore, Dr Obert Mpofu must be congratulated for dedicating his time to effectively engage the national question through this self-chronicle. It is also humbling to be part of this notable academic venture by a household brand in Zimbabwean politics.

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The Mind and Pilgrimage of Struggle

40 Years on, Still Standing.

April 18, 2020, marked Zimbabwe's 40th anniversary of the attainment of independence from the British colonial rule. I am proud to have participated in the revolutionary processes which won Zimbabwe's freedom, alongside many luminaries, some of whom have since departed and others still living. My anti-colonial radicalisation stems from my Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZPRA) military training and my full-time membership to the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) after independence. I do not regret the choices I have made with regards to my bona fide allegiance to both ZANU PF and Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and, of course, ZPRA. The Unity Accord, which was signed in 1987, solidifies the experience I acquired as a member of both ZAPU and ZANU PF. The Unity Accord facilitated the coming together of Joshua Nkomo's loyalists and avid political disciples of Robert Mugabe, leading to the formation of ZANU PF. The four-decade deferment of this writing was not premeditated. It has been a long time coming for those of us who were with ZPRA and ZAPU to tell versions of our story apart from the common nationalist history.

Forty years after independence, it becomes necessary not only to revert to the field contributions of ZPRA but also to reflect on how founding nationalist movements, namely, ZANU and PF-ZAPU later contributed to nation-building after independence. It is even more critical to go beyond the linear and fragmented categorisations of our liberation movements, if a holistic account is to be given about the full contribution of ZPRA and

ZANLA's involvement in the liberation struggle is to be fully chronicled. The whole idea is to guard against memory loss and the distortion of our treasured past. In essence, this contribution explores compelling ideological force and strategic military inputs which made the armed liberation struggle a success. A key intention of the memoir is to also discuss the major political processes that our country has undergone from 1980 to date. In this self-account, I intend to transcend the sensational with a strong inclination towards the analytical. Beyond the historical, attempts are made to also tackle the philosophical dimension because politics is played out on the foundation of competing ideas. About the Zimbabwean political question, all ideas which have characterised the juxtaposed contestations of power are confronted and unpacked. If this memoir works as I intend, it will leave the reader with a more intimate understanding of the Zimbabwean national question from 1980 to date.

The Cradle of Nationalist Conviction

I am a proud product of the iconic leadership credence of Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe. My political vocation is indebted to these founding patriarchs. As a direct beneficiary of their political orientation, they certainly built my political personality. My involvement in the struggle for Zimbabwe is an appendage pursuit of Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe's selfless sacrifices to fight for the freedom of Zimbabwe. The national unity they ushered in to break the machinations of neo-colonial interests in post-independent Zimbabwe inspires a pro-people culture of governance, democracy, lasting peace and reconciliation.

Guided by the inspiration they provided for the decolonisation and nation-building project after independence Father Zimbabwe Joshua Nkomo, and the African icon, Robert Mugabe, are the souls of the anti-colonial movement in Zimbabwe. Mugabe and Nkomo's frontline role in Zimbabwean politics is synonymous with the broad-based Pan-Africanist ideological wave which had an overhauling effect on colonialism in the late 50s across the African continent. Pan-Africanism and nationalism represent the pragmatic concept of the Global South's total eradication of colonialism. This is made more evident in our armed struggle's organic connection with countries like Zambia, Algeria, Namibia,

Angola, Tanzania, Mozambique South Africa and Botswana as well as other African countries which supported our cause against imperialism. The joint military operations between ZPRA and the ANC's uMkhonto weSizwe, leading to the Wankie and Sipolilo Battles, further affirm the Pan-Africanist undercurrents of our liberation trajectory.

The material and ideological benevolence of Eastern countries, mainly Russia, cannot also be ignored if the history of our struggle is to be fully told. From the ZPRA side, several of our combatant forerunners like Dumiso Dabengwa, Phelekezela Report Mphoko, Kembo Mohadi and Tshinga Dube, among other members of the High Command, were products of Russian military training. The reorganisation of the ZPRA military strategy from 1967 was an extension of the military diplomacy which existed between our military structures and the Soviet Union. The AK 47 which was developed by the Soviet military genius, Mikhail Kalashnikov, was an indispensable implement of our struggle, further mapping the Eastern connection of the Second Chimurenga. The anti-colonial diplomacy which ZPRA enjoyed from Russia demonstrates that the nationalist movement was not inclined to narrow prejudices along the lines of race. We established diplomatic ties with those countries which sympathised with our cause regardless of our colonial marginalisation. The fraternity we shared with Eastern Europe validates the view that we were not fighting the White man; we were fighting an exploitative system of the White man. The nationalist fight was, therefore, against Britain's exploitation of Africa, its dehumanisation of our people, its looting, plunder and its unjust laws.

The ZPRA philosophy and that of ZANLA were premised on the need to break the uneven socio-economic and political system of colonialism. Both ZPRA and ZANLA were ideologically stoked by the plight of the masses to fight against the Smith regime and bring it to its knees. The success of our resolve was marked by our attainment of independence on April 18, 1980. Therefore, the drive to "Look East" has not been merely and narrowly geopolitical, but it was strongly informed by an ideological tenacity to re-think our immediate political interests beyond Western hegemony. For some of us who joined the ZAPU struggle, Russia became a strategic ally for Zimbabwe's decolonisation. Russia's

support to Zimbabwe's liberation deeply resonated with the anticipated revolutionary effects of historic sabotage initiatives spearheaded by the Southern Rhodesia African National Congress (SRANC) as early as 1948. These had culminated in the birth of the National Democratic Party (NDP) in 1959 after the banning of the SRANC. The NDP deployed organised sabotage strategies to make the country "ungovernable." It was at the height of this structured (dis)ordering of society that Samuel Parirenyatwa, a ZAPU cadre, was assassinated at Ntabazinduna. Whilst Bulawayo became the birds' nest of the urban insurrection against Rhodesia, other militant vanguards of the revolution in Harare emerged under the banner of the Salisbury City Youth League which was led by James Chikerema, George Nyandoro, Henry Hamadziripi, Paul Mushonga and Edison Sithole, among others. These countrywide acts of mutiny by the budding nations sent panicking shocks to the entire Rhodesian administration. Garfield Todd, then Prime Minister, was fired and replaced by David Whitehead whose role was to firmly uproot the enabling structures of the nationalist insubordination.

Put simply, the freedom we celebrate today was won out of a decisive determination to break the colonial system. We fought to reassert the human dignity which colonialism had denied us. Our inspiration to fight for independence was also derived from the icons of the 1893 Anglo-Ndebele War (*Imfazo yamaNdebele*). They defiantly fought the White system using less sophisticated weapons to challenge Cecil John Rhodes and his Pioneer Column's invasion of 12 September 1890.

That early resistance was achieved through the First Chimurenga which was fought between 1896 and 1897. In the year that followed, the anti-colonial forerunners of our struggle, Nehanda Nyakasikana and Kaguvi, were hanged in one of the most public sacrileges by the enemy against the spirit of our freedom. In so doing, the colonialists were unaware that they had energised the cosmos to spur to action future anti-colonial the uprisings which ultimately liberated the land we now call Zimbabwe. The desecrations of our human dignity and dimensions of spirituality by the settler powers made us acquire a unifying political soul as *Abantwana Bomhlabathi/Vana Vevhu* (Sons and Daughters of the Soil) during the Second Chimurenga.

The Chimurenga transcended the physical and geographical dimensions of freedom. It morphed into a spiritual and ideological binding force for African resistance and a cause for uniting against every reactionary force. At the centre of decolonisation, the “soil” was and is still a motif of reclaiming our economic, social and political birthright. The soil symbolises the geographic topography of the battles fought in Sipolilo, Hwange, Chinhoyi and many other parts of our country. The soil bears witness to the timeless trails by indigenous feet long before the arrival of the settler minority to loot and plunder. On many soils of this country, millions of umbilical cords are stashed as part of the sacred ritual of marrying every product of the womb with the divine: the soil. In the depths of the womb of this soil, the remains of the gallant fighters of our freedom are interred, not to mention the many heroic lineages of our beloved motherland. The struggle for this soil, therefore, represents the most sacred aspirations of our struggle, one to which our national interest must be incessantly aligned. This land, born out of the barrel of the gun, is a spiritual connecting point to our patriotism embodied in the ethnic and racial constructs of our society. This explains the extemporaneous and yet the revolutionary logic of our erstwhile fight against the Smith regime and our present-day grapple with neo-colonialism.

Today, every institution whose existence is linked to the decolonisation agenda, particularly ZANU PF, measures national progress against the fulfilment of the core values of our liberation. This is the only way the nationalist agenda can continue to stand the test of time in the face of imperial motives to subject the spirit of resistance to new forms of racism, fascism, colonialism and apartheid.

The Philosophical Urge to Write the Struggle

Our struggle for independence was driven by the will to decimate the economic marginalisation of our people. This was a response to our systematic downgrading as second-class in the land of our ancestral birthright by the colonial minority. Future generations must be constantly reminded that the modern African state, Zimbabwe, in particular, was born out of the need to break the inequalities created by colonialism. As such, this writing is a reminiscence of the ideas which united us yesterday

and must unite us today and forever. Through the shared reflections in this submission, I hope to encourage our next generation of leaders to continuously embrace the dignity which our independence delivered to us to be free people.

In the passage of time and the inevitable fading of memory, it remains critical for us to jealously guard the enduring values of our struggle for independence. These same values are a timeless ingredient for democracy, equality, territorial integrity, economic empowerment, public service delivery and the technological advancement of our rural communities still yoked in colonially inherited underdevelopment. I hope that one day when my generation lies in the bosom of this consecrated earth, the future generations of this country will have a connecting point to the emancipatory psyche of my contemporaries.

In our quest to enjoy our freedom we must not forget that our social contract was born out of the aggressive dislocation of the colonial powers. As we journey forward, we must be constantly reminded by our past that we are masters of our destiny. I hope that this writing will inspire Zimbabwean solutions for Zimbabwean problems. Our political processes must not be presided over by the same nations which once denied us democracy. Likewise, the definitive parameters of the protection of human rights must not continue to be dictated by those who denied us our humanity until we took up arms to defend our God-given right to be human. We fought for the equality we enjoy today as citizens of Zimbabwe, whether Black or White, and that must never be forgotten. Speeches and resolutions could not uproot the deep-seated hegemonic pillars of colonialism. The starting point to retracing and reimagining our national memory resides in a firm revolutionary plinth from which the inspiration of this writing is derived.

Here, I do not pretend to be a historian. I also do not intend to portray myself as a political saint. I am intensely aware that most political memoirs have suffered the vice of self-exaltation by their authors. Therefore, I resorted to giving an abstract account of my involvement in the struggle for independence. To this end, I have chosen to share my personal views on state power construction in Zimbabwe with a bias on the period

between 1967 (when I joined the struggle) up to the time of the writing of this memoir. This book seeks to revisit some unattended facts about our past and present political processes. Through this account, I intend to challenge neo-liberal mistruths about the post-1980 Zimbabwean society to proffer a liberation grounded counter-interpellation of the status quo. I hope this piece will find rational epistemic resonance within the discursive terrain of Zimbabwean political studies, history, economics and sociology, among other relevant disciplines. I hope it will catalyse a multi-disciplinary academic engagement on Zimbabwe's past and present construction of political power.

This four-decade reflection of Zimbabwe's independence comes against a backdrop of innumerable biographies written by key actors in the nationalist movement. On the other hand, most nationalist biographical work has been the reproduction of colonially invented history. This has seen little historiographical input coming from those of us who were in the trenches fighting the same colonial system which now wants to claim a monopoly to telling our story. It is even unfortunate that the late former President, Cde Robert Mugabe, is mainly remembered from the perspective of imperialist scholars, his political opponents and a few of his nationalist counterparts. As such, I write to liberate our nationalist history from imperial capture and narration. Moreover, I write to engage those rarely articulated truths of our political evolution against a backdrop of a highly polarised knowledge ecosystem.

On the other hand, most of the war events and experiences have been given by those who were either in command or in some form of leadership position in various areas of military operations. However, not much has been said by those cadres who bore the brunt of the real combat operations against the vicious enemy. I represent that group of liberation fighters whose story of involvement in the fight for independence and the consolidation of its values has not been fully chronicled. Not much has also been exhaustively recounted about the countless men, women, and children who came face to face with the full wrath of Rhodesian anti-nationalist resistance.

The multitudes who sacrificed their lives, with some facing death in the dungeons while others did not make it out of Rhodesian prisons alive, did not get the opportunity to share their stories. Therefore, as a token of appreciation to the divine for allowing me to live to this day, I had to posit this submission to the repository of our national memory. While certain aspects of our past are captured in this account, I have found it reasonably compelling to reflect more on the transitional currents of the Zimbabwean political landscape since 1980 by giving a fair share of my participation in the political processes of Zimbabwe since independence.

Propaganda(s) at War and Contradictions in the National Question

This publication is a response to the distant theoretical interpellation of political processes by academics, creative writers, local and international media and various other thought leaders who have written about Zimbabwean politics. One recalls the mushrooming of several Western-sponsored intellectual movements against our fast-track land reform programme. Against references to Operation Murambatsvina and our Look East Policy after our fall-out with Anglo-American powers, Zimbabwe has been labelled a failed state. Sadly, this position has not been aggressively contested. The unimpeded proliferation of post-independence ideological warfare encourages the need to right the misrepresentation of Zimbabwean politics by Western-funded human rights activists since the time of the land reform.

As it stands, we live in a time where social media have become a swift and preferred information repository. The publishing liberties associated with social media have been emphasised over factual verification. Sometimes, claims find their way into the public domain unquestioned. As in any other divided and polemic political context, the reality of the distorted making of history becomes even more eminent in this digital age. Those who are lethargic to giving a gymnastic stretch to their analytical skills have to endure the toxicity of reactionary micro-blogging hashtag mistruths and hate speech. Deception, rumour, slander and many other corrupt habits emanating from excesses of social-media-driven freedoms of expression have become the conduit for fake news and ignorant political grandstanding. In some instances, social media hearsay is remanufactured

as truth for gullible minds. It is against this background that the need to reconstruct the multi-layered fabrications of political truths becomes necessary.

Social media also play a critical role in facilitating the competition of ideas. As such, this has inspired the need to digitalise the liberation archive. To those of us who belong to the old school, this social media era has thankfully enabled the digital preservation of our interfaces with the national agenda for posterity. That way, future generations, who will be more digitally suave, will find this written account and many more as useful history resources.

I write to influence political debate which goes beyond the simplistic and linear intellectual confines of our polarised political discourse. At the same time, this contribution affirms the democratic remaking of the state in Zimbabwe. In the past, political players could not openly give out their opinions on issues of power. It was mainly after the birth of the “New Dispensation” in November 2017 that the pitch of democracy became heightened, and the environment for political discussion enabled. This further signals a culture change even within the ranks of the ruling ZANU PF Party.

Therefore, this account is inspired by the spirit of the Second Republic of opening up politics in as much as “Zimbabwe is Open for Business.” The emphatic discourse of opening up Zimbabwe for business seems to overshadow the prevailing political-culture reform. However, for the first time, pluralism has been up-scaled through the Political Actors Dialogue (POLAD). The POLAD framework is composed of opposition leaders who participated in the 2018 Harmonised Elections. POLAD is a policy consultative forum made up of a cohort of firebrand opposition politicians and their respective parties. During the Robert Mugabe era, some of the POLAD members like Lovemore Madhuku and Thokozani Khuphe among others were brazenly strident antagonists of the ruling ZANU PF. Thokozani Khupe is the president of the MDC-Tsvangirai splinter group. In its establishment, in 1999, under the leadership of Morgan Tsvangirai, before its continued factional degeneration thereafter, MDC was rooted in post-independence pro-White settler anti-land reform politics. It must be

recalled that Morgan Tsvangirai's original MDC, now led by Thokozani Khupe, and the MDC-Alliance formation led Nelson Chamisa are both opponents of the indigenisation policy. ZANU PF's espousal of the indigenous economic policy mainstreaming at the turn of the millennium flared up hostile responses from empire-leaning scholars, CSOs and all MDCs. This strongly partisan intellectual tradition conceived by contestations of power in Zimbabwe advanced politically antagonist and incongruent national identities. As a result, the fundamental import of this contribution is to facilitate a rethink of the constructions of nationhood from the polemic post-land-reform archive. Beyond that, I was motivated to make this recollection to complement the prevailing maturation of our democracy in the Second Republic. Under the current state of reform, active political players now have space to critically self-examine the national policy trajectory, but, most importantly, everyone can now challenge the orthodoxies which were projected as purely cast in stone.

Bruising the Colonial Ego and Mending the Wounds

At the behest of the well-concerted efforts to deconstruct the nationalist legacy as ZANU PF, we had to enhance the widespread dissemination of the liberation memory. The turn towards commemorative politics was inaugurated by the Umdala Wethu Gala in 2001. This annual event was aimed at celebrating the heroic contributions of the late Vice President of Zimbabwe, Dr Joshua Mqabuko Nyongolo Nkomo. Nkomo became a subject of national celebration in the same way the other late Vice President, Cde Simon Vengesai Muzenda, was celebrated as the "Soul of the Nation".

The public press had to stay alert and counter-attack privately-owned media propaganda which was constructed to undermine Zimbabwe's agrarian reform. The inevitable bias assumed by state media in its support of the Government was necessary for confronting the exaggerations of the Zimbabwean economic meltdown by the private press. The land reform programme activated a political discursive tension between the state and retrogressive anti-redistribution forces. Former President Cde Mugabe emerged as the foremost living Pan-Africanist leader, channelling his intellectual charisma to substantial gains on the platform of land reform.

It was then that the Third Chimurenga was born. Whilst the source of this third phase of struggle was our land reclamation, it must be unequivocally acknowledged that this was Zimbabwe's important ideological turning point. Zimbabwe assumed the status of a post-colonial think tank in the global political space. Zimbabwe became a site of attraction for Africa's practical delinking from Western hegemony. In response, the West launched an unrestrained political demonisation of Zimbabwe. The European Union illegal sanctions and the US' Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA) embargo aptly validated the downgrading, demonisation and consequent deliberate isolation of Zimbabwe.

Therefore, as the re-engagement foreign policy trajectory takes its unprecedented form under the leadership of President Emmerson Mnangagwa, it is also critical to set the record straight on a lot of misinformation engineered to sustain Zimbabwe's international isolation. There is a need for an alternative narrative that frames the emotive sincerity of the Second Republic's position of engagement and re-engagement. To attract new friends for the Second Republic in the international community, it is important to demystify the exaggerations of the "Zimbabwean Crisis". There is no doubt that as a country we have had a lot of socio-economic challenges and political problems. However, there is a need for truth-telling in the interest of mutually beneficial re-engagement. Those who have been convinced that Zimbabwe is not politically repairable deserve a little of the truth which, over the years, has been swallowed up by opposition propaganda and its CSO proxies.

The opposition, particularly MDC, has largely thrived on the dysfunctional state of the economy, which is mainly characterised by poor public goods and services delivery. To this end, MDC has been at the forefront of calling for the imposition of the illegal EU and ZIDERA sanctions on Zimbabwe since the launch of the land reform.

Many avid readers of Zimbabwean politics have been starved the "inside" detail as to how our politics has evolved since independence. At some point, the idea of mainstreaming national history has been discarded as ZANU PF's manipulative ploy to construct a partisan biased

national memory. Therefore, the need to create a narrative balance on the contested national question strongly motivates this writing. I am more interested in recollecting the nationalist movement's contribution to our independence. In so doing, this account takes a deliberate turn to highlight my direct involvement with ZANU PF in its quest to consolidate national liberation aspirations, national sovereignty and national wealth. These three key foundational pillars to Zimbabwe's history have also modelled my political personality and ideological loyalty to the total liberation of our people. In this book, I also illustrate how my life has been shaped and influenced by the core values of our liberation struggle. Here, I reflect on my political journey in a bid to inspire the present and future generations to learn from the successes and shortcomings of the nationalist generation and build a better future for all.

The mark of Cde Mugabe's influence continues to permeate across the political acumen of all of us who served under him in both the party and government. No doubt, the impact of his rich leadership is also visible in the statecraft of his successor, His Excellency, the President and First Secretary of ZANU PF, Cde Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa. Having been a close protégé of Cde Mugabe for more than 50 years, President Mnangagwa embodies the political genius which was much needed to carry on the virtues of our revolution beyond the Mugabe era. His appointing of full-time senior party functionaries is a testimony of this astute leadership to which I am a beneficiary.

It is a pleasure that the tide of renewal which graced the Zimbabwean political landscape provided an opportunity for me to continue serving in the ruling ZANU PF Party, this time under President Mnangagwa, a distinguished cadre of the Zimbabwean revolution. Through the visionary and instructive call for party supremacy over government, it is clear that the party has found its place in the day-to-day processes of statecraft. This gives a compelling advantage for the two institutions to work towards the consolidation of our permanent national interests. I am grateful to President Mnangagwa for granting me the opportunity to serve my compatriots under the banner of ZANU PF, which is the linking centre of the aspirations of our people.

Emanating from my background as a former liberation fighter, this piece of memory would be remiss to ignore the institution of the war veterans. These distinguished patriots sought the freedom of this country in selflessness. These are the men and women who had to neglect the comforts of their ordinary/civilian life and win the nation back through the barrel of the gun. Some had to forego their right to education. However, their role in the land reform programme was demonised. This invites the need to challenge their widespread castigation as vanguards of human rights and property rights violation when they were just seeing through the promise of the liberation struggle.

In the spirit of the loyalty which they gave to our country, “Operation Restore Legacy” was initiated. To this end, my fidelity to the institution of the Defence Forces is unyielding. The Zimbabwe Defence Forces is an enduring symbol of our territorial integrity and liberation legacy preservation. The values of the military today are not different from those of yesterday. The Zimbabwe Defence Forces epitomise the continuity of the principles of our armed struggle. The same institution carries the hopes for the future of our country’s peace and tranquillity.

Above all, in the face of all our trials and tribulations, my loyalty to Zimbabwe will never die. Therefore, this writing is dedicated to the spirit of our self-determination.

I am Zimbabwe!

I am proud to be

Immersed here,

Inside your now

barren womb

Khami and deaf

Njelele.

I am Mzilikazi;

I am Charwe;

I am Murenga;

I am Mapondera;

I am Zimbabwe!

2

Childhood and Initiation into Struggle

Born a Colonial Subject

I was born on 12 October 1951, in Southern Rhodesia's then Wankie-Jambezi area. This was five years after the inception of the Federation of Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The three countries, which made up the Federation, are today's Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi, respectively. The fraternal colonial subjectivity of the three countries, bundled together in protectorate status, strengthened their resolve to join forces in dismantling colonialism across the region.

It was a blessing in disguise that the Federation wedged our countries as administrative quotas of the colonial system. The imperialist ploy to integrate us into colonial provinces solicited our subconscious acquisition of the common cause to fight the colonial system. Having been denied the innocence of childhood, I found myself joining the armed struggle during its budding phase in 1967. Under unforeseen circumstances at the age of 16, I crossed the Zambezi to Zambia. I was involved in the pioneering stage of the liberation struggle under the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZPRA). I unconsciously found myself committed to the assignment of collective African resistance against colonial domination. It is important to mention this here at the outset, though a greater account of my involvement in the armed struggle is detailed later on. The formative years of my life were embedded in anti-colonial political consciousness. It is from this predisposition that I find myself still aligned to the continued ideological stand against imperialism and all its transfiguring forms and expressions.

Displacement

In 1930, the Land Apportionment Act had taken its course with the race-based land segregation order being fully implemented to solidify the colonial system. Consequently, our parents were displaced from the Nkayi and Gwayi area in the late 40s. My father's family came from Mayindibulala in Lower Gwelo. The place earned its name from the political activity begun by the generation of my grandfather, Siphulilo. This community was radically determined to resist colonialism. Therefore, when the Land Apportionment Act was put in place, our families were displaced and we were scattered all over. This was the case all around the country. Systematic displacement took its course. Beyond the repressive effects of colonialism, the forced marginalisation of the Africans to native settlements weighed down on lineage memories. Therefore, I can only trace my genealogy few branches up, from my father, whose father was called Siphulilo, the son of Takasala, the son of Msendelekwa, whose father was called Mazise. Not only were we disenfranchised, but we lost traces of our history and ultimately our being.

The resettlement process to the marginal agro-ecological lands which were unproductive was haphazard. Growing up in a colony fired up the determination to fight. The living conditions in Jambezi were deplorable. The area was tsetse-fly infested. People and livestock became prey for wild animals. There were no schools or hospitals when our parents were resettled. Our people were dumped in the area. The living conditions in these areas was inhuman. My family was resettled in present-day Hwange in the Jambezi area.

Early Education

My educational background started at Chidobe Primary School in 1958 where I did Sub A and B before I was then transferred to Chewumba Primary School for my Standard 1 and 2 and then to Jabula Primary School to do Standard 3. In 1964, I proceeded to do my Standard 4 up to 6 at Sacred Heart Mission a Roman Catholic institution, after which I joined the liberation struggle.

I was privileged to have benefited from the generosity of Catholic priests who helped in preparing my travelling documents when I was at Sacred Heart Mission. Some teachers sympathised with the cause of the liberation struggle. There was a group of teachers who left the school and were led by Cele Ncube who later joined the ZAPU National Security Organisation led by Dumiso Dabengwa. I would be allowed to use the school telephone to communicate with comrades at the ZAPU headquarters in Zambia. Father Cunwell and Father Renatto were among the key Catholic figures we relied on for supporting our fight against the colonialists. These two Catholic priests were of Spanish origin and their role gestured that emotive reality of how the fight for independence transcended race. Their support for our cause displayed the logical reality of the need for Rhodesia to fall. In the same spirit of the race-blind brotherhood to the liberation agenda, Russia became a strong ally of ZPRA.

Radicalisation

My father, Mswelangubo Ginyilitshe Mjembe Moses Mpofu became a political prisoner before our family was moved from Lower Gwelo. When our families were dumped in Jambezi, several people including my father had been incarcerated back in Lower Gwelo for mutiny. They were all detained in Gweru, some without trial. My father died in 1957, having failed to recover from the excessive torture that he had endured under incarceration. Technically, I lost my father to colonial apparatuses and from then my anger towards the colonial system became relentless. It was from this position that I sympathised with the many nationalists who were detained for Zimbabwe's freedom. Their determination to endure torture and imprisonment only inspired me towards the cause of the armed struggle. I had faith that their sacrifice and that of my father in resisting colonial repression would one day bring about the sore desire for freedom by our people all over the motherland. As my father had lost his life in the hands of colonial brutality, I had no reason to fear for my own life.

I was hardly six years old when my father passed on. I was raised by a widow, Josephine Dube. However, my father's death coincided with the

birth of the Southern Rhodesia African National Congress (SRANC). The SRANC became the sole prominent anti-colonial political movement which attracted the membership of Africans across the pre-independence socio-economic divide. The continued growth of the nationalist movement regardless of its trials and tribulations led to the birth of Patriotic Front-Zimbabwe African People's Union (PF-ZAPU). My affiliation with PF-ZAPU was partially motivated by my immediate family members who had been actively involved in nationalist political activity since the days of the National Democratic Party (NDP). My two brothers, British and Robert Mpofu, were members of the NDP. At the birth of PF-ZAPU, they were conscripted into military training. Some of my sisters were also part of the NDP, with Sisi Lydia as the most politically active of them all.

Organic Links to the Struggle

African political consciousness had immensely heightened during my teenage days. Almost every family was engaged in the struggle in one way or another. On the other hand, industrialisation and urbanisation were synonymously taking root across the globe. Therefore, the exploitation of the African masses had taken an accelerated turn, breeding a new political consciousness. Pro-African labour movements led by such firebrands such as Charles Mzingeli and Benjamin Burombo were at the centre of the political discourse of the time. Unsurprisingly, the late Father Zimbabwe, Joshua Nkomo, is a politician of trade-unionist extraction. The rise of the anti-colonial political culture became the key motive of the early nationalist mobilisation. The socio-economic history of the time is correlated with the political interactions of the colonisers and the colonised.

When nationalism started its objectives were crystal clear. In the gradual growth of the nationalist movement, we developed contradictions which emanated from our differing ideologies within the nationalist movement. Some of the cadres had trained in Russia, some in Algeria, Cuba, and East Germany. I had trained in Zambia and Tanzania. So imagine the fusion of all these ideological backgrounds! The most important lesson is that our fight against colonialism had been internationalised beyond any reasonable doubt.

However, in its adoption of external influences, the liberation movement faced contradictions. Due to different areas of expertise which we had acquired in different countries, who conveniently became our revolutionary neighbours, we imported various ideas which became the cause of ideological differences. This sincere appreciation of tensions within the liberation movement is essential in understanding some post-independent power dynamics which I discuss fully in the book.

Surviving the Tides

As I begin my story, I should reiterate that the nationalist movement has survived several existential threats. Many have been part of this journey and fell by the wayside, but I should state that the secret behind my survival in politics is anchored on party discipline, self-restraint and commitment to principles. I have never been reprimanded or punished for indiscipline since the time I joined politics. Even during the struggle, I was never subjected to corporal punishment. Never have I indulged in any political mischief which invited any disciplinary action from the party. My first training was in the military. In the military discipline constitutes one's initial grounding. Self-restraint is another major character which makes one a solid leader. So I was taught loyalty and discipline in the formative years of my training.

Humility is a virtue and respect to all comrades in the struggle is a critical weapon of political survival. I have always committed to submitting to the appointing authorities in any given stage of my gradual rise in politics. However, I am not a passive follower and leader. I respect those who are senior to me and those I am appointed to lead. In turn, I reciprocate respect, loyalty and honesty with the same virtues. Likewise, I have never belonged to a faction. I am loyal to all my leaders equally. I submit to mutual respect. I submit to qualitative social relationships. I respect everyone regardless of their ranks. These have been the cardinal values of my political existence.

3

Involvement in the Armed Struggle

By Any Means Necessary

In 1967, at the age of 16, I went through the arduous experience of the liberation struggle. Young as I was, I had made a resolute decision to fight for the liberation of my dear motherland. Breaking the system that kept the captivity of our people intact was the most revolutionary thing to do. Some of my immediate family members and some individuals in my community were already involved in mainstream politics. My uncle Solomon “Mzethi” Mpofu, my father’s brother and my auntie’s husband, Mlobisi Sibanda, were among the top ZAPU contacts in our village. Our homestead hosted regular ZAPU meetings at the time. Apart from this immediate family connection to ZAPU through the meetings hosted at our home as early as of 1964, my involvement in the liberation struggle was broadly inclined to the emotive quest for liberation of the Black majority. Uncle Solomon and Mlobisi both had a high degree of political consciousness which ignited strong patriotic zeal in me. In 1965, when I was in Standard 5, I was involved in the periodical collection and supply of *The Zimbabwe Times* which was published in Zambia. *The Zimbabwe Times* was a pro-ZAPU publication which was circulated to party loyalists. Apart from being involved in the distribution of this ZAPU publication, I was involved in frontline collaborator activities whenever I crossed to Zambia with my peers. At one point I was detained with my cousin Albert Sibanda for crossing over to Zambia with expired passes. We were only released after comrades in Lusaka intervened and secured our release. My passion for politics grew. In the process, the search for radical actualization in military activity resulted in my decision to be finally conscripted into ZPRA in 1967.

My father had died after succumbing to excessive torture in the hands of the cruel colonial regime. Therefore, I had no fear of losing my life in the hands of those who had caused my father's death. Ultimately, each one of us had a valid personal reason to fight the enemy. Our different objections to the colonial system climaxed in the resolve to break the bondage.

Joining the liberation struggle was the most virtuous decision that any politically conscious person could make. It was the most honourable thing to do. During holidays, with other teenagers at the time, we would covertly cross to Livingstone, Zambia. There alongside others, I received early reconnaissance grooming which later formed the science of information extraction about the activities of the enemy. These routine trips to Zambia were mainly coordinated by Luke Mhlanga and Pepezele Ncube. There we were equipped with the ability to spy on the activities of the Rhodesians and their military formations. From this rudimentary state of reconnaissance, my role developed into sophisticated forms of military intelligence to guide the nationalist military strategy. In the process of the mission to liberate our country, I felt the assurance of having regained my humanity and the dignity of our people which had been long lost in the hands of colonial repression.

At the time, Zambia was the sanctuary for liberation movements. It was in Zambia that we met ANC's Umkhonto weSizwe guerillas and received extensive military training in preparation for the protracted guerilla warfare against settler rule. The anti-apartheid cause of the people of South Africa was synonymous with the anti-colonial predisposition of our people in Rhodesia. As a result, we were unified by common aspirations for self-determination as the then colonised people of the South to fight for our rightful place in humanity.

Zambia provided a Pan-African fraternal link to the cause of our liberation movements. We would bring back home newspapers published at the time in support of the armed struggle. This way, we were able to carve a political consciousness which aided in justifying the cause of the war against Rhodesia amongst our people. All these activities were in preparation of the 1967 Wankie Battle. Tanzania was another home for

the revolutionary cause. In 1968, I received military training in Morogoro Tanzania. I was part of the second ZPRA cohort to train in Tanzania. The pioneer group had been trained in 1967. The advanced military training I received in Tanzania further heightened my conviction to the cause of Zimbabwe's liberation. Thereafter, I was geared to take part in the Sipolilo Battle.

Background to the Wankie Battle of 1967

The African National Congress (ANC) had opened an office in Lusaka in 1965, a year after Zambia became independent. The alliance between Zambia's independent Government under Kenneth Kaunda and the ANC offered a practical manifestation of the Pan-Africanist cause. Zambia's political big-brother status afforded the then liberation aspiring Southern Rhodesia and apartheid South Africa political mentorship on the needed revolutionary processes to collapse White monopoly rule. ZAPU had already established a camp for ZPRA recruits in the surrounding area of Kongwa in Tanzania. The Kongwa camp also hosted:

ANC: African National Congress

FAPLA: People's Armed Forces of Liberation of Angola (Portuguese: Forças Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola);

FRELIMO: Mozambique Liberation Front and the

PAIGC: African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde;

De facto diplomatic negotiations to create a military alliance between ZPRA and Umkhonto weSizwe had begun in 1966.

The ANC assigned Chris Hani to undertake a feasibility investigation on the possibilities of military cooperation between ZPRA and Umkhonto weSizwe. The proposed military pact between our ZPRA and Umkhonto weSizwe received an endorsement from the newly independent governments of Tanzania and Zambia. The outcome was the joint military pact which aided in the initiation of the famous Wankie Battle. ZAPU was already headquartered in Zambia by 1964. The widespread support of the two liberation movements aided the execution of the joint military

campaign. The union between ZPRA and Umkhonto weSizwe was also founded on the shared historically compelling factors of the fight against imperialism in both Zimbabwe and South Africa.

Beyond, the pro-ZPRA interests, the ZAPU-ANC alliance was aimed at aiding the Umkhonto weSizwe forces who had been trained in Zambia and Tanzania. Rhodesia provided an easy passage for the Umkhonto weSizwe forces to execute their military activity in South Africa. From a strategic point of view, Rhodesia could be easily infiltrated by the Umkhonto weSizwe troops. Therefore, it made significant sense for the ANC troops to take part in the ZPRA offensive missions as they sought a passage entry in transit to South Africa.

Another strategic merit of this alliance was not only the convenience of Rhodesia as an appropriate passageway for the South African guerrillas. Rhodesia harboured a politically attuned majority similar to our fellow Black majority across the Limpopo. The harmonious cultures of the oppressed majority in Rhodesia particularly in Matabeleland with those of Zulu, Sotho and Xhosa people in South Africa also justified the eyed fortunes of this military expedition. The Rhodesian passage back home to South Africa, therefore, implied ease of communication for the Umkhonto weSizwe troops.

On the other hand, Botswana was a non-starter for a possible transit down South. Botswana had been served with an instruction by the South African Government to suspend its assistance to any of the liberation movements and, if possible, crush their military activities. Consequently, Botswana had the predicament of showing non-alignment to the cause of any liberation movement. On one end, Botswana could not afford not to ignore the popularity of the liberation cause in Rhodesia and South Africa. However, its economic dependency on the Rhodesia-South Africa railway lines bent it into submission to the dictates of the two colonial Governments. That economic survival was uppermost in Botswana's administrative logic became more evident after the Sipolilo Battle when some guerrillas were arrested in the country. To sustain the temporary benefits of its proximity to the apartheid South African and the Rhodesian regimes, Botswana had to keep its distance from the liberation movements'

activities. In the interest of political-economic survival, Botswana had to stick to more diplomatic ties with colonial powers in South Africa and Rhodesia. This became more evident after the Sipolilo Battle when some guerrillas were arrested in Botswana. In the foundational stage of the ZPRA military conscription, young revolutionaries who took up military training in Zambia went through Botswana. Therefore, Botswana was heavily infiltrated by Rhodesian forces.

Participation in the Wankie Battle

I was among the ZPRA and Umkhonto weSizwe reconnaissance teams along the Jambesi-Victoria Falls, Lupane and Tsholotsho routes. The 1967 famous Wankie Battle was a culmination of these reconnaissance initiatives. Through reconnaissance, we coordinated the movement of the armed troops who waged a war that wobbled the entire Rhodesian and South African security forces. This mission was an outgrowth of joint political and military synergy between the two liberation movements. Oliver Tambo of the ANC and James Chikerema of ZAPU chaired the political coordination of this pact. At a military operational level, Akim Ndhlovu (ZPRA commander) and Joe Modise (MK Commander) were all at the leading front. The late Dumiso Dabengwa of ZAPU was the Chief of Intelligence. Among some Umkhonto weSizwe military gurus there was Archie Sibeko (Chief of Operations), Eric Tshali, (Chief of Staff), Walter Mavuso Msimang (MK Chief of Communications) and Chris Hani (Political Commissar).

The inaugural joint offensive by the ZPRA and the Umkhonto weSizwe was carried out on the 13th of August in 1967 on the banks of the Inyantuwe River. This meant that the Wankie and Dete area became a protracted guerrilla firing zone which saw the Rhodesian forces' conceding to our vicious attack. Realising the intense combat effect of the joint assault of the ZPRA and Umkhonto weSizwe, the Rhodesia Government solicited the assistance of the South African apartheid forces. It was clear that the guerrillas had successfully infused this area in a way that posed as a tremendous future threat to the Rhodesian defence force. The South African Government responded to Rhodesia's request for military support. A determined group of soldiers were unleashed to

assist in gathering intelligence. This resulted in swift military intervention by the South African forces, but it was all clear that the Rhodesians' military power was at its weakest point and was certainly beyond possible recuperation.

After Inyantuwe, we also had other major battles at Sinamathela, Tsholotsho and along the Natha and Tekwane river areas. The Tekwane Battle marked an end to the Wankie Campaign which saw the enemy being derailed and decimated. The next port of call was the Sipolilo Campaign. On the other hand, some troops landed themselves into the hands Botswana security forces. There they met their fate. They were imprisoned before being deported back to Zambia.

Running for My Life

The Smith regime responded by visiting violence on everyone suspected of having been part of the Wankie battle. I happened to be one of the boys who were on the wanted list of the Jambezi Special Branch. I escaped the wrath of the regime by fleeing to Zambia. The Rhodesian intelligence unit was quite aware of my reconnaissance role in the Wankie Campaign. I managed to flee with a host of other courageous cadres to Zambia. Upon arrival, we were received by Cde Luke Mhlanga and Cde Pepezelu Ncube. I had initially met these two during my initial training in preparation for the Wankie Campaign in 1966 when I first went to Zambia.

Thereafter, we were taken to Lusaka's Zimbabwe House where we were received by Cde George Silunduka and other leaders who were stationed in Zambia. We went through a severe vetting process before we were taken to Luthuli Camp which was under the command of Cde Joe Matthews of Umkhonto weSizwe with some other ZPRA Commanders like Cde Kezwana and others. Cde Dumiso Dabengwa, Phelekezela Report Mphoko, Abraham Nkiwane, Cde Tshinga Dube, Gibson Mayisa and Cde Arnold Gombagomba were among the senior cadres who provided mentorship to us as young military trainees. From time to time, these senior ZPRA comrades would visit the camp to boost the morale of the trainees, at the same time, reporting the progress which was being

made in the fight against the Rhodesian rule. Such exchange platforms were critical as they inspired confidence in the purpose of the struggle.

I spent five months at the camp receiving some induction on basic military intelligence and reconnaissance. The faculty of reconnaissance was critical in the ZPRA military formation as it enabled a conduit of civil-military relations. At the height of political consciousness of our people, reconnaissance activity strengthened mass mobilisation for the armed struggle. At the beginning of the year in 1968, more cadres were recruited and joined us before our next phase of full guerrilla training in Tanzania. Back at home, the struggle had gained a strong momentum which in exchange strengthened our determination not to give up the fight. After all, my mind was made up and there was no turning back on the struggle. We were loaded into different trucks for a long journey to Tanzania. I recall some of the drivers of two of the trucks were Cde Thomas Ngwenya, now a retired Colonel, and Cde Danger Ndlovu. It took us three days travelling through Tunduma, Mbeya-Iringa and finally Morogoro Training Camp. We were received at the main training camp by:

Albert Nxele	:	Camp Commander
Ambrose Mutinhiri	:	Camp Chief of Staff
Ethan Dube	:	Co-ordinator of the Training
Phineas Majuru	:	In charge of Personnel
Alfred Nikita Mangena	:	Instructor
Lookout Masuku	:	Commissar/Instructor
Gorden Munyanyi	:	Killerman/Instructor
Tsvarayi	:	Medic/Instructor
Grey Mutemasango	:	Toy Toy Instructor
Sam Mfakazi Moyo	:	Instructor
Tapson Gampo	:	Instructor
Elliot Masengu	:	Instructor

Some Algerian instructors acted as advisors to our ZPRA Algerian

trained instructors. We enjoyed continued military diplomacy with Algeria during the entire phase of the liberation struggle. During this period, I also trained with the late Solomon Mujuru (Rex Nhongo) whom we nicknamed “Chimsoro.” Others include the likes of Cde Makhonya, Siziba, Dombodzuku, Sogaga Malaba, Cephas Cele, Richard Dube and many other comrades. The training entailed nine months of laborious and gruelling combat exercises up to the end of 1968. We were also going to receive commando training for a year.

The Sipolilo Campaign

After the training, the entire three battalions were taken back to Zambia in Chakwenka/Kalowa Camp. The final destination was the Eastern front, where the Sipolilo Battle of 1968 was to be waged. In the Eastern front, I was among some accomplished military cadres and I was responsible for camp security. The key figures in this camp included Cde Muza, Cde Dombodzuku, Cde Makonya, Cde Siziba and Cde Mashengele. The High Command at the time comprised of:

Akim Ndlovu	:	Commander
Robson Manyika	:	Chief of Staff
Dumiso Dabengwa	:	Intelligence
Abraham Nkiwane	:	Operations/Personnel
Embassy Tshinga Dube	:	Communications
Gordon Butshe	:	Reconnaissance
Phelekezela Mphoko	:	Logistics

The Sipolilo Campaign ran from December 1967 to July 1968. This period up to 1970 was characterised by accelerated military engagements which were sophisticated. The first mark of this sophistication was courtesy of advanced reconnaissance activity. The reconnaissance strategy instructed that the troops would use the flat and wide crossing point between after the Manna Pools area and Feira, near where the Chewore River on the Rhodesian side flows. The guerrillas had to transport multiple grenades, rifles and explosives into Rhodesia.

Crossing the Zambezi using canoes was not a preferred option, considering the possibility of high-velocity currents of the Zambezi. Since the time of the Wankie Battle, Rhodesians had employed air force planes patrolling along the border area across the Zambezi covering some part of Feira and the Kariba Dam. Therefore, the resorted alternative was to take the route through Manna Pools and Feira. Joe Modise of Umkhonto weSizwe created a plan for the construction of a carriageway with a base made up of sealed empty 100-litre drums with a wooden platform on top. The troops were able to ferry their military wares which were to be used in the campaign. In the reconnaissance of our task was to ensure that all these movements were risk-free. Rhodesians made thorough patrols which kept us on toes as we coordinated these operations.

Internal Contradictions in the Battle Front

Tribalism and regionalism started creeping into the camps, thereby demoralising some of the fighters. There were tensions within the ZAPU Executive, mainly between James Chikerema and Jason Ziyaphapha Moyo. The two were at the helm of ZAPU's political activity from the time Nkomo was detained since 1964 and their tensions in 1970 impeded the struggle in a lot of ways. The loyalties of the forces degenerated, leading to some being aligned to Moyo and others being aligned to Chikerema. These internal conflicts hampered the logistical supplies to cadres who in turn became restless. Communication between cadres in the fronts and Head Office was completely immobilised due to the squabbles within the national leadership in Lusaka. George Nyandoro and James Chikerema began to lobby for a pro-Shona takeover of ZAPU against the party's clear tradition against tribalism. Their argument was that ZAPU's exile structures were not reflective of the demographic ratios of the Ndebele and Shona people in Southern-Rhodesia.

During this turbulent period, ZPRA was operating in both the Eastern and Western front. I was in the Eastern Front where the Sipolilo Battle had been executed. The political differences affected the morale of the combatants culminating in tensions at the camps leading to the cadres sending a delegation to Lusaka to assess the situation. The delegation included among others Walter Mthimkhulu, Cain Mathema, Livingstone


Mashengele, Joberg Mzilethi and others. We had completely lost contact with the centre and relied on *BBC* for most of what was happening in Lusaka between James Chikerema and Jason Ziyaphapha Moyo.

Cdes Tshinga Dube and two other commanders visited Kolowa camp where I was in the Eastern Front and advised me that they had come to collect me so that I could join a reconnaissance unit in the Western front. I was also cautioned that the situation at the head office had become so tense due to some ideological differences which also threatened a tribal split. On the other hand, our ZPRA and ZANLA camps had become more hostile towards each other. It was dangerous for me to remain on the Eastern front. I was advised to move to the Western front where ZPRA had assumed territorial command as the tempo of the struggle heightened.

We drove the whole night to Lusaka where I was taken to Cde Silundika's office very early in the morning who briefly updated me on the situation and told me that they had decided to send me to Deka DK Camp where I would be in the reconnaissance unit under Gordon Butshe. Cde Silundika also hinted to me that as I was still young, he would ensure that I go back to school should the opportunity arise. The reconnaissance unit at DK Camp included some Umkhonto weSizwe cadres such as Peter Mfene, Dotli, Gatsheni and others. Our side had the likes of Killion Dube, Zitshe Moyo, Mika Mlilo, Brother Khuphe and Sharp Shoot among others. Cde Killion Dube was the Camp Commander.

At the main Combat DK Camp, Cde Cephas Cele was the Commander and that was the camp whose cadres we assisted to cross the river to fight the enemy in Rhodesia. There were regular skirmishes with the enemy each time we escorted the comrades to the front. We would be attacked or attack in the areas of Mlibizi, Deka Drum, Hwange and Binga areas. Due to the enemy activity, we opened other crossing points in Mlibizi, Deka and Kazungula areas. We established reconnaissance satellite camps, at Siampondo, DK Deka, Mukuni and VC Camp near Kazungula.

Several attacks were made against the Rhodesian forces. These included attacks on enemy camps in Jambezi, Chisuma, Victoria Falls Airport and the general areas of Hwange, Lupane and Tsholotsho. In the meantime and due to the intense military activity in the area most of my relatives had joined the struggle. These were Tabu Mpofu, Pray Mpofu, Gunduma Mpofu and Amos Dube, among others. My uncles, Solomon Mpofu, Mlobisi Sibanda, SaNkazana Sibanda and Albert Tshuma many others had been arrested.



My late uncle Mlobisi Sibanda

Cdes Mica Mlilo, Zitshe Moyo, Brother Khuphe, myself and other comrades such as Stolom Roger Ndlovu did most of the reconnaissance and crossing of the comrades. I was paired with Cde Roger Stolom Ndlovu as both of us came from the Hwange area and knew the reliable

contacts for our combat units to use. We spent several weeks making contacts with reliable party supporters. We crossed and escorted many combatants, some of whom are alive today and can recount their experiences. One of them is Cde Msimanga of Tsholotsho Rural District Council and others are scattered around the country.

Other than making routes for combatant operations we also made contacts with African spiritual custodians, *inyanga*. The most prominent and highly consulted traditional healer at the time was Mkhanyiso Sibanda. I remember he was a crippled old man. We consulted him every time whenever we had to lead a combat contingent in and out of the country. It was believed that the rituals we engaged guaranteed our operations some supernatural protection. While there was the physical dimension to our military operations, comrades believed that we had to get blessings from the divine to outwit the ploys by the regime's security. So some rituals would be performed as a way of assisting us to evade the severe security dictations set by the enemy. Based on my commitment to the Seventh Day Adventist creed, I do not subscribe to African traditional religion. However, in the interest of solidarity, I had to partake in the ritual processes which were believed to attract supernatural guidance to our missions.

It was assumed that the charms we got from the African Traditionalists would offer some spiritual protection to the cadres during military undertakings. Our reconnaissance training was meticulous and hence we were able to cross over the Zambezi at ease through its violent tides on various occasions. In some instances, the Rhodesians Security Forces would invade our crossing points and find where we would have hidden our crossing boats and oftentimes this led to exchanges of fire. We would navigate the entire Western front to establish safe crossing areas, consequently, there were several military encounters in Hwange, Victoria-Falls, Lupane and Tsholotsho. There the enemy suffered heavy casualties. Elephant Hills Hotel, the Victoria Falls Airport were among our key targets for attack.

As a result of the advanced military operations, a lot of people in the Hwange-Jambezi area were tortured and incarcerated. At the time, my uncles, Solomon Mpofu and Mlobisi Sibanda were taken to Zambia for

brief military training. Their training entailed exposing them to handling a variety of guns and ammunition. The Rhodesians had intensified their brutality, our people were arrested and tortured *en masse*. Some who survived deaths were charged with life-sentence arrests. In all this, some Catholics clerics at Sacred Heart Mission assisted in the cause of our liberation struggle. They assisted in preparing travelling documents for our forces since at the time it was hard for our people to acquire travelling documents, particularly passports. Such support to our cause displayed the logical reality of the need for Rhodesia to fall. In the same spirit of the race-blind brotherhood to the liberation agenda, Russia became a strong ally of ZPRA. Nonetheless, we had internal contradictions we to grapple with.

Tracing the Genealogy of Contradictions within the Nationalist Movement



From the left, my brother Robert Moses Mpofu, and Solomon Mpofu. They motivated my participation in the struggle. Solomon Mpofu is the young brother to my father and he became my guardian after the passing on of my father. He was trained in Zambia, and was incarcerated by the regime for several years where he was tortured and had three broken ribs.

The decision to leave the Eastern front was primarily based on the intense manifestation of tensions between our liberation movements. Both military wings, ZPRA and ZANLA operated in the Eastern front, but ZPRA acquired exceptional credit in the Sipolilo Campaign. In making a collective reference of the military prowess exhibited by ZPRA and Umkhonto WeSizwe, Oliver Tambo of the ANC remarked:

In battle after battle, the racist forces were overwhelmed by the courage and firepower of our gallant fighters; instance after instance, the coward enemy broke ranks and fled, abandoning weapons, their injured and dead. Many members of that indomitable detachment fell in battle in Wankie and on the Eastern front. Their names are inscribed in the roll call of honour of our revolution. On this day every year, we pay special tribute to those illustrious combatants who fell on sacred fields of Zimbabwe with the warrior cry 'Victory or Death!!' on their lips.

The proclamation of victory by Tambo on the success of the joint operation of ZPRA and Umkhonto weSizwe armies in the Wankie-Sipolilo Battles characterises the commemorative tenor of the nationalist discourse. In so many instances, there is deliberate amnesia on the challenges and pitfalls which gripped the nationalist cause. Most biographies by some political players have offered exhaustive accounts on the contradictions which ensnared the nationalist movements. In the interest of political correctness, our national history and the liberation memory, in particular, has been embedded in commemorative rhetoric which has been mainstreamed as the basis of linear historical truth around the Zimbabwean national identity.

To offer an alternative to the reproduction of commemorative constructs of our past, it is essential to understand that our nationalist movements existed in entrenched points of political-ideological dissimilarities and clashes. I later understood these differences among ourselves after being actively immersed in nationalist politics. After all, when I initially joined the armed struggle I was still a teenager. Much of the complexities linked to the political operations of the struggle were fairly beyond my grasp at the time. Later on, I came to understand that the ethnically charged

tensions of the late 60s and the 70s were visible proof of the unresolved ethnic roots of post-independent Zimbabwe conflicts. To this day, our history has scantily confronted this gloomy side of our past.

As a starting point, the NDP's top hierarchy was predominantly Kalanga. The NDP's top brass included Joshua Nkomo as President, JZ Moyo as Secretary General and George Silundika as Secretary of Finance. These were influential positions in the NDP executive which had a total of seven posts. The NDP emerged in 1960 after the banning of the ANC in 1959. Before its ban, the ANC led to the rise of prominent nationalists like James Chikerema, George Nyandoro, Jason Ziyaphapha Moyo, and Henry Hamadziripi among others. In its short life, the NDP was rocked by more acute factional tensions which saw some nationalists of the Karanga ethnic group, led by Michael Mawema, forming the Zimbabwe National Democratic Party (ZNP). In a bid to outmanoeuvre possibilities of a future split, more Shona nationalists were elevated to the upper ranks of the NDP.

Robert Mugabe joined this bandwagon of nationalists in the NDP in its formative years. ZAPU was formed in 1961 after the banning of the NDP in December 1961. In 1963, a decisive turning point of the nationalist cause was witnessed when a group of ZAPU top members broke away from the party to form ZANU. This group was comprised of Enos Nkala, Ndabaningi Sithole, Henry Hamadziripi, Herbert Chitepo, Leopold Takawira and Edgar Tekere. This factional wrangle which led to the formation of ZANU was premised on ethnic, constitutional and personality contradictions as well as the clash of interests among the nationalists. Again, the absence of a shared policy on the execution of the armed struggle was the major reason for the factional fights within ZAPU and the consequent break-away of leaders. However, there is a tendency to reproduce a history of a seemingly frictionless construction of our political past.

Later on, Ndabaningi Sithole also found himself ousted from power in the mid-70s courtesy of the factional issues which led to internal conflicts within nationalist groupings. Factionalism matured over time, but it had been inherent in our politics since the NDP days. The ZAPU-ZANU split

made the liberation struggle to be regionally embodied in its execution. Later in ZANU, Ndabaningi Sithole was eliminated to make way for Robert Mugabe. Essentially, Sithole was viewed as a leader of the Ndau people. This explains why for the longest of time ZANU-Ndonga assumed a more regionally pronounced political character.

Immediately after the 1963 split, the ZAPU-led “Zhii” protests and the ZANU’s “Zhanda” street fights symbolically characterised the partisan-demarcated activities of the sabotage operations in the townships. This led to the separate incarcerations of the nationalists. ZANU activists were locked in Wha Wha, while some ZAPU militant elements were confined to Gonakudzingwa. By 1965, Sikombela became the new detainment centre for ZANU activists. Nkomo, Mugabe, Sithole among others were incarcerated.

It was against this background that I found myself joining the liberation war from the ZAPU-ZPRA front. The withdrawal of my service from the Eastern front in 1969 was influenced by the protracted ethnic defined tensions witnessed in the armed struggle. The same problem of ethnicity found its way into post-independent politics.

The ideological disenchantments emanating from the ZAPU and ZANU’s divided tackling of the struggle resulted in the emergence of Formation of the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI) in 1971 by James Chikerema. To those of us who belonged to the main-wing movements, FROLIZI was a reactionary movement whose intention was to capitalise on the ZAPU-ZANU contradictions to take charge of the liberation struggle. Among others, FROLIZI was led by Nathan Shamuyarira, George Nyandoro, Stephen Parirenyatwa, Ambrose Mutinhiri, Charles Goromonzi, Shelton Siwela, Zebediah Gamanya and Enoch Dumbutshena. The leadership crisis which hit the reins of the two most nationalist parties, ZAPU and ZANU facilitated the need for the region’s intervention.

As such, the Lusaka Unity Accord of 1974 played a mediatory role to the leadership crisis which befell the nationalist movement. This agreement compelled ZAPU, ZANU, FROLIZI and Muzorewa’s ANC to come

together as a united front. In 1975, ZIPA was formed to execute a joint ZPRA-ZANLA military effort. However, the formation of ZIPA did not put an end to the tensions between ZPRA and ZANLA forces. It was felt that on our part as ZPRA we had not brought the most brilliant of troops from our well-trained crop of soldiers. The failure of ZIPA was further evidenced by clashes of soldiers from both liberation movements in Iringa and Mgagao camps in Tanzania. The violence in Morogoro further substantiated that the formation of ZIPA did not extinguish tensions within nationalist armies and the erstwhile interests they represented. Most of these tensions were primarily based on the troops prejudice towards one another's armies.

Therefore, in a bid to prove each other's military prowess, the two groups went to the point of firing arms against each other. The Mgagao incident was the most unfortunate as there were open attacks among combatants. This typical violence was a shadow of the impending post-independence conflicts as all movements were beginning to eye their imagined prospects of assuming power after independence. Hashim Mbita's Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Liberation Organ had to intervene for peace to be restored. In Zambia, ZAPU's leadership had broken up into tribal camps, while junior officers felt abused by senior army officials who were seen to be manipulating their power to sustain selfish interests.

The clashes in the liberation camps after the formation of ZIPA could have been a result of failure to instil discipline among the joint forces of ZPRA and ZANLA. Furthermore, the idea of combining trained and semi-trained groups of soldiers in the same camps had the effect of creating unrestrained misdemeanour ploys which culminated in excesses of violence. In the process, animosity grew among the soldiers and the possibilities of creating lasting cooperation among these forces in the future were going to be a daunting task. The infancy of the armed forces' tensions later assumed much adhesive clout as witnessed in the ceasefire period after the attainment of Zimbabwe's independence in 1980. Meanwhile, these challenges coincided with the untimely elimination of our radical liberation leaders such as JZ Moyo. A letter bomb was sent to Jason Moyo leading to his elimination. In 1978, a landmine was used to eliminate Alfred Nikita Mangena who was a ZPRA Commander.

These targeted assassinations of our ZPRA command element followed the collapse of the Geneva Talks and individuals like Ziyaphapha Moyo and Alfred Nikita Mangena defied the moderate terms of negotiation. Consequently, their radical position made them targets for assassination. Earlier on, in 1975 Herbert Chitepo had also been assassinated. On the 26th of December, 1979 Josiah Magama Tongogara died in a car crash. At the time, the Lancaster Conference resolutions were in the course of implementation. The deaths of these prominent nationalists from both liberation fronts had a derailing effect on the pace of the revolution.

The Lancaster Conference

The Lancaster discussions came as a result of ceasefire calls by Ian Smith's embattled regime in December 1979. Lord Carrington was the major mediator. The conference set out the transitional modalities of the power shift from Rhodesia to the new African political power. The issue of a democratic transition was at the centre of the negotiations with the nationalists advocating for the adoption of the One Man, One Vote policy. The adamant penchant towards this proposition was inspired by the need to dismantle the inequalities harboured by the repressive rule whose power was sustained by a narrow franchise. Voting was only limited to propertied citizens who happened to be predominantly White and bourgeoisie in terms of the marginal clauses of colonial social belonging. The outgrowth of this lobby was the first majority election in 1980. This was one successful aspect of the Lancaster talks.

The negotiated framework of the post-liberation era in Zimbabwe was the foundation of the compromise of the radical terms of the nationalist cause. In a way, the acceptance of the negotiation model of the liberation question shows that the conference gestured neo-colonialism. The first source of evidence pointing to that crisis was the creation of a constitution under the guidance of our former oppressors. The fundamental weakness of the Lancaster constitutional design largely related to the realignment of property rights. Given the disenfranchisement of our people, it was retrogressive to have constitutional protection of the uneven control of the land. The compromised redressing of the land issue was paramount to the abortion of the entire cause of the liberation. In its deep-rooted

conviction to block the mass-driven land expropriation agenda, the Willing Seller, Willing Buyer principle was adopted with regards to shifting of land ownership. This sternly narrowed the post-colonial state's capacity to redress the land inequalities and of course the broader question of economic indigenisation which would be only be revisited two decades after independence. On the part of inequality beneficiaries, there was no conviction or willingness to give away the land. A commercial conscience justified the need for White settlers to hold on to the land. The Government was able to acquire land in negligible areas and less commercially viable areas. By 1989, the post-independent state only managed to resettle 52,000 households on 2.7 million hectares of land.



The late R.G. Mugabe and the late J.M.N. Nkomo at the Lancaster negotiations.

Photo credits: BBC

Lancaster House Conference was a conduit of the colonial entrapment of the decolonisation process. It formalised the sustained marginalisation of the African majority, the racially couched economic disparities were consolidated and solidified through this agreement. The imperial global design of economic power relations between the settler minority and the majority was at the heart of the Rhodesia-Zimbabwe transition. This

way, the nationalist cause was reduced to a transitional vanguard of securing interests of White monopoly capital. The reconciliation terms facilitated possibilities of Black and White reconciliation, but the internal contradictions which fuelled hostility between ZPRA and ZANLA were left unaddressed. Therefore, the aspect of guided reconciliation forms one problematic position of the transitional crisis. We were preoccupied with creating an artificial reconciliation with the enemy at the expense of uniting our people from the perils of a divisive past and its toxic histories which we chose to conceal in commemorative rhetoric. In his independence speech, Mugabe pronounced the reconciliation path:

Henceforth, you and I must strive to adapt ourselves, intellectually and spiritually to the reality of our political change and relate to each other as brothers bound one to another by a bond of national comradeship. If yesterday I fought as an enemy, today you have become a friend and ally with the same national interest, loyalty, rights and duties as myself. If yesterday you hated me, today you cannot avoid the love that binds you to me and me to you. Is it not folly, therefore, that in these circumstances anybody should seek to revive the wounds and grievances of the past? The wrongs of the past must now stand forgiven and forgotten. If ever we look to the past, let us do so for the lesson the past has taught us, namely that oppression and racism are inequities that must never again find scope in our political and social system. It could never be a correct justification that because Whites oppressed us yesterday when they had power, the blacks must oppress them today because they have power.

The trajectory of peace and reconciliation was largely welcome but in implementation it seemed to have taken an elitist leaning. On the other hand, the protracted Lancaster protocol left the nationalists more hostile towards each other. It is also true to say that ZANU had attracted possible supports from the British. Nkomo and ZAPU were placed at the edge of a disadvantage because of the military support which ZPRA had received since the 60s. The ZAPU-Soviet Union alliance made Nkomo lose favour with the British as he was perceived to be an agent of Russia which was traditionally hostile to Britain since the Cold-War era. The Lancaster

Conference was also aimed at recovering the lost ego of the Western imperialism whose settler army was savagely decimated by nationalist armies particularly ZAPU which was Soviet-backed.

The politics of “divide and rule” formed a key characteristic of the Lancaster negotiation. It was also felt that Nkomo’s rationality was polluted by a group of Whites he often consulted to inform the premise of his negotiation at the Lancaster Conference. These included the late historian Terence Ranger, Leo Baron, John Reed and Peter MacKay. Consequently, both ZAPU and ZANU were resolute to extricate their short-term alliance of convenience as the Patriotic Front. In their separate routes, ZAPU and ZANU penetrated their diverse spheres of influence as political parties with campaign messages linked to their direct partisan interests. Though PF-ZAPU and ZANU went to the Lancaster under the banner of the Patriotic Front, the deliberations at the conference spurred the evident contradictions of the nationalist bodies. Months before the February 1980 Lancaster House inspired election, ZANU announced that it was to go it alone, formally splitting from the struggle partnership with ZAPU.

In the later elections, ZANU secured an outright victory of 57 seats from the available 80 Common roll seats. ZAPU was the second runner-up with only 20 seats, confined to the Midlands and Matabeleland regions. The confined influence of ZAPU to these two regions proves how much regionalism encumbered the nation-wide characteristic which was supposed to define the normative appeal of the liberation movements. The foundational conviction of the nationalist cause compelled ZANU to invite ZAPU into a power-sharing arrangement. The first cabinet was comprised of political figures from both ZANU and ZAPU.

Back to the Future

I do not regret being at the forefront of my country’s fight for liberation from colonialism. It took a lot of sacrifices for this country to be liberated from the chains of imperialist bondage. As such, it is my wish to leave a memory which will commit future generations to unwavering patriotism which is anchored on the spirit of sacrifice which gave birth to the

freedom of Zimbabwe. As a personal starting point of my recollection, the Wankie-Sipolilo Battles benchmark my commitment to the noble cause of decolonisation. The unity we established with the ANC of South Africa further gives the philosophical detail of the interconnected motives and convictions we have always shared as Africans to decapitate racism, apartheid, imperialism and colonialism. The contribution of Zambia, Tanzania, South Africa, Angola and Algeria, among other countries, in supporting the ZAPU armed struggle solidified for our wide-stretching ideological fraternity. In turn, this made the brunt of the struggle bearable. These countries not only rendered a Pan-African impetus to the nationalist liberation trajectory, but their solidarities to the various stages of our liberation largely characterise Ubuntu as a practical and inherent philosophical underpinning of the decolonisation project.

However, it must be noted that the infused Pan-African and Ubuntu-driven successes of our liberation path were constantly interjected by the reproduction of colonialism in the decolonisation project. Therefore, the internal contradictions couched on the ethnicity dilemmas and the aspect of negotiated independence during the Lancaster Conference offer an analytical introspection to the coloniality of the decolonisation project.

In essence, this suggests that the notion of independence must be approached from a sternly critical point of view if the co-values of the national question emanating from the aspirations of the armed struggle are to be preserved. Then in this context, what becomes the mandate of the present and future generations? There must be a shared conscious political will to negate all manifestations of neo-colonialism and every other idea which keeps Zimbabwe tied down to colonial dependence. ZANU PF has the mandate to be a custodian of the liberation-driven values enshrined in our 2013 Constitution which replaced the first constitution which was handed down the throat of our independence at the Lancaster Conference. To this end, our determination for freedom must remain enshrined in the perennial aspirations of the people.




Retired Col. Tshinga Dube in the prime of his military contribution in ZPRA.



Comrade Dumiso Dabengwa, head of ZIPRA security. Photo Credits: BBC



My uncle Joseph Guwe Ndebele, a special aid to the late Vice President, J.M.N. Nkomo at the peak of the armed struggle.



My uncle Melusi Mbuze Mpofu. He earned the nickname “Sarenda” as a malapropism for “surrend”. This was after he was subjected to the brute of Rhodesian forces in one of their patrols in our village. All he had was a defeated exclamation agony as he cried out “surrend”. Thereafter, earned the nickname “Sarenda”.

A Scholar Combatant

I belong to the generation of anti-colonial radicalised African teenagers who rebelliously dropped out of formal education to join the liberation struggle. During my time, most mission schools particularly Manama, Cyrene and Inyathi mission schools faced a massive exodus of students who swapped their student status to be on the frontline of the armed struggle. Most mission and government rural schools, particularly in Matebeleland, became the source of manpower for ZPRA. Due to the popularity of the liberation cause as I was growing up, the school environs became a site of emancipatory ideological mobilisation.

As highlighted earlier on, part of my political consciousness was acquired at Sacred Heart Mission. The anti-colonial wave which had swept through the church-founded schools created a new political consciousness amongst students across the entire country. ZAPU ran underground mobilisation activities in the schools. This is how many of my generation and predecessors joined the struggle. Driven by the determination for freedom, we quit school and found ourselves joining the “comrades” in Zambia, Tanzania, Russia, Algeria and other diplomatic frontier states which supported us throughout the liberation struggle. As such, I exited Southern Rhodesia to join ZPRA in Zambia at the age of 16. Considering that most of the recruits had abandoned their studies to be part of the armed struggle, ZPRA had a deliberate policy to send these young soldiers to school.

In 1974, ZAPU, through the International University Exchange Fund (IUEF) Programme which was being administered by a lady called Zanele Mbeki, recommended that I go back to school from the camp since I was

still young. They secured a place for me at Linda Secondary School in Livingstone where our group of young people who had left school to be part of military training was allowed to continue with academic studies. In 1975, I moved to Livingstone Day School which was headed by a South African cadre called Cde Matyia. There were also some ZPRA teachers, but I only still remember Meshack Jongilanga Matshazi. He was a history teacher and taught me up to Form 5. He was a respected scholar and he passed on in 2015 (MHSRIP).

I continued with my studies and, after Form 5, enrolled for a Diploma in Journalism from Evelyn Hone College in Lusaka, Zambia. All my education bills were covered by the IUEF. I took up this course in journalism because I was passionate about information dissemination dating from the time I was responsible for circulating the Zimbabwe Times Newspaper. The experience at Evelyn Hone College intensified my hunger for knowledge. Even after finishing the course in journalism, I found myself yearning for more knowledge beyond my combatant. Meanwhile, extensive training was at its peak in our bases inside and outside the African continent. Our BaTonga makeshift wooden canoes were now replaced with dinghies made from Russia. Landmines had also been introduced in our military operations with more recruits coming in to support the struggle. As counter-measure infiltration was enhanced, there was heavy Rhodesian security presence in Zambia. There was also an influx of many of our people in Livingstone.

In 1977, after graduating with my diploma, I was awarded a scholarship to go and study in India alongside other ZAPU comrades. This was my best accomplishment considering that I was actively involved in nationalist work and, at the same time, I had to find time for my studies. My thirst for knowledge was never quenched; with my scholarship having been renewed, I enrolled for my first Degree in Commerce at the University of Delhi.

After independence in 1997, I enrolled for postgraduate studies, shifting my focus to public policy. I took this path after I had been appointed Deputy Minister of Industry and International Trade. This course was jointly offered by the University of Zimbabwe and the University of

Fort Hare. It was coordinated by leading Zimbabwean scholars like the late Professor Sam Moyo, Professor Masipula Sithole and Professor John Makumbe. Of all my lecturers, two are still alive, that is Dr Ibbo Mandaza and Eldred Masungure a veteran political science lecturer at the University of Zimbabwe. I am not sure of the whereabouts of one Dr Ndlela who was also my lecturer. The late Professor Sam Moyo produced extensive work on agrarian studies which has informed the debate of the political economy of the land reform programme. Dr Mandaza has remained a strong critic of ZANU PF.

The fact that I was a Deputy Minister at the time and a senior member of ZANU allowed some of my lecturers to fan out their dislike of my party, but their engagement was largely intellectual. I hold a PhD in Policy Studies with the Zimbabwe Open University. My study focused on the Tripartite Negotiation Forum in Zimbabwe.



Graduation 1981 - Degree in Commerce

Liberating Knowledge Production

The university is established to produce knowledge values designed to shape the structure of the economy as well as promoting science and technology. In the area of social sciences, logics of curating political culture, social welfare and preservation of human values are constructed. This is the ultimate and most generic function of every university. I accessed formal education as I doubled up as a military operative while in Zambia before moving to India to further my studies, at the University of Delhi. I only accessed decent conventional education after independence. This was courtesy of the visionary education policy which was adopted in Zimbabwe under the leadership of the late Cde Robert Mugabe. Otherwise, my elementary education was entrenched in the discriminatory construction of society under the imperialist regime.



In my student days with comrades at the University of Delhi

In as much as the stride towards the mainstreaming of access to education was important, the post-independence university was custom-made to preserve the colonial enabling of power, being and knowledge production. This way education was designed to maintain the relics of colonialism. We produced learners for exploitative statuses. The benchmarks of Western thinking were sustained such that the production of knowledge

which is relevant to our developmental interests remains constrained. The university is still struggling to come out of its conformist role as a repository of Western ideas. The dialectic density between colonial and liberating knowledge(s) is even expressed in our political polarization. We have seen how all policies aimed at driving economic empowerment have been dismissed in various academic disciplines. The conflicting contrasts of the African and Western ideas have also divided our society, industry and commerce in terms of neo-liberal and anti-colonial terms.

This position has been sponsored by the global order infused in our concepts of understanding politics outside our indigenous experience and self-definition within the “world order.” The historical logic of the land reform is erased in such debates resulting in popularised condemnation of this process as an absolute undermine to White landowners’ human rights. The categorical analytical dislodgement of economic freedom in our political discourse substantiates how our system has been producing vanguards of colonial capital other than nationalist inclined technocrats. Going forward, we need a new breed of scholars with the capacity to adapting academic concepts to serve national interest more.

This explains why the land reform programme was intensely contested across the academic divide, with only a remnant of African scholars standing up to the policy’s defence. The knowledge generated on the land reform in the past decade has prominently misrepresented Zimbabwe’s fast track land reform experience as an odd aberration. This exposes the extent to which the post-independence state has not fully come on board in terms of creating a culture inclined to preserve the posterity of the core aims of the liberation agenda, particularly economic empowerment.

Based on this reality, there is a need to think in terms of decolonising knowledge so that the values of our liberation are consolidated from all fronts. African intellectuals must be in a position to use the knowledge from our tertiary institutions to defend the gains of the struggle. Our intellectuals must be at the centre of progressively engaging politicians and giving counsel in policy-making. There must be a cordial interaction space between academia and politics to align knowledge production to the spirit and values of our liberation. Over the years, we have seen the

extent to which most of our academics have also been actively involved in deconstructing the political image of the country by working in cohorts with institutions serving neo-colonial interests.

The university must shift its focus from conservative terms of knowledge production towards the pragmatic repositioning of productivity by generating knowledge which can, for example, help in harnessing sustainable food security models. Knowledge generation must be premised on engagement with the African past and the perennial ideological constructions of our society.

Academic freedom and association must be allowed to flourish but our academia must also be involved in nation-building. One way or the other, those of us in politics, particularly the nationalist movement, must join hands with our tertiary institutions in issues of curriculum-building. We need to define the knowledge we want for ourselves in redirecting the broad and continuing agenda of decolonisation. In terms of promoting nation-building, we need knowledge dissemination which transcends the narrow inclinations tribalism, racism, sexism, patriarchal penchants and other retrogressive tendencies.

Instead, we need to collectively advocate for an education system which drives the ambitions of poverty eradication, investment attraction and enhancement of science and technology. This proposition to liberate knowledge resonates with the post-colonial trajectory to liberate Africa from colonial dependence.

The gap between the university and the informal economic communities has only led to the dismal failure in conceptualising the value of incomes which could be generated from smallholder access to land. Liberated and decolonial emphasis on economics must have a profound focus on how the post-colonial economic policies could be instrumental in poverty reduction. Bridging that gap through research would incentivise subsistence and commercial farming as well as giving scientific direction in Government's review of the land tenure concerns.



[Seated] from the left, Dr. Washington Mbizvo, the late ZOU Vice Chancellor Proffessor Primrose Kurasha, the late former President R.G. Mugabe, and the former Minister of Higher and Tertiary Education, the late Dr. Stan Mudenge.



Lighter moments with the former President R. G. Mugabe extending his congratulatory greetings to my wife on the attainment of my PhD. Onlooking, from the left is Dr. Jorun Gumbo, one of the long serving cabinet ministers in the Government of Zimbabwe.

The Logic of Being ZANU PF

Reliving the Scars of the Armed Struggle

At independence, my commitments to the nationalist movement remained unwavering. After intense retrospective and introspective insights in a bid to map out my future in politics, ZANU PF became my new political home. It was in ZANU PF where I was “born-again” politically. At the time, I was going through an evolutionary phase which entailed graduating into civilian life from the previous military life. The painful reality of undoing the psychological traumas of war which I had borne since the age of sixteen was inevitable. Sadly enough, to this day some comrades never came to terms with this transitional phase. They were lost in the memories of the war and never recovered from the trauma. This was one of the many other tragic effects of the war which had a direct bearing on some of our freedom fighters.

Some of these context-sensitive realities of our past were not dealt with properly. Many of our cadres never psychologically made it back from the bush. Many times, we talk of those who lost their lives in the war of our liberation and ignore those who lost their minds as a result of the war. Some lost their manhood; some returned from the war with some of their body parts amputated.

War was ugly, no question about that. Some returned to derelict homesteads. At the same time, they could not be harmonised to civilian life. Many of my relatives were lost in the war. Others had endured imprisonment. Those of us who came from the war alive suffered the reality of its innumerable effects. We had to deal with its haunting memories and

the countless tragic losses of our loved ones. In the trenches, we became brothers and sisters. At independence, we were never to see some whom we had established strong emotive bonds with. To their great memory, some left orphans of the war. Those of us who survived did so because some comrades sacrificed their lives to protect ours. Such was the depth of loyal sacrifice to the armed struggle. Today, history remembers all the great luminaries we lost along the way. These include Alfred Nikita Mangena, Jason Ziyaphapha Moyo, Ethan Dube, Josiah Tongogara and Herbert Chitepo, among others. The turbulences experienced at the time were more defining to the trajectory of the liberation movement. The leadership of the revolution in both ZANU and ZAPU was threatened. However, these and many more trials and tribulations have motivated the longevity of the nationalist cause. A lot has been lost, but much more stands to be consolidated.

It has been many decades now, but it is hard to uproot the traumatic hangovers of the war days. The pain is still fresh to this day. Coming back to civilian life had its unbearable strains. Back at home, many relatives were displaced by the harsh conditions of the war. Consequently, they took refuge in neighbouring countries. Among these, some were exiled to eternity. There is no trace of their remains. No one knows if they were consumed by the wrath of war or other calamities. There are some whose bones were never found and many who were never afforded decent burials. These departed souls still haunt the minds of the living. These were our friends and were unfortunately sent to their Creator because of the evil committed by the foe on the land. Independence came, we celebrated and these lost sons and daughters of the soil were not with us to be witnesses of this celebration. Some whose chests were ripped apart by bulletins were never witnesses of Zimbabwe's freedom.

Joining ZANU

My affiliation to the then ZANU was based on my acknowledgement and acceptance of the people of Zimbabwe's democratic choice to vote ZANU into power in 1980. Our fight for independence was anchored on the need to achieve majority rule and ZANU was an embodiment of that cause. It was clear that the aspirations of the freedom we fought for

resided more in ZANU as the party of the majority. ZANU's electoral triumph leading to the 1980 landmark transition showed the extent of the party's popularity. It made more sense for me to situate my future political interests in ZANU. As a result, my decision to join ZANU was a result of a clear evaluation of the future of Zimbabwean politics. By then, ZANU presented itself as the party of the future. It did not make sense for me to be in the opposition. After all, opposition parties are formed to be the Government-in-waiting. I had the opportunity to join those in Government then. I did exactly that and, 40 years down the line, ZANU PF is still the party in Government. I recall tendering my resignation from ZAPU at the time. I was warned that I was headed towards the end of my political career. My wife who was a Councillor on a ZAPU ticket migrated with me to ZANU and few years down the line we were reunited with our ZAPU comrades after the signing of the Unity Accord.

The organisational precision of ZANU since the time of the Lancaster Conference offered clear nuggets of an optimistic future of the party. Based on these futuristic considerations, I made up my mind and joined ZANU in 1980. 40 years later, I can safely say I did not misread what the future had prepared for my political career in ZANU. I am glad my political crossover from ZAPU preceded the Unity Accord which was signed in 1987. My allegiance shifted purely on political calculation and the outcome of that calculation is still correct.

In any case, I was part of the team that worked tirelessly towards unifying PF-ZAPU and ZANU, leading to the signing of Unity Accord between Cde Mugabe and Cde Nkomo in 1987. In as much as I had foreseen the survival limitations of ZAPU, I was adamant to see the unity of the two nationalist movements. The coming together of PF-ZAPU and ZANU to form ZANU PF in 1987 was history rewriting itself because in the formative years of the fight against colonialism all nationalists were united in one organisation against colonialism. Therefore, their dissenting routes in the process of fighting the enemy had deviated from their founding motives.

I am proud that my political career is precast on the ideological virtues of the core liberation movements of this country, the then ZAPU and

ZANU. The two parties might have endured a plethora of tensions which led to their split in 1963, but their shared anti-colonial resolve remained steadfast. However, in the broad sense of their ideological convictions, PF-ZAPU and ZANU cannot be analytically classified as institutions which were propagating parallel monologues. For that reason, beyond the parties' shared protagonist contradictions, the unity of PF-ZAPU and ZANU was inevitable. My shift to ZANU was based on a futuristic scenario projection which could not be postponed for longer than a decade before coming to fruition. The "Patriotic Front" concept, which served as a prefix label for ZAPU and, later on, represented the collective agenda of the nationalists at the Lancaster Conference, stands as a permanent emblem of the national loyalties which the nationalist movement bears. To me, ZANU PF embodies the emotive values of loyalty to Zimbabwe. Just like PF-ZAPU, ZANU was involved in the fight for Zimbabwe's liberation. Therefore, in terms of ideological conviction, my political cross-over to ZANU PF after independence was never corrupted and I am grateful to be ZANU PF without any apology.

Becoming a member of ZANU PF provided me with the opportunity to transcend unbeneficial ethnic essentialism which characterised our politics before and after independence. The decision to join ZANU reaffirmed my allegiance to the collective essence of national belonging. In so doing, I ceased to be a regionally defined politician because ZAPU had become a Matebeleland-Midlands predominant political party. It will be recalled that the demographic distribution of the two parties ZAPU and ZANU ended up assuming the ethnic bias as either pro-Ndebele or Shona-aligned.

To this day, these superficial attributes of national belonging drawn from the liberation struggle days are still being used to interrogate the underpinning strength of our national unity. By joining ZANU, I broke the ethnic essentialist barriers which demarcated the PF-ZAPU and ZANU tribal centred divide before the Unity Accord. However, those who are still pushing for these narrow propositions of essentialism fail to consider that it was inevitable that most ZPRA cadres would be mainly from Matebeleland and possibly drawn from indigenous ethnic groups from Matebeleland. Zambia, where ZPRA had established its

camps, was easily accessible through Matebeleland. Naturally, it was expected of ZANLA to recruit many ethnic groups from Mashonaland simply because Mozambique, a ZANLA training base, was situated in the proximity of provinces of Shona-speaking Zimbabweans. It has been ignored that it was the structural design of geography and demography which saw some cadres crossing over to Zambia and Botswana to join ZPRA. Others found an easy route to take part in military training in Mozambique. After independence, it only made sense for one to dismantle that superficial chasm which is still embedded in the mindsets of our people. Until this day, the enemy has used ethnicity to confine our broad patriotic convictions to regionalism.

I also joined ZANU because of the party's commitment to meritocracy. Unlike in ZAPU, where there was a certain bias against people from Matabeleland North, in ZANU there was an all-embracing political culture. To think of it, the people of Matebeleland North had borne the brunt of the struggle. In the competition for the Matebeleland North Province seats, there was only the late Cde John Nkomo from the province while the rest were from Matabeleland South. Sydney Malunga was appointed to represent ZAPU in Victoria Falls, while Vote Moyo was to be in charge of Nkayi and Ruth Chinamano was to take up leadership for Lupane. The list excluded other top ZAPU members who were originally from Matebeleland North such as Welshman Mabheba, Francis Nehwati, Chiyasa, Sekajaya Mutanga and Ronald Sibanda, among many others.

Most of the people in Matebeleland North and Hwange, in particular, expected to have locals representing them but ZAPU did not offer that opportunity. Most people in Matebeleland North continued to lament the state of marginalisation experienced by the province. Up to this day, the people of Matebeleland North still problematise the distribution of opportunities since it is only a few of our people who hold influential positions in the party and government. This disparity can also be noted in the uniformed forces, diplomatic corps and high public administrative occupations.

Immediately after independence, I raised the issue in ZAPU, but the matter was not given the attention it deserved. However, my determination

to reverse our marginalisation has continued to inspire my hard work for merit earned political engagement. This has been the case with other fellow compatriots from my province, namely Advocate Jacob Mudenda, the current Speaker of the Parliament and Hon Cain Mathema, a ZPRA ex-combatant and Cabinet Minister.

My political elevation in both the ruling party and Government to key and strategic positions has been a product of hard work and my ability to fight against all odds. In all this, the politics of entitlement has continued to manifest within our body politic. However, President Emmerson Mnangagwa has been able to eliminate the tendencies of entitlement within ZANU PF and in Government. Most of the appointments he has made have transcended the narrow penchants of polarising and polemic attitudes which have threatened the potential for sustainable nation-building over the years.

Falsehood and defamation have been levelled against my credentials and loyalty to ZANU PF and Zimbabwe at large. These gross and misguided allegations have been the making of characters who have been rejected by the people and are not even popular in the grassroots. Generally, this shows the recurring contradictions which were experienced since the days of the liberation struggle. Those who were not ideologically deep-rooted were the source of strife and tension. They compromised a lot in terms of principle and disrupted the course of combat strategy in some instances. They were reactionary busybodies aimed at elevating their profiles. In the long run, their folly got the better of them and history does not remember them at all. The revolution and its guiding principles always have a way of excreting malcontents from its system. Over the years, ZANU PF has expelled and suspended many who thought they were bigger than the party.

In all these lifelong lessons of the revolution, I am constantly reminded to remain loyal to the values of national belonging. I am reminded of the reward of discipline as a cadre of the struggle. To this end the wisdom of the late former President, Cde Robert Mugabe still echoes:

I have described discipline as having two dimensions – the external and the internal – emphasising that the internal kind of discipline was the more important of the two. Internal discipline is a state of order within a person that propels him to do the right things. It is a stage of individual development that resolves the contradictions within an individual. The pull to be selfish is counterbalanced by a greater pull to be selfless, the pull to drunkenness is countered by one to moderation, the pull to disobedience is negated by that to obedience, and the pull to sexual givenness yields to sexual restraint, deviationism is corrected by compliance and individualism by collectivism. The individual must comply with the order laid down by the group. Our group is the Party called ZANU.

I bear testimony to the wisdom of the departed liberation icon. I believe it was through discipline and loyalty to the party that I was able to serve as a leader in the ruling ZANU PF and Government this long. I was entrusted with very crucial ministries during my tenure in the cabinet. I have successfully executed my duties with the diligence and honour of a determined patriot. I am grateful for my current elevation as the ZANU PF Secretary for Administration. My current assignment has been made smoother by a robust atmosphere of collegiality from highly experienced former cabinet ministers and diplomats deployed as full-time heads of departments at the party headquarters. ZANU PF as a political organisation has been transformed into a professional and authentic symbol of nationalist supremacy.

In the Core of Politics

Joining ZANU PF was the best thing I ever did in my whole political life. In ZANU PF, I discovered my political worth. I was well-received by the entire leadership including the current President, His Excellency Cde Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa, Cde Hebert Ushewokunze, Cde AVM Tungamirai, Cde Morris Nyagumbo and Rex Nhongo, whom I had previously encountered in Morogoro and Sipolilo respectively. In 1987, President Mugabe appointed me as a non-constituency Member of Parliament. This was after I had stood as a candidate for the Hwange-Tsholotsho seat and lost to the ZAPU candidate in the 1985 election. I

found myself involved in national politics for the first time as I started interacting with ZANU PF cadres who thought I would be a relevant asset in the development of our country. Meanwhile, I had also risen through the ZANU PF ranks to be a provincial Deputy Treasurer in Matabeleland North. Unbelievably, the most sceptical of them was Cde Enos Nkala who suspected me to be a ZAPU plant. He never fully accepted me, perhaps since I did not join ZANU PF through him. When I moved to Bulawayo in 1985, I joined party ranks starting from the cell, branch, and province up to the Central Committee. I was also the Councilor for Umguza Rural District Council before being elected to Parliament in 1995.

In 1990 while serving as the Vice-Chairman of Umguza Rural District Council and its Chairman of Finance, I was elected to the Central Committee in the united ZANU PF. In 1988, Cde David Chiweshe, Cde Changara and I were invited to State House by the former President Cde Robert Mugabe. There, we were tasked to form an association of the liberation war-veterans. The idea was to organise the liberation forces of both ZPRA and ZANLA. The Government wanted to set a framework to channel resources which were to serve the welfare needs for the former combatants. Our task was to create a framework to organise the former fighters to acquire their pensions. Therefore, the purpose of this meeting was to organise structures to channel the benefits for the former guerrillas. We made nationwide consultations with both ZPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants. We organised meetings which were coordinated by selected comrades around the country. The most prominent figures for this process included Justice Charles Hungwe, Andy Mhlanga and Webster Shamu, among others. I had several meetings in the Midlands and Bulawayo where I had a torrid time from colleagues who thought it was a waste of time and they needed guarantees that the initiative was worth pursuing. The frustrations from the comrades were justified because ex-combatants had been abandoned at independence and there had been no formal expression of gratitude for their contribution to the country's liberation. Former ZPRA combatants such as John Gazi and Robert Mlalazi were very helpful in the process though they were also sceptical about the success of this initiative. The sincerity of the Government towards this

initiative was constantly interrogated. This was mainly because the post-war reconstruction of Zimbabwe was more determined by elite-driven transition terms. White capital secured its long-term interests while ex-Rhodesian bureaucrats and combatants still commanded a huge stake in the political economy after independence.

However, after a lot of resistance, it was finally agreed that a national war-veterans body would be formed. I was appointed the first Chairman of Bulawayo/Matabeleland North war-veterans chapter. Since then, this association has become a powerful player in national politics and continues to have vibrant membership structures whose advocacy role has been crucial in influencing the direction of policy-making. In various ways, the institution of war-veterans has been at the fore of ensuring that ZANU PF does not depart from its founding values. War-veterans have continued to be the guiding beacon in several political processes of the party.

In 1995, I was appointed Deputy Minister of Industry and International Trade. I deputised Nathan Shamuyarira and later Hebert Murerwa. In 1998, I was appointed to the Politburo as Deputy Secretary of Security, deputising Cde Sydney Sekeramayi and later Cde Nicholas Goche. In 2000, I was appointed Governor and Resident Minister for Matabeleland North Province. As Governor, I initiated the following projects: Lupane State University, Lupane Government Complex and Bubi Dam, among other critical projects. In 2005, I won the parliamentary elections and was appointed Minister of Industry and International Trade. In 2008, I was re-elected for the Umguza parliamentary seat and then I was appointed Minister of Mines and Mining Development. I was elevated to the substantive Politburo post of Secretary for Economic Affairs in 2009 at the party's congress. After the 2013 July elections, I was appointed Transport and Infrastructural Development Minister, from where I was moved to Minister of Planning Development and Investment Promotion. Later on, I was reassigned to be the Minister of Home Affairs and Cultural Heritage until 2018. Since then, I have served as the ZANU PF Secretary for Administration on a full-time basis.



With His Excellency President Cde ED Mnangagwa during the inaugural Politburo after the birth of the New Dispensation. Photo Credits: Reuters

As a parliamentarian, I was a member of most of the committees at various stages. In all the above, I think I executed responsibilities with diligence and focused patriotism. I presided as Governor for Matabeleland North at the most volatile time of the Land Reform Programme. I succeeded in resettling thousands of landless people in the region against all odds. As Minister of Industry and International Trade at the country's hyperinflationary period of hoarding, price increases and speculation, I managed to keep distressed industries afloat using the Distressed Industries and Marginalised Areas Fund (DIMAFA). As Mines Minister, I revolutionised the mining sector to a point that Zimbabwe was on the global map once more. At the time, much of the revenue from this sector went a long way in balancing Treasury needs.

Party Supremacy over Government

My appointment as the Secretary for Administration in the Party resonates with the new trajectory of "Party's Supremacy over Government." In the first half of 2019, the administration department has been central in effecting the implementation of the supremacy of the party over the government.

To this end, the party has made efforts to direct government policies and programmes nationally. A strategic framework to synchronise the party's proposals in the National Budget Process is being initiated to guide party supremacy. This has seen the establishment of a Technical Committee on Party Supremacy whose aim is to synchronise a consultative interaction between party and government in the area of national economic policy architecture.

Human-resource capacitation of the party has been progressively achieved ever since the deployment of full-time heads of departments at the ZANU PF headquarters. The professional development of staff members has gone into force at the party headquarters. The complimentary staff has since been recruited to fill in new posts in the party.

ZANU PF's resounding by-election victories in 2019 across the country affirm fully the extent to which the party has reinvented itself to meet power dynamics in the country. Restructuring of the party from the cell/village right up to the provincial organs has been successfully attained in this period. This success needs to be consolidated further to strengthen structure-based affiliation to the party. The decentralised issuance of electronic membership cards to the provinces has been done across the country. This has assisted in the nationwide party restructuring processes. The digitalisation of party membership registration to be used as the sole voters' roll for party primary elections has been initiated and must be continued under more innovative terms.

The transformation of the party has suffered a few challenges as some old retrogressive norms are still entrenched in some pockets of our membership. At some point, the resolution to have full-time senior members of the party was moved by the Women's League. The plan was to have long-serving Ministers in Government being deployed at the ZANU PF Headquarters and then presumably force them into retirement. The targeted portfolios were Secretary for Administration, Secretary for Finance and that of Commissars. As we transformed through modernising party operations more comrades sought to join the party and ZANU PF now has truly become a citadel of power. As is always the norm, some characters within party structures have been disappointed by this success

and have been mobilising some war-veterans and youths to sabotage the process through falsehoods and tired machinations of tribalism.

These internal contradictions are not premised on any ideological tenacity, but they are incentivised by selfish interests which are retrogressive to the long-term interests of ZANU PF. This calls for determined thought-renewal to redefine the Party's internal democracy system and redesign the scope of the Party's agenda in the context of the nationalist legacy rejuvenation. ZANU PF as a satellite conduit of the broad Pan-Africanist agenda must be able to locate its space in contributing to the fight against neo-colonialism. I have reiterated this position on many occasions; we must be responsive to the efforts by the enemy to displace ZANU PF and the entire nationalist movement (*See Appendix 1*).

The Future of ZANU PF

As underscored earlier, ZANU PF is the custodian of the triumph of the liberation agenda. In as much as the party was successful in leading the fight against colonialism, it needs to strengthen its cause for the realisation of new solutions for the contemporary challenges which the country is facing. The party needs to go beyond servicing its power consolidation interests. As custodians of the liberation of this country, we must be the vanguard of the objectives of our revolution which include:

Democracy

Decision-making within the party and the Government must be affixed in mass consent. Policy direction must be determined by widespread consultations from the grassroots. This is part of our revolutionary democratic tradition where the masses and the nationalist leadership frequently interacted in making decisions which guided the processes of the fight against the enemy until victory came our way. It is through the primary elections with which the party produces candidates for national elections. In essence, democracy finds its roots in community-based decision-making. The ward is the nucleus for decision making and in reverse, it is the starting point for policy delivery. The nationalist mandate came from the masses in the same way the party isously thriving on electoral popularity since independence. The cell is the root of ZANU

PF structures. To remain formidable, the party must continue to uphold the fundamental tenets of democracy which enabled us to dismantle colonial power. The foundation of democracy in Zimbabwe predates our independence.

Inclusive Nation-Building

Since the signing of the Unity Accord in 1987 political rivalry has been suspended to make way for national unity. ZANU PF has always initiated political dialogues which have aided in overriding the limitations to unity. As it stands, the establishment of the Political Actors Dialogue (POLAD) under the Second Republic serves as a key milestone in the attainment of social cohesion.

Equality

Egalitarianism forms the fundamental base of African society. Our societies were modelled in terms of mutual respect which were only disrupted by the racist regime. ZANU PF must be at the centre of ensuring equal access to economic opportunities, health, education and other public welfare facilities.

Economic Empowerment

At the centre of the armed struggle's objectives was the need to recoup the looted national resources. The resources include vast tracks of arable land, mineral-rich areas and access to wildlife. ZANU PF carries the mandate of ensuring that economic empowerment is attained for the benefit of our formerly marginalised groups. This way, ZANU PF will take the lead in poverty eradication. To achieve all these goals, ZANU PF must be ideologically grounded to be a relevant political party of the future.



Obert at 50: Celebrating with the love of my life Sikhanyisiwe



With former Vice President of Zimbabwe, the late Joseph Msika on the occasion of my 50th birthday celebrations



With the late former cabinet minister, Dr. Sikhanyiso Ndlovu

6

Professional Career, Business Empire and Marriage

In 1977, I graduated with a Diploma in Journalism from Evelyn Hone College, followed by a degree in Commerce. These accolades qualified me to work for Zimbabwe Newspapers (1980) Ltd (Zimpapers) as a trainee manager with the Mass Media Trust which had acquired the majority stake from the Angus Africa News Service. Within a short space of time, I migrated from the media fraternity with my next posting in the Ministry of Finance in the Department of Customs and Excise as a senior collector of customs and excise. I was directly appointed to this new department by the then Prime Minister of Zimbabwe after a series of problems I had faced at Zimpapers.

The Department of Customs and Excise by then was being administered by some hardcore Rhodesians such as Neil Harper and Fincham John Austin, among others, who initially resisted our appointments into the department. I was part of the first black university graduates ever to join the department and this became a source of discomfort to the Rhodesian officers, most of whom were ex-Special Branch officials or army conscripts. But we managed to handle the resistance, eventually taking over the entire department and having more Africans in senior positions, setting it up to progress to what it is today.

My role in public sector management can be closely linked to the Africanisation of statecraft considering that Rhodesian hegemony had entrenched itself in major public institutions. Arguably, at this point part of the mandate which our Government had to face was that of restoring

the values of independence to various socio-economic sectors which had been set as a preserve for colonial-settler class. At the time, the hangovers of colonialism were inherent to every public institution. At the Customs Department, I assisted immensely in promoting transparency and accountability in an area which had long been infested with corruption.

Joining the Private Sector

In 1985, I resigned from the Ministry of Finance to join Treger Holdings Company. I was employed as a Personal Assistant to the Managing Director. Within three months, I was promoted and served as the Group Projects Director. I was entrusted with the firm's Grain Bag Plastic Project. This particular project was one of the key innovations of the group and the project had huge returns for the company. I successfully initiated the project, the first of its kind in the country, whereby grain was to be packed in specially designed plastic bags through a process of anti-slip weaving. The manufacturing of these bags involved rigorous testing of the bags for stackability, durability and strength.

Following the output of this innovation, which I had nurtured to the extent of attracting high revenue for the group, I was appointed the Managing Director of the then newly-established Zimbabwe Grain Bags company. In a short space of time, my contributions had enhanced my profile within this company. I found myself climbing the ladder as the first and only black board member of all the thirteen Treger Group of companies. This equally meant that I was the first executive member of the Bulawayo Chamber of Industries in the late 1980s. When I joined the group, the shareholders were facing challenges of foreign currency and viability, but the grain bag project gave the group a lifeline to cater for the wages and welfare of its 8,000 employees then. The Treger Group was and still is one of the biggest family-owned businesses in the country and has various companies such as Kango Industries, Monarch, Treger Plastics, Treger Products and Treger Security. I gained a lot of private sector experience during this period.

However, even after I had established my professional profile and assisted in gearing up the Treger Group to greater heights, there was

an absolute need to deal with the constant interference of operations of the company by some senior politicians. A greater part of the problems which were attached to my service in the Treger Group were linked to some politicians, especially Enos Nkala.

For starters, I negotiated a deal with Treger Holdings for the party, ZANU, to acquire a substantial stake in the Group. Initially, Enos Nkala - who was the party's Treasurer - objected to this but eventually gave in after the now late Maurice Nyagumbo and other party cadres convinced him that the proposal was a good one. I further persuaded him to consider the party's purchase of National Blankets after convincing Mr Rueben Pilosof, who was the Managing Director of the company, to sell.

It was also during this period that corruption was beginning to take its toll. I was exposed to the scope of graft and the extent to which some politicians wanted to have some underhand involvement in the running of private enterprises. My encouragements to the party to have a big investment stake was driven by the need to make it self-sustainable and curb individuals from acting as proxies of the party's investment interests and yet securing their self-aggrandisement. Some of these cadres also began resenting me because of the close ties I had with the then President and Joshua Nkomo before the Unity Accord.

The Willowvale Scandal

Things got nasty when the company was being pressured to buy vehicles from Willowvale Motor Industries through Cde Enos Nkala and others. I objected strongly to this leading to Enos Nkala personally directing the shareholders that I had to be fired from the company as he alleged that the party was not comfortable with me working in the group. I cautioned the group that if they listened to Enos Nkala the image of the organisation was going to be tainted. I also insisted that I was not going to accept any move which would undermine my integrity. True to my word, I resisted this move because it was unwarranted and self-serving for Cde Nkala whom I had advised against using the company to buy overpriced vehicles through a scheme which was corrupt and prejudicial to the viability of the company.

In response to this move, Nkala - who was a Cabinet Minister then - is said to have ordered the dismissal of Rueben Pilosof, who had assisted ZANU PF to buy into National Blankets from Lonrho. Pilosof was the Managing Director of National Blankets and had played a major role in facilitating the transaction. I was the next victim of Nkala's purge.

Tregers Group shareholders were extremely intimidated by Cde Nkala. As a result, they pleaded with me to concede to Cde Nkala's order to leave the company. They offered me a lucrative package, hoping that I would relent and accept Cde Nkala's manoeuvres. I refused and decided to take the matter to court through my legal counsel, Mr Mordecai Mahlangu of Lazarus and Sarriif, and we won the case against the Tregers Group. They were ordered to reinstate me immediately with costs. Having made some disclosures on the Willowvale Scandal, I decided to negotiate an exit package which saw me walk out of the company with a golden handshake that included cash, a company house and a Mercedes-Benz. The exit package also included profit share scheme benefits.

I was requested by the Tregers shareholders to enter into a Restraint of Trade contract for ten years. This was mainly because I was the only executive in the country with the knowledge of the plastic technology which the group had introduced. The company feared that I would work with potential competitors and deprive Tregers its monopoly as the sole manufacturer of grain bags at the time. After receiving the golden handshake I left the private sector. On the other hand, the Government invited me to serve on several boards such as the Urban Development Corporation, Air Zimbabwe, Afretair, Agricultural Development Corporation, ARDA and Defence Services Commission. My wife, who worked for CABS at the time, played a major role in securing loans from CABS and other financial institutions to procure valuable assets which we both own. Through such loans, we acquired the York House building which was originally owned by Old Mutual.

The Willowvale scandal was unearthed leading to the appointment of a Commission of Inquiry called the Sandura Commission. As a result, the entire Tregers Holdings shareholders fled the country and some ministers resigned, including Cde Nkala.

Venturing into Business

Exiting the private sector heightened my business inventiveness and it was all from humble beginnings. In 1988 I bought Green Haven Resort from the late Dumiso Dabengwa. In a short space of time, Green Haven quickly became the most popular entertainment spot in Bulawayo. We also acquired three butcheries in the CBD called The Regent and another in Pumula under the name Mandlakababa, while the third one was at Green Haven itself. Due to the increased demand for meat from our clients, we bought Auchernburg Farm from Government, which we used to breed a sizeable herd for domestic and international markets.

Following my exit from the Tregers Group, I moved into full-time politics. At the same time, my acumen in property investments after I resigned from private sector employment saw me securing many entrepreneurial interests. As already pointed out, in 1988, I was a proud owner of three butcheries and I was actively involved in agriculture. My initial penetration into the agricultural sector was through paprika farming and ostrich rearing for the export market. The success of this venture is to be attributed to my partnership with the Hyveld Export Company in Ruwa.

This hard work culminated in my investment widening into bureau de change services which operated in Bulawayo and Victoria Falls in 1990. In a short space of time, I opened a micro-finance institution called Trek Finance. In 1994, I also moved into haulage services and I later partnered Wellington Nyatanga.

In 1998, I sold the bureau de Change to CFX Bank and used the proceeds to acquire a mortgage from CABS to buy York House Building from Old Mutual. This was a breakthrough, though we had already developed a significant portfolio in terms of movable and fixed assets. I also produced sorghum for Ingwebu Breweries which they used to produce their Ingwebu prime brand.

With the assistance of the Cold Storage Company (CSC), which I had established a good working relationship with, I then embarked on a lucrative ox-fattening project. For this particular venture, my investment group was allocated a feedlot which was used to feed 500 oxen which the

CSC would purchase for the public market. This assisted in my business stable's acquisition of a lease arrangement to rent the CSC 5000 hectare Block in Umguza. As a reciprocal corporate responsibility gesture, the accrued profits were used to rehabilitate the CSC block which was derelict before it was handed over to us. This project grew fast, raising my profile as one of the most prominent cattle farmers in the Southern region. At the time, I had the largest herd, with more than 4000 beef cattle. A decision was then made to convert Auchernburg Farm to a ranch. The idea was to make way for a mass cattle-breeding venture which turned out to be very successful. Therefore, when the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) took its course, I was a better-positioned beneficiary.

I own one farm in Hwange, a game farm called Horseshoe Estate, which I was allocated under the Land Reform Programme. I have never been a multiple farm owner/holder except for the leased properties which I pay rent for every month. Green Haven is not a farm but a 13-acre plot which I bought from Dumiso Dabengwa in 1988.

Other than farming, the family is also involved in the hospitality industry through a company formed in 2000. The company does tours and transfers, accommodation, bungee jumping, and game drive cruises, photographic safaris and car hire. We have lodges and guest houses in Victoria Falls, Bulawayo and Harare. We are also into construction and earthmoving equipment as well as trucking.

My passion for agriculture has also seen my investment portfolio incorporating pork and chicken production. In 2013, I also explored tobacco farming. Beyond that, the safari trade is the lifeblood of our business. I have an interest in hunting safaris at the Horse Shoe Estate Farm. We are assured a hunting quota on an annual basis for our hunting clients by National Parks. All in all, we are involved in micro-finance, tourism, farming and trade. Our company, Khanondo Safaris and Tours, is one of the leading touring companies in Victoria Falls. Given our commitment to diversification, we are certainly poised for greater heights.

40 Years in Marriage

I have been married to Sikhanyisiwe Mpofu (nee Mnkandla) for four decades. Even in the twilight of our walk on this earth, as we are already grandparents, our love hasn't faded. My wife continues to be my major political advisor and business partner. Our love journey began in 1980 – that glorious year of Zimbabwe's freedom from colonial rule. I had just come back from India where I had been doing my degree in Commerce. I had come home to celebrate the independence of our nation and doubled up to be an opportunity for a life-changing coincidence. A month later, in May 1980 I met this beautiful pure Nguni jewel who was to become my wife.

My auntie and cousin Janice were responsible for wooing Sikhanyisiwe to me. Those days she was employed as a book-keeper at Sinamane Shopping Centre which was a family-run business. With the smooth aching of my nerves when I first met her, I knew that was a cosmic signal that my heart had fallen in love with this girl. Immediately, my cousin, Janice introduced me to Sikhanyisiwe. I remember her calm and collected reciprocity which had a glow of affection. Love was written all over her face. I had seen many women in my life, but her smile from a distance and the beauty of her eyes struck me and yes, it was love at first sight. After that, she became the reason for my persistent visits to the shop. I later declared my intentions to her and fortunately, she also confessed that she liked me and was equally interested in me. Technically, there was an unsaid deep-seated emotion of mutual affection between me and my then wife-to-be. Unfortunately, my little bubble was about to be burst. I had to go back to India to conclude my studies as I had only visited home for my final semester holiday.

As I left for India arrangements were made for the payment of *amalobolo* (bride-price). Even as I was away, our affection remained in good stead. I was constantly assured by family members that I had found myself a virtuous woman whose obvious levels of loyalty was unquestionable. Throughout my absence between 1980 until my final return to Zimbabwe Sikhanyisiwe remained devoted to our love. This even strengthened our love. Those days, we mainly communicated through letters unlike

nowadays where people have cheaper social-media platforms for ease of communication. Those days, you had to write long romantic letters to consolidate love commitments. Otherwise, failure to do so would mean having your loved one snatched from you.

Our love and care for each other continued to grow. Due to the commitment Sikhanyisiwe showed to me, our relationship grew into something permanent. Her presence at the dawn of my adulthood was critical as it geared me for greater responsibility. I had spent my childhood in the fight for our country's liberation and also studying in preparation for post-independence. After involvement in the anti-colonial struggle since then and simultaneously acquiring skills to govern a liberated Zimbabwe, it was prudent to build upon a lot which was lost since my childhood. Sikhanyisiwe became that fitting piece of the puzzle to complete my long fragmented emotions after being raised by a single mother. In one of many ways, she filled the many emotional and psychological gaps which my childhood had created. In the process, her presence in my life moulded me into being a purposeful man. Above all, she gave me a reason to love – having been taught hate by the repressive colonial regime in my entire life. She ignited that long lost feeling of love and ever since I have known what it truly means to love and to be loved. She is a divine embodiment of love.



And on top of all else, her level of political consciousness made her an absolute soulmate. When we met, she was already active in national politics. She was the first female ZAPU Councilor in the entire Victoria Falls at the age of 24. Politics became a major connecting factor in our relationship. Just like me, Sikhanyisiwe was a product of the anti-colonial rebellious student movement which challenged colonial authority. She was a member of the Scripture Union at Luveve Secondary where she received political theology which raised her hate for the colonial status-quo. This is how she fell in love with the gospel of the oppressed and became a bona fide member of ZAPU.

Our shared radical affinity for ZAPU made an ideal couple. We were on the same political wavelength as we were both attached to grassroots politics. For reasons which I indicate in Chapter 5, we then moved together to ZANU. Sikhanyisiwe relinquished her position as a ZAPU Councillor in 1983. Our decision to leave ZAPU hurt both our families because the old ZANU in those days was not popular in Matebeleland. Besides that, both our family backgrounds were purely ZAPU. Therefore, our decision to join ZANU was met with so much resistance by both sides of our families. The initial hostility I experienced as a result of my allegiance shift from ZAPU to ZANU was at the family level. However, throughout all these experiences, I had my wife's support and her dependable support helped me to make a lot of firm decisions which I am happy about to this day. She has supported me as her husband and throughout my political and business career.

Through it all, she has continued to define her self-worth as a leader and this is something I have found to be extremely delighting. From 1998 until 2013, she served as a Councillor Umguza Rural District Council. She was also the Vice-President of the Association of Rural District Councils from 2008 to 2013. My wife has also served as a Member of Parliament under proportional representation. In 2018 she was elevated to the position of Senator.

Sikhanyisiwe has also remained a consistent pillar of strength even in the pursuit of my academic journey. Since day one, she established herself as a companion. It is hard to imagine life without her. I love her so dearly. It was through my wife that the experience of love permanently visited my life.



My office at the present day Herald House



My darling wife, Sikhanyisiwe Mpofu nee Mkandla.



Serving in the Customs Department in the 80s

Gukurahundi: 38 Years On

Imperialist Constructions of Conflict in Africa

The paradox of African independence is that colonial suffering was followed by ethnic violence in many places, leaving a massive trail of destruction of lives and livelihoods. Whereas access to the means of production had been skewed towards White monopoly, economic inclusion was further delayed as it became a site of ethnic struggles. Nigeria, Rwanda, Sudan and others bled tragically from the politicisation of ethnicity. In many countries, psychological injuries still trouble populations. The dream for a united Africa under the OAU, now AU, fails at home in such countries before it becomes a multi-lateral concern. It is important to expose the hidden hand of imperialism in the conundrum. Cold War politics resulted in the capitalist bloc deliberately destabilising communist or socialist-inclined countries in Africa.

The post-colonial state inherited nations which were divided along ethnic lines. Ethnic divide-and-rule, particularly the case of Katanga, was used by the colonial system to ensure perpetual White monopoly control. In places like Congo-Brazzaville, internal conflicts went beyond the Cold War binary to reflect intra-Western competition, between the U.S and France in particular. The shortfall of decolonisation was its inability to curb neo-colonialism. Decolonisation paved the way for competing forces of neo-colonialism. The bid to entice colonial capital resulted in the consolidation of diplomatic relations with colonial regimes, sometimes retaining the pre-independence master-slave binary at the expense of national unity.

Former colonisers deployed destabilisation strategies to continuously access and exploit natural resources and to mislead the black majority into seeing White rule as the epitome of good governance. Zimbabwe attained its independence in 1980 after a gruesome and painful struggle of one-and-a-half decades. The years of war might have exacerbated the ethnic and political divisions which were planted by the White settler Government to assert minority dominance. As with many African countries, the attainment of independence was swiftly followed by politically charged ethnic tensions. In Zimbabwe, the hallmark of the escalation of this colonially constructed turmoil was *Gukurahundi*.

The Dissident Outbreak and the Post-*Gukurahundi* Politics

Faced with the possibility of becoming a fragile or failed state, the Government responded by deploying troops in areas where “dissidents” mainly operated from, that is, Matabeleland and Midlands provinces. These areas specifically include Matabeleland North’s Tsholotsho, Umguza and Lupane, Matabeleland South’s Filabusi and Ntepe, Guyu and Midlands’ Gokwe, Silobela and Lower Gweru. Unfortunately, like in any other crisis of this nature, a considerable number of lives were lost. Citizens’ livelihoods and their psychological and physiological well-being were disrupted. The effects of these disturbances were cross-cutting the ethnic and political contours of belonging, although the disproportionate Government response was concentrated in the aforementioned provinces. Although there was a Unity Accord in 1987 to signal a deliberate effort towards peace-building, reconciliation and, ultimately, an end to artificial ethnic and political divisions, over three decades later many actors still push for this issue to be part of the broader policy agenda-setting in the country. This has raised many questions about the sincerity of this agenda as it has been mainly used by the opposition for political expediency. However, it is prudent that we explore the causes of the crisis, the outcome, both immediate and long term, the actors involved and their interests.

The Matabeleland Crisis in Perspective

It has been submitted that there were various challenges between ZPRA and ZANLA-trained combatants. Escalating tensions were witnessed in

areas surrounding the freedom fighters' holding camps in many parts of the country. At times, this degenerated into serious confrontations. The Entumbane saga of 1981 was the most spectacular as it triggered full-scale conflict. Besides, there had been sporadic confrontations among the freedom fighters' Assembly Points (APs) countrywide. Such outbreaks began after independence and continued throughout the early 1980s. The *Gukurahundi* disturbances are well accounted for in the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe (CCJPZ) Report of 1997. The causes of these conflicts were complex and the net result was that by early 1982, Zimbabwe had serious security problems in various areas, particularly in the western region of the country. Bands of dissidents were causing massive harm to civilians and property in the country.

Statistical Analysis

The usual narrative, drawing on the CCJPZ Report, is that Gukurahundi claimed the lives of at least 20,000 people, some buried in shallow graves and others in mass graves. However, after a detailed analysis, it is clear that there is no definite or agreed statistical standpoint on the lives claimed. The British Military Advisory Training Team (BMATT) who were on the ground, posit that the crisis resulted in the death of 10,000 to 20,000 people. Conservative estimates put the number of civilian deaths at around 8,000, but there is an insistence that the recorded cases of the human-right violations range between 20,000 to 30,000. What is clear is that the figure is indefinite and this is the reason why the data of people who lost their lives per district is not known. Depending on whom one talks to, from 1982 to 1987, between 8,000 and 30,000 people lost their lives in the Matabeleland provinces and around Bulawayo.

Causes of Gukurahundi

Suspicion among Freedom Fighters

From the 1960s onwards, the people of Zimbabwe were involved in a civil war to get rid of colonialism. This civil war intensified during the 1970s where there was the Rhodesian army on one side and the two armies of ZPRA and ZANLA on the other side. ZANLA was the armed wing of the then ZANU, and ZPRA was the armed wing of ZAPU. The

two armed wings competed with each other for territory and support and frequently confronted each other even before independence. This meant that they were suspicious of each other even after independence. In Chapter 3, I also pointed out the deep-seated ethnic and personality tensions within the nationalist movements since the NDP days. Later on, the escalation of these tensions reached an acute height in the Morogoro Camp where open firing among combatants was witnessed. Apart from the 1963 split of ZAPU and ZANU, the Lancaster Conference gestured the colonisation of the decolonisation agenda as the liberation movements emerged out of the negotiations more divided and preoccupied with self-centred manoeuvres to acquire power.

The Legacy of Colonial Rule

The legacy of colonial rule also contributed greatly to the outbreak of *Gukurahundi*. Repressive legislation dates back to the beginning of colonialism, with various pass laws, tax laws, land laws and a myriad of other racially biased laws all of which served to ensure the economic and educational supremacy of a small White elite (which was never more than 6,2 percent of the population), at the expense of the black majority.

One of the results of 90 years of colonial rule was that ordinary blacks came to see the law as their enemy and after independence, some sections of the black community did not feel that the new black Government was impartial, which also triggered dissident activity.

Apartheid South African Destabilisation Policy

Apartheid South Africa's destabilisation policy on Zimbabwe equally contributed to the outbreak of *Gukurahundi*. As countries in Southern Africa began to gain independence from 1975 onwards, White-ruled apartheid South Africa began an increasingly deliberate policy of destabilising these nations to prolong its own power. Independent nations most notably affected by South African destabilisation in the early 1980s were Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Lesotho.

During Truth and Reconciliation Commission proceedings in newly-independent South Africa, it was explicitly unearthed that the Apartheid

Government had a deliberate policy of destabilising the Frontline States, all in the vain hope of continuing to repress black South Africans. To them, accentuating Gukurahundi was a strategy to breed and sustain despondency in Zimbabwe.

Super ZAPU

As part of the external efforts to destabilise newly independent African states, Apartheid South Africa implemented “Operation Drama,” which was the South African code name for the undercover support of Zimbabwean dissidents. It was carried out under the direction of Col Moeller and Col Breytenbach. The operation’s primary role was the formation and funding of Super ZAPU. This was a small band of dissidents, recruited from refugee camps in Botswana and trained in four camps in the Transvaal. Super ZAPU operated in southern Matabeleland in 1983 and 1984, exacerbating the insecurity already there. Precise numbers of Super ZAPU and the degree of material support offered by South Africa to Zimbabwean dissidents remain largely conjecture, although it is clear the Zimbabwean operation was far less extensive than those in Angola and Mozambique which occurred concurrently.

The Dissidents’ Perspective

One contributing factor to escalating dissident numbers was the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA)’s initial failure to sustainably integrate ZANLA and ZPRA into one army. The task facing the ZNA at independence was unprecedented as it had to integrate three armies, all of which had long-standing warring attitudes towards each other. The guerrilla backgrounds of both ZPRA and ZANLA also made it a challenge for the two to be integrated into one conventional military organisation. From the time of the negotiated ceasefire in Zimbabwe, ex-freedom fighters were held in Assembly Points (APs) throughout the country from where they were gradually integrated into the army or demobilised.

Many ex-freedom fighters from both sides resisted entering the APs because of personal fear, or outright rejected the negotiated outcome of the war. There were conflicts between ZPRA and ZANLA forces in the APs and different parts of the country. In February 1980, *The Chronicle*

reported that approximately 200 freedom fighters were roaming the North West, campaigning for ZAPU and committing crimes. In Nkayi and Gokwe, in Northern Matabeleland, there was a group of ZPRAs operating under a man called “Tommy” who was renowned for refusing to obey the ZPRA High Command Structure in the 1970s. There was also a group of ZPRAs in Tsholotsho who refused to join other ex-combatants in the APs as they did not favour the idea of the ceasefire. In May and June 1980, 400 ZPRA freedom fighters were rounded up in Northern Matabeleland and taken to Khami Prison near Bulawayo. ZANLA had its share of challenges. It is alleged that ZANLA was involved in armed conflicts in Mutoko, Mt Darwin and Gutu. Both sides were involved in the concealing of weapons outside the APs. I remember pointing out to some senior comrades in ZAPU that the post-independence transition had taken a very elitist route. As such, the fissures of that elite-negotiated transition created these feuds in the grassroots. Whilst it was a noble idea to have all forces in the APs, it was equally noble to have consulted all interested parties. This explains why the ceasefire was resisted by some quarters amongst ex-guerrillas.

The Matabeleland crisis indeed resulted in several people losing their lives while some remained with permanent psychological and physical injuries. The perceptions and views about the impact of *Gukurahundi* have been, more often than not, susceptible to political manipulation and political grandstanding by many political parties, civil societies, student movements and trade unions. Nevertheless, it is important to have these perceptions understood for one to be able to establish the real truth about this sad phase of our past.

Ethnic and Political Essentialism

One of the most tragic effects of events in the 1980s is that it served to harden ethnic and political differences in Zimbabwe. Ethnic and partisan polarisation has continued to characterise Zimbabwe’s present-day political and social landscape. This has arguably slowed nation-building and economic development. Furthermore, the intensity of the violence by 5th Brigade created a great sense of fear and mistrust for ZANU PF and the military among some sections of our population.

However, ZANU PF has continuously won significant parliamentary seats in elections in erstwhile *Gukurahundi*-severe areas. Given this fundamental anomaly, ZANU PF's electoral popularity in the entire Matabeleland region can be mainly attributed to:

- a. Acceptance of the fact that the *Gukurahundi* issue was resolved by former President Robert Mugabe and the late Vice President J.N. Nkomo through the signing of the Unity Accord; and
- b. The popularity of ZANU PF as a liberation party which played a crucial role in the attainment of independence. The scourges of colonial oppression probably are deeper than the conflict that occurred in Matabeleland and Midlands. These assumptions can nullify the perceived contention of the *Gukurahundi* as a fundamental stumbling block to post-independence nation-building. Besides some CSOs have used the *Gukurahundi* issue to push for self-serving interests which excluded the victims of the disturbances. Most of them are mere Western sponsorship-hunting activist groups who survive on donor stipends to project an acute political crisis in Zimbabwe for their colonial handlers. This depicts the extent to which post-colonial conflict in Africa is part of the imperialist grand plan to sustain conflict in Africa at the expense of peace, unity and sustainable development.

Economic and Social Hardships

People from Matabeleland complain bitterly about economic marginalisation, attributed to a deliberate state agenda for the socio-economic side-lining of the Ndebele. There are suggestions that there seems to be an unwritten law that people belonging to the Ndebele-speaking group have to be disadvantaged on all fronts. Some even believe that marginalisation is a continuation of *Gukurahundi* by other means. However, this position ignores the fact that in the absence of a constitutionally implemented position of devolution, since 1980, other provinces which did not experience this tragic episode have attributed their context-specific socio-economic challenges to marginalisation. This serves to expose the bureaucratic centralisation of policy-making over the years as part of the perpetuated tradition of colonial systematic

administration. As a result, the concern about marginalisation is also predominant in other parts of Zimbabwe which did not suffer the blow of *Gukurahundi*.

However, the sensationalised focus on this subject has strained prospects of analytically situating the uneven distribution of power in the inherent post-colonial characteristic of failed approaches towards integration and consensus-building. The 2013 Constitution has posited significant interventions to address this challenge which has been long resident in our political space. The issue of the uneven distribution of power found cross-cutting regional resonance in the constitution-making process which commenced in 2009. The countrywide calls for devolution during the COPAC consultative processes depict the universal challenge of unequal sharing of power which resulted in a constitutional intervention by 2013. In line with this constitutional direction, the Second-Republic's political re-engagement trajectory and sustained implementation of devolution entail a paradigm shift which will encourage a socio-economic and political re-engineering of Zimbabwe with a pivotal underscore on true nation-building, unity and equality.

Psychological and Physiological Injuries

Many people who were either victims of physical torture or forced to witness it continue to suffer psychological disorders indicative of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Such disorders as unexplained anxieties, hypochondria and a permanent fear and distrust are evident in victims. The same can be linked to those who experienced the horrid effects of military operations during the armed struggle. Typically, such victims pass on their stress to their children and create a heavy burden on the healthcare structures. Beyond *Gukurahundi* there has been perpetual recycling of memories of violence. Going forward, there is a need for a holistic approach to national healing which addresses all these historical episodes of violence experienced in Zimbabwe.

The Second Republic's Commitment to the Unity Accord

After a protracted national crisis, Mugabe and Nkomo finally entered into talks. This culminated in the signing of a Unity Accord between

the two parties on 22 December 1987. The Unity Accord merged the two parties into the new ZANU PF and this brought an end to the crisis and brought peace. Following President Mnangagwa's pronouncements that his Government would facilitate the exhumation and reburial of thousands of people who died during the Matabeleland crisis of the 1980s, many lawyers and pressure groups in Bulawayo questioned the Government's sincerity in bringing closure to the emotive *Gukurahundi* issue. However, the multiple CSOs coalescing under the banner of Matabeleland Collective have embraced this path of dealing with the past. Besides, the President advised that apart from reburying the victims of those atrocities, the Government is also committed to providing birth and death certificates to the children and relatives of the victims whom for decades now have been facing insurmountable hurdles at the Registrar-General's Offices. Beyond the signing of the Unity Accord in 1987, various groups have been formed as anti-*Gukurahundi* lobby entities.

Matabeleland Collective (MC)

The MC convener and activist Jenny Williams, in one of her speeches, advised that the Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in the region share and continue to experience the pain of ethnic exclusion. While others have defined the Zimbabwean crisis along with economic and partisan terms, this grouping has defined the crisis as a making of regional political marginalisation. Further, she noted that the region continues to remember their loved ones, buried and unaccounted for. As a result, this group advances the need to engage the Government to find common resolution ground for the *Gukurahundi* issue. Following several meetings between President Mnangagwa and its members, Government has proposed and implemented a raft of measures to deal with issues arising from *Gukurahundi*. These include the provision of birth and death certificates to affected communities, reburials and opening of space for decriminalised discussion of the issue, provision of medical assistance to survivors, expediting the policy of devolution to prioritise locals in awarding of tenders and employment opportunities and provision of social services through construction of schools and clinics, among other measures. I believe some of these measures go beyond only addressing the effects of *Gukurahundi*, but they also proffer some relevant solutions to the perceived

marginalisation of Matebeleland as a whole. Commitment to this roadmap will be critical in ensuring that absolute national healing is achieved. At the same time, this will make way for addressing all concerns about the slow pace of development in Matebeleland. I am also of the view that there must be similar organised efforts of national dialogue across the entire country. The marginalisation aspects of development are not only limited to Matebeleland. Instead, the issue of underdevelopment is cross-cutting. Therefore, there is need for the equal representation of all provinces on the national dialogue table. Whilst it is prudent to have a specific focus on Matebeleland because of the compelling factors inspired by the *Gukurahundi* atrocities, other parts of the country must be given an equal opportunity to call for their context-sensitive proposals of development. This will build a sustainable path towards the noble cause of devolution which the Second Republic is working hard to implement.

Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe (CCJPZ)

In March 1997, the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe compiled a report on the situation in Matabeleland and the Midlands between 1980 and 1988 titled “Breaking the Silence, Building True Peace”. The published report was based on the human rights abuses orchestrated by then Prime Minister Robert Mugabe’s North Korean-trained Fifth Brigade. This report posits that the national tragedy continues to have a lasting impact on the affected regions through two noticeable themes: a lack of acknowledgement and a lack of development. Lack of acknowledgement by the Government for its alleged atrocities has prevented the regions from moving forward emotionally. This has left the victims of the *Gukurahundi* in a state of suspension where they are prohibited from mourning their dead and thus have never been able to fully recover. Similarly, a lack of development is continuing to affect today’s society. However, the challenge of socio-economic development cannot be solely tied to the issue of *Gukurahundi*. The Government is battling to improve the economic status of all citizens in Zimbabwe.

Ibhetshu Likazulu Pressure Group

A vocal pressure group which has been at the forefront of calling for

justice against alleged perpetrators of *Gukurahundi* atrocities posited that the processes announced by President Mnangagwa needed careful consideration and handling. This group has constantly suggested the need for reburials to be done by competent people. The group has also insisted on the need for communities to get education on how reburials are done. This position has been cemented by the Second Republic's commitment to ensure that the reburials are done. So at the level of the proposals and policy-making, there is consensus. The implementation stage would assist in driving the nation towards genuine unity.

The Mthwakazi Republic Party (MRP)

MRP was formed in 2014 to questionably defend, and protect the “interests” of the people of Mthwakazi against perceived Zimbabwe's continued marginalisation of their forefathers' land. State agents in 2018 blocked Ibhetshu LikaZulu and MRP from erecting *Gukurahundi* memorial plaques at Bhalagwe. Government has since turned Bhalagwe into a district Heroes' Acre, a move criticised by some civic groups as an attempt to tamper with the evidence of mass graves. Civic groups argue the Government must look for alternative land for a district Heroes Acre and leave Bhalagwe as a *Gukurahundi* memorial site.

Traditional Leaders

Some traditional leaders in Matabeleland have written to the South African Parliament requesting permission to be allowed to present “facts” about the 1980s killings in Matabeleland and Midlands as they push for an independent investigation into the atrocities known as *Gukurahundi*. Chief Vezi Mafu (Maduna) of Filabusi in November 2018 petitioned the United Nations (UN) seeking the setting-up of an independent inquiry into the *Gukurahundi* massacres. Further, in his report, he noted that, “As traditional leaders, we live within these affected areas, within the Ndebele nation and we are mindful that this matter of unresolved genocide has the potential to seriously destabilise the country and indeed the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region.”

Why the *Gukurahundi* Discussions at this Point?

More than ever before, discussions on *Gukurahundi* have become louder and more frequent in both formal and informal circles. There are two broad assumptions regarding this:

- a. The New Dispensation – the Second Republic under President Mnangagwa has opened up a democratic space to confront issues affecting the nation and its development; and
- b. As a result of the New Dispensation opening the democratic space, many foreign-funded civil society organisations and political parties, such as MDC, have manipulated this conversation through private media platforms;

It may be noted that although *Gukurahundi* occurred, the timing of this conversation points towards a deliberate attempt to: Discredit the legitimacy of the Government; question its sincerity towards inclusive development; criminalise the Government; seek the International Criminal Court (ICC)'s prosecution of Government officials; and, finally, give opposition parties an opportunity to retain relevance in Zimbabwe's political arena by manipulating this narrative. Opposition politicians and their proxies have used the issue of *Gukurahundi* as a smear campaign against ZANU PF. The sincerity of some of these discussions is questionable considering the CSO-sponsored polarisation of our politics in Zimbabwe. The same Western countries which were mute when this gross abuse of human rights occurred are the ones funding CSO advocacy on *Gukurahundi*. This reveals the ulterior motive behind the sensational construction this matter even beyond the Unity Accord.

Conclusion

The *Gukurahundi* disturbances ended in 1987 when ZAPU and ZANU signed the Unity Accord. This agreement effectively dissolved both ZANU and ZAPU and gave birth to a new party known as the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU PF). On 18 April 1988, the Government announced an amnesty and further instituted a ceasefire. A general ordinance was issued stating all those who surrendered before 31 May would be granted a full pardon.

Recommendations

- * The *Gukurahundi* issue was resolved on 22 December 1987 by former President R.G Mugabe and the late Vice President Joshua Nkomo. If discussions on *Gukurahundi* are to happen, ZANU PF as the custodian of the Unity Accord should define the agenda and own the process, fully engaging the concerns of all stakeholders.
- * Furthermore, discussions on *Gukurahundi* should focus on identifying the victims and help them to access basic social services such as identification if need be.
- * Like any other disaster, a crisis of this sort is bound to create victims who have lost economic and social livelihoods. Some of these things can never be fully restored; instead, the Government can recognise these people as victims and try to establish centres where they can be assisted.
- * Finally, let bygones be bygones. Government should not be coerced into making reactionary subjective “apologises” for *Gukurahundi* by forces pursuing a neo-colonial polarising agenda. The Unity Accord formalised the needed reconciliation process as it brought the key stakeholder political entities to map the path out of conflict towards durable national healing.



President Mugabe and the late Vice President Dr Joshua Nkomo after signing the Unity Accord. Photo Credits: The Chronicle Zw

Gukurahundi and Selective Amnesia

There is no doubt that the political appropriation of *Gukurahundi* is of great emotive capital. Much of this is a single narrative bent on disintegrating current efforts to unite our people. This Matebeleland-Midlands crisis was only internationalised after the land reform programme. Before that, the international community did not raise any points of concern about the gross human rights abuse. It is valid to pinpoint the shortfalls of the post-conflict transition. However, it is problematic that our erstwhile colonisers are exhuming the past to perpetuate further conflict amongst ourselves. Too much has been lost for us to remain at war with one another instead of finding common ground. *Gukurahundi* occupied the centre of the national discourse after the land reform took place. Superficially radicalised civil society groups formed during this period constantly used *Gukurahundi* as a warrant for their polarising “human rights” agenda.

The security dilemma which erupted as a result of the dissident factor cannot be overemphasised in as much as the excessive use of force by the state needs equal acknowledgement. However, the constant problematisation of the state perpetuates neo-colonial motives. In some instances, the pressure groups pushing for this cause are mainly Western-sponsored. The same Western countries allowed what they are now defining as genocide to unfold under their watch to service the hegemony of anti-Soviet nations. As noted earlier, the weakening of ZAPU in Zimbabwe meant that Russia’s influence in Southern Africa was neutralised. ZAPU’s military wing, ZPRA, had proved to be a formidable force after its collective onslaughts with ANC’s Umkhonto weSizwe.

As a result, *Gukurahundi* served as an indirect Cold War effort. Our internal conflict dynamics in light of the global dynamics have been rarely discussed. This selective exclusion of global dimension to conflict in Zimbabwe conceals the enabling global forces in the background. To this end, the stereotypical post-colonial projection of African states as genocidal has been achieved. For quite a long time those of us who were in ZAPU have not been forthcoming to expose the underlying realities of the global factors of these disturbances. Given the complexity and polarising effect of this subject, there is a need for counter-narratives to consolidate national unity. It is against this background that I was compelled to reflect on the effects of *Gukurahundi* in hampering long-term interests of peace in Zimbabwe.

The expected limits to truth-telling by both victims and alleged perpetrators must be backed by a sincere acknowledgement of the colonially charged factors of our conflict. As we reflect on civil conflicts in Zimbabwe and Africa in general, we need to apply a holistic appreciation of both internal and external threats to peace. Beyond victimhood and instigations of violence, we need to regenerate a new narrative of belonging which binds us towards peace, national healing and reconciliation. As briefly highlighted in the previous chapter, the Second Republic's transitional political landscape presents us with an opportunity to evaluate our past and how we can construct ideas which frame lasting national values beyond the temporary positives of self-serving interests. Taking this direction calls for the absolute sacrifice of essentialist limitations to defining our national identity. It requires a genuine introspective commitment to auditing our sources of conflict and how we can produce a new and lasting consciousness of nationhood which is built on the foundation of unity, peace and prosperity. This calls for the need to locate the origins of our divided memories and emotions to recreate progressive nationhood which redeems its existentialism from the "pitfalls of national consciousness".

The issue of *Gukurahundi* has been framed as one of the major causes of our contemporary socio-political conflict. In the broader political discourse, the subject has been presented as a solely tribe-driven project to eliminate the Ndebele. Over the years, the subject has taken a radical polemic turn

which has been enabled by sponsored imperial academics and NGO reactionaries. Over the years, the debate around *Gukurahundi* has not been centred on resolving the neo-colonial bedrock of this tragic side of our past. The polarised discursive framing of *Gukurahundi* also invites the need to locate the role of various actors in influencing the quagmire of nation-building in Zimbabwe. Beyond the linear misrepresentation of the past centred on the *Gukurahundi* debate and its dilemma to the national question, there must be a commitment to unpacking the path that has been initiated by the Government towards fostering national healing. In this vein, we need to sincerely analyse the historical stagnations to resolving this issue. At the same time, we must reconsider the merits of the path taken by President Mnangagwa in championing a pro-healing policy direction. This gives room to evaluate the sincerity of the Second Republic in ushering a transformative political culture in Zimbabwe.

The Constructions of a “Crisis” and the Perversion of National Belonging

Western diplomats and their proxy NGOs have applied selective amnesia to historically situate Zimbabwe’s economic downturn and its resultant political challenges. The current economic challenges faced by the country are conveniently linked to the land reform, post-2000 collapse of public institutions, corruption and nepotism. The perceived misalignment of public policy to the rule of law, among other forms of bad governance, has been weaponised to categorise our country as a “failed state.” Objection to the imagination of Zimbabwe as a failed state in imperialist powered discursive terms does not necessarily erase shortcomings of the Government at the time. However, the narrativisation of state failure has also served as a subtle way to dissuade extensive interrogation of the role of neo-colonialism in Zimbabwe’s current economic challenges. The analysis of the “Zimbabwe Crisis” is deliberately ignorant of how colonial hegemony made the post-independence economy volatile. These attempts to conceptualise the depth of the Zimbabwean crisis is blind to the reality of the political fragility which the country was subjected to as a result of colonially driven transitional dynamics.

This linear anti-establishment depiction of the First Republic carries with it the burden of polarity, a monologue underpinned on diplomatic, and sometimes selective, characterisation of the Zimbabwean political landscape by private media and opposition politicians. Over the years, the constructions and deconstructions of Zimbabwe's image have been predominant in global political discourses. This was mainly because of the Third Chimurenga which was initiated by ZANU PF. The economic empowerment policy overdrive popularised ZANU PF as a mass-line party. Consequently, this turn to economic indigenisation offended the empire-leaning politics on property rights. As land redistribution assumed an irreversible turn, Zimbabwe's international isolation ensued. The idea of returning land to the marginalised majority agitated international capital. This explains the international pressure which has been exerted on our domestic political processes. In our reading of the media, academic and CSO advocacy, we need to locate the forces competing for power. To understand the present, we need to have a strong appreciation of the past and how it has modelled our present realities of tension and impediments to nation-building.

From 2000 to date, Britain was foremost among Zimbabwe's antagonists. The friction between Zimbabwe and Britain was accentuated by the unsolved land question which saw revolutionary justice being implemented to realign property relations by the land-hungry masses. The peasants and the war-veterans in the countryside mobilised to reclaim land and reassign the struggle for the birth right through land expropriation with no compensation (the Fast-Track Land Reform Programme/*Hondo yeminda*/Third Chimurenga).

It was against this background that Zimbabwe faced economic sanctions which were a design of a neo-colonial opposition and a vigorously corroborating civil society with a clear agenda to collapse the prominence of the ruling party in what some sections of the academia have referred to as the "regime change" agenda. It was never a coincidence that when the land question was revisited, there was increased pressure to change the order of power. Since the late '90s, the land reform programme and its underpinning motive of consolidating liberation goals ushered radical nuances of re-imagining the citizenship. This call for the redefinition of

citizenship was mainly premised on a sinister project to pacify the strong-rooted values of nationalism which have always been the rallying point of the African liberation movement. A neo-liberal campaign to stimulate a deliberate erasure of memory was deployed. In the process, this has created a viable logic for ethnicity-themed tensions. The politicisation of ethnic belonging has been effectively manipulated elsewhere in Africa to promote superficial dissent among our people.

A neo-liberal captured academia has also emerged with the clear intention of rewriting ZANU PF into political oblivion. The thought premise of this captured section of the academia is self-defined in terms of its anti-establishment manoeuvres to narrow the significance of the nationalist discourse in galvanising a post-colonial delink from neo-colonial hegemony. This section of the academia has called for the disbanding of the “official” prescriptions to national belonging and social cohesion. On countless political debate platforms, there has been a tendency to undermine the Government’s calls for national unity on the mere basis of dismissing terms and tenets to national belonging as political-elite impositions. Usually, Matebeleland has been used as an effigy of repressed nationhood. As such, there have been wide calls for secession or deliberate policies to dislocate Matebeleland from the “centre” (Shona administration). This seemingly innocent advocacy for alternative national belonging is expressive of the extent to which the idea of a united Zimbabwe is under threat. The country’s unresolved past is manipulated for the benefit of political opportunism at the expense of the bigger ambition of nation-building.

In response to these opposition-constructed contestations of national belonging, ZANU PF heightened its commitment to promote social cohesion through intense liberation recollections as well as the agenda of economic indigenisation. Since then ZANU PF has been intensely condemned for manipulating nationalist historiography to gain political capital. This is where Zimbabwe’s dark past of post-independence tensions, particularly the *Gukurahundi* history, is raised to smear ZANU PF.

As part of dismembering ZANU PF’s authoritative hold on history, the party is criticised for being at the centre of producing a linear narrative

which shapes its political relevance. The role of ZANU PF in locating itself in history has come under massive criticism, but few fail to question why there is a collective assault on ZANU PF. It is often forgotten that the nation as an imagined community is born out of the inventive brilliance of academia. Therefore, considering that nations are creative inventions of knowledge producers, ZANU PF is allowed – like any other political movement – to defend its fort through its intellectuals. Opposition-inclined writers are given room to call for alternative nationalism, but those aligned to ZANU PF are regarded as retrogressive academics. There has been a deliberate effort to subdue ZANU PF's place in history by those sustaining political transition agendas on behalf of the imperialist forces.

We need to imagine national belonging outside the confines of tribal prejudices. We cannot also avoid the reality of the tensions we have experienced as a result of our patriotic pitfalls. The establishment of the Second Republic must be a site of reinventing hopes of a new future. The Second Republic as a fulfilment of a close to four decades of ambition for Zimbabwe's democratic maturation serves as a landmark success in our lifetime.

Gukurahundi: A Past Buried or Past with Us?

The past will always have a way to haunt us if its depravities are not dealt with. In our lifetime, the land reform programme has sustained this truth. The land reform programme was a recurrence of history which has visited our contemporary politics. Its fundamental logic was to redress to the structural imbalance of the past. We had initially misconstrued the tenets of post-independence reconciliation as the ultimate source of generating cohesion and yet the White farmers wanted to perpetuate their monopoly.

In the same manner, even after the signing of the Unity Accord in 1987, some polarised dimensions to nation-building have given prominence to selective reflections on the past. In the process, *Gukurahundi* has been manipulated to expose the selective reality of our tensions. Sadly, this ugly side of our past has been manipulated to influence election patterns in favour of the opposition. Over the years, the *Gukurahundi* issue has been

used to relegate the ruling party's political prominence. However, election outcomes in some parts of the southern region which are characterised as epicentres of these disturbances have given electoral allegiance to the ruling party.

This only shows that affected communities have been naturalised to the initial edicts of reconciliation which were spelt out in the Unity Accord signed in 1987 between the late Vice President of Zimbabwe, Dr Joshua Nkomo and the President of the First Republic, Robert Gabriel Mugabe. The post-Unity Accord electoral patterns in Matabeleland North and Matabeleland South reflect an organic prevalence of cordial and narrow antagonism between the southern region and the ruling party. The notion of tension is a by-product of academic and civil-society constructions of the Zimbabwean reality. However, the pitfall of this predisposition is that it deliberately ignores that what happened in Matabeleland and Midlands was far beyond ethnic essentialism. Rather it was absolute evidence of the consequences of the splits of the nationalist movement dating back to 1963.

Moreover, as discussed in detail earlier on, ZAPU was a victim of neo-colonial treachery which was brazenly targeting its Matabeleland and Midlands strongholds. The aim of this policy by the West was to curtail the spread of communism in Southern Africa through ZAPU. This also helps in formulating a strong understanding of the philosophy behind the 1987 peace concession and how it originated a path for lasting peace and reconciliation. This further translates to unpacking why the ethos of unity remains a cardinal rallying point to safeguarding national interests. The Unity Accord as a foundation of peace continues to inspire a unifying consciousness towards national belonging. However, it does not supersede the reality of the need to embrace the fractured state of our societies. To this end, Bhebe (2016; ix-x) argues that:

... achieving consensus on how communities should heal and reconcile seems difficult to achieve in most societies in transition. Oftentimes, such societies confront a complex mixture of divergent political ideals, divided memories, conflict ethnic and political histories, contesting definitions of political harm and victimhood

and legal loopholes... The intermingling of the aforementioned incongruent interests towards national healing frustrates the establishment of comprehensive national peace-building projects and all-inclusive state-making.

Consequently, the future of our country depends on our unity and our honest confrontations of the threats to our unity. There is no doubt that part of the tensions we are experiencing today are drawn from the mistakes we made yesterday. On the other hand, while the past has been manipulated to promote contemporary conflicts, it is also imperative to frankly confront the roots of our current challenges. At the same time, correctional frameworks to aid in the attainment of national unity can be formulated. Our societies need to heal and we need to build safer political spaces to guarantee democracy and good governance which is self-defined and not aligned to colonial impositions. Furthermore, we need to ensure that every one of us is a key player in allowing peace to thrive.

Given the burden of this ambition, we need a renewed culture of dialogue to interrogate the steps taken by the new Government under President Emmerson Mnangagwa to recover national healing.

The Zimbabwean experience must awaken African countries to be thoughtful of the divisive undercurrents of colonial residues in influencing our disharmony. Failure to do so will hinder the possibilities of achieving sustainable peace not only in Zimbabwe but in the entire African continent. Neo-colonial forces have not rested in the pursuit of their self-interest in Africa. This is why a host of multifaceted efforts continue to be deployed to keep Africans at war with one another. Ethnicity remains the root cause of our conflict.

Consequences of Weak Institutional Frameworks for Peace and Reconciliation

The absence of peace and reconciliation is a hindrance to the transitional progress of any nation. We are compelled as individuals, families, communities and as a nation to devise lasting home-grown models of peace, healing and reconciliation to achieve the Zimbabwe we want.

Like any other post-colonial state, Zimbabwe must grow its economy. The state must be at the centre of uniting the citizenry and rebuilding bonds of nationhood defined outside the chasms of reactionary politics. Therefore, our people must find aspects of our past and present which unify us towards a common national destiny. This calls for vigilance and discernment when our former colonisers reach out to be “democratic mediators” in our conflicts. We must be more questioning of the motives behind sponsored peace and reconciliation projects by our erstwhile colonisers. On our own, we must find our points of socio-political and economic divergence to map long-lasting points of convergence.

The Transitional Position to Peace and Reconciliation in Zimbabwe

The enacting and signing into law the National Peace and Reconciliation Act on the 5th of January 2018 and the subsequent appointment of the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission (NPRC) confirms Government’s commitment and resolve to create a sanguine norming of peace, reconciliation and healing. Zimbabwe is a nation of diverse people who have managed over the years to be cohesive. Culture, in its diversity, has facilitated the integration of this nation. Any attempt to ignore the unifying Zimbabwean cultural diversities will not deliver the peace dividend and nation-building that we are striving for.

Whilst the Government is aware and accepts the diversity of models and methodologies of peace and nation-building, it is alive to the importance of the community’s cultural involvement that will continuously maintain the people’s being and identity. To this end, the Government remains committed to upholding a political culture which advances peace, healing and reconciliation.

The NPRC: A Reconstruction of Peace, Unity Belonging and Nationhood

With President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s assumption of power in November 2017, the comparatively fixed, polarised claims to nationhood have since been interchanged with a vibrant, open society characterised by widened pluralism and other tenets of democracy.

This view can be validated, given the newly enacted National Peace and Reconciliation Act which birthed the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission (NPRC). This commission was established to audit the unresolved issues of social conflict. This has distinctly served as a clear highlight of the current administration's drive towards social cohesion as an integral part of Zimbabwe's current political culture. Against the backdrop of *Gukurahundi* and other cases of political conflict in Zimbabwe, the commission has to abide by the constitutional principles of its foundation.

The countless public engagement platforms initiated by President Mnangagwa in Bulawayo and Matebeleland provinces are also illustrative of a strong initiative to reconnect the ruling ZANU PF with this region. This birth of the NPRC serves as part of the state's flexibility in the area of wide citizen engagement and policy environmental changes. The move is a critical strategic step towards peace, unity and national healing.

This emerging social transitional phase is also essential in terms of cultural development. This comes at a time the new Constitution of the country features an in-depth acknowledgement of the need to celebrate our ethnic diversity. Therefore, the new trajectory of national unity called for by the Second Republic offers a rational template for social transformation. Therefore, today we stand to benefit from the positive lessons we can draw from our past and those who initiated the early models of state and nation-building before the entry of colonialists. Certainly, if in our unity we managed to seize power from the colonial regime what makes us think that we will fight our present challenges as a divided people? We need to be at peace with each other. When this happens, Zimbabwe will be poised for national cohesion, transformation and sustainable socio-economic development.

In light of these conceptual crossroads to peace and reconciliation between the state and various entities preoccupied with peace and reconciliation, all of us must retool ourselves with new perspectives of conflict resolution. We must be seized with a clearly defined preoccupation towards achieving peace-building through the unity of thought and perspective. In the process, we need to find ways in which peace and reconciliation can be

exploited for the needed social re-engineering culminating in national unity. The key output of this process must be the solidification of our passion to be proud citizens of Zimbabwe outside our comfort zones of split patriotic consciousness.

Transcending the Margins of Polarisation towards National Healing

Tribalism is real and its perpetuation by colonial forces cannot be excused from the debate of nation-building. In attempting to find alternative means to peace and reconciliation, we must pay attention to the competing co-existence of tribalism and the global dimensions to our conflicts. African states are presented as genocidal because those who control the knowledge economy have successfully instilled self-hate amongst our people. Colonial forces have not given up their manipulation of our ethnic diversity to keep Africans at war. The Global North is guilty of sponsoring the infrastructure of violence in Africa while equally playing the Big Brother role in cosmetic conflict mediation. This has seen calls for transitional justice for African conflicts being lobbied for in Western capitals. On the ground, NGOs are deployed as agents of defining post-conflict transitional terms. Oftentimes, such interventions are usually premised on underhand meddling of Western interests in African politics.

Through CSOs, a deliberate downplaying of the status quo is accelerated to usher public disillusionment. Local solutions for local problems are dismissed to justify punitive measures for ailing African economies. Given the weight of the pressure exerted on African Governments, tension prevails between the state and the Western-sponsored pressure groups. The sponsored NGOs arrogate the voice of the victims to attract funding. Therefore, the continued tension between the state and civil society becomes justification for the funding of regime-change activity by colonial states. With a captured academy, polarisation is inevitable.

The real victims of such disturbances only become subjects of justifying donor-funding. This is even made worse by the fact that the same victims are not a part of the post-conflict dispensation. It is only now

that in Zimbabwe the inclusion of the victims and their wishes have been included in mapping strategies for conflict resolution. Unlike in the pre-Mnangagwa era, there was limited open dialogue on *Gukurahundi*. Affected societies must organise themselves to engage Government on the way forward to put the matter to rest. This will assist in ensuring that the affected communities confront the memories of this sad past. There is a need for community-based memories of the *Gukurahundi* tragedy. This will assist communities to come to terms with all that happened in the past. Such communities don't need to be coerced by CSOs to define how they should move on considering the concealed ulterior motives of CSOs in purporting to facilitate national healing. The space for the collective memorialisation of *Gukurahundi* must be opened up. We also need to own this memory to find genuine healing instead of being weighed down by this past to nurture ethnic conflicts and settle political scores.

The Genealogy of the Zimbabwean Crisis

The History and the Ontology of the Crisis

The past creates the present. In the present, our business is to create memories for the future. As such, any constructive delineation of the contemporary political-economic question must be premised on a historical lens of analysis. Africa's contemporary problems are directly linked to Western triumphalism and its exploitative tradition. To understand the modern-day relations of the formerly colonised and the colonisers, the history of colonialism and the ideologies it served must be engaged. This way we can pinpoint the destructive effects of colonialism we are experiencing today. In the same vein, the motivations of the anti-colonial movement should be brought to the fore to evaluate how our post-colonial relationship with the colonial empire has not eroded the very essence of our agenda to restore our socio-economic and political dignity.

After hoisting flags which marked the birth of new sovereignties, our ideological flirtation with the West saw several independent states falling into the trap of colonial policies which heightened the impoverishment of the Black majority. The crossover to independence accentuated neo-colonial repression of the African people. While the new African governments enjoyed superficial support from the former colonisers, they slowly became alienated from the people. Various policy instruments adopted by nationalist parties across Africa became necessary tools of alienating revolutionary parties from the political soul they had acquired in fighting the enemy. The independence euphoria was depleted by the continental debt crisis which justified the embrace of the International

Financial Institutions (IFI)'s Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). In Zimbabwe, we introduced the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) after the first decade of independence. In the long run, it was apparent that the SAPs were designed to marry colonial capital with the political affairs of the independent African nations. Africa's attainment of independence severely disordered the political supremacy of the colonial powers. As a deliberate turn-around strategy, the dependent economic linkage between forces of colonialism and African countries had to be created. Global capital was at the centre of this neo-colonial agenda. The continuation of this mission has been facilitated by emerging Western-sponsored opposition political parties which draw their popularity from the economic stresses of the people. The continued escalation of poverty in Africa has been used as a decoy by imperialist forces to fracture the popularity of liberation movements. This has sustained the naïve depiction of Zimbabwe's underdevelopment as an exclusive and typical creation of the post-colonial state's bad governance culture.

The emergent neo-colonial opposition in the African body-politic has fashioned a contemporary political debate which is aggressively proving to be more ahistorical. The aim is to erase the contribution of the West to our economic despairs from the minds of our people so that we only locate our economic challenges to the most immediate and contentious contexts. First, we need to understand that our independence was born out of a culture of socio-political inequalities which legitimised the oppression of Africans during the colonial era. Therefore, the forces opposed to the uneven structure of society created by colonialism are bound to be annihilated. This explains the overemphasised misrepresentation of Africa's current economic challenges as a product of the liberation movements' failure. It also shows how the colonial structure of economic control is still preoccupied with preserving the interests of settler capital. Therefore, the focus on political-centred independence was a manifestation of the continuity of the system of a colonial economic monopoly.

In our Zimbabwean context, the colonial establishment had created a robust hegemonic stratified society which was entrenched in preserving White dominance. This system was designed in a manner impossible to

transform. The drive towards Africanisation was particularly restrained by the colonial capital reinforcing tenets of the Lancaster Constitution.

Before the initiation of the decolonisation process, the ideology of colonialism was premised on the economic domination of the African people by the White minority. Consequently, the transfer of political power in the decolonisation phase entailed the consolidation of the minority's economic interests at the expense of the economic disenfranchisement of the formerly colonised. On the part of the nationalists, the appetite for state takeover was primarily centred on the political transfer of power. War fatigue and euphoric expectations for change on the part of the masses catalysed the colonially designed terms of transition which left the African more politically empowered than they were economically. The crisis of political independence which was low on economic wit saw gross mismanagement of public institutions, corruption, and misappropriation of public funds and squander of national resources. The transitional dynamics which gave birth to post-colonial Zimbabwe were largely colonially defined. There was an element of a "change with repetition" mainly characterised by the independent state's failure to eradicate colonial hangovers. Independence became more politically cosmetic than it was economically empirical. The engrained manifestation of the coloniality of our post-colonial transition, as in any other country in Africa, could be best outlined in terms of the continued economic subjugation of the majority. At the same time, the ruling party also had to consolidate the support it enjoyed from the masses since the pre-independence era. The manifest economic failures witnessed after independence were a footprint of the colonial vestiges. The same economic challenges gave prominence to the opposition's regime change plot. There is a thin connecting point between the country's economic meltdown and the justification for the existence of the MDC formations as neo-liberally driven political outfits.

Before the inception of the MDC, a colonially backed opposition, the ZANU PF Government had a formidable task to pacify the determinedly hegemonic orders of White capital. On one hand, we had to ensure that the issue of unequal access to land was addressed. The Willing-Seller-Willing-Buyer principle remained a hindrance to the land redistribution policy we adopted at the behest of our land-hungry and poor majority.

On the other hand, the welfarist character of the state had to be seen to be practised, given our inclination to socialism. It was also evident that we had a crumbling fiscal system, but we could not abandon the mandate to provide satisfactory living conditions for our people.

The Government was compelled to attract FDI and also ensure that it consolidated its hold on the local extractive and secondary industry. We also had the mandate to cater for public social welfare in an industrially declining environment. This economic collapse was a culmination of a host of factors, namely illicit financial flows, a decline in FDI, public administration inadequacies and corruption, among other issues. The need to maintain relations with global capital certainly became the nerve centre for ideological hostilities between the state-driven socialism and a capital-couched neo-liberal penchant. The consolidation of relations with capital meant eradicating the state's impassioned hold on socialism. The reality of the elimination of socialism for capital-driven terms to economic governance ushered in the introduction of ESAP.

The economic problems we find ourselves in today substantiate a historical burden of economic policy-making. A multi-dimensional analysis of our economic challenges as structurally, historically, externally and internally triggered is required. Our fundamental fault was to allow colonial parameters to shape our economic governance in the first decade of independence. Again, the preservation of economic dependence on global capital led to severe infiltrations into our economic policy-making. We also opened up Zimbabwe to perennial imperial domination by embracing global capital's diagnoses of and prescriptions for our economic challenges. As we map the future, we need to be cognisant of the ravaging effects of relying on Western solutions to determine our economic destiny. Imperialist forces have not repented from their determination to keep Africa economically subjugated. After all, global capital is the creator of Africa's present impoverishment and underdevelopment.

The Post-Liberation Economic Evolution: The Inevitable Crisis

The first phase of Zimbabwe's economic policy between 1980 and 1982 was characterised by Africanisation of labour, nationalisation and socialist-

motivated distributionism. This policy position targeted the increased inclusion of Africans in public service structures. Strategically, Africans remained a source of labour for colonial capital. This asymmetrical economic order made the Mugabe administration to enjoy closer bilateral ties with the former coloniser, Britain.

The state reaffirmed its allegiance to socialism, an ideology which was actively deployed in mobilising mass support for the liberation struggle. The socialist rapture at the time served as a threat to conservative White capital but secured the popularity of the party with the disenfranchised African majority. Socialist distributionism and nationalisation was not welcomed by the private sector. Faced with these acute contradictions, the ruling party's power was threatened from all fronts. Capital flight was witnessed and FDI started to decline. Foreign currency shortages worsened. There was also a gradual shutdown of White-owned factories. Meanwhile, we were degenerating into being an exclusively extractive economy. The need for value addition and beneficiation became an important panacea to our looming economic crisis. Without the processing industry, the scale of productivity did not attract meaningful gains.

Around 1986, it became more evident that we had acquired political independence with less economic gains. The Government was obligated to secure the interests of capital to sustain the Treasury. In a bid to prevent the erosion of investor confidence, there was a judicious turn to easing market controls and encouraging trade liberalisation. This policy turn-around was to be fully actualised through the Structural Adjustment ultimatum, to which we conceded in desperation. The move facilitated investment optimism, but practically this policy position yielded insignificant market traction. The decline of the economy was unstoppable.

Fears of potential nationalisation were alive and this partially offered slight economic stability which was witnessed between 1986 and 1990. Moderate erosion of welfare-inclined public policy approach by Government took effect. This caused strained service delivery in the area of education, health and other social amenities before the official adoption of ESAP. At the time, poverty was slowly punishing the masses who had already been

economically marginalised since the colonial era.

The Economic Structural Adjustment Programme: Resurgence of Economic Colonialism in Zimbabwe

The ESAP was initiated at the brink of a large public finance imbalance and diminishing revenue remittance. Economic collapse and unemployment ensued. In this partially defunct economic state, Zimbabwe needed IMF support for a US\$ 3.5 billion credit line. US\$700 million pledged for the first phase was only available in March 1992 after trade liberalisation had been long adopted in October of the previous year. The 1992 drought also forced the Government to concede and take up more stern IMF conditions.

When ESAP took effect, I was serving as the Vice-Chairperson of Umguza Rural District Council. Prior to that, in 1987, I had been appointed a Non-Constituent Member of Parliament. Therefore, I had the opportunity to have a direct appreciation of the legislative and administrative processes of the state in the first decade of independence. The adoption of ESAP saw a rise in unemployment and hyper-inflation. As a public administrator at the time, I experienced first-hand effects of ESAP because my work entailed direct interaction with the people in the grassroots. At the time, there were no more subsidies for local governance operations. To make matters worse, Umguza District had not yet recovered from the effects of colonial marginalisation. Ten years after independence, the people of Umguza and the rest of other Zimbabweans faced the severity of ESAP's austerity measures.

Previously, the country's crippling industrial sector sustained the employment needs of the general populace. The decline in productivity also led to foreign currency shortages. This hampered the country's possibilities for increased international trade. The Government had an inflated wage bill and yet tax remittance was low. The provision of public goods and services was also declining. Import and price control systems were intact and the state was at the centre of this function. However, the deterioration in local and foreign investment persisted, and the consequent route was to adopt an economic reform path recommended by the World

Bank and the IMF. Therefore, ESAP prescribed the following economic reforms:

- * Implementation of a deliberate currency depreciation policy to discourage imports and capital flights and to encourage exports;
- * Acceleration of trade liberalisation based on eradicating the price and import controls to attract foreign capital. This was also seen as a way to open the market space for foreign companies to compete with local firms;
- * Retrenchment of the civil service staff, coupled with the reduction of the public service wage bill was to be executed and;
- * Government expenditure in social welfare was to be curtailed leading to the mass commercialisation of public enterprises. This led to the withdrawal of subsidies on basic commodities and public services.

The drastic turn to these conditions set by the IMF strained the social obligations of the state as the living conditions of the majority became unbearable. The IMF adjustment precedents had proven that these prescriptive conditions of economic recovery had a bearing on social security interests of the debt-affected countries. The institutional features of the market-driven economy prescribed by the IMF prohibited the initial role of Government in its pursuit of social protection to the traditionally disenfranchised. Consequently, the IMF adjustments were backed by “austerity” strains which were mostly felt by the ordinary citizens and the elimination of the socialist type of distributionism. This policy position implied the suppression of potential economic empowerment of our people.

Upon the adoption of Structural Adjustment, we had joined the bandwagon of Third World countries whose economic policies were similarly conditioned. The IFI conditions resulted in the high-cost of living for the majority of our citizens. Taking the IMF route implied a collapse of the economic sovereignty of our newly independent state. When I look back, I can safely say that the adoption of ESAP was a bad decision. ESAP made ZANU PF lose its popularity with some sectors of the Zimbabwean polity, particularly the urban population. As a party, we had to grapple with humane insensitivities of neo-liberalism and its depressing effect on

our socialist trajectory. With my active involvement in politics as one of ZANU PF's point persons in the Matebeleland region, I directly witnessed constant criticism of the ruling party. ESAP was heavily felt by a greater part of our people who had become unemployed. With increases in the costs of living, some of our people started believing that there was a deliberate strategy to marginalise people from Matebeleland. Whether we adopted capitalism with its absurdity or we embraced socialism in its idealistic and yet impracticable character, we had to respond to the immediate mandate of fighting poverty and the collapse of the industrial sector. The structural adjustment policy reproduced the policy logic of the industrialised West's ruling classes and their multi-national corporations. The structures for protecting the poor and vulnerable in society were negated. The debt crisis linked to the adoption of ESAP in Zimbabwe symbolised the unequal capitalist relations between Western sources of capital and former colonies. I have always maintained the view that such policies only cemented dependency on colonial institutions. Our adoption of this policy only exposes that our level of administrative competence was not as advanced as it should have been from the outset.

As the borrowing country, we had to remove state investment in the economy, privatise public corporations and open up the local economy to foreign investment. This excruciating package of orders from the IMF was presented to Zimbabwe with no negotiation. There were no special considerations which were made to our unique circumstances as a country. Our mistake was adopting a policy which had failed elsewhere in Africa. Technically, encouragements to the state for a hands-free approach to the economy strengthened the curtailing of economic sovereignty. Consequentially, the colonial designs of power were enforcing and implementing political independence which encouraged limited control on the economy. Technically, privatisation and encouraging the influx of foreign capital meant downplaying the state's economic custodian role.

The key preoccupation of the programme was on export-led economic growth and further positioning of the economy towards Western capital markets. ESAP's erosion of the market protection system resulted in imported goods flooding the local market at the expense of Zimbabwe's manufacturing sector. Considering the unbearable production costs

of goods locally, this furthered the collapse of home-grown business initiatives, particularly the manufacturing sector. The economy grew to be more import-dependent than it was locally self-sustained. Instead of heightening productivity, ESAP's unlimited competitive advantage for foreign products negatively impacted local industries.

Industry lacked capital and this blocked potential growth and impeded the viability of the manufacturing sector. Today, we have an obsolete production sector whose burden was inherited from the trade liberalisation policy introduced as a result of ESAP. Further to this, there was a brain drain as the local sector could no longer regenerate itself from the suppressed potential growth by foreign market domination of the local economy. The export promotion was not of great help given the dominance of corporates which were directly linked to the sources of capital. Given this reality, ESAP largely served to benefit Multi-National Companies (MNCs). On the other hand, the local companies had limited access to local capital in the form of bank loans, and export and innovation incentives. This even paralysed their potential to be at an equal competitive footing with foreign-owned companies. As a result, MNCs gained more market traction which led to the crumble of the local industry. ESAP encouraged a penchant towards liberalisation of our economy and the rest of the Third World. Ironically countries in the West were taking a very opposite direction.

The production of export crops was promoted at the expense of food crops. The 1992 drought exposed the weakness of this strategy. The drought could not be mitigated because our export-oriented market inclination did not factor in food security back-ups. The drought came as a wake-up call that emphasising horticulture, tobacco and tea did not serve our local interests to the greater extent. Instead, it made us an extractive hub for the West. Zimbabwe's confinement to the export comfort-zone eliminated the possibilities of searching for other market innovations especially in the area of science and technology. As a result, we had to depend on foreign players for agricultural inputs. This tradition was carried over even after the ESAP era. This explains stunted economic growth and limited innovation.

Consequently, the competition for markets with other developing countries manufacturing the same goods produced in Zimbabwe caused the value of our local commodities to depreciate in the international market. In the face of our currency devaluation, the export market gradually became less lucrative. As a result, the export market failed to address the scarcity of foreign currency in the country. Given the background of currency devaluation, the value of our exports continued to fall while the cost of acquiring manufactured inputs from the technologically advanced countries continued to rise. This suppressed the potential of the local industry's development.

In the period between 1989 and 1992, Zimbabwe's foreign debt escalated from US\$2 791 000 000 to US\$4 007 000 000, as GDP declined from 4.6 per cent to 1.7 per cent. The volume of production dropped from 130.8 to 119.3, while the Zimbabwe dollar's exchange rate fell from Z\$2.113 to Z\$6.473 per US\$1 between 1989 and 1993. Meanwhile, the ESAP-induced debt crisis was reported to have made Zimbabwe one of the most indebted countries in Africa, with a total debt of Z\$34.1 billion (US\$4 billion). Also, the debt-service ratio rose from 23.1 per cent in 1990 to 31.9 per cent in 1994. As a result, the majority of our people were subjected to poverty due to the withdrawal of subsidies on health, education, transportation and agricultural inputs, the high cost of utilities, the retrenchment of labour and the subsequent high rate of unemployment.

Challenges in the education sector gave clear indications of the unsustainable terms of the adjustments. Primary school tuition was introduced and secondary school fees hikes were effected. Students sitting for national examinations were to pay exam registration fees. The rise of tuition fees by 1992 also added to the burden of inflation which was being strongly felt by the working class and those who had been retrenched. Household livelihoods had to bear the strain of inflation since subsidies on the provision of public services were also cut. The 1992 student demonstrations at the UZ further reflected that the education sector was crippled by ESAP. Student grants were eroded by inflation and were no longer enough to cater for the welfare of students. The students responded by initiating mass demonstrations which led to the

temporary closure of UZ.

In 1993, after the increase in flour prices was announced, bread riots in the lower-income suburbs of Harare also took place. This followed the Government's decision to liberalise the prices of flour and bread. The demonstrators smashed windows of local bakeries and looted bread in protest. At this point, there was a multifaceted body of disgruntlement across the entire populace. As inflation skyrocketed, the average consumer's real income fell drastically. The wages could not keep up with the pace of inflation. This is being witnessed again in 2020 by many civil servants and those employed in the private sector. In the face of this inflationary set-up, a flourishing parallel market emerged, again a scenario being repeated four decades later. The shortage of basic commodities escalated as is the case at the present moment. Most of these goods were sold in foreign currency at a much higher price out of reach for the majority of Zimbabwean consumers. These acute challenges faced by the ordinary Zimbabweans particularly the urban populace created a degree of unpopularity for the ruling party. These perennial problems in our economy substantiate the crisis of Western-backed solutions to our economic problems. The interventions from Western centres of capital have never worked for us and it is evident that the structural problems we inherited since the post-colonial transition can only be solved by none but ourselves.

In the face of these perils, the 1995 election indicated that ZANU PF still had some popularity that needed to be consolidated. As a result, the party committed itself to accelerate land redistribution, economic reforms and indigenous economic empowerment. The opposition parties promised to change the constitution, expedite reforms, ameliorate hardship and unemployment, promote investment, and reduce corporate and general tax. This shows that the economic challenges conceived by ESAP gave justifications for the opposition's existence. For this reason, the antagonism to the empowerment agenda is primarily based on consolidating the ravaging effects of ESAP on our political economy. The opposition's relevance has been entrenched in the socio-economic problems which were a creation of ESAP. The erosion of our political economy as a result of the colonially inherited, a centralised system of governance and

structural adjustments led to the following prominent cases of corruption in the public sector between 1987 and 1999:

1987: Zisco Steel Blast Furnace Scandal

1987: Air Zimbabwe Fokker Scandal

1986: National Railways Housing Scandal

1988: Willowgate Scandal

1989: ZRP Santana Scandal

1994: War Victims Compensation Scandal

1995: GMB Grain Scandal

1996: VIP Housing Scheme

1998: Boka Banking Scandal

1998: ZESA YTL Soltran Scandal

1998: Telecel Scandal

1998: Harare City Council Refuse Tender Scandal

1999: Housing Loan Scandal

1999: Noczim Scandal

1999: DRC Timber and Diamond Scandals

1999: GMB Scandal

1999: Ministry of Water and Rural Development Chinese Tender Scandal

1999: VIP Land Grab Scandal

Returning to the Liberation Aspirations: Confronting the Ugly Face of Imperialism

After a decade of the searing effects of ESAP on the economy and the prevalence of corruption which was a result of the entrenched centralised governance, there was a need to re-model our politics outside the regulation and presence of White capital (the IMF-included). The land reform programme was executed at the behest of the awakened spirit of the liberation struggle. Inevitably, we had to forgo the repressive dictates of the IMF and reassert a new destiny for our people. The land reform took its root in favour of the long marginalisation of our people.

Upon deciding to have the land returned to its rightful owners, the

Black majority, ZANU PF faced all sorts of antagonism from the West, which had already planted an opposition party that served its economic interests. The birth of the MDC under the late Morgan Tsvangirai was a continuation of the West's propensity to have indirect control of the political space in our country. The birth of a directly Western-funded opposition served as a culmination of colonial forces' efforts to castrate the nationalist movement in Zimbabwe. More CSOs, which were proxies of the opposition, were formed to advance the Western hegemonic hold in the internal affairs of Zimbabwe against the clearly defined parameters of our sovereignty.

The continued existence of the MDC depicts, to a greater extent, the sustained efforts by the West to decimate ZANU PF's existence. The MDC has taken a leading role in urging the West to maintain the sanctions it imposed on Zimbabwe, exposing its role in the country's economic evisceration. In keeping with its essence, the MDC has been opposed to the land reform and other economic indigenisation policies aimed at widening economic inclusion.

The MDC represents every idea which is opposed to the founding values of our hard-earned liberation. It is a mercenary political outfit whose existence seeks to challenge all revolutionary processes inclined to empower our people who were subjected to many years of White oppression. As a result, there is a need for our politically conscious citizens to be committed in the fight against the resurgence of neo-colonialism. Our people must guard against formations which secure the interests of imperialism. MDC is not home to the ideas which caused Rhodesia to fall; instead, it represents the ideas which have caused imperialism to remain intact in Africa. The late Robert Mugabe once remarked:

The MDC should never be judged or characterised by its black trade union face; by its youthful student face; by its salaried black suburban junior professionals; never by its rough and violent high-density lumpen elements. It is much deeper than these human superficialities; for it is immovably and implacably moored in the colonial yesteryear and embraces, wittingly or unwittingly, the repulsive ideology of return to White settler rule. MDC is as old and as strong as the forces that

control it, that drive and direct; indeed that support, sponsor and spot it. It is a counter-revolutionary Trojan horse contrived and nurtured by the very inimical forces that enslaved and oppressed our people yesterday.

The rise of MDC remains an antithesis to all aspirations of disentangling the colonial socio-economic and social conditionality which is produced by the continuing manifestations of the structure of imperialism. At the same time, the post-colonial state is to blame for the failure to evacuate itself from the colonial domination, given the predicament of economic reliance on the former colonialists. It is also hard to deny the reality of how the nationalist movement was co-opted into compromising revolutionary fundamentalism. To a greater extent, this has seen our politics being taken apart by demands of capital to compromise the indigenisation of our economy. Efforts to ensure broad-based policy-making for the empowerment of our people outside the dictates of the imperialists have been vilified in various political opposition fora. Any attempt to turn back to anti-colonial ideas is met with resistance. Apart from the continuing pain of IMF austerity, we had to grapple with the formation of an opposition whose ideological intent has been to incessantly disrupt anti-colonial reform. After the land revolution by our then landless majority, there was a widespread establishment of CSOs whose agenda was to assist in the structured demonisation of Zimbabwe. This shows that the imperialism has not departed, but its existence continues to be enabled by a plethora of sources opposed to the African revolution. The agenda of these institutions is to keep our politics tied down to Western economic supremacy dictates which, for long, have kept Africa at the receiving end of coloniality.

The Land Question and the Struggle for Economic Liberation

We have a constitution that guarantees property rights. It is as watertight as any constitution you can ever imagine. We cannot, therefore, expropriate or nationalise without compensation, and if we do, it requires changing the constitution and it is not easy to change the constitution. We have accepted the constitution and we live by it. Therefore, we respect property rights.

Bernard Chidzero [Minister of Finance, Economic Planning and Development, 1982]

But look how civilised we are! Where land was freely taken away by Whites, we are paying for it. When the land was taken away, there was no compensation court to which our ancestors could appeal.

Emmerson Mnangagwa [Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs 1990]

Dialoguing Land Redistribution after 1980

The remarks made by Dr Bernard Chidzero in 1982 and the submission by the current President of Zimbabwe, Cde Emmerson Mnangagwa, in 1990, during a landmark Parliamentary debate that was a precursor to the land reform, connote the magnitude of controversy linked to the land question in Zimbabwe. The contradicting submissions by the two former cabinet ministers are centred on the supremacy of the contested dictates of the Lancaster House Constitution. Chidzero's position recapitulated the defiant need to preserve the Lancaster

precedent and the imperial protectionist edicts it embodied. During this period, the Government was fixated on ensuring that land access was to be guided by transitional terms which were negotiated at the Lancaster House Conference. The adherence to colonially pronounced structural rigidities was effected until the first decade of independence. During this period, particularly towards ESAP, as indicated by former Minister of Justice Cde Emmerson Mnangagwa's vantage point was indicative of a policy shift which was grounded on correcting the constitutionally sponsored injustice which had racialised agrarian inclusion. President Mnangagwa has remained consistent on the land question and has repeatedly emphasised its irreversibility. This depicts the extent to which the land revolution engraved nationalist genes of post-independence politics. I recall how most parliamentarians after independence were impatient with the Willing-Seller-Willing-Buyer clause.

By 1990, Parliament was debating the Bill of Rights which was to be effected to give the Government the right to compulsory acquisition. The diverging policy turns from a finance and justice perspective substantiate the extent to which the land issue affected every sector of policy-making in Zimbabwe. The robust debates which ensued across the polity from the period between 1990 until the manifestation of a more public-driven land reform process are evidence of the sensitivity of the land question. Today, the restitution of the land to the Black majority remains a major reason for Zimbabwe's international role as a radical agent of the dismemberment of colonial capital.

The current neo-liberal and nationalist polarisation of the Zimbabwean political discourse after the land reform suggests the extent to which Zimbabwe's anti-colonial radicalisation agitated neo-imperialism. As such, this has seen a deliberate aiding of the forces of regime change and pronounced demonisation of all economic indigenisation initiatives since ZANU PF embarked in the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP). It is imperative, therefore, to make critical considerations to rare facts in the public domain about Zimbabwe's hallmark agrarian reform. To a greater extent, exaggerated pro-White capital narratives have been upturned to silence the revolutionary significance of the land reform programme. To challenge this colonially framed rationale, the history

of the asymmetrical social order which was created by colonialism; one must locate the roots of the post-independence agrarian revolution from an anti-colonial point of view.

The Root of the Primitive Land Accumulation

The common logic for equal land access remains at the centre of the philosophical motives of our endless confrontations with global colonial powers. In our immediate reality, colonialism legitimised varying socio-economic inequalities since the arrival of the Pioneer Column. But beyond that, the footprints of imperialism can be traced back to the exploitative trade relations our ancestors shared with the Portuguese. The crossover to British imperialism ushered in an acute asymmetrical encounter with the Western world and its repressive system of power tampered with centuries of Black anger, hence the series of protracted resistances by our people. Under British imperialism, racial discrimination was the centrifugal *modus operandi* of the occupation of geographical spaces. Legal, coercive and administrative methods were interchangeably or collectively deployed to facilitate the mass colonial land acquisition. To keep Africans isolated from possibilities of future solidarity against invasion, the divide-and-rule strategy was effected. African communities were estranged from each other through ethnic and clan particularism. The social dismembering framework of Africans was initiated through the deliberate exclusion of Africans from fertile soils to marginal and agriculturally unfavourable Tribal Trust Lands/native reserves. As already mentioned, my family was displaced from Lower Gwelo to the Jambezi area to make way for the effective occupation of our homelands in Mayindibulula.

As a result, the fight against British imperialism was anchored on the need to dislocate this system of primitive accumulation which had entrenched its hegemony to preserve settler interests. Colonialism established itself as a system of dominance, privilege and exploitation. By its virtue and character, colonialism became a vanguard of legitimising the illegalities of the social-spatial structure of White rule. Even after the first inaugural anti-colonial resistances of 1893 and 1896 to 1897, the colonialists never intended to acknowledge the dignity of Africans concerning property rights. Displacement entailed the dehumanisation and emotional fracture

of the African. In the quest for supremacy, many Africans were maimed, imprisoned and massacred. The memory of my father's untimely departure from the earth in the hands of White brutality is the major reason for my emotive connection to the land issue. To me, the land reform programme came in as a critical restitution initiative and as an initially ignored step towards national healing.

After the first anti-colonial resistance, the colonial system reorganised itself by concretising its legislative and administrative infrastructure to castrate future African uprisings. With the full establishment of the BSAC after 1900 and the increased focus on agricultural production, Blacks had to be moved away from vast tracts of productive lands which were forcefully acquired by Whites. This led to the creation of native reserves across Rhodesia. Around 1925 the Native Purchase Areas (NPA) System was introduced and Africans were made to buy land in designated areas which were largely unproductive. This system only benefited a few disgruntled Africans; the majority endured this dispossession and the very feeling of dispossession became the bedrock and inspiration to challenge the inequality produced by colonialism.

The colonial policy position on land access was profoundly segregating as it only privileged the economic interests of the White populace. In 1930, the Land Apportionment Act was introduced to cement the further institutionalisation of the racial distribution of land ownership. After the end of the Second World War in 1945, White Rhodesian ex-servicemen were offered farms while, on the contrary, Black soldiers who participated in the Second World War were excluded from this distribution process. This policy reflected yet another purely structural inequality of the colonial system. The result was bottled tension among the Africans who, at the time, were begrudgingly settled in the native reserves. My family had fallen victim to the effects of the Land Apportionment Act. Even after the forced settlement in Jambezi, there was wide resentment for the colonial system. Having been socialised under conditions of mass discontent, emanating from the economic injustice of the colonial system, going to war to fight for land was duty.

In 1950, the Native Land Husbandry Act was introduced to legally enforce

destocking of herds of cattle at the household level. This law came against a backdrop of the harsh Land Apportionment Act of 1930 which had subjected the majority to poor living conditions. Given Black population expansion, the colonial administration faced increased pressure to ensure that the White populace had a monopoly over land ownership. In 1967, the Land Tenure Act was put in place to further the security of the White community's permanent entitlement to commercial land ownership. This legislation also isolated Africans from acquiring land designated for the White settlers. The confinement of land control to the Whites became a major justification for mass discontent as the African population kept growing and yet access to land was not being widened to cater for the growing African population. The narrow franchise on property rights continued to overstretch the system of inequality.

The Land Husbandry Act of 1950 and the Land Tenure Act of 1967 were instituted at a time when African nationalism was gaining traction. The land was an emotive premise for our struggle. The enactment of the two laws offered a defining turn to the values of the liberation. As a result, those of us who rose to the nationalist aspirations of the time had an organic and practical purpose to fight for the equality and reorganising our society towards a shared economic vision of the disenfranchised African majority. Freedom without a clear policy of agrarian inclusion could not be imagined, especially since the bedrock of imperial political and economic influence was in land ownership. The lifeline of Rhodesia was politically enabled through the state's control over the productive lands, minerals, wildlife and the country's water bodies.

Fighting Primitive Accumulation to Humanise Ourselves

The ultimate goal of the liberation movement was to transform the landscape of political repression and undo the economic monopoly of the colonial structure. This dual destruction of the political and economic facets of the colonial system offered assurances of an independent state which was going to deliver meaningful social equality. The economic and political superstructure of any state interlaces the fibre of society. The fundamental point of dedication to the struggle, starting from our combatants, our command structures, the nationalist forerunners and

the masses, across class, ethnic and generational demographics, was to achieve decolonisation more than just deracialisation. The advantage of decolonisation over deracialisation is its repositioning ambition to break the timeless disenfranchisement of Africans long capitulated to economic exploitation. Therefore, the reclamation of the means of production continues to be a humanising project for Africans against a history of being subjects of exploitation and primitive accumulation.

The Lancaster and Constitutional Preservation of Illegality

The Willing-Seller-Willing-Buyer principle was a hindrance to the efforts to expedite land redistribution. This system aided the perpetuation of market-based land re-allocation whose pace was determined by colonial capital. The Lancaster Agreement bequeathed a legacy of a racially organised agrarian sector. Given the need to conserve the status of primitive accumulation, the dialogue towards independence and its terms of reference spelt out in the Lancaster Treaty mapped a future of a White-controlled economy. This was a mistake made from the beginning and our sovereignty became surrogate to colonial fraternalism.

At independence, the Land Tenure Act enacted in 1950 was kept intact; agricultural productivity and tenure claims were limited to the monopoly of 6000 White farmers and some foreign-owned estates. On the other hand, there were 700,000 peasant families and 8000 small-scale black commercial farmers who were still bearing the marginal effects of the antiquated colonial land tenure legislation. The Lancaster transition was not committed to ending the poverty faced by the Black majority.

Through the system of transitional reconciliation, there was a retention of White expertise in key arms of the state. The moderate inclination towards Africanisation did not extricate White control in the strategic economic fronts such as lands, mines, wildlife, bureaucracy, social services, local government and the judiciary. These cornerstones of the public sector finance were the material bedrock of the Rhodesian capitalist monopoly after independence. In a way, the edict of reconciliation suppressed retribution, at the same time enabling the absorbent of the much abhorred racial status quo. Immediately after independence, only 10 per

cent of peasant families were resettled on three million hectares. On the part of the majority, redistribution of land mattered much more than the narrow resettlement initiatives which did not resolve the inequalities inherited from the colonial system. The inadequacy of the Lancaster House provisions made the land question to be central in deciding the full realisation of independence after 1980.

The impact of the exclusionary post-independence agricultural policy framework was noted following the intense decline of peasant production in 1992. The peasant market production output had reached 45 per cent in 1985 following the low 8 per cent productivity witnessed at independence in 1980. The few resettled farmers under the state's land acquisition programme, introduced in the 80s, transformed peasant livelihood, demonstrated by the height of productivity recorded in the period between 1980 and 1985. With the expiry of the Willing Seller, Willing Buyer clause of the Lancaster Agreement in 1990 and the impact of the 1992 drought, the Government had to intensify its turn to an alternative plan of action to alleviate the majority from poverty and food insecurity. On the other hand, ESAP resulted in the fall of the employment rate from 2.4 per cent in the late 1980s to 1.55 per cent in the period between 1991 and 1997. Household poverty was pegged at 14 per cent during this period. As a result, of the worsening poverty, squatting was on the rise on commercial farms and communal lands.

At this point, it was indisputable that the Lancaster arrangement secured the material interests of colonial capital at the cost of African impoverishment and marginalisation. The impact of ESAP (explored fully in the previous chapter) had left a rooted deterioration of the livelihoods of the majority. This facilitated the need for the overhaul of the constitutional injustice of the transitional retention of the means of production by the minority settler class.

Liberating the Economy: Towards Inclusive Access to Land

After the signing of the Unity Accord in 1987, the issue of nation-building had found its premise through the political collaboration of the prominent nationalist movements, PF-ZAPU and ZANU, to form the present-day

ZANU PF. The former ZPRA and ZANLA forces were also united by the agenda to implement an action plan for the full realisation of economic liberation. The issue of land redistribution became the rallying point of ideological enunciation on the economic front. In the following year, I was among those who led the process of the establishment of the ex-combatant collective, the Zimbabwe National Liberation War-veterans Association (ZNLWVA). This outfit became an agent of advocacy by actively engaging Government to cater for the welfare needs of the war-veterans. ZNLWVA was instrumental in calling for land redistribution at the time. This group of liberation fighters symbolised the lost aspirations of the struggle. At the time, most of the comrades were landless and our emotive call for land redistribution was incentivised through a system of inequality which was continued close to the first decade of independence after ZNLWVA had been formed. This collective of ex-guerrillas was highly subscribed and the majority of its affiliates were in the lowest strata of society. Some were unemployed, peasant farmers and ordinary civil servants. War-veterans were among the most affected group following the adoption of ESAP. This accelerated the resolve of the former liberation fighters to champion the shifting of capital ownership from the minority settler class to every deserving Zimbabwean.

In December 1990, there was an amendment to the Bill of Rights. This proposition was aimed at undoing the stringent conditions of the Willing Seller, Willing Buyer clause of the Lancaster Agreement. The amendment authorised the Government to confiscate land without being challenged by the concerned “landowners”. This was followed by the resettlement of marginalised peasant families under the Land Acquisition Act whose framework was to grapple with the lasting race centred marginalisation effects of the 1930 Land Apportionment Act. The radicalisation of the call for land redistribution by the war-veterans catalysed the Government’s reaction.

In 1997, The Land Acquisition Act enabled the Government to acquire underutilised farms, some of which were derelict. White multiple farm owners became targets of the compulsory acquisition land process. In Matebeleland, the Government had also initiated public consultative meetings to coordinate policy modalities for viable terms of resettlement.

There was contention on the need for widening native reserves for cattle grazing instead of resettling families. The people preferred to have native reserves extended instead of being resettled to other areas. The rejection of this offer by the Government after independence could have resulted from the memories of the forceful resettlement implemented during the colonial era. In areas such as Binga and Jambezi, people refused to be resettled because they had established emotional connections with their settlements. Whilst this strained the pace of the resettlement process, farm invasions had taken root in other parts of Matebeleland.

However, ground-breaking occupations at the time were witnessed in the Svosve and Goromonzi areas. The occupations led by war-veterans were collectively aided by traditional leaders, peasants and spiritual custodians of the land. As the occupation gained momentum, other provinces in the country became part of the nationwide procession for land acquisition from the White community. At the time, our people became more organised to change the status quo of White monopoly.

This intensifying cross-sectional pressure left the Government with no other option, but to amend the constitution in favour of the demands of the landless populace. In 2000, there were calls for constitutional amendments which were linked to the land redistribution exercise. The next step was a constitutional referendum process which was aggressively resisted by civil society and the opposition. At this stage, long knives were drawn against the land reform and our disconnection from the absolute IMF superintended economics. The urban populace which had been distant from the land reform processes did not find value in the need for a constitutional reform which favoured land redistribution. Again, the urbanites had been subjected to a high cost of living as a result of ESAP. Therefore, the state-urban electorate relationship was more on the hostile side than it was progressively cordial. ZANU PF's popularity in the rural areas had also increased after the restoration of the long demanded property rights. The increased support of the rural populace to ZANU PF compensated the low urban support which the ruling party was beginning to face.

During the last three decades, Zimbabwe implemented land reform in

three phases. The first phase between 1980 and 1985 was superintended by the Willing Seller, Willing Buyer principle and was largely market-determined. At the time, the state-led the land acquisition and redistribution was adopted. While legal manoeuvres were on course, illegal occupations on the farms also ensued.

The second stage between 1986 until 1999 saw the state obtaining some land through expropriation and negotiated market terms. At the time, the economically paralysing effects of ESAP made the need for widened financial inclusion more critical. The majority of our people were out of employment and the impact of economic inequality could no longer be avoided then. The FTLRP phase in 2000 marked the climax of the land revolution which was then christened the Third Chimurenga. The FTLRP was defined by rigorous land expropriation combined with “illegal land occupations” which still bore proof of the insatiable hunger for land by our people.

The Land Reform and Transformation of Zimbabwe’s Political Landscape

The adoption of the FTLRP by the Government invented a new form of political tension between the revolutionary forces, the embattled erstwhile capital monopolists and their CSO proxies. As the White community organised itself in more anti-establishment terms, the rural populace which had benefited much from the land reform asserted its strong fraternity to the ruling ZANU PF. On the other hand, the banner of the ex-guerrillas maintained its defiant position as the vanguard for Black empowerment. The MDC capitalised on urban impoverishment as a result of ESAP for its metropolitan mobilisation. The resistance of the constitutional referendum in urban areas substantiates this claim.

The partisan demarcation of citizen belonging emanating from the land question makes the possibilities of conflict inevitable. Since the launch of the land reform, the Zimbabwean society has been polarised between forces in support and those opposed to the land redistribution. Lines of citizenship were more defined in either nationalist or neo-colonialist cleavages. The turn to the convenient discourse of property and human

rights was largely pursued by those servicing the land reform instigated regime change agenda. As such, since the effective launch of the FTLRP, ZANU PF policies and its legitimacy have come under criticism from “human rights” and “democracy” defenders. The pivot of their moralism is the state’s resistance to the colonial status quo which privileged White capital. However, what our Western-sponsored left does not understand is that colonial privilege survived on the demolition of the Africans’ human rights.

The Poverty of the Neo-colonial Property and Human Rights Advocacy in Zimbabwe

The unequal status of economic security on the part of the African community presents a critical case of a human-rights crisis which had to be addressed through the redistribution of the land. The Tribal Trust Lands epitomised the entrenched colonial culture of human-rights denial to the Africans. The convenient turn to the human rights and democracy moralism is misplaced if it ignores the structure of colonial dehumanisation and how it was supposed to be collapsed to facilitate the humanisation of both the colonisers and the colonised.

The subject of human rights in post-independence Zimbabwe must not be disconnected from this historical context of being selectively applied in defence of a fallen oppressive system and a minority it protected. Therefore, a candid reflection on this subject must facilitate an appreciation of how history conceived the fragilities of our diverse national belonging.

This enabled the collective rise of the marginalised and the colonially dehumanised to challenge colonial privilege. The negotiated processes of independence manufactured a neo-colonial state and the accentuated motive to transform the state raised the need to resist neo-colonialism to reassert liberation morality. The prefacing reference to the words of President Mnangagwa in 1990 reflects the gradual radicalisation which the state had to go through in a bid to redefine the ethos of independence and create fairness to property ownership.

Political radicalisation was needed to see the transition from a neo-colonial state to a people-accommodating state through. While there

was a tendency to preserve the colonial status quo on the narrow basis of “principle”, the transformation of Zimbabwe’s political economy was catalysed by the organic aspirations of the people of the land. Therefore, to judge this inevitable shift in the principles servicing the machinery of power using reactionary standards ignores the fact that Zimbabwe had to go through this decisive phase.

It only made sense for ZANU PF, as a liberation movement, to take the prerogative of leading the masses in reclaiming the land. Again, the mandate of rallying the people towards this cause further entailed the party’s material and ideological support to this agenda. This was critical as the opposition was taking a contrary route to destabilise efforts towards the land reform. While ZANU PF relied on the support of the peasants, war-veterans and farmworkers, the MDC depended on reactionary alliances to denounce the land reform. In a way, the MDC became an internal agent of expressing the frustrations of international capital towards Zimbabwe.

At an international level, the war waged by imperial reactionary forces manifested through the ZIDERA (See Appendix 2) and EU sanctions imposed in 2001 and 2002 respectively. The country-wide peasant farm occupations which coincided with Zimbabwe’s intervention in the DRC crisis resulted in the restriction of Zimbabwean manufactured military equipment in the international market. Zimbabwe’s support to the Laurent Kabila-led administration in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) threatened the efforts of the US-supported rebels to take over the state. At the same time, the UK had abandoned its land compensation responsibility. Collectively, in 2002, the EU, UK and US Governments froze the assets of notable figures linked to ZANU PF. The listed officials were also issued with travel bans. Zimbabwe was subsequently ejected from the Commonwealth.

Sanctions have facilitated Zimbabwe’s isolation from the international market and credit lines. Through the continued renewal of the sanctions, Zimbabwe has found regional support against sanctions. This serves as proof of how the rest of the African continent is becoming increasingly opposed to the imperialist logic of sanctions. The support that Zimbabwe

received from SADC countries in 2019 exerts collective diplomatic pressure on the forces of imperialism.

African Sympathies towards Zimbabwe

In a communique of the 39th SADC Summit, the region declared the 25th of October 2019 as a solidarity day to push for the removal of sanctions against Zimbabwe. This pledge further consolidates the fraternal economic sympathies which the SADC countries share. The SADC Secretariat further lobbied for the anti-sanctions positions to be tabled for discussion during the 74th UN General Assembly held in September 2019. This unprecedented move by SADC sets a new tone for repositioning African issues in the global political arena; but most importantly, this serves as a major diplomatic score for Zimbabwe. The anti-sanctions position registers the extent to which our fellow neighbouring states are fully cognisant of the unbearable living conditions which the sanctions have inflicted on the Zimbabwean populace.

It is in my considered view, now that SADC has spoken, that the long-enduring cry of the people of Zimbabwe and Africa as a whole will be heard throughout the world. Therefore, this is the time for Zimbabwe to reaffirm its position as a think-tank of Africa's economic liberation trajectory. We now have to draw more inspiration from our time immemorial struggle to defend the liberation legacy and the people's voice of reason towards the unification of Africa. The SADC resolution emphasises this fundamental ideological lobby of African States in safeguarding the humanist agenda of the long-isolated interests of the continent. In so doing, the SADC is re-living its founding regional solidarity mandate. Of note, the imperative underscoring influences for the formation of SADC are informed by the joint experience of liberation struggles, the fall of apartheid and the shared distress about the economic marginalisation of Southern Africa. Beyond the Pan-Africanist ideological currency of this regional bloc, the genealogy of SADC traces back to two former regional organisations, namely the Frontline States (FLS) and later the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). These two institutions respectively constitute the conception of SADC's political and security cooperation wing, and the socio-economic cohesion

wing. These two arms of regional integration were co-founded within the context of the African decolonisation project. The post-independence experience continues to urge SADC on to execute a mission which enhances governance from a more Afro-centred inclination.

Beyond the 25 October Declaration

There is a need to aggressively pursue the collective call for the immediate and unconditional removal of illegal sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe by the West and to devise counter-measures against potentially similar threats on member states. Member states have to take all necessary steps and measures including, but not limited to, legislative and administrative frameworks to underpin the fight against sanctions in their various forms and manifestations. SADC must deepen cooperation anchored on an outright fight against imperialism through economic development-centred diplomacy in Southern Africa in a bid to secure the continuity of the decolonisation agenda and guarantee the longevity of the region's central political interests.

There must be strengthened effort in harmonising African countries' economic policy frameworks as an enabling mechanism to take full advantage of the newly formed African Continental Free Trade Area (AFCTA).

The Success of the Land Reform

The land redistribution programme was mainly aimed at transferring economic power from White monopoly to the Black majority and, at most, achieve a fair system of wealth distribution. True to that principle, between 1980 and 2009, over 13 of the 15 million hectares of land has been reallocated to over 240,000 peasant families countrywide. This means that in post-independence Zimbabwe, the monopoly of land ownership has been shifted from 6,000 White farmers who controlled the land in 1980 in favour of our people who had been marginalised from land access. To a greater extent, the agrarian reform has reduced unfair labour relations which characterised the previous era of majority land-hunger. The exploitative system of the system of a master-servant relationship came under threat with the redistribution programme. With the elimination

of land ownership monopoly, the land reform can be commended for improving the welfare and general livelihood of farmworkers across the agriculture value-chain.

The accelerated redistribution of land since 2000, with the radicalisation of the African land occupation, resulted in 168,671 families benefiting from the programme across 9.2 million hectares. The household beneficiaries of the FTLRP attained an average of 20 hectares of land, and hold 70 per cent of the transferred land, through the A1 schemes. Under the A2 scheme, 16,000 new farmers in 2008 had access to an average of 100 hectares. Under the same scheme in 2010, over 20, 000 pieces of land on an average of 100 hectares were acquired countrywide.

Access to land was further extended to proxies of the official beneficiaries. To this day, the same approach is being applied and therefore suggesting that the shift of land ownership from the settler community had widened access to land by the African majority. The Government's input assistance to farmers has enabled moderate retooling of the agricultural sector given Zimbabwe's protracted exclusion from access financial aid from IFI. The recorded land reform productivity largely owes its success to state-incentivised inputs in terms of machinery, seed, fertilisers and other production paraphernalia.

The redistribution of land did not solely benefit ZANU PF supporters as constantly argued by those who service the agendas of neo-colonialism. The partisan linearisation of the agrarian programme is misplaced as it ignores that the spontaneous processes of land occupations did not take a party structure-guided routes. It was mostly mob-coordinated until the process acquired a more systematic route. This saw A1 beneficiaries being taken from their respective provinces including some provinces where ZANU PF had low popularity in the 2005 and 2008 harmonised elections.

Again, it is not entirely true that the war-veterans had an absolute monopoly over the land allocation processes and were the only beneficiaries of the land distribution. The common illusion surrounding this position is that the former freedom fighters acquired huge farms which they could

not manage because they lacked the relevant skills to productively run the farms. In reality, only close to 8 per cent of the war-veterans benefitted from the land reform programme. The rest did not benefit from the programme. Moreover, not all war-veterans were interested in taking part in the land reform. Some who had shifted their allegiances to the opposition at the time were never involved in the land reform programme. It would also be naïve to ignore that some war-veterans still subscribed to the Lancaster Agreement. Amongst the war-veterans, some were never interested in agriculture.

The land distribution process widened access to other natural resources such as minerals, water, wildlife and forests. This has created land-driven diversification of the economy. Instead of having farms being solely used for agricultural purposes only, the land reform has seen some beneficiaries of the programme venturing into safari, game and fishery ventures. Farms have been converted to meet multipurpose entrepreneurial ventures, besides their conventional agricultural function. Small-scale mining has also taken root in some farms and given room for the full exploitation of land for the benefit of many individuals unlike in the past where mining activities were concealed for the benefit of the sole farm owner.

To also improvise for the lack of external investor input and the prevailing fiscal liquidity to support agriculture, especially during the GNU, the beneficiaries of the land reform devised innovative means of acquiring capital. This way, some farmers ventured into contract farming, subletting some farming space to gain funds to rehabilitate production infrastructure, acquire machinery and buy inputs. Contingent plans have also been made to ensure the importation of farm equipment during the economic meltdown witnessed in the post-FTLRP. The innovative methods used to sustain the agricultural sector in harsh economic conditions made the land-reform programme a success. This is because the sector has been self-contained outside the support of international capital.

The Government must also be commended for developing deliberate policies to support the indigenous farmers through context-sensitive interventions such as farmer-designated fuel pricing, subsidising the agro-economy and special foreign currency allocations. State-owned enterprises

have been actively involved in this process and have contributed to suppressing the monopoly of private sector entities in the value chain of the post-redistribution agro-economy. In the same way, the sustained state-owned enterprise intervention in curtailing the production burden faced by indigenous farmers also put a strain on the parallel market in the agricultural input supply chain.

The Future of Agrarian Reform

The evaluation of the success of the land reform exercise needs to be put into context, given that the colonial set-up had a lesser investment inclination in the rural areas. Therefore, the new farmers inherited an agricultural system which had limited infrastructural capital. Given the uneven order of the colonial public administration system, there was an insignificant investment in rural economies and agricultural infrastructure. Therefore, introducing an unfinanced land distribution economy entailed an inevitable exertion of pressure on irrigation facilities and other critical amenities of the sector. The Government is still constrained in terms of ensuring that adequate facilities which sustain the rural economy are provided to enhance production. The land reform programme also took effect against a backdrop of a slow rural electrification programme. Moreover, the decline in the energy sector has not been complemented by alternative mechanisms and this means a further strain to the agro-economy which had not been boosted from the outset in the area of energy. There must be committed efforts to ensure that alternative sources of energy are introduced to aid agriculture production.

Low levels of modernisation provide a key explanation of the recession of the agricultural economy. Faced with changing global technological transitions in the sector, Zimbabwe must invest in knowledge production which gives a strong science and technological innovation impetus to the agricultural sector. The Government must put in place policies which promote agriculture-centred investment and innovation to help in catalysing the national yield capacity. With the advent of economic engagement and diplomatic re-engagement, efforts must be put in place to encourage local and foreign investment in the sector. More agriculture-based special economic zones must be introduced to create a durable revenue stream for national development.

Given the conflict-rooted land question, Zimbabwe's agrarian revolution will continue to be the epicentre of academic and political controversies. The land question continues to confine discussions around losses and reclamation of the human dignities of both the dispossessing imperial class and the once dispossessed Africans. With the former settler being the "now-dispossessed" a new discourse of human rights has been born. The shift from White economic monopoly to majority-driven distribution has seen national belonging being streamlined across pro-nationalist and neo-colonialist terms. At the centre of this fractured nationalism, the political space has produced antagonists and protagonists. There is a need for our people to be united by the need to build Zimbabwe outside the disruptions to our social co-existence. As political actors, we need to introspect and ensure that our power consolidation interests resonate with the enduring values of liberation. This way, equality will be realised, and humanity reinvented.



The Post-Independence Democracy Enigma

The Genesis and the Paradox of Democracy

Democracy is usually credited to the Global North. Political cultures of Western Europe and North America invoke democracy as an idea and a practice. But one notes, already at this point, that it is not possible to talk of global democracy. Whether in the U.S, Britain, France or Germany, democracy takes a national character so that no one democracy is compelled to be a replica of the next. Maybe, we need to consider talking about “democracies” instead of democracy. Each democracy is inspired and framed by unique historical circumstances, and its applicability is driven by specific political conditions. Contrary to these nuances, democracy is exported to the Global South as a handed-down robe to fit all, a homogenous concept representing the linear values of political equality and freedoms of association, speech and participation.

If we are faced here with the universal pitch for democracy, then we may also add the principle of representative Governments that should derive their legitimacy from electoral endorsements and adherence to the constitution. But the universal claims of democracy necessarily refuse to be narrowed down into something made in the Global North for the rest of the world to emulate. Modern history is in large part a theatre of Africa’s emancipatory consciousness awakening in opposition to Western anti-democracy. Equality, good governance and inclusion are essentially African. Even before colonialism eats into the scene, our broad-based value systems which translate into our indigenous political norms already

constitute democracy without the Western terminology. Then, of course, democracy in Africa derives its contemporary existence mainly from the continent's revolution against colonialism, a revolution which Lobengula and Nehanda did not need to invoke a duplicitous Western canon but rather our indigenous values. Africa compares favourably in the hostile exchange of civilisations at the juncture of imperial conquest and nationalist resistance. It is these values that African contemporary political thought refers back to for the elementary qualification of democracy.

From here, it is one step to note that the Western understanding of democracy is an essentially self-interested one. Not just because Western Europe and North America's torchbearers of enlightenment like Hegel did not think of their ideas of human progress as applying to Africa – a time-warped land-mass to be thought of in terms of domination rather than humanity – but also because democracy in the post-colonial theatre is weaponised by the West for self-interest. Having thought of democracy as exclusively applying to itself so that it was considered the enlightened duty to enslave and colonise, the West now remodels democracy into a Trojan horse for a part of the world that has already emancipated itself and progressed by its indigenous values. In a Protean stroke of narrative duplicity, the West spreads out into the world again in new self-assigned roles as priest and policeman, back in the jungle for a second civilising mission. What is at stake here is what was already at stake in the first civilising mission: the resources, sovereignty, common decency and destiny of Africans.

Concentrated focus on the human-rights discourse in Zimbabwe has alienated the importance of the debate on the democratisation of the economy. This explains why the efforts by ZANU PF to democratise the economy through the land reform and other economic empowerment policies deliberately tilted to the majority attracted international scorn. There has been little effort to interrogate why the need for open societies has not practically translated to the opening up of the national economy. This absence of critical thought in the Western-sponsored public sphere requires vigorous interrogation. Subsequently, we turn to how forces of imperialism have manipulated the linear definitions of democracy to foster a regime-change-incentivised narrative based on the tenets of

liberal political culture. Referring back to political events between 1980 and 1990, it is important to expose the flaws of the liberal enterprise against home-grown democracy. Indeed, it is also important to confront the crisis of the one-party state debate advanced by the opposition and critics ZANU PF as a basis for importing democracy.

Democracy and the Free-Market Economy

The monopoly claimed by the West to the origins and evolution of democracy has made the concept to be largely associated with a neo-liberal market-related culture. The free-market system engendered in the democratic discourse is synonymous with the prescriptive dictates for states to open-up their political spaces in as much as they should open up their borders for trade. Essentially, there is a thin interactive divide between democracy and imperialist capital. The Western genealogy of democracy remains problematised due to the prominent historical role of Western countries in the colonisation of Africa, Asia and the Caribbean. The consequent sub-categorisation of Western colonies as the Third World serves as an impairment to what the Western model of democracy entails.

In our case, the post-independence democratic turn exposed us to a short-lived interaction with International Financial Institutions (IFIs). During this phase, Zimbabwe enjoyed cordial standing with the neo-colonial institutions of capital. The advent of neo-colonialism also reflects the crisis of democracy in the global political-economy structure. Zimbabwe's economic collapse after the introduction of ESAP substantiates the post-colonial policy pitfalls as a result of contextually irrelevant free-market conditions for economic development. On the ground, ESAP was not favourable to our populace's social and economic well-being. When "radical" policy initiatives to curtail imperial domination in the national economy emerged, that was regarded as a key signal to the demise of Zimbabwean democracy. Basing on this background, democracy is arguably entrenched in protecting the interests of capital. The relationship between democracy and Western financial aid is quite intimate. Socialism as an alternative to capitalism, and its role as an ideology premised on the protection of the aspirations of the working class, is an antithesis to the

limitations of the free-market system.

The effects of the prescriptions of ESAP are evident in the crisis of democracy and its attachments to the global norm of market authoritarianism. ESAP and other policies dictated from capitals of North America and Western Europe depict the extent to which the Global South is deliberately confined to the receiving end of capitalism. This was the major cause for the economic domination of Zimbabwe by the minority settler class and transnational companies even after independence. The economic liberalisation policy ushered in by ESAP advanced the interests of the foreign market players within our domestic market.

The manifestation of the economic democracy handicap after independence was a hallmark divergence from the liberation agenda. From the outset, the fight for democratisation was not limited to the liberal enterprise narrowly defined in terms of individual freedoms and the creation of a multi-party system. Those were the most obvious and rudimentary objectives of decolonisation. However, economic democratisation was the summit priority of the fight for liberation. Therefore, the full realisation of democracy entailed undoing the domination of colonial capital.

The Recurrent Defects of the Democracy Discourse

Now, the convenient preoccupation with the need to enhance the liberal tenets of democracy and the broad discursive articulation of individual freedoms has always been used to divert attention from the fundamental question of economic democratisation. The economic liberalisation impetus of ESAP and the dominance of White monopoly capital in Zimbabwe has not been exhaustively engaged as an impediment to the democratisation of the economy. Focus has always been misdirected on ZANU PF's Machiavellian model of power consolidation since 1980. However, ZANU PF's role in facilitating the democratisation of capital by abandoning ESAP and redistributing land has mainly received widespread academic and political conversational lampoon other than objective engagement. In the process, ZANU PF has been framed as an anti-democratic force in the Zimbabwean body politic. Those opposed to ZANU PF have conveniently acquired political sainthood as progressive

agents of democracy.

Today, we are confronted by the fight against sanctions, particularly their effects on the economy of Zimbabwe. In support of the sanctions, those in the opposition argue that their illegal imposition and continuation is justified as progressive retribution to the state's tradition of human-rights abuses. The ritual allegation of corruption against state officials is also brought to the fore, but none dares to question the corruption in the opposition and some CSOs linked to it. Apparently, in Zimbabwe, corruption only exists in ZANU PF and Government institutions. The corruption in the opposition-run local councils is exonerated by political critics. Over the years, we have witnessed several NGOs collapsing due to massive cases of donor-funding embezzlement. Biased anti-Government critiques exempt those who have equally arrogated a moralist locus. Several audit reports have also exposed the height of corruption in opposition-run urban councils but our opposition-linked media and CSOs have not impartially looked at such vices. This proves beyond measure that the opposition-aligned narrative of democracy is a discursive conduit for polarisation.

Contrary to the mainstream misrepresentation of Zimbabwe's political culture, there has never been a dedicated position to make Zimbabwe an authoritarian state. For the convenient rhetoric of the "one-party state" after independence, it is important to understand the prevailing socio-political circumstances which catalysed this affirmative position. The call for a one-party system became more pronounced towards the ZANU PF Congress of 1989. The euphoric call for a one-party was an internal ZANU PF position which did not represent the overall national attitude. Therefore, to project that stance as universally connected to the national question is misleading. After all, the world over, political parties set agendas which are not necessarily the national policy or do not reflect on absolute national feelings.

Zimbabwe, like any other post-independent African state, faced neo-colonial entanglements and consequently simplistic reductionism of the political landscape as evolving towards an anti-democracy. Beyond the Zimbabwean body-politic, it cannot also be ignored that the opposition

faced by liberation movements across Africa has been colonially sponsored. History has proven that most opposition parties in Africa have been formed to challenge the liberation agenda which is constantly subjected to vigorous antagonistic scrutiny.

This crude reading of African politics by an imperialist reactionary left narrowly bundles most nationalists under the “dictator” label. This left deliberately chooses not to locate the political-economic strains of the independent state outside the structural challenges inherited from the colonial state. This does not imply that African countries do not have a fair share of their faults. However, it is deeply naive to only analyse the administrative incompetence of post-colonial African Governments outside the reality of inherited colonial problems. This view is not only selectively ahistorical, but it is intellectually problematic.

Again, the ingenious analytical tendency to diagnose dearth of democracy as the major cause for socio-economic problems in the Third World is flawed. Instead, some of the major socio-economic challenges in Africa are structurally determined by neo-colonialism. Elsewhere in the book and in the very preface of this chapter, I highlighted how ESAP created a multidimensional structural collapse of Zimbabwe’s political economy. Therefore, to analyse the decline of our education, health and social welfare sectors without acknowledging the underlying historical roots of our policy-delivery inadequacies is problematic. The correlation of democracy and national development has been largely incentivised by neo-liberal extremists whose social capital is sustained by judging African politics on the pretext of “bad governance”, “corruption” and “authoritarianism”.

On this narrow basis of neo-liberal prescriptions, the opposition, servile civil society promotes ahistorical hostile postures towards the Government of the day. The dynamics of neo-colonialism are exonerated in all their analytical attempts to interpret the country’s socio-economic challenges. The convenient argument of corruption, bad governance, deteriorating human rights and the collapse of democracy has been massively deployed to authenticate the neo-liberal ideological existentialism of the regime-change project in Zimbabwe. As such, the major polarity of our politics

has been divided along ZANU PF-aided “authoritarian patronage” and the opposition-driven fight for “democracy and upholding of human rights.”

The opposition’s dogmatic position, particularly its direct ideological and financial proximity to the imperialist forces, is rarely subjected to intense interrogation. In our unique Zimbabwean experience, the academia and civil society have been a convenient and an indirect ally of the opposition in deliberate manoeuvres to push ZANU PF out of power. In response, the state has responded by deploying strategic defences to secure itself from the potential threats of being toppled from power. The paranoia of the ruling ZANU PF in the face of these destabilisation efforts is rooted in the experiences of other African liberation movements. The aggressive attitudes of the late former President, Cde Mugabe, towards the opposition must be understood in the context of the memory of the toppling of other African leaders, particularly Sekou Toure, the first President of Guinea in 1984. This was three years after Zimbabwe attained independence. In 1964, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania had been a victim of a coup attempt. In 1966, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana was aggressively removed from power. The precedence of the unconstitutional removal of progressive leaders from power in Africa must be recorded as one of the key factors which influenced what reactionary commentators have termed “regime survival” strategy.

Mugabe and the One-Party State

Until his exit, there was never a sincere proposition towards the establishment of a one-party state under Mugabe. First, the constitution guaranteed political pluralism and, at the same, time guaranteed free participation in the general election of 1985. This shows the unfettered existence of a multi-party system contrary to the alleged implementation of the one-party state policy. The call for a one-party state was an emotionally fixated position to challenge the internal contradictions which were profusely emerging, thanks to Mugabe’s nationalist counterparts. At the time, Nkomo was disgruntled that his sacrifices for the liberation of Zimbabwe did not land him in power in 1980. On the other hand, Tekere had risen as an immediate threat to ZANU PF’s political ambitions. The

public pronouncements on the lobby for a one-party particularly towards the ZANU PF congress of 1989 were premised on a punitive position to punish fellow counterparts who were deemed to have “sold out”. Therefore, at the time, the subject of the one-party state did not reflect a holistic proposed national trajectory. Edgar Tekere’s Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) had been formed in 1989 (as explained later in this chapter). In a bid to subdue its popularity, the disseminated position on the one-party state was a strategy to dissuade remnants of Tekere’s loyalists within ZANU PF from withdrawing their loyalties from the party. The main objective of the proclamation of the one-party state agenda was to cement ZANU PF’s internal unity in the face of potential fragmentation. There was also a need to send a clear message that outside ZANU PF there was no other political home. However, those analysing issues from a distance were too quick to assume that Zimbabwe was degenerating into an authoritarian state. The one-party state narrative was short-lived. The 1990 general election was open for all, and ZUM was one of the prominent participants in this election.

As such, it is, to a larger extent, incorrect for anyone to argue that ZANU PF has been less democratic due to its euphoric proposition for a one-party state after independence. Practically, there was pluralism, but it stands to be highlighted that Mugabe’s brutal reaction to opposition from his armed struggle allies might have emanated from a strong feeling of betrayal. The fear of being toppled by those he had deemed associates since the liberation struggle might have been uppermost in his mind. One cannot refute that Mugabe and Nkomo’s career paths took a contradictory turn after the 1963 ZAPU-ZANU split. But, even in their differences, Mugabe and Nkomo were united by the need to both fight for the liberation of Zimbabwe. At independence, the ambition for unity remained strong between these nationalists though both of them had to grapple with their respective self-interests at the time.

Again, Mugabe was aware of ZPRA’s military ability which dated back to the Wankie and Sipolilo Battles. The continued existence of ZAPU remained a threat to Mugabe’s administrative longevity. The “dissident” outbreak linked to ZPRA also created this paranoia, motivating the Government’s decision to neutralise ZAPU, and leading to the unfortunate

civil crisis witnessed after independence. As one would notice, before the signing of the Unity Accord, efforts were made to victimise some top ZAPU officials including the current Vice President, Cde Kembo Mohadi, Cde Angela Masuku the late Cde Sydney Malunga, Cde Ruth Chinamano, Cde Dumiso Dabengwa and Cde Welshman “MaWelsh” Mabheha, among others. Some ex-ZPRA officers in the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) had also been detained.

Mugabe was aware of the military and intelligence proficiency of ZAPU-aligned nationalists and former ZPRA officers. Therefore, he had to deploy excessive force to downplay cadres whom he deemed politically sophisticated as to challenge his totalising ambitions. This explains why, between 1985 and 1986, then President, Robert Mugabe deployed excessive attacks on senior ZAPU nationalists. In Lupane, Nkayi and Gwanda, ZAPU offices were shut down.

Others have argued that the threat of “dissidents” also led to Mugabe’s insecurities. Notwithstanding other serious factors to state security, the unleashing of violence was also caused by the desire to dampen ZAPU’s radicalism. The former President, Robert Mugabe, has been judged harshly for his decision to use the Fifth Brigade to tackle the dissident-induced disturbances. While excesses in violence and the consequent abuse of human rights were noted at the time, the prevailing trend of post-colonial instabilities elsewhere on the continent might have provoked Mugabe’s paranoia.

However, after this period of political crisis, the nationalists found common ground. The Unity Accord became the unifying agent towards nation-building and consolidating the nationalist movement’s points of convergence. Some sections of the academia and the left-wing have narrowly interpreted this as a strategy which was applied by ZANU PF towards the creation of a one-party state. This position negates that any phase of human conflict must culminate in a resolution. When we fought against colonialists we sought reconciliation. We had to negotiate and that was not a sign of weakness on the part of the nationalists. However, we had to concede to the given reality to build peace and set the modalities for a transition which was meant to preserve national interests.

It was only logically compelling for our people to be united after the *Gukurahundi* disturbances. However, today we have some politicians who are constantly bringing up this subject to validate the myth of the creation of a one-party state by ZANU PF and, in the process, excessively project ZAPU's victimhood.

Surprisingly, the politicians who were in ZAPU and were direct victims of state violence at the time conceded to the rationale of reconciliation and peace-building. As mentioned earlier, the current Vice President, Cde Kembo Mohadi and Cde Angeline Masuku are among some of the surviving and leading political figures who had the first-hand experience of the violence which was targeting ex-ZAPU officials. Instead of choosing to fight back, they chose national unity over vengeance.

At some point, Dr Joshua Nkomo had to flee into exile, but he opted for unity with his estranged ally and took part in the signing of the Unity Accord in 1987. The Unity Accord was a restoration of the principle of regional balance which served as a bedrock of nationalism. Courtesy of this settlement, Zimbabwe entered into a new phase of peace-building, national healing and reconciliation. Indeed, the Unity Accord reaffirmed the political brotherhood of the gallant nationalists, our liberation Cde Robert Mugabe and Father Zimbabwe, Cde Joshua Nkomo.

The Permanent Contribution of the Unity Accord to Democratisation and Nation-Building

The Unity Accord is an enduring agreement which directed the reversal of the catastrophic effects of the colonial reproduction of violence. The point of consensus derived from this agreement reaffirms the role of our struggle for liberation as a force for decisive nationalism to fight for Black liberation and the unity of all Zimbabweans. The colonial reproduction of violence saw our people becoming victims of Western hegemonic tensions which were fought on the African soil. Before the maturation of our democracy and the full attainment of our independence, Zimbabwe became a victim of the post-colonial dilemma of violence. At the time, Western Europe, the UK in particular and North America did not react to the crisis in Zimbabwe. Britain's role as the transitional custodian of the

newly independent state was invisible in this whole political chaos. It did not intervene because the White minority's security was still guaranteed at the time. Meanwhile, the trampling of human rights was justified because the effects of this instability did not hurt White capital.

The Lancaster Conference reconciliation policy secured the liberties of the remaining Rhodesians. Today the same Global North powers are at the forefront questioning what they regard as a deterioration in constitutionalism, good governance and protection of human rights. However, when *Gukurahundi* was taking place and the potential spread of communism through ZAPU was crushed, the global imperial powers deliberately ignored a clear and undisputed case of human rights abuse. The concealed influence of colonial interests in the construction of post-colonial violence is ignored. All these cases of violence which have befallen us have been used to find justifications to encourage disunity. Zimbabwe, like many other African states that have undergone civil unrest, has been conferred the typical "failed" post-colonial status. The non-specific and problematic universal characterisation of state failure attributed to Zimbabwe is a construction of neo-imperial hegemony which is sustained by oligopoly capital, colonial scholarships, regime change civil society and human rights activists propelling the fight against nationalist movements all over Africa.

The beginning of the struggle against Rhodesia in the late 50s was a product of collective national consciousness. The mobilisation of cadres for the armed struggle was based on the African emotion to dismantle the colonial system. Tags of ethnic belonging were buried in the assumed identity of resistance and ideological intention to liberate Zimbabwe. Subconsciously, regional balancing became the pivot of nationalist cadreship. Consequently, the Unity Accord gestured the rebirth of collective nationhood epitomised in PF-ZAPU and ZANU's engagement in the armed struggle as unifying agents of the decolonisation project

Today, ZANU PF carries the obligation of further fighting imperialism in all its forms of modern manifestation. Now the Party has the mandate to disentangle every arsenal designed to downplay our history to appease the ghosts of coloniality. This determination to build Zimbabwe remains

a pivotal source of our cohesion and shared national aspirations beyond all the frantic efforts to dissuade us from uniting beyond our party lines.

The Hypocrisy of Western Democracy

Years later after the signing of the Unity Accord, Morgan Tsvangirai formed MDC with the help of Western powers. The unfortunate attack on Tsvangirai and his party attracted a confetti of international human rights accolades for him and his fellow neo-liberal reactionaries. Surprisingly, Joshua Nkomo, who suffered more persecution from the state since independence, was never afforded the same honour by the colonial powers. Likewise, Cde Kembo Mohadi, Cde Angelina Masuku, Cde Sydney Malunga and many other ZAPU cadres who suffered the violence of the state were never accorded the same global recognition and accolades which some fly-by-night human-right defenders are getting now. The ZAPU victims of political violence, including those who were massacred during the *Gukurahundi*, were not given the global attention which individuals like Itai Dzamara, whose alleged disappearance is still rooted in mystery, are receiving. This exposes the insincerity of this whole democracy agenda as a tool by the West to maintain its interference with our domestic affairs as a means of securing political-economic domination in Zimbabwe.

Today, the remembrance of *Gukurahundi* is selectively manipulated by sponsored activists and neo-imperial political grandstanders to advance a memory of dismemberment. All these institutions preserve a clear agenda of constructing the idea of failed African Governments which must be replaced by more market-oriented regimes with the capacity to attract Western direct investments and access to colonial credit lines. This explains the numerous visits by the MDC-Alliance to the American Congress to consolidate the ZIDERA sanctions. The same neo-colonial agents push the good governance, and human and property rights narrative is a smokescreen for the fight against the agrarian reform. This reaffirms their mandate to maintain the economic disparities invented by colonialism. The Zimbabwean agrarian revolution continues to attract wholesale hostilities from the West as a result of the reactionary efforts of entities like MDC-Alliance.

After the land reform, efforts were deployed to erase the philosophical essence of national remembrances. Our Independence Day, Heroes-Defence Forces and Unity Day were relegated to mere partisan commemorative events by anti-establishment actors. This has served well towards the trivialisation of our national history. For those pushing this agenda, the key aim is to erase the legacy of the nationalist movement from the liberation memory. This has worked well in creating an ahistorical validation of the pro-settler opposition since the days of the late Morgan Tsvangirai. Today, his successor, Nelson Chamisa, has followed his precedence of giving allegiance to imperial powers in pushing the MDC agenda.

Joshua Nkomo and Edgar Tekere: Champions of Post-Independence Democracy?

Whilst Nkomo and Tekere must be commended for rising to challenge Robert Mugabe's rule in the 80s, the point must be buttressed that the two nationalists contested for power out of a shared attitude of entitlement to the outcomes of the liberation struggle. It must be understood that their post-independence political victimhood, which became a source of their protagonist representation, was part of the wider self-centred contestations for power and contradictions within the nationalist movements. The role of Joshua Nkomo and Edgar Tekere in the post-independence power contestations can be historically aligned to the roots of factionalism, dating back to the formation of ZANU in 1963. In 1970, ZAPU was faced with internal conflicts which almost destabilised the morale of the combatants. In 1975, elitist disagreements within ZANU led to the Mgagao Declaration which saw Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole being stripped of his executive powers in ZANU. Thereafter, he formed his ZANU-Ndonga political outfit. After independence, ZANU-Ndonga existed as a competitor of ZANU PF. Before the Unity Accord of 1987, Nkomo's ZAPU was a more formidable ZANU opponent. Likewise, the formation of Zimbabwe United Movement (ZUM) in 1989 after the expulsion of Tekere from ZANU PF was a personality move which was not different from the formation of Sithole's ZANU-Ndonga outfit. A greater part of academia has ignored this motivation. The short elasticity of the prominent anti-ZANU PF tradition emanating from intra-nationalist

rivals can be noted through the negotiation for a political alliance which gave birth to the Unity Accord and the consequent birth of ZANU PF. Likewise, in 2005, Edgar Tekere expressed interest to run for Senate leading to his readmission in ZANU PF in 2006. However, in 2008, Tekere was among the lead election campaigners for Simba Makoni's presidential candidature against Mugabe. Tekere's tactical allegiance to ZANU PF expresses the extent to which his contest against Mugabe was primarily based on self-positioning as a disgruntled political figure.

Therefore, the trend of self-disassociation to the Mugabe-led ZANU by Nkomo and Tekere after independence points to the extent to which the democracy question in Zimbabwe has also revolved around the self-interests of towering nationalists. The fact that these two nationalists who were opposed to Mugabe later found a home in ZANU PF shows the ultimate primacy of liberation values over personal differences. Where proximity to the liberation processes had served as a claim to power, it became the basis of unity.

As indicated in Chapter 5, ZANU PF had a more open democracy compared to ZAPU and it was the receptiveness of cadres in ZANU PF which caused me to seek full membership in the party after independence. I am aware that many have questioned why I crossed over to ZANU before the Unity Accord. The answer is simple: ZANU had a more democratic culture and there was a clear meritocratic system in the ruling party compared to ZAPU. In ZAPU, Nkomo used a head-hunting approach for senior appointments. Even in the NDP era, most influential positions were held by nationalists from Nkomo's Kalanga ethnic extraction.

Above all, I still maintain the view that, regardless of Nkomo and Tekere's pursuit of self-repositioning as active political actors since the time of the armed liberation, their challenge to Mugabe facilitated a healthy democratic culture in Zimbabwe. However, the argument raised by regime change apologists inclined to the ritual authoritarian characterisation of post-independence politics is misplaced. Instead, there is a need to locate the input of these two nationalists in the struggle for democracy separately. One also needs to situate the gaps of their respective contributions in birthing a democratic political space in Zimbabwe after

1980. This is one area which our political analysis has missed over the years. The situational proximity of Joshua Nkomo and Edgar Tekere to mainstream nationalism and their political seclusion in post-independent politics must be thoroughly examined.

Ideological Wiring of the Anti-Colonial Movement

The nationalist anti-colonial movement in modern Zimbabwe is directly intertwined to the ideological efforts and political charisma of Cde Joshua Nkomo. Dr Nkomo's role in the anti-Rhodesian struggle resides in the ambit of the broad-based agenda linked to the total liberation of Africa. In essence, Nkomo's legacy is located in the global scope of the pan-Africanist political pragmatism dating back mid-1940s. The birth of Joshua Nkomo's political career dovetailed with the unstoppable momentum of Africa's total decolonisation mission. To this end, pan-Africanism, as embodied in the leadership credence of Nkomo (and his fellow liberation counterparts home and abroad), serves a counter-hegemonic ideology to imperialist domination. In political terms, Joshua Nkomo epitomises the inception of the organic liberation genes to Zimbabwe's contemporary national question.

Inside Zimbabwe's Liberation Struggle

Joshua Nkomo's early popularity was drawn from his distinguished labour movement exploits dating back to the 1945 workers-led civil disobedience initiatives. In 1948, Nkomo was voted President of the Railway African Workers Union which coordinated major labour riots in Rhodesia. These urban riots were the foundation of massive sabotage activities which set the cause of nationalist resistance ablaze. Later on, Joshua Nkomo was to be a leading brand of Zimbabwe's decolonisation under the banner of African nationalism. This is why he is celebrated as "Father Zimbabwe". Even after his 1980 electoral defeat, the Mugabe-led Government invited Nkomo to be part of the new administration. This was in the spirit of the revolutionary solidarity shared by these two late founding fathers of Zimbabwe in the pre-independence era.

In 1957, Nkomo was elected President of the SRANC. During this period, nationalism was beginning to assume an institutional route. The African

race question and, inseparably, the class question became the conduit of nationalist mobilisation. At this particular point, the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 was being enhanced through the Land Husbandry Act of 1957 which deepened racial land access segregation and animal destocking. The Land Husbandry Act coincided with the peak of the anti-colonial movement, which at this point was gaining growing support. The land question automatically became the rallying point of this newly pro-African political movement. Based on this, Nkomo's involvement in nationalist politics can be largely attributed to the need for a democratic alternative to settler politics in Southern Rhodesia. The Africans' demand for democracy was tied to the cause of dismantling imperial economic domination. This explains why the proposed model of contemporary democracy is attached to neo-liberal property rights and encouraging free-market economies which in turn suppress the fundamentals of the third-world's economic liberation. Nkomo's involvement in the democracy struggle was linked not only to the distribution of power but also to the fair distribution of the means of production. This explains his trade-unionist entry-point within the liberation movement.

The SRANC was banned in February 1959 following the massive threat it posed to the colonial administration. This saw the formation of the NDP in January 1960. At this point, nationalist politics had reached a high actualisation stage. There was an accelerated turn towards deep anti-colonial consciousness. Due to his clear track record as a forerunner to nationalist politics, Nkomo assumed the top post in the NDP right up to 9 December 1961 when it was banned. In the same month, ZAPU was formed and Nkomo became the president of that political outfit. ZAPU existed right into the beginning of the armed struggle. ZAPU's emphatic use of the name "Zimbabwe" marked a significant and defining point to envisioning the birth of a nation independent from Rhodesia. ZAPU was involved in both the political and military activities which fast-tracked the Lancaster Conference and later on Zimbabwe's independence.

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ZAPU was involved in both the political and military activities which fast-tracked the Lancaster Conference and later on Zimbabwe’s independence. At independence, Joshua Nkomo’s ZAPU was a major competitor to ZANU PF. Nkomo’s determination for ZAPU’s political competitiveness in Zimbabwe kept power contestations alive after independence. ZAPU’s role as a purely nationalist opposition was critical as it ensured that the incumbent maintained the ideals of the revolution. As already highlighted, the continued persecution of ZAPU cadres before the signing of the Unity Accord in 1987 shows that the Government met defiance. After all, the fact that ZPRA and ZANLA had fought from different fronts for the attainment of democracy was enough to create the basis for a multi-party system and political pluralism in independent Zimbabwe.

Edgar Tekere and the Struggle for Democracy in Zimbabwe

Edgar Tekere is a veteran nationalist whose contribution to the birth of Zimbabwe’s independence dates back to his bona fide membership to ZAPU in 1961 after the NDP was banned. In 1963, Tekere was among the prominent nationalists who left ZAPU to form the then ZANU. He was also part of the group of nationalists who were viewed as subversive elements in Rhodesia. In 1964, he was arrested for political activism and ZANU was banned. Tekere was imprisoned for 10 years in Hwa Hwa Prison with the late Cde Mugabe.

The two were released from prison in 1975 and crossed into Mozambique. The two nationalists’ shared experience of incarceration strengthened their bond. Their fight for democracy had been well cemented by their confrontation with imperial forces since the days of organised radical

civil-disobedience initiatives. Their determination to change the status quo was much clearer.

In Mozambique, Tekere was central in reorganising ZANLA's military structure. It was during this period that the ZANLA combat activity had reached an ultimate turning point which fast-tracked the need for negotiated settlement at Lancaster. Tekere was on the forefront of ZANU's military diplomacy, particularly in the communist bloc where he was soliciting funding of the guerrilla warfare. It was during this period that Tekere committed himself to seek weapons for ZANLA. He managed to cross ranks from the military to political leadership as he emerged ZANU's Secretary-General in 1977 (a post I hold in ZANU PF today).

Tekere was also a leading figure in ZANU PF's election campaign and its consequent victory in 1980 election. At independence, Tekere was appointed the Minister of Labour and Manpower Planning. However, Tekere was abruptly ejected from the cabinet and his post as ZANU PF's Secretary for Administration after he was implicated in a murder case. Around 1987, Tekere resurfaced as a sharp critic of the ruling ZANU PF. His relevance was propped by the wide prevalence of corruption which he vehemently castigated. This was at a time when several corruption scandals headlined the news namely:

1986: National Railways Housing Scandal

1987: Zisco Steel Blast Furnace Scandal

1987: Air Zimbabwe Fokker Scandal

1988: Willowgate Scandal

In the context of these public scandals, Tekere gained prominence as a sharp critic of the state. In October 1988, Tekere was expelled from ZANU PF. Thereafter, he moved on to establish his opposition political party, ZUM. In the 1990 election, he contested for the presidency against Mugabe, his long-time ally since the liberation war. The state responded by suppressing Tekere's political activities. Tekere got just over 16 per cent of the vote in the 1990 election and ZUM was eroded from Zimbabwe's political landscape.

It has been argued, as has always been the case, that this election was marred with numerous irregularities. However, beyond the ritual argument of electoral fraud, Tekere's campaign did not have a competitive alternative to that of ZANU PF. ZUM's election campaign focused more on disseminating the pitfalls of ZANU PF, particularly how its top leadership was heavily engrossed in corrupt activities. The ZUM campaign only conveyed Tekere's disgruntlement with ZANU PF which, in his view, had betrayed the values of the liberation struggle to which he was a significant player. The major contradiction of his criticism of ZANU PF's ideological standing was largely flawed considering that ZUM had established political cooperation with Smith's Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe (CAZ). Tekere exposed himself as a colonially entangled leader of the opposition. As a result, ZUM's campaign message did not address the colonial land imbalances. Instead, on the economic front, the policy prospectus of ZUM centred more on pursuing Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).

What Democracy and Whose Democracy?

Democracy is an embodiment of ideas which guide how power relates to those who legitimise it. In this case, power refers to the right to govern which is derived from an electoral mandate. Therefore, democracy facilitates the creation of a system of power which should be answerable to the aspirations of the people. African democracy should be designed such that it responds to the historical factors which gave rise to the need to fight colonialism. Zimbabwean democracy cannot be expected to mimic the democracy of America, Asia or European. Our democracy should be grounded on our immediate forces of social change. Zimbabwe's democracy must not be confined to the liberal enterprise. Instead, it must be an agency for ensuring mass economic empowerment in as much as it encourages mass political participation. This approach must ensure that institutions of colonial capital do not decide how we should be running our politics and our economy as was the case immediately after independence. The spirit of democracy must be kept alive to ensure that the unity of our people is preserved. Our democracy must be defined by our political morality. We need Zimbabwean democracy for Zimbabweans, not American or British democracy for Zimbabwe.

Joshua Nkomo and the Liberation Footpath

In his entire career, the late Vice President, Dr Joshua Nkomo, proved himself to be a towering political figure and a celebrated nation-builder. I am sure he would have been happy to witness the decentralisation of Independence celebrations. The decision taken by President Emmerson Mnangagwa's administration to devolve national commemorations proves the current administration's commitment to embracing all Zimbabweans as benefactors of the liberation struggle. The reorganised celebration of our Independence Day to accommodate all provinces as hosts of this national event deeply resonates with the pluralist political culture which was born out of Joshua Nkomo's fidelity to the ideological bonds of unity and equality of all citizens of this land. President Mnangagwa has aligned his style of governance to the anti-colonial philosophy which is inseparable from the legacy of Father Zimbabwe. Through this experience, the premise of legacy restoration which conceived the New Dispensation in 2017 becomes overwhelmingly floodlit. The new ritualisation of Independence Day celebrations hardly two years after the birth of the Second Republic must not be isolated from the nationwide renaming of our streets. This is proof that the Mnangagwa administration is committed to marrying the present with our perennial liberation aspirations. These key national aspirations are derived from the dedicated sacrifices of our liberation doyens, especially Joshua Mqabuko Nyongolo Nkomo.

I authoritatively connect this current political development to the late nationalist's leadership qualities, given my close personal relationship with Father Zimbabwe. This position is also supported by the exploits of his long service to the cause of Zimbabwe's liberation which is

known to all. In taking stock of Nkomo's liberation credentials and post-independence contribution to nation-building, I do not intend to rewrite history, but this is my distinctive way of also retracing how Cde Nkomo inspired the evolution of my own political career. Having joined the struggle from the ZPRA front and acquired my foundational ideological mentorship from ZAPU, it only makes sense to explain how Nkomo's political personality was voluntarily invested in the making of my political self. I was privileged with close access to Nkomo as his protégé. In all my professional interactions with him, Nkomo was a father and a teacher to me. I am forever grateful for his generous investment not just into my political but also into my private life.

Mqabuko and the Making of the Nation

The independence of Zimbabwe cannot be discussed without acknowledging the centrifugal role of Joshua Nkomo in the fight against colonialism. His towering role as a nation-builder belongs atop our national liberation and entire post-independence politics. Therefore, my humble contribution to the freedom of Zimbabwe is directly linked to the African nationalist trajectory which was conceived and put into action by the late Father Zimbabwe, Joshua Mqabuko Nyongolo Nkomo. His role as the founder of African nationalism in Zimbabwe, as well as his travails in the face of post-independence disturbances and, later, his resurgence as a beacon of national unity depicts the fluidity of his illustrious political career.

In Rhodesia, Nkomo spent more than a decade in political detention and after independence, he was in exile too. This time he was being "protected" by the same colonial powers which were involved in underhand politics to ensure that his links to the Soviet Union were utterly dismembered. As if that is not enough, today some imperialist reactionaries have appropriated his legacy to foster the polarisation of our people. We have seen an increased reactionary academic emphasis about Nkomo and ZAPU's political victimhood to cement notions of disunity in Zimbabwe.

The recent fashionable turn to ZAPU/ZPRA memorialisation by

imperialist opportunists has been exploited to historicise Nkomo as a perpetual victim of the pre-Unity Accord political disturbances. This narrow location of Joshua Nkomo in history has been used to engender ethnic tensions and project Zimbabwe as a “failed state”, yet it is known that Nkomo was the core master-builder of the Unity Accord signed in 1987. Before independence, the nationalist movement was born out of regional balancing. Even after the ZAPU split of 1963, leading to the birth of ZANU as a breakaway entity in the fight against colonialism, and the 1971 internal tensions in ZAPU which led to the rise of FROLIZI, Nkomo embraced the idea of the amalgamation of ZAPU and ZANU in 1976 hence the creation of the Patriotic Front. The Patriotic Front spearheaded the peace conciliations right up to the Lancaster Conference. Without doubt, Nkomo valued national interest over personal ambition.

Through the mirror of Nkomo’s political journey, it is easy to situate the path we have traversed as a nation in the pursuit of our liberation. It is also through Nkomo’s giant nationalist steps, in the face of his entanglement in the race and ethnic schisms of Zimbabwean belonging from which we can evaluate the achievements of Pan-African nationalism in Zimbabwe. Significantly, his praise name, “Father Zimbabwe” benchmarks the authenticity of his credentials in contributing to the realisation of a united Zimbabwe. As his student, my commitment to politics has remained founded on this virtue.

My involvement in the liberation struggle was directly inspired by the foundation which Nkomo had set through the establishment of SRANC. The acceleration of the fight against colonialism then compelled me to join both ZPRA and ZAPU in 1967. Mqabuko presided over these two liberation institutions. Through the internal support which he attracted for the cause of our freedom, I was trained in military reconnaissance leading to my pro-active role in the Wankie and Sipolilo Battles.

A Champion of Social Justice and a Nationalist

In socio-economic and political terms, Joshua Nkomo was a product of an oppressive and dispossessing colonial system. His family, just like many other African families, was a victim of discriminatory agrarian

policies which triggered the fight for freedom. Therefore, Nkomo's anti-imperialist stance resonated with the existing conditions of colonial repression. In the same vein, nationalist mobilisation was grounded in the African nationalist-driven stubborn determination to undo colonial domination. The quest for equality between the oppressed majority and the ruling minority became the rallying point for the political reform which Nkomo was advocating for.

The colonial administration dismissed his political reform advocacy. In response, Joshua Nkomo took a leading role in organising the labour movement in Bulawayo to redress capitalist injustices. Between 1945 and 1948, Nkomo became the active forerunner of mass labour protests with the immense support of Africans serving in the Rhodesian Railways headquartered in Bulawayo. His continued fight against the disenfranchisement of the African workers mapped his sphere of immense political influence. After engaging with Thompson Samukange (a Methodist cleric in Makokoba) in 1952, resulting in his full membership to the SRANC, Nkomo rose to prominence as the President of this political organisation in 1957. Nkomo was deputised by James Robert Dambaza Chikerema who was the then President of the Harare City Youth League. Chikerema supported the amalgamation of both SRANC and the Harare City Youth League. Nkomo's SRANC presidency coincided with the independence of Ghana in March 1957. As a result, he transformed the social rights advocacy of the SRANC and gave it a radical political outlook. From 1957, the Nkomo-led SRANC began championing the One Man, One Vote principle which became the initial rallying point for nationalist mobilisation. At this point, the nationalist movement was beginning to assert its existence as a political force worth the envy and agitation of the colonial regime. This resulted in the banning of the SRANC in 1959, leading to the birth of the NDP.

The formation of the NDP intensified the defiant calls for democratisation and constitutional reform to pave way for the inclusion of African nationalist interests in the governance of Southern-Rhodesia. This resulted in the British Constitutional Conference of 1961 and it was resolved that the regime will open up 15 of 65 seats for occupation by the nationalists. This arrangement compromised the possibilities of fast-tracking majority rule.

As such, Nkomo's inner circle was offended by this decision. However, his action was based on his futuristic ambitions for inclusive participation of the nationalist movement in decision-making. Britain declared that it would remain distant from the internal affairs of Southern Rhodesia.

After the prominent riots which led to Nkomo and other nationalists' arrests, the People's Caretakers Council was formed to serve as the face of ZAPU's banished political activity. While in incarceration beginning in 1964, Nkomo kept his hopes high that the country was going to be free from colonial rule. The mobilisation on the ground and the ongoing military operations at the time prove that Nkomo led the armed struggle from prison. This also proves the magnitude of his charisma. For 11 years, ZAPU's faith in Nkomo was not lost. On the other hand, he was optimistic in the people's victory. After his release from prison, in 1974, Nkomo was adamant to seeing our people becoming masters of their destiny. A year later after his release from prison, I met him in person for the first time in Victoria Falls.

Coming to Know Umdala Wethu

The stride set by Nkomo in the fight against colonialism made him a hero to both my generation and that of our parents. Today, his indelible legacy informs our people's quest for self-determination. As I was growing up, Nkomo was revered as an unparalleled liberator. The people affectionately adored Nkomo, hence the reference to him as *Umdala* (father-figure). After independence, he was then referred to as *Umdala Wethu* literally translated as Our Old Man. Beyond the commemorative attribute of his fatherhood to the entire nation, Nkomo became a surrogate father to those of us who served in various ranks of the armed struggle. Having lost my father at the age of 7 and joined the struggle at the age of 16, the veteran nationalists who groomed me and my other contemporaries assumed a fatherly role for me. Subsequently, Nkomo, as the father of nationalist resistance, became an arch-father because his charisma permeated into all the operations of the liberation struggle.

In my entire childhood, Nkomo towered as a defining symbol of liberation for the oppressed. He was a father to all the subjugated. He was indeed

an endearing character, and his name was endlessly mentioned in my own family home and the whole community. Like any other African born in Rhodesia, my political socialisation was grounded on the racially designed oppression of our people. By the time I was mature enough to read between good and evil, the only existing institution which was opposed to the racist regime was ZAPU. It was in the values of ZAPU where I initially came face to face with the vision which Joshua Nkomo had for a free Zimbabwe. My second encounter with Joshua Nkomo, the idea, was when I joined ZPRA. In ZPRA I was taught patriotism, vigilance and loyalty to principle.

Again, it was in ZPRA where my anti-colonial ideological resolve was established and cemented. To this day, I am adamantly opposed to any type of oppression and all prejudices which facilitate inequality and dehumanisation. It was in the struggle, where I was humanised and in turn ideologically equipped to rehumanise my people from White minority rule. In ZAPU, I was taught the cardinal principle of reclaiming the stolen. I was taught to fight to defend the wealth of our nation. Our land had been looted, mineral wealth plundered and our humanity desecrated to ensure that we only looked at ourselves as objects of labour for colonial capital. We were also reduced to subjects of colonial cultures and beliefs systems at the expense of our norms and cultural values. Therefore, when Nkomo conceptualised the roadmap to African colonial resistance, his status of fatherhood to our right to be free was established.

At the level of the Black rehumanisation agenda, Nkomo's ZAPU and ZPRA became ideological proxies of deracialising humanity and breaking the barriers of man-made prejudices. His epoch-making contribution to the struggle for liberation signified the re-ordering of society towards equality. He challenged the racially defined terms of power and being. The creed of the struggle as defined by Nkomo and his imaginations for a free Zimbabwe entailed the elimination of racial degeneracies and the privileges of the colonial regime. At the same time, ZAPU's nationwide mobilisation capacity became the conduit for dismantling ethnic essentialism which the colonialist regime effectively deployed in the interest of the divide-and-rule strategy.

Beyond my emotive and ideological connection to Nkomo's cause, I met him for the first time in August 1975 during the Victoria Falls Peace Talks. Meeting Nkomo in person in 1975 at this most decisive point of our struggle was quite fulfilling to my political journey which had begun in 1967. I was among the cadres who met Nkomo in 1975 in August. This critical point of peace negotiation was the initial roadmap to the détente period. ZAPU, ZANU, FROLIZI and Abel Muzorewa's United African National Congress (UANC) were represented at this conference. The late Rhodesian leader Ian Smith was the head of this political dialogue. The conference aimed at soliciting a middle ground for the nationalists and the Smith regime to end the war. No logical consensus was reached at this conference, but for me, the most important thing was getting the direct opportunity to meet with this man whose fatherhood to the struggle motivated us in the trenches. Seeing him for the first time in Victoria Falls was quite fulfilling. The platform signalled how much the colonialists were conceding to our determined fight for freedom.

Geneva Conference: Nkomo's Militant Diplomacy Revealed

A year after the Victoria Falls Talks, Nkomo's next venture into dialogue was the Geneva Conference of October 1976. The main objective of the Geneva Conference was to set the transitional modalities from the Smith regime towards a nationalist-led Government. The issue of constitutional reform was of higher priority in the agenda of this conference. During the Geneva conference, Nkomo was the principal representative of the nationalist demands and submissions. This conference earned him a high diplomatic standing as it marked a critical point in the internationalisation of Zimbabwe's liberation from colonialism. At the time this conference was held I was still a student at Evelyn Hone College. From the other side of the divide, Ndabaningi Sithole was toppled from ZANU presidency and replaced by charismatic Robert Gabriel Mugabe by 1977.

Other key delegates at the conference included Robert Mugabe of ZANU, James Chikerema of FROLIZI and Abel Muzorewa of UANC. These nationalist political leaders shared common ground on their demand for independence, but this does not erase the fact that each one of them had competing interests to secure the respective relevance of

their political organisations. The platform offered an opportunity for the nationalists to market their contested interests and market their respective approaches to the decolonisation question. This platform also aided the colonialists to create divisions among the nationalists. Regardless of their already existent points of dissent, ZAPU and ZANU formed the “Patriotic Front” (PF). Through the Patriotic Front, Nkomo and Mugabe resolved to suspend their differences in advancing a single and solid approach to making transitional demands to Britain which was brokering the negotiations.

The PF also acquired its legitimacy from the OAU by July 1977 following the 14th OAU Ordinary Session of Heads of State. The resolve to have the Patriotic Front as an anti-colonial organ of transitional negotiation was also noted after independence in response to the neo-colonial post-independence instabilities. Therefore, the philosophy of national unity which framed the personality of Nkomo’s leadership style is not only noted in 1987, but it is a common feature of his leadership style traceable throughout the liberation struggle. To a greater extent, the establishment of the PF and its role as a negotiation vehicle for ZAPU and ZANU depict how Nkomo’s leadership was not primarily Pan-Africanist. Instead, Nkomo acquitted himself as an internationalist.

During the Geneva Conference Nkomo’s consistency on the One Man, One Vote principle became the central agenda of the negotiation. This transitional requisite which he mainly called for was in sync with the anticipated goal of the disenfranchised masses. This proves that even though at a military level the nationalists had outmanoeuvred the Rhodesian Front (RF), there was room for diplomatic engagement. Again, this proves beyond measure that Nkomo was both a militant and diplomatic strategist of the struggle. Beyond military acumen, Nkomo also used diplomacy as an agent for political engagement. At this point, he was willing to negotiate peace in a colonially set dialogue though he had the means to pursue robust military action. The period between 1975 and 1979 was reflective of Joshua Nkomo and other nationalists’ tilting towards diplomacy. However, he was vocal in dismissing the idea of proportional representation which was being mainly advanced in favour of imperialists. This explains why Nkomo and Mugabe emerged united

although the Geneva Conference did not yield the anticipated political transition. Also noteworthy is that the PF was short-lived, an outcome of the concerted efforts to divide the focus of the nationalists. The Geneva talks collapsed because of the contradictions between the hardliners and moderates.

The Lancaster Conference and the Build-Up to Nkomo's Demise

In 1979, Nkomo's ZAPU and Mugabe's ZANU delegations under the PF banner took part in the final push for diplomatic transition at the Lancaster Conference held in London. This roadmap towards the election which brought Zimbabwe's majority rule followed a ceasefire proposal by Ian Smith's Government between 10 September and 21 December 1979. Britain, the USA and the Frontline States took part in this conference. The conference's proceedings were chaired by Lord Carrington, a trusted British foreign policy strategist at the time.

While Nkomo was the centre of attraction in the Geneva negotiation, Mugabe seems to have attracted some inconceivable popularity during the Lancaster Conference. Mugabe's fame at the Lancaster Conference was a culmination of the divisive tactics deployed by the imperialist forces since the Geneva negotiations. However, the proposal for equal and universal suffrage was at the centre of the conference's deliberations. Britain's preference for Mugabe was mainly caused by Nkomo's proximity to Russia which had aided ZPRA's military success. Consequently, on the part of the British and the US, it was strategic to make Mugabe the heir of the post-independent state. Marginalising Nkomo was strategic in ensuring the obliteration of Russia's political influence in Southern Africa. ZAPU's post-Lancaster triumph entailed victory of Soviet hegemony in independent Zimbabwe and the region at large. The peripheral placing of Nkomo during the Lancaster negotiation became the major starting point of his political demise. Nkomo's diplomatic purging was working in the interest of the Cold War situation at the time in favour of British interests.

The diplomatic decapitation of Nkomo was engineered by the British in a bid to have absolute control of the post-independence transitional

process without Russia's antagonising interferences. The British had direct economic interests to secure in post-independence Zimbabwe. A political environment which could sustain colonial economic interests needed to be created. Having Nkomo in power threatened the West's neo-colonial ambitions because his loyalties were more inclined to Russia – a direct enemy of Britain and its ally, the U.S, at the time. Resultantly, the PF had to be tactically split leading to create a colonially determined outcome of the road to Zimbabwe's independence.

During the preparations for the Lancaster negotiations, it is said that Nkomo ignored the guidance from ZPRA's command structure not to take part in the Lancaster Conference. It was our view in the military that ZPRA had outdone Smith's forces and it was only logical for war to be continued with no retreat as this was the only justified means to seize power. It is also believed that Nkomo's decision to take part in Lancaster Conference was largely driven by the advice he was receiving from some Whites who were perceived to be misleading him into political oblivion. Therefore, ZAPU's participation in the Lancaster Conference seemed more politically correct in the eyes of those in the political strata, but the military front had a different view altogether.

Moreover, the exclusion of Russia as an interested stakeholder in the transitional roadmap set at the Lancaster Conference was indicative of Britain and America's monopolistic determination to shape Zimbabwe's independence politics. Key African countries which had assisted both ZANLA and ZPRA in the execution of the armed struggle were excluded in the Lancaster arrangement. This exposed Nkomo to more isolation considering his feared links to Russia. Automatically, this placed ZANU at an advantageous position, though Tongogara was on record for recommending a united approach to engaging the colonial powers whose strategy to divide the PF seemed well-calculated. Nkomo decided to participate in the Lancaster Conference against the advice which he had received from ZAPU's lifelong Russian allies. Nkomo's decision also served as a swipe to ZPRA commanders' instruction to him not to participate in the Lancaster talks.

The friction between the military and Nkomo's political decision

precipitated more internal contradictions between the combatant forces and those at the height of political decision-making. The military remained radically defiant to negotiation whilst Nkomo became a victim of the political limelight which was constructed for him since the Geneva Conference days. This explains why in the fast-tracked flow of events towards the 1980 election Nkomo was isolated since his party was linked to potential post-independence Soviet hegemony which threatened the interests of Anglo-American powers. Some in the military ranks especially the Late Lookout Masuku felt betrayed when Nkomo decided to take part in the Lancaster Conference which was perceived as a self-created onslaught for ZAPU. It is also alleged that Josiah Tongogara's insistence on the need to maintain the PF compelled Nkomo's dependence on collective negotiation. As such, his close allies in ZPRA viewed Nkomo as more dependent on the advice of outsiders than his close military staff and Russian counterparts. As warned by the Russians and his top military men, it turned out that Nkomo's Lancaster participation lacked strategic calculation. All forces at play during this conference were working to his disadvantage.

After excesses of infiltration and divisions, ZANU reconvened after the Lancaster and broke-away from the PF arrangement ahead of the 1980 election. The Lancaster Conference only managed to produce a Constitution which determined the path for universal suffrage and the subsequent independence of Zimbabwe. A major achievement of the Lancaster Conference in preserving the interests of Britain and America was the outwitting of Nkomo. The second goal of this conference was to reproduce the West's hegemony through the divide-and-rule strategy which left the PF fragmented and fragile. In the 1980 election, ZANU had a majority of 57 seats of the 80 Common roll seats. ZAPU only had 20 seats mainly in the Midlands and Matabeleland provinces. However, ZAPU was invited into a coalition Government.

At that particular point, it was clear that ZAPU had lost absolute national traction as its political presence was more in Matebeleland and Midlands. The Mugabe-led ZANU had not only acquired diplomatic enabled legitimacy at Lancaster House, but it had also proved to be the more popular party in 1980. The regional redefinition of the nationalist

movements outside their erstwhile PF arrangement of 1976 carried the possibilities of future conflict. In no time, the post-independence elation was terminated through *Gukurahundi*, a dark chapter which marked neo-colonial triumph.

From ZAPU to ZANU PF

Robert Mugabe's electoral popularity in 1980 only proved that the future of Zimbabwean politics resided in ZANU. The coalition government which was created after the then ZANU had a majority in parliament after the 1980 election was a progressive rewinding course to the spirit of the Patriotic Front which was established in 1976. Moreover, the pre-1963 fraternity of the nationalist organs was reaffirmed. However, the fault lines of the Lancaster compromise became the agent of conflict and disintegration.

Having noted the Lancaster blunders and calculated the possible scenarios, I decided to join ZANU after independence. To some this has been viewed as a great betrayal to ZAPU and Nkomo in particular. However, what is unknown to many is that Nkomo welcomed my decision to cross floors to ZANU. He did not take offence in this decision. Nkomo himself conceded to the given reality that the future of Zimbabwean politics was in ZANU. The Unity Accord facilitated embracement of cooperation between the two nationalist movements. As a result, ZANU PF was then born at the emotive nation-building directive of the Unity Accord.

The fact that ZANU PF is still in power to this day and Nkomo's ZAPU is no more justifies my rationality to join the then ZANU immediately after independence. This may sound morally wrong, but in pragmatic terms, this was the correct thing to do. Nkomo himself could not resist the reality of the then ZANU dominance. My wife who was a ZAPU Councillor also joined me and we became bona fide members of ZANU. I was grateful that Nkomo respected my decision to leave ZAPU. In so doing, he proved to be an accommodative leader who would not impose himself on anyone. Nkomo had always been that open-minded and he was objective in digesting views which he opposed. Nkomo transformed me from a combatant cadre to a conventional politician. In 1995, when I

was campaigning for the Bubi-Umguza parliamentary seat, Nkomo took me to Ntabazinduna and endorsed my candidature. This solidified my relationship with him both at a personal and at a political level.

In his company, I never felt like a subordinate. He always made me feel like his equal and for me, that was a humbling experience. The moments of laughter with Cde Nkomo and our mutual exchange of ideas strengthened an already unbreakable bond. His warm personality demystified the mythic aura attached to him. I remember the countless times I visited his house. The hospitality there was just out of this world. The key lesson from Nkomo's kindness is that a leader must be accessible and must not view the company of his followers as a bother. Nkomo's openness to me in the infancy of my political journey only proved that a true leader finds the company of his followers to be a blessing. Nkomo's main teaching was that leaders must listen and attend to the plight of the people, never taking them for granted or looking down upon them. Following that philosophy, I have earned huge electoral support in Matabeleland North.

During the precious moments of interacting with *Umdala Wethu*, I was intellectually enriched. Nkomo was a fountain of wisdom. He also taught me that wisdom is acquired through listening to and learning from others. According to this principle, leaders lend ears to those who submit to their leadership. As a result, authentic leadership does not dictate. Instead, it is sustained by the wishes of the people. To this day, I am still trying by all means to emulate this gift which Nkomo had. His ability to listen to anyone regardless of their position in society only proved how humble Nkomo was regardless of the great respect which he commanded not only as a senior politician but as a champion of African interests and a doyen of Zimbabwe's liberation struggle.

His Support for My Business Interests

Even during his days as Vice President, Nkomo would ask me to be part of his delegation whenever he attended to his several personal and national errands. Unconsciously, the late Father Zimbabwe buttressed this fatherhood effect on me. I remember when I bought properties from the

late Dumiso Dabengwa, Nkomo encouraged me to prioritise investment. From time to time, I consulted him for business ideas. His door was always open for advice, especially to young people. At a national level, he believed that policy-making must create a friendly environment for innovation to thrive. He had so much confidence in young people whom he viewed as the anchor of the national development agenda. It was through Nkomo that Strive Masiyiwa, the telecoms mogul, was elevated to a multi-millionaire. This was because Nkomo had faith in young people and this can be traced back to how he raised teenagers and youth of my generation to take part in the armed struggle.

The late Vice President encouraged me to venture into business as he always reiterated that there was life after politics. It was thanks to his wisdom that I ventured into business to supplement my formal income. Nkomo's support for local business ideas encouraged my commitment to acquiring fixed and movable assets. As his student, I was committed to living up to his teaching by venturing into business. Beyond his political influence to me, Nkomo inspired my interest to invest in property acquisition. In the process, I became an adherent of African economic empowerment at a time when White monopoly capital was dominant in our various sectors of production. I owe my achievements in business to the entrepreneurial talents which I borrowed from Father Zimbabwe. It is not surprising that he is outlived by the axiom: "*Nxa ufuna imali, lima* (If you want to be rich, utilise the land for production)." This proves that Nkomo's obligation to the freedom of Zimbabwe was not only political; he also had a bigger vision for the economic liberation of the country. Nkomo's involvement in the fight against colonialism had been, after all, strongly linked to the democratisation of the economy.

Indeed, Nkomo was a larger-than-life politician and a champion of economic empowerment. The life-long lesson he offered to my career has been that of resolute loyalty to the republic. Here is a man who initiates the fight for liberation, but due to colonial designs, he is pushed to the periphery. However, at all costs, he is willing to submit to fate and still negotiate amicable conflict resolution and pursue the goal of peace and national unity. Once in power, he also serves as an agent for the economic democratisation agenda at a time when colonial plunder

and monopoly was deeply entrenched in post-independence economics. All these qualities unquestionably depict Nkomo as a true-born African liberator. To this end, Nkomo remains a source of inspiration not only to those of us who enjoyed direct access to his phenomenal character but to every Zimbabwean.

Serving under Mugabe

Meeting Mugabe before Independence

Since the dawn of my political consciousness, Robert Gabriel Mugabe was famed for his illustrious exploits. He was a heroic heavyweight, celebrated for his eloquent nationalist oratory. He was a refined product of colonial education and was widely admired across the entire nationalist fraternity. I only came into contact with him for the first time in 1974 when he was in exile in Zambia. Just like other nationalists, he had been imprisoned since 1964. When he came to Zambia, I was already enrolled for my diploma in journalism. As a combatant and a student of Journalism at Evelyn Hone College, I found ideological comfort in his intellectual personality which was quite magnetic. One could spend an entire day listening to him and never get exhausted. We visited him at the Inter-Continental Hotel where he was booked with a group of other ZANU officials. He was an eloquent English speaker and this made him a highly admirable figure. His eloquence was mesmerising, considering the weight of social prestige which was associated with one's level of colonial language proficiency. Mugabe was also full of decorum. He was a typical "gentleman" in the British sense. On the other hand, the man had radical Marxist ideological charisma which defied his Western style of sedateness. He spoke with the authority, clarity and calmness of a man in control. All around him there was an insurmountable revolutionary aura. There was a dense weight of leadership in his words – a true composure of statesmanship. The more he spoke, the more I was philosophically charmed. At the time I did not imagine this person would be my own President but, all the same, I got to understand why he earned so much admiration.

He was just more than an orator, so full of Marxism and a whole load of anthropological command in his discussing of issues related to the liberation of our people. I remember disclosing my deep admiration for him to my other fellows in ZAPU. There was consensus that Mugabe was a politically refined character whom we all aspired to be someday. We all agreed that his distinct intellectual gravitas could not be compared to that of some of our ZAPU leaders. Every time I recalled the first encounter with him, my mind would crack into nostalgic sunshine. For the most part, though, I kept my reverence for him a secret because Mugabe was also disparaged within ZAPU for revolting against Joshua Nkomo's leadership in 1963. As a member of ZAPU, it was politically incorrect for me to openly express my strong admiration for him. I could not share how his courageous articulation of the logic of the liberation struggle had reconfigured my thinking. After my encounter with Mugabe and following closely his profile thereafter, I was ideologically transformed to appreciate that the values of the struggle transcended partisan lines.

From Mugabe, I got to appreciate that the liberation struggle was founded on cross-cutting values which collectively defined the role of ZAPU and ZANU in the armed struggle. Since then, I embraced the bigger picture of dedicating myself to the cause of liberation rather than partisan loyalty. I emerged from the first encounter with Mugabe as a patriot and not a mere member of a political party. It was through him that I began to understand that our acquired identities are fluid in as much as there are permanent facets which are inherent in our varying social and political tutelages. Since then, my political consciousness was reconceived with new confidence and optimism for the future of Zimbabwe. I knew that one day we would liberate our country not as ZAPU or as ZANU but as a fraternal front.

Even after I had left the battlefield to further my studies in India, I followed keenly events back at home, in Zambia, Tanzania and Mozambique. In as much as I was ZAPU, I closely followed Robert Mugabe's political activity. I particularly interacted with pro-ZANU students to follow closely on the work Mugabe was engaged in. Without acknowledging it then, I was unconsciously aligned with his charisma. In the process, I found ideological affections floating between Nkomo and Mugabe's

dedicated leadership traits and how the two nationalists inspired the direction of the liberation struggle. In India, we related and exchanged notes as students outside our partisan affiliations. I got to access a lot of literature on Mugabe from my ZANU counterparts and we held robust debates on the political issues emerging at the time. In the process, I got to appreciate the common vision which all of us from both ZAPU and ZANU shared. We had a common and dedicated passion for the total emancipation of Zimbabwe from colonial oppression regardless of our respective partisan affiliations.

I remember interacting with Andreas Rukobo who was a member of ZANU PF and is now a senior official at the Parliament of Zimbabwe. As students abroad, we wrote articles for various political journals to disseminate information on the struggle to our fellow revolutionaries home and abroad. My other contemporary during my years of study in India is Dr Mavis Sibanda, who is now the Permanent Secretary in the ministry of industry. In 1977 Mugabe was appointed to the top post in ZANU. I was particularly excited that the eminent leadership qualities I observed in him when we first met in 1974 were not superficial. He replaced Ndabaningi Sithole whom I had encountered from a distance during the Victoria Falls Talks of 1975. Mugabe's leadership further radicalised ZANU as the intensification of the guerrilla warfare was pursued. His charismatic leadership made him a shining figure in the anti-colonial political landscape. With the birth of the Patriotic Front (PF) in 1976, it was clear that the articulation of the liberation philosophy was made much clearer courtesy of Robert Mugabe and Nkomo.

Even during the Lancaster Conference, we were told that Mugabe exhibited deep-rooted defiance to some highly compromising terms of the negotiations. Likewise, the combined submissions from our ZAPU side and our ZANU counterparts created a strong optimism for the liberation of Zimbabwe. Once again, the conviction of a collective liberation outcome was reinforced by the ZAPU and ZANU position of challenging the British during the Lancaster Talks. However, Mugabe manoeuvred his way into the Lancaster-coordinated election leading to independence in 1980. He declared ZANU's breakaway from the Patriotic Front. Having noticed his wide winning margin in 1980, I got to

appreciate that ZANU widely represented the aspirations of the people. In any case, the fight for independence was aimed at achieving majority rule and in 1980 ZANU demonstrated that its popularity was entrenched in the will of the people. ZANU's electoral victory in 1980 only signalled the need for ZAPU to reconvene and join hands with the Robert Mugabe-led Government. This was effectively done when ZANU called for the formation of a coalition government after the 1980 election. However, the 1982 to 1987 differences only threatened the formidable character of a united PF-ZAPU and ZANU.

An Appointment Which Led to Other Appointments

In early independence Zimbabwe, I was first employed at the Zimbabwe Newspapers (Zimpapers) as a trainee manager. Since its establishment in 1980, Zimpapers has remained the country's largest newspaper producer. Zimpapers acquired the majority stake from the Angus Africa News Service and I had the opportunity to serve the stable until tensions rose about the post which I held. It was felt that my allegiances were with ZAPU and because of that, I was not supposed to be employed by this state-controlled press. The high level of professionalism I had exhibited regardless of my loyalty to ZAPU was ignored. I had come to terms with the fact that my exit was inevitable. At the verge of the termination of my contract, I received a call from the late former President Robert Mugabe who was then Prime Minister. He invited me to his Munhumutapa office to get my side of the story on what was happening at Zimpapers. He listened to me attentively as I narrated how I was being victimised. After a lengthy discussion, he ensured me that my job security was guaranteed. He then told me that he wanted to assign me to the Ministry of Finance in the Customs Department. I had no choice but to accept the offer. Within days I signed my contract and I was part of the first group of Africans to work in the Customs Department.

Later, I got to realise that the reason for this appointment was more complex than I had initially imagined. My mission was to uproot corruption in the Customs Department, which at the time was a strategic unit of the nation's revenue remittance. Immediately after independence, the Customs Department was mainly controlled by conservative Rhodesians. The monopolistic hold of the colonial system was still intact

and the Rhodesians who were in the system were more preoccupied with sustaining the bloodline of colonial economic interests and control. As a result, the White people in the Customs Department expressed so much uneasiness about having a few Africans as their workmates. Having been part of the pioneer cohort of Africans to be recruited, I had the firsthand encounter with the perpetuation of post-independence racism. To think of how the edict of reconciliation had been applied and some Rhodesians were still unrepentant was very appalling.

As pointed out earlier, a large chunk of the White officers were former Rhodesian Special Branch officials. In the back of their heads, we were mere subjects they could dominate and all we could do was to take instructions from them. I adamantly refused to be subjected to that downgrading. Our White counterparts had their allegiances firmly attached to the old order. They were not ready to embrace intelligent young Black professionals coming in to occupy a space which had been exclusively preserved for the settler minority. Some of them could not stand sharing the same workspace with Africans and they were all resigning one after the other. It was clear that the remnants of imperialist prejudice were still inherent in organisational cultures. The Whites were not willing to give up their old superiority mentality or to even fake integrating to the cosmetic transitional terms of independence.

For that reason, the opportunity granted to me by Cde Mugabe to serve in the Customs Department presented a new reality of appreciating that the Rhodesian system of monopoly was left intact and had to be dislodged. The relics of imperialism needed to be extricated and this awakened my realisation that we had only attained the first phase of decolonisation – political independence. Now the challenge ahead of us was to get rid of all systems and functions of society where colonialism had deeply incarnated itself in the post-independence running of the state. For me, this became an important orientation phase to neo-colonialism and how it was critical to fire up our ideological forte in fighting the new battle against the remnants of colonialism. Through this experience, I got to understand the level to which imperialism had precast its longevity. Indeed Rhodesia was not ready to go.

It then made sense for me to join ZANU to continue the decolonisation project, considering that ZANU had acquired a people-driven mandate to eliminate the stubborn vestiges of colonialism. After all, ZANU was the party in Government and my ZAPU comrades were there by invitation. All logic pointed out to its longevity. The loyalty I had fully pledged to ZAPU did not translate to long-term political career growth. After independence, I was serving at a senior Government level at the mercy of the late ZANU leader. He directly identified my talent and offered an opportunity for my career to flourish. In the 1985 election, Mugabe himself encouraged me to run for the Hwange-Tsholotsho seat as a ZANU candidate. I lost to a ZAPU candidate, but that did not dissuade my commitment to politics.

I had made up my mind that I would serve my country for the better regardless of my electoral defeat. I was content in ZANU considering that it was the ideological epicentre of the continuing liberation ideals which in a way defined my patriotic loyalty to Zimbabwe. My crossover to ZANU after independence did not corrupt my devotion to the enduring anti-colonial tradition. In the first instance, the decision to join ZAPU was personal in as much as the right to leave ZAPU was equally personal. Above all, the zeal to join the liberation struggle was underpinned on strong ideological convictions and absolute confidence in the liberation of Zimbabwe. What is important is that all these decisions were made in adherence to my sincere liberation convictions and unconstrained love for the motherland.

Joining ZANU under the direct influence of Robert Mugabe redefined my career path and I graduated from being a regionally inclined politician to a national leader. This explains why most people who take offence in my exit from ZAPU would comfortably call me a “sell-out” of the region. Such views only prove how much ZAPU had degenerated to a regional political party whose influence and popularity was limited to Matebeleland and Midlands. This was mainly because the demographic distribution of ZAPU and ZANU ended up assuming proclivities of ethnic bias as either pro-Ndebele or Shona-aligned, but the struggle was never aimed at achieving a regionally defined freedom from colonisation. Ethnic essentialism was largely shaped by internal contradictions which filtered

into the nationalist movements. However, this betrayed the prefacing idea of the fight for freedom as primarily national. Decolonisation was never intended to give legitimacy to regionalism – a default sequel of tribalism. Since the formation of the SRANC, it was never about producing political figures who represented narrow regional interests. Mugabe's leadership conveyed the true ethos of national unity as his political career began in the NDP. At independence, he formed a coalition government with ZAPU. Even after 1987, a government of national unity was formed. Upon joining ZANU after independence, I became a beneficiary of the party's culture of meritocracy. I was elevated to Deputy Provincial Treasurer for Matebeleland-North which was still amalgamated with Bulawayo Province.

Countlessly, I had the opportunity to be invited by Mugabe to discuss issues affecting the region and posit measures which the Government could deploy to encourage unity and development in Matebeleland. This was largely motivated by the resentment which ZANU experienced from some sections of Matebeleland. However, Mugabe was never tiring in his willingness to understand the concerns of all people from Matebeleland. As a result of the countless consultative discussions on matters affecting the region, I was part of the team which actively participated in providing technical support in the creation of the Unity Accord. Since then, the level of trust which the late former President invested in me enhanced my loyalty to serve under him. In 1985, he appointed me a non-constituent Member of Parliament.

As mentioned earlier on, I was then invited to the State House alongside other comrades to discuss the welfare of war-veterans leading to the birth of the now prominent Zimbabwe Liberation War-veterans Association (ZLWVA). The initiative was resisted in Matebeleland because it was viewed as a political gimmick to lure ZPRA ex-combatants into joining ZANU PF. The late ZPRA intelligence sage Dumiso Dabengwa initially opposed the idea. He effectively executed efforts to block comrades from becoming members of the umbrella war-veteran association. In the face of this massive resistance, the task before me and other colleagues who pioneered this cause was to communicate that the envisaged war-veterans association was not meant to advance partisan essentialism. Instead, the

initiative was aimed at addressing the marginalisation of the war-veterans across the country. After independence, many war-veterans were subjected to abject poverty. A representative organ was meant to fix this anomaly. The late former President had asked us to extensively disseminate that position to the ex-combatants. This cause was fully implemented and its outcome was the creation of the legislation which set out the framework for the welfare of all former freedom fighters. Regardless of the clear objectives of the assignment, some politicians in the region wanted the idea to collapse. All they wanted was to undermine the reconciliation which ZANU and ZAPU had created following the *Gukurahundi* era. Their key aim was to maintain the political polarity which had sustained the resentment of ZANU in Matebeleland.

John Gazi, now a sharp critic of the state and a pro-Mthwakazi activist, was one of the few ZPRA ex-combatants who realised the importance of setting the guiding legislation for the welfare of the former fighters. He was instrumental in defending the idea from sabotage. Headman Moyo, who is now the Deputy Secretary of the War-veterans Wing in ZANU PF, also assisted in explaining the rationale of this important initiative to other ZPRA combatants. Thereafter, we were successful in convincing a huge number of former ZPRA cadres to be part of the ZLWVA structures. The task was gruesome considering the heated debates which emerged from the engagements we had. Thereafter, comrades managed to embrace this idea beyond the narrow regionalisation it had been subjected to. We successfully convinced other former ZPRA combatants to be part of this process which was only pioneered by 27 ex-liberation war-veterans before it grew to be a nationwide fraternal front for both former ZPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants.

After the Unity Accord

In 1995 after the lapse of my tenure as a Non-Constituent Member of Parliament, I stood for a parliamentary election and won in Umguza-Bubi constituency. The late President Mugabe appointed me Deputy Minister of Industry and International Trade. This was at a time when Zimbabwe was still struggling with the gruesome effects of ESAP which had left some local industries collapsed. With the rise in unemployment and the need to keep the few functioning industries alive, we had the obligation

of creating a strong business-friendly environment. Our ministry also had to deal with the effects of capital flight and skills exodus. The effects of a White-appropriated industrial sector were largely manifesting and exposing the shortfalls of the post-colonial transition.

In 1998, I was appointed to the Politburo as Deputy Secretary for Security. This post exposed me to the most fragile task of appreciating the magnitude of the underhand operations which were being deployed by the enemy to promote despondency. With the land reform beginning to take shape, increased vigilance on our part as ZANU PF was critical. The land grabs mainly by our war-veterans in this initial phase saw more efforts being made by the former commercial White farmers to promote political violence which in turn geared ZANU PF to upscale various pre-emptive measures.

The late Cde Mugabe appointed me Governor and Resident Minister for Matabeleland North Province in 2000. I was specifically assigned by the late Cde Robert Mugabe to ensure that concerns about the province's marginalisation were addressed. I was summoned to pursue wide-reaching development projects for Matabeleland North. True to the assignment, I initiated the full establishment of the Lupane State University, Lupane Government Complex, and Bubi Dam, among other critical projects. Today, I can look back and be grateful for the opportunity of serving the community and the people who raised me to be a national political figure. I owe success in these development-oriented projects to the former head of state whose profound passion for development surpassed regionalist inclinations. He was passionate about the equitable development of every province in Zimbabwe.

In 2005 I won the parliamentary elections and the late Cde Mugabe found it befitting to assign me as Minister of Industry and International Trade. I took up this appointment during the country's hyperinflationary period, mainly characterised by illicit financial flows, corruption, price increases and speculation. In response to that crisis environment, I managed to keep troubled industries afloat by working out modalities for the launch of the Distressed Industries and Marginalised Areas Fund (DIMAF). The adoption of this programme also served as a measure of directly reciprocating the wrath of the illegal Western-imposed economic sanctions.

During my tenure in Cabinet, I now had the privilege of interacting with Cde Mugabe who was, by all means, a leader of enormous distinction. He would take time to engage the counsel of his ministers. Mugabe proved to be very supportive of innovative ideas. The heavy weight of global capitalist pressures exerted on him to leave office only proved his immeasurable leadership qualities. His old-time charisma seemed to have not departed from him as he constantly encouraged us to stand firm in our fight against colonial pressures. He acquitted himself as a seasoned anti-colonial figure whose defiant fight against the perennial embedment of imperialism in our politics was unrelenting. He never succumbed to the pressure by the opposition and its failed preoccupation to push ZANU PF out of power. It was from Mugabe's charged anti-colonial far-sightedness that we derived our loyalty to the old-time creed of struggle as senior members of the party and the cabinet. He interacted with each one of us at a personal level as a proverbial father. He specifically encouraged me to further my studies. Given his inordinate passion for knowledge, I found myself enrolling for my post-graduate studies in 1997.

In the face of the plummeting economy mainly caused by the West's sanctions on Zimbabwe and many other economic governance structural challenges, Mugabe gave us hope for the survival of ZANU PF. He gave all of us in the cabinet an opportunity to explore all innovative ideas which could help combat the country's economic decline. In 2008 under his leadership, I was re-elected for the Umguza parliamentary seat. Then I was appointed the Minister of Mines and Mining Development from 2009 to 2013. This ministry became one of the best Government departments which assisted greatly in the revenue collection and boosting Treasury. In 2009 I was elevated to ZANU PF's Secretary for Economic Affairs. My simultaneous appointment as the Minister of Mines and the Party's Secretary for Economic Affairs dovetailed with the party's economic indigenisation policy position.

The mainstreaming of the mining sector was heightened. Zimbabwe's Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Programme was then established to champion economic empowerment for the previously marginalised majority. The programme aimed at guaranteeing the majority's ownership and control of the country's natural resources.

The policy was a democratic counter-balance to the historical economic inequalities which were a creation of colonialism. Mugabe must be credited for allowing this policy to thrive regardless of its notable pitfalls. The indigenisation of the economy reflected Mugabe's loyalty to the idea of liberating an economy once predominantly controlled by the colonial minority. As a way of cascading this policy to the grassroots, Community Share Ownership Trusts (CSOTs) were established particularly in the mineral-rich regions of the country. However, the indigenisation of the mining sector also incentivised high levels of patronage and this compromised the intended beneficiation process of the programme. This was unfortunate considering the extent to which the former President had entrusted some of us to diligently execute this broad-based empowerment project.

After the 2013 July elections, I was appointed Transport and Infrastructural Development Minister. Later, I was moved to the Ministry of Planning Development and Investment Promotion. Halfway through the tenure, I was reassigned to be the Minister of Home Affairs and Cultural Heritage. At this point, the ruling party was facing internal contradictions which later resulted in Operation Restore Legacy (which I will discuss later in detail). I am proud to have served under Cde Mugabe who granted me the opportunity to pay homage to the liberation legacy. While it may be narrowly convenient to castigate Mugabe for the country's political and economic challenges, it must be emphasised that our current situation is a culmination of the good and bad decisions which were collectively made. It would be insincere to treat Robert Mugabe as the main culprit of Zimbabwe's present economic and political distress. Under Mugabe, all members of the Politburo and the Cabinet freely expressed their ideas. Every success or failure was premised on the strength or inadequacies in teamwork. All legislation was endorsed in Parliament and therefore, it only makes sense for all of us who served under him to take collective blame for the challenges we find ourselves in today. Mugabe was a victim of the trust he gave to some key political figures. The challenges encountered in the area of economic indigenisation evidence the magnitude of treachery which Mugabe was slapped with, leading to the collapse of the economy.

The Many Centers of the Mugabe Legacy

Mugabe and the Paradox of Decolonisation

Mugabe's diplomatic ploy during the Lancaster Conference earned him a darling status to Britain and the US. As already indicated, Nkomo's Soviet links set up Mugabe for easy transfer of power. The affluent diplomatic scores by ZANU at the Lancaster negotiations validated a transition in favour of ZANU. In the process, the inheritance of the colonial state by ZANU meant that colonial dominance had to be consolidated. In the interest of creating a viable transition, it can be reasonably argued that the Late Former Head of State had to partially conform to the manipulative schemes of the colonially set negotiation terms.

When ZANU emerged triumphant from the Lancaster House and declared its position to disconnect itself from the Patriotic Front, it was apparent that the imperialist bargain had assumed a substantial hegemonic stretch. Whilst the desire to cede collective blame to Mugabe alone as the key benefactor of the Lancaster resolutions, there is also need for a blanket critique of both ZAPU and ZANU in ushering a negotiated post-independence transition. As indicated earlier that Nkomo was dissuaded from taking part at the Lancaster Conference by his counterparts in the military. The accommodation of a diplomatic turn by the nationalists to resolve the armed struggle stalemate was a compromise that led to a rift. From the Geneva Conference right up to Lancaster, the founding fathers, Dr Nkomo and Cde Mugabe, were being ripped apart. The acceptance of the negotiated model of independence substantially laid the foundation for neo-colonialism. The imperialist guided constitution was a major signification of the limitations of negotiated independence. The same constitution gave legality to the uneven economic order which sustained colonial supremacy.

Now with the Lancaster as the final stroke to their common cause, Mugabe became the heir of a colonial state. The wide economic exclusion of our people made the Lancaster constitutional arrangement flawed and the aggressive turn to the land reform retrospectively proves fault lines in the settlement. Mugabe incidentally came into power without power, because the idea of independence was arranged and needed to be reconstructed

and recreated. The land reform programme was the prefacing point of total independence reclamation.

Against this backdrop, Mugabe as a revolutionary mentor, founding father of the First Republic and an outstanding champion of Pan-Africanism also finds his legacy entrapped in imperialist manipulations. The footprint of negotiated independence attached to his legacy is an antithesis of how those of us in the nationalist and anti-colonial movement would want him to be memorialised. This substantially implicates all his right-hand men (myself included) as bearers of a paradoxical ideological predisposition. Having acquired an imperialist education and soaked up imperialist socialisation, only to be radicalised by and against the same colonial tradition to seek independence, the outcome was a bi-polar national consciousness. As pioneering post-colonial political leaders, we had to grapple with internal binaries encapsulated in the colonial and anti-colonial latitudes of power. The post-colonial state we built was an embodiment of the conflicting psyches of power. This is why after independence, up to this day, we continue to fight amongst ourselves in ethnic, partisan and racist based terms. Mugabe must be seen as a creation and a victim of the colonial paradigm of power. The colonial state he inherited continues to be ensnared in the long-term effects of imperial domination.

Gukurahundi

The legacy of post-colonial violence is also imprinted in the contemporary affairs of our country. Zimbabwe was entrapped in the post-colonial trend as the country entered into ethnic and tribal conflict mode. The footprints of *Gukurahundi* like political violence in any other part of the continent entailed the loss of lives, massive displacements and inter-generational trauma. *Gukurahundi* as an imperialist strategy to assert itself in post-independence politics brought about mass violence and betrayal of confidence in the post-colonial state. This marked the beginning of Mugabe's estrangement from the people of Matebeleland and Midlands provinces. Just like many other African countries, Zimbabwe experienced what many have regarded as the trend of post-colonial ethnic purging. However, *Gukurahundi's* link to Cold War dynamics has been conveniently

ignored to sustain reactionary regime change positions. *Gukurahundi* as an outgrowth of post-independence competing political interests will go down in history as one of the major political tensions to be ever experienced in Zimbabwe. *Gukurahundi* history has been used in contemporary contestations of power to promote the electoral marginalisation of ZANU PF. Unfortunately, the other underlying roots of this ugly side of our history have been ignored to justify the calls to remove ZANU PF from power. This outbreak of violence under Mugabe's rule only exposes him as an unwitting pawn of colonial entanglements as the *Gukurahundi* assisted greatly in curtailing the Soviet influence in Southern Africa.

Regardless of the efforts dedicated towards post-conflict peace resolution, Mugabe's has been presented as a prominent human-rights violator in the same way this past has made him to forcefully acquire the "despot" tag. *Gukurahundi* must be located in the contested forces of friction dating back to the break-up of the Patriotic Front and other tensions which confronted the liberation movements dating back to the liberation struggle execution period. *Gukurahundi* must also be appreciated as one of the major colonial machinations of state disintegration to give perennial political traction to the imperialist world.

The former President and Joshua Nkomo must be applauded for their initiation of the Unity Accord as a way of ending the *Gukurahundi* conflict impasse. The two leaders united to form ZANU PF, leading to the continued peace and stability in Zimbabwe. The *Gukurahundi* and post-conflict interventions by the Cde Nkomo and Mugabe reversed the retrogressive effects of *Gukurahundi* and all its neo-colonial undercurrents. From this perspective, Mugabe has to be remembered for ushering peace in Zimbabwe in as much as his legacy was initially exposed to volatile entanglements of colonial hegemony.

Economic Colonialism and the Struggle for Self-determination

The period between 1980 and 1990 was hugely defined by transitional administrative incompetence which created the foundation for Zimbabwe's economic crisis. The lack of adequate governance skills emanating from inheriting a failed colonial state was noted through

the systematic degeneration of the economy. Various sectors of public service delivery, namely health, education, recreation and the social welfare sector declined. As widely highlighted in Chapter 8, ESAP vividly demonstrated a failure of the state to be self-sufficient. Just like the rest of the post-colonial world, we turned to the International Monetary Fund and World Bank loans to succour our deteriorating economic landscape. Taking this route affirmed the economic insubstantiality of post-independence policy-making. This infancy in our statecraft offers a defining mark of the colonial entrapment of the First Republic's sovereignty. The reality of post-colonial dependence syndrome cannot be detached from the legacy of Robert Mugabe and those of us who served under him since independence. I can relate to this position given the initial assignment I directly received from him upon my appointment in the Customs Department. This was only one area where colonial interest was deeply entrenched. It was equally manifesting itself in other areas of the economy. The colonial class dominated industry and had an absolute monopoly of the exports sector. Land ownership was still a preserve of the White minority.

Whilst it sounds highly convenient to label the crisis of economic independence as a failure of the post-colonial state, it is imperative to trace this challenge within the broader scope of neo-colonialism which interrupted development across post-independent Africa. From an all-inclusive African view, the Structural Adjustment Programmes were created to align imperialist capital with post-independence power contestations. This was a strategic reaction of the imperialist world to decolonisation and its impact in disordering colonial hegemony. By inheriting the colonial state, Mugabe like the rest of his counterparts in the continent involuntarily succumbed to the Global South's structural dependence on the Global North. Under Mugabe, we became subscribing entities to imperial hegemony. This is why the major opposition to ZANU PF was a product of imperialist design.

By attaining independence in its highly negotiated form, we became actors in the neo-colonial power matrix. Consequently, we became subjects of global capital which has always been at the centre of the neo-colonial agenda. The continued rise of poverty levels in Zimbabwe

like everywhere else in Africa continues to be manipulated to justify imperialist-aided regime change initiatives. After reviling this colonial positionality in the late 90s, Robert Mugabe was globally denigrated as a dictator. In the same way, top ZANU PF leaders have been subjected to wholesale demonisation. This feeds into the simplistic characterisation of Zimbabwean politics into binary extremes of dictators and democrats. ZANU PF, which has become an inconvenient entity for its pursuit of resource nationalism and protection of liberation gains after coming to terms with colonial duplicity, is now portrayed as an enabling organ for polarisation, corruption, human rights violation and electoral fraud.

All these allegations, levelled against the Zimbabwean government at the behest of the opposition MDC formations, have failed to remove ZANU PF out of power since the dawn of the millennium. While the agenda of neo-colonialism seems to be excelling in the Zimbabwean political landscape, it stands to be noted that ZANU PF continues to command and attract the support of the majority. ZANU PF owes this continued relevance to the pioneering anti-colonial spirit which the late former President continued to defend. His defiance to colonialism enabled us to fight for the liberation of the economy. In the same spirit, we continue to be guided by his passion for self-determination to incessantly fight for political self-determination.

Fast-Track Land Reform Programme

The compromised transfer of power at the Lancaster Conference left the land question unaddressed for close to two decades. The turn to the agrarian reform was a strategic reclamation of the essence of decolonisation. Upon establishing this irreversible turn, Mugabe became famous for the dictum: “Zimbabwe will never be a colony again.” This became the rallying point of Zimbabwe’s lasting anti-colonial political culture associated with the late icon. The side-lining of the land reform and its replacement with the White land ownership monopoly after 1980 was suicidal to the democratisation of the economy. The Willing Seller, Willing Buyer land ownership-impediment clause had to be reversed and the land reform played a crucial part in this respect.

I am particularly grateful for being allowed to serve as the Minister of Provincial Affairs for Matebeleland North at the peak of the fast-track land reform. For me this was edifying as one of the core values of my participation in the liberation struggle was founded on the need to deliver economic equality in Zimbabwe. On the part of the White beneficiaries of economic inequality, there was no conscious conviction and willingness to give away the land. An exclusively commercial conscience motivated the settlers' desire to hold on to the land. The tradition of settler monopoly narrowed the post-colonial state's capacity to redress the land distribution inequalities. Therefore, Mugabe empowered all those who served under him to champion the noble cause of economic liberation. This made him unpopular with the imperialists and their local opposition party allies. It was on this basis that Zimbabwe had to face the colonially formulated wrath of economic sanctions under the guise of promoting democracy and ending the alleged human-rights crisis.



Former President of the Republic of Zimbabwe and the global Pan African Champion, Cde Robert G. Mugabe. Photo Credits: BBC

Sanctions

As an offensive reaction to the land reform, the European Union imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe. On the other hand, the US Congress also enacted illegal sanctions on Zimbabwe. In sanitising the retribution for the land

reform, the sanctions were imposed as “targeted” at ZANU PF elites who were criminalised for collective human-rights violations. The sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe by Euro-American imperialist forces served as a direct attack to the political interests of the ruling party as they safeguarded the opposition-driven regime-change mandate. At face value, ZIDERA was founded on catalysing a democratic transition to terminate ZANU PF’s purportedly repressive rule. ZIDERA also purported to usher in economic recovery in Zimbabwe. This legislation was signed into law by George Bush with the full backing of the U.S senate.

The West’s imposition of sanctions on Zimbabwe substantially outlines the significance of Mugabe as a target of imperialist political hegemony. The introduction of the land reform and the consequential imposition of sanctions on Zimbabwe gestured the initial breakdown of relations between Zimbabwe and the West. Substantially, Mugabe reincarnated the timeless revolutionary spirit in our contemporary politics. Serving under him offered a direct chance to encounter the reality of the imposing character of neo-liberalism and all the resilient dictatorship facets of imperialism. The shadow of the rule of law and protection of colonially underpinned property rights became the facade for Zimbabwe’s global marginalisation. As a result, the Mugabe era symbolises a period of directly grappling with neo-colonialism at its worst.

Regardless of the punitive impact of sanctions, Robert Mugabe boosted the anti-colonial resistance through an ideologically solid basis of emasculating the vestiges of a White economic monopoly. The imposition of sanctions on Zimbabwe was inclined to reinstating minority dominance under the guise of a democratic transition. Technically, this was aimed at propelling the few remaining colonial descendants to reassert their space as a solid oligopoly. The same imperialists would capture the Government and hold it to account in the service of its interests. Sanctions served as a mitigation measure to stifle the emergent anti-colonial notion of realigning property rights. As a senior member of the Government, I witnessed the crumble of the economy because the West was agitated by the radical redefinition of our economic sovereignty pursued under the leadership of the former President. The first decade into the sanctions, human-capital exodus was heavily experienced with a majority of our people turning to the diaspora

for greener pastures. Brain drain reached alarming levels as we were exposed to the sanctions regime which the West imposed on us.

Both the country and those aligned to ZANU PF have been victims of the polarised global capitalist demonisation. The hostility which has existed between Zimbabwe and capitals of Western supremacy in the aftermath of the land reform displays a pragmatic breakaway from cosmetic independence. The land reform-inspired foreign policy justifying Zimbabwe's delink from the West has successfully aided in the strategic slamming of the West's continued interests in former colonies. Therefore, concerted attacks on the legacy of Mugabe today is no different from the vilification of the liberation struggle as a terrorist undertaking. Many have failed to appreciate the role of Mugabe as a liberator and victim of neo-imperialism. The privilege of working closely with the late former President exposed those of us in ZANU PF to endless efforts by the West to interfere in our politics.

In all these frantic efforts to destabilise our principled stand against neo-colonialism, ZANU PF has emerged as a champion of Western driven political dismembering and socio-economic disruptions. Courtesy of the ideological sobriety of Mugabe, the future of ZANU PF remains intact considering the triumph of the ruling party in submerging Western-sponsored regime-change operations.

As a result of the ideological scores of the anti-imperial values espoused by ZANU PF, Cde Robert Mugabe is decorated as an anti-colonial champion and a radical defender of economic justice. The imposition of sanctions on Zimbabwe only accelerated the ideological pre-eminence of the Third Chimurenga and the resurgence of the Pan-Africanist tenets. In this light, my service to the nation during the sanctions era has heightened my commitment to a profound Pan-African consciousness and global justice. Given the strong echo that the political and social issues raised by Mugabe found across Africa, several African leaders paid reverence to him. In this regard, Mugabe gained international political latitude from such wide solidarities. Mugabe will be best remembered as a think-tank of African liberation.

Economic Indigenisation

The radical delink from the West under Mugabe will be recalled for disbanding colonial supremacy in the area of resource control and ownership. The protracted history of colonial domination and its decapitating effects on Africa's economic growth continuously validates the logic of economic indigenisation. The call for economic indigenisation, which is not unique to Zimbabwe but is spreading across the post-colonial world, is underpinned on the need to remedy the uneven economic structure created by the colonial system. The official pronouncements on racial reconciliation immediately after independence were never successful in circumventing the reality of the evident and popular call for democratising the economy.

The social connection between the erstwhile colonisers and the colonised remained imperceptibly conflictual towards a looming explosion. The resultant characteristic of deracialisation and its shortcomings manifested in the form of pronounced economic disparities. The undercurrents of pushing for a post-colonial system of economic equality surfaced through collective pressure group campaigns for the inclusive participation of the indigenous people in building the national economy. African business communities emerged and were organised into cooperatives, associations and policy action groups. A leading advocacy front to emerge after independence was the Affirmative Action Group (AAG), once led by prominent businessman and politician Philip Chiyangwa.

Faced with widespread calls for economic indigenisation between 1980 and 1982, the Government pacified and dismissed this as populist. Africanisation of labour, nationalisation and socialist redistribution became central in the public policy discourse. Africanisation entailed the increased inclusion of Africans in the public service. The evident contradiction to the overall call for total economic indigenisation was that Africanisation only became a veneer for true economic empowerment. Ironically, the long economically marginalised Africans only became labour subjects of colonial Europe's capital.

A highly ambivalent response to socialist promises made during the liberation war was deployed as a means of securing allegiance to the ruling party. Coincidentally, conservative White capital felt threatened. The call for socialist distributionism and nationalisation created animosity between the state and the private sector which was predominantly White. Capital flight heightened and Foreign Direct Investment dwindled. There was an increase in foreign currency shortages. The need for value addition and beneficiation became an important panacea to our looming economic crisis. Without the processing industry, the scale of productivity did not attract meaningful gains. At the start of the millennium, levels of unemployment were heightening. Urban councils' service delivery started declining.

The introduction of the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Programme through an Act of Parliament in 2008 was critical not only in re-entering the erstwhile economic marginalised majority, but the policy was pivotal in ideological re-entering of the working-class, and peasantry to participate in economic policy-making. The legislation offered a 51% mining and industrial ownership share for the black majority. This trajectory re-organised ZANU PF into a pro-majority economic empowerment political organisation. The launch of this policy, just like the land reform, ushered in an era of liberation philosophy renaissance in statecraft design and policy delivery. As an antithesis to this trajectory, the opposition advanced the neo-liberal "property rights" protection politics. This contradictory landscape of pro-indigenisation and pro-Western capital polarisation are highly definitive of the Robert Mugabe legacy. However, the compelling justifications of the indigenisation programme make me a proud insider of Zimbabwean politics. Those opposed to Mugabe and ZANU PF have conveniently misrepresented the indigenisation policy as a vanguard for state-led primitive accumulation, corruption and cronyism. While some of these accusations can be substantiated, it must be emphasised that the major criticism of the indigenisation policy was meant to Whitewash the policy's cardinal feature of widening economic empowerment access.

Saviour Kasukuwere, a former cabinet minister responsible for Indigenisation and Empowerment, is one of the few state officials whose role has been aligned to the detriment of the programme. Kasukuwere

was involved in informal arrangements with mining companies which were purported to have entered into Community Share Ownership Scheme Trusts. During the GNU, Kasakuwere misinformed the entire nation that mining companies operating in the Chiadzwa/Marange fields pledged US\$50 million to the local Community Empowerment Scheme. An impression created that his ministry had attracted compliance of mining companies to the Local Empowerment Scheme. The supposedly pledged funds never reached the Marange-Zimunya community. In turn, the mining company dismissed that it had made the US\$50 million pledge towards the scheme. This was followed by a Parliamentary Subcommittee Enquiry in 2016 (See Appendix 3). Based on the findings of the Parliamentary Portfolio Report on Marange-Zimunya Community Share Ownership Trust (CSOT) of October 2016, Kasakuwere used a dummy cheque to give a deceitful impression that the Local Economic Scheme was successful. It also emerged that the parading of the dummy cheque pledge was meant to hoodwink the former President who was the guest of honour on the official ceremony of the establishment of the Marange-Zimunya CSOT.

This is one of the many incidents where this noble policy was abused to satisfy political grandstanding. In some instances, the indigenisation policy is criticised on this basis. However, this does not change the extent to which the turn to economic indigenisation was a revolutionary cause. The major shortcoming of the policy was the level to which it was personalised by some elements who later emerged as having actively captured the former first family. The policy abstractly became a preserve for power consolidation. As indicated in the above mentioned Parliamentary Portfolio Report, the Marange CSOT saga happened when I was the Minister of Mines, but my office was snubbed by Kasakuwere in his informal engagements with mining companies which formed CSOTs. At the party level, my role as the Secretary for Economic Affairs was equally disregarded and this makes it more evident that the economic indigenisation policy was applied under chaotic circumstances because some party members betrayed the trust which the late former President, Cde Mugabe, had bestowed on them.

The inadequacies on the part of some ZANU PF officials like Kasukuwere have justified efforts by the opposition to denigrate this policy. It is some of these shortcomings which have validated the imperialist retaliation mechanisms to ZANU PF's commitment to achieving:

- * Eradication of the excess colonial monopoly on the means of production
- * Socio-economic equality against a background of uneven resource distribution
- * provision of even infrastructure development
- * Decolonised labour practices in a bid to eradicate exploitative labour relations
- * Control of monopolies
- * Reduction of the power of private capitalists, and
- * Legislation of corporate social responsibility

Through some of these cardinal tenets of the economic indigenisation programme, we were able to emasculate global economic imperialism. As a result, at a global stage, Zimbabwe was negatively projected in Western media as a failed state. At the same time, Cde Mugabe's open attack on the uneven global political-economic order validated his domestic policy of indigenisation. In reciprocation, opposition and CSO pressure groups have continued to exert efforts to remove ZANU PF from power. The Western world's interests in the 2008 and 2013 election demonstrated the extent to which the indigenisation policy distressed frontiers of global capitalism.

Among some radical pro-indigenisation radicals in ZANU PF, Mugabe's exit from the political stage has been viewed as the demise of the anti-Western capital policy position. This follows the massive call for the privatisation of the economy in a manner which is viewed by some as more tilted towards neo-liberalism. The accelerated inclination towards opening Zimbabwe for Business has been welcomed as a strategic path for investment attraction. However, to some, the "Zimbabwe is Open for Business" policy position has been perceived as a retrogressive counter-position to the economic indigenisation agenda which was instituted

since 2008 under Mugabe. The current emphasis on inclusive economic empowerment which is open to foreign investment has been partially viewed as an attack on the economic indigenisation policy. Among some radicals, the current penchant on re-engagement has been criticised for potentially reversing the achievements of indigenising the economy. However, moderates within ZANU PF feel that economic re-engagement employing the strategy of opening up the economy to foreign capital will contribute to overall national development.

Resisting a Colonially Parented Opposition

The opposition's dogmatic position, particularly its direct ideological and financial proximity with imperialist forces is rarely subjected to intense interrogation. In our unique Zimbabwean experience, some sections of the academia and civil society have been a convenient and an indirect ally of the opposition in the deliberate manoeuvres to clamp ZANU PF's hold on power. In response, the state has responded by deploying strategic defences to secure itself from the potential threats of being toppled from power. The paranoia of the ruling ZANU PF to these destabilisation efforts is rooted in the experiences of other African liberation movements.

The Lasting Mark of His Legacy

Mugabe will be better remembered as a Pan-Africanist and anti-colonial champion. This is chiefly influenced by his role in challenging the Global North and the Global South's asymmetrical relations. As a sovereign defender of Zimbabwe's international image, he will be remembered for his role in exposing the West's bullying, especially to its former colonies. The land reform programme executed during his tenure further revealed that the post-colonial regime change agenda is founded on colonial reason. The selective framing of the discourse of human rights after the land reform also exposed how the West is preoccupied with securing hegemony in Africa. As a result, Mugabe's defiant position in the fight against relics of imperialism will make him a perennial symbol of African liberation. Under Mugabe's imperial delink position, it became apparent that African Governments which rebel from the colonial global order are punished.

Back at home, the White community and some CSOs became more politically stratified in anti-establishment fraternal terms. Mugabe was able to hold together the relevance of ZANU PF through his populist proclivity. This way the mass party status of ZANU PF was galvanised by the membership of the working class, peasants and indigenous business communities. The indigenisation of the economy became the rallying point of ZANU PF's support base. The war-veterans continued to maintain their revolutionary vanguard status in the fight against efforts inclined to imperial domination. As a result, Mugabe's memory will remain more associated with the aspirations of the masses and the liberation struggle. The urban resentment on Mugabe as a result of opposition political capital will never erase the illustrious mark of his role as a decolonial giant considering the extent to which he moved beyond deracialising the status quo. However, his role in promoting economic liberation and agitating the West in the process serves as a critical mark of his enduring contribution in the fight for the total political and economic freedom of Africa.



Myself, with the late former President, R.G. Mugabe

Under Mugabe's mentorship, I was taught to be an African who is proud to reaffirm values of liberation in every aspect of governance. The monumental lesson of serving as a public administrator right up to my promotion to various ministerial capacities is that policy-making must be responsive to the enduring aspirations of a people. Under Mugabe, the key lesson was that leadership must be guided by the historical experiences of those whom one serves. This principle made much more sense considering the deep-rooted reality of economic inequalities which were inherited from colonialism and later infused into post-colonial governance. The weight of this burden of history must be reconciled by paving a way for equality and widening the people's access to the control of their resources. Colonialism was founded to secure resource control for Europe on the back of the exploitation of our people. My active involvement in government since the days of the land reform right up to the enactment of economic indigenisation into law was quite rewarding. I was part and parcel of the implementation of the key objectives of the struggle.

The launch of the land reform was critical as it exposed us to the reality of the unfinished business of the liberation struggle. After the mass resettlement of our people, polarisation was constructed to help create a mass dislike for ZANU PF. However, this has not been successful because we have continued to win elections regardless of the efforts by the West and its proxies to fragment national consciousness along pro-liberation and neo-colonialist lines. No matter how much the subject of property and human rights was deployed to make ZANU PF unpopular, Mugabe remained resolute in reasserting his irreversible defiance against the West's meddling in Zimbabwean politics.

The FTLRP simultaneously took off when Zimbabwe was intervening in the DRC crisis. This resulted in the restriction of Zimbabwean manufactured military equipment in the international market. Zimbabwe's support to the Joseph Kabila-led administration in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) threatened the efforts of the US-supported rebels to take over the state. Once again, Mugabe proved to be a rock-solid Pan-Africanist who supported other African countries in the face of acute neo-colonial hostilities. In response, the EU, UK and US governments froze

the assets of notable government officials and senior ZANU PF members. The officials were also issued with travel bans. Zimbabwe was ejected from the Commonwealth. In all this, Mugabe maintained unrestrained defiance in castigating Western powers for their hegemonic meddle in the affairs of weaker nations in the world. Sanctions have necessitated Zimbabwe's isolation from the international market and IFIs credit lines. Zimbabwe has found regional support against the continued renewal of the sanctions. For me, the sympathy we are getting from other African countries substantiates the reward of our determination in challenging the West's dominating influence in African politics. The regional call against sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe is not only a success of the re-engagement policy instituted by the Second Republic. This should also be viewed as a total response to the logic of the late Cde Robert Mugabe's determined stand against Western domination.

Power Struggles and the Military in Zimbabwe

We wish to make it very clear to all Zimbabwean citizens that the security organisations will only stand in support of those political leaders that will pursue Zimbabwean values, traditions and beliefs for which thousands of lives were lost in the pursuit of Zimbabwe's hard-won independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and national interests. To this end, let it be known that the highest office in the land is a straitjacket whose occupant is expected to observe the objectives of the liberation struggle. We will therefore not accept, let alone support or salute, anyone with a different agenda that threatens the very existence of our sovereignty.

[ZDF Commander, General Vitalis Zvinvashe, ahead of the 2002 election]

Since independence, several socio-economic and political milestones have been recorded to the credit of ZANU PF. Equally, ZANU PF cannot be exonerated from a fair share of the failures of the state. Our success in delivering the aspirations of the people is impounded by several miscarriages of some national goals. However, it is important to emphasise that such faults within ZANU PF and in Government were never meant to cause any harm to the permanent national interests and aspirations. A major part of the country's current problems are embedded in the vestiges of colonialism. ZANU PF inherited a colonial state whose 1980 transitional fortunes and challenges resided in the structural currencies of colonial determination. This explains the centrality of the liberation legacy in the consistent power dynamics in Zimbabwe. Having been in Government almost my entire post-independence career, I would be remiss not to also hold myself accountable for some of the problems which Zimbabwe is facing. At the same time, I am also proud

that, as a national liberation political party, ZANU PF has also strived to protect the legacy of the armed struggle. It is prudent to recall that the party's long stay in power has also been characterised by various internal contestations, contradictions and longstanding power struggles. After all, ZANU PF was born out of the early contradictions experienced in 1963. Therefore, the DNA of contradiction has always been engrained in ZANU PF.

My entire experience in Zimbabwean politics has proved the reality of another major "struggle after the struggle." This has been the fight between revolutionary forces bent on consolidating liberation gains and counter-revolutionary forces dedicated to entrenching the remains of colonialism. The competition for state power in independent Zimbabwe has been fought by these two opposing forces. In the face of these contestations, the military and war-veterans have been the pillars of preserving decolonisation values. For us, in the liberation movement, our fight has been to preserve what fellow comrades died for in the struggle for Zimbabwe. However, opposition supporters and their leaders feel that the liberation struggle has been devalued by the socio-economic challenges which Zimbabwe is currently experiencing. In the process, we have observed sponsored efforts to erase the triumphant nationalist past and its success in challenging the cruelty of imperialist oppression. Today, there is so much hidden colonial presence in opposition and CSO-initiated political protests. The obsession with postcolonial mismanagement of national resources, corruption and abuse of human rights is ironic, especially coming from the neo-colonial practitioners who are vanguards of the vestiges of colonial relics.

Selective amnesia pretends that the decline of the economy has been only precipitated by the ruling ZANU PF. There is always a tendency to ignore that the colonial design of power positioned Zimbabwe to perennial colonial dependency. Therefore, the contribution of colonial powers to Zimbabwe's problems cannot be ignored. This justifies the centrality of the revolutionary element in the form of war-veterans and the military as the vanguard of Zimbabwean politics. The traces of colonial influence to our post-independence politics can be linked to Gukurahundi, ESAP, opposition and CSO-sponsored resistances to economic democratisation.

Throughout phases of national turmoil, colonial influence can be identified to this day.

Western propaganda has vilified the vanguard role of the liberation legacy in the promotion of the posterity of the ruling party. We have been made to think that the military is an entirely hostile element in our politics and that it must be disengaged from all political processes. This is ambiguous and misleading, considering the relations which existed between the military and the masses in the armed struggle. Today, when the military asserts its revolutionary position on the politics of the day, we are reminded of the military capture of the state. This ahistorical approach of misrepresenting the role of the military is consciously targeted at influencing our people to abandon the liberation legacy. ZANU PF as a revolutionary party has ensured that it secures all the key ideas devoted to ensuring that the liberation legacy is not wounded. In the process, neo-colonial forces have been working tirelessly to rob us of the dignity of our liberation pride which, since independence, has been under siege. As an ex-combatant and an active post-colonial actor in Zimbabwean politics, I have been always interested in locating the role of the military in the Zimbabwean political landscape. There is no doubt that power dynamics in ZANU PF cannot be analysed without factoring the ever-present ideological presence and symbolism of the military in shaping internal contradictions in the ruling party. The military is a decisive factor in Zimbabwean politics. Its role has been to ensure that ZANU PF remains on the path of ideological correctness at all times. Combined with the tenets of African nationalism, the values of discipline borrowed from ZPRA and ZANLA remain the binding terms of association in ZANU PF. Based on this tradition, Zimbabwe's period of political turmoil, produced by Western antagonisms to the land reform and witnessed pronounced military positions with regards to power struggles in Zimbabwe. The prefacing remarks above by the late Commander of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF), Vitalis Zvinvashe, broadly substantiates this fact. After all, nationalist movements' pre-eminence and the foundation for democracy across post-colonial Africa was derived from armed struggles. ZANU PF as a party of Zimbabwe's decolonisation embodies this major characteristic and this is a major perennial feature of the party.

The military in Zimbabwe is not only as a mere institution of security and territorial integrity preservation entity in the normatively postured modern political sense. Instead, the ZDF is also a vanguard of the liberation legacy. The ZDF's role in Zimbabwean politics is grounded in the memory of resisting the return of colonialism. The ZDF is, by all means, a defender of the nationalist project and its enduring objectives against imperialism and all neo-colonially aligned elements in Zimbabwe's contemporary power struggles.

The Decade of Political Turmoil

With the intensely hostile political environment between 1998 and 2008, the economy massively declined. The level of household poverty increased; unemployment was on the rise and international demonisation of Zimbabwe took an accelerated leap. The tense political atmosphere in the country became the breeding ground for political violence with limited terms to arriving at social integration. The state had to intensify its resistance to the Western-sponsored opposition. With sanctions also immensely contributing to the total fall of the economy, we had no other option but to resign to strengthening indigenisation and economic empowerment. In the context of the prevailing crisis, it became evident that some high-ranking officials engaged in corrupt activities, threatening the integrity of the state. The crisis continued Zimbabwe's international isolation, with many sectors of the economy being severely affected.

In many instances, the opposition, private press and NGOs misrepresented the political situation in Zimbabwe by falsifying cases of power centralisation, electoral fraud, a decline in the rule of law, judiciary partiality, growing constraints on the operations of the independent media, widespread human rights violations, a growing militarisation of the state and an increasing recourse to state-sponsored violence against opponents. The cumulative delicacy of the Zimbabwean state was both a cause and consequence of the wider economic malaise largely determined by global forces and their internal neo-colonial substitutes. As the economy contracted, the financial resource base of the public sector was eroded and human capital drained away. This, in turn, led to diminished state capacity to plan and finance economic growth and ensure the provision

of basic public goods. Gross mismanagement characterised the public sector and that tainted the image of the Government.

A major part of Cabinet deliberations centred on strategies which could be applied to deal with the vertiginous spiralling inflation, unemployment, productive infrastructure decay, decline of service delivery and high debt burden. There was massive brain drain since the majority of the working class sought greener pastures in the diaspora. Worsening poverty attracted international humanitarian assistance. In the process, some NGOs used the opportunity to execute disguised commissariat work for the opposition. This facilitated wide resentment towards ZANU PF. In response to the growing crisis, I had to ensure that the basic social needs of the people in my constituency were met. Unnecessary aid supplies were compensated by community-based development initiatives. Support was mobilised to heighten grassroots political consciousness since some donor organisations were using aid to shape anti-establishment attitudes. The success of this intervention was the continued dominance of ZANU PF in the entire Matebeleland North province in every election. Our provincial structures remained relevant to the cause of challenging imperialist efforts to dissuade our people from supporting ZANU PF.

International media propaganda and colonially inclined local players continued to exaggerate the political situation in Zimbabwe. In as much as the country was facing problems which we all acknowledge, it cannot be ignored that the media and NGO efforts collectively contributed to Zimbabwe's political-economic detriment. Zimbabwe was recurrently presented as a "failed" state in global indexes of international finance organisations. We continued to be rated low in their governance, democracy and human rights indexes to justify our international isolation. This pushed away possibilities for FDI, on top of the effect of the sanctions. There were coordinated efforts to diminish the territorial integrity preservation role of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) and the Zimbabwe Republic Police. The two institutions were presented as key actors in fostering cohesion and suppressing all forms of political dissent.

With intensified hostile propaganda on Zimbabwe from Western powers aggrieved by the land reform, the 2008 plebiscite was presented as unfair and ZANU PF was accused of gross electoral fraud. In the end, this all validated the reality of the underhand neo-colonial activity which was linked to the West's support to the MDC. With the externally and internally effected hegemony in the Zimbabwean political space, it has become apparent that the polarisation we have to bear is mainly centred on creating some disillusionment which will work in the service of removing ZANU PF from power.

Internal Contradictions

The inevitable collapse of the economy after the land reform and the subsequent imposition of the illegal sanctions on Zimbabwe by the West incited disgruntlement amongst many senior members of the party. At this point, the longevity of ZANU PF was in crisis. The effects of confronting global superpowers hurt us beyond measure; the proverbial ethos of revolutionary unity was under siege. In the previous years, the internal affairs of ZANU PF were not littered for public consumption. The Unity Accord and its amalgamating consequences to Zimbabwe's political powerhouses ensured strategic power consolidation and a sustained nationalist euphoria. Even in our most troubled times, we have maintained a very discreet way of handling our problems. It was only once after independence that we experienced a major political shake-up with the rise of Edgar Tekere and his short-lived political outfit, ZUM.

With his exit from ZANU PF, the party's postures and lived realities of unity remained intact until MDC was formed. Even with the coming of MDC onto the political scene in 1999, we have managed to contain all elements with a destructive intent towards our survival interests. As a result, factionalism in ZANU PF has been a subject of interest for our Western misanthropists through usual conduits of expression of interests such as the private press, opposition associated CSO-detractors and some Western embassies in Zimbabwe. Otherwise, besides that, ZANU PF had always maintained the culture of in-house conflict management. Where disciplinary action was needed, the party called out or weeded out retrogressive elements. It was never the norm to discuss internal party

issues outside constitutionally prescribed platforms. It was only after the 2013 election that a new culture of “washing our dirty linen” in public emerged, continuing to this day. This is unavoidable considering the central role of social media in shaping public discourse. Whilst this new tradition may have signalled a higher level of ZANU PF’s democratisation, those inclined to the conservative predisposition of internal conflict resolution saw this as a wayward approach to dealing with internal party issues. At some point, there were wide deliberations at Politburo level for members to suspend their use of social media to dispatch contestations of power in ZANU PF.

While it may be convenient to look at the succession crisis in the context of the fast-paced events to Operation Restore Legacy, it must be recalled that individuals like Tekere were on the forefront of pushing for Mugabe to leave office. The radicalised turn in this direction was also seen when Simba Makoni, the former Finance Minister, established his political party which contested against ZANU PF in the 2008 election. In as much as there were forces of ambition at play, it must be acknowledged that this reality was all conceived by an unchecked system of monopoly.

Mugabe was a revered political actor and, in the process, he became a surrogate father to many of us in the ruling party. There is no doubt that he remained a predominant stalwart of our revolutionary trajectory in the face of acute neo-colonial hostilities. His role as a champion of economic empowerment also earned him an illustrious status as a father figure of a colonially endangered spirit of African nationalism. This even explains why people like Simba Makoni and Dumiso Dabengwa found themselves seeking to challenge Mugabe outside the parameters of ZANU PF membership. The Simba Makoni-led Mavambo/Kusile/Dawn was formed with the full endorsement of the late Dr Dumiso Dabengwa and General Solomon Mujuru. After the flop of the Mavambo project, Dabengwa had to take up the initiative of supposedly forming ZAPU as a symbolic gesture of defiance to the terms of the Unity Accord conceived under Joshua Nkomo’s PF ZAPU in 1987.

The Military and the National Question

The tradition of the armed struggle jointly fought by ZPRA and ZANLA leading to the attainment of independence in 1980 make the military an integral part of the power dynamics in ZANU PF. Most leaders in ZANU PF have their present political careers rooted in the military. The basis of our revolutionary values is in the protracted combatant activity which brought Zimbabwe's freedom. The collaborative role of the nationalists and the liberation armies cannot be put into question given that nationalists proffered charismatic direction to the liberation struggle. On the other hand, the military executed the practical processes of our armed resistance towards independence. After 1980, the military was at the centre of most important political questions of the day not only as a custodian of territorial integrity but as an interested actor in the consolidation of the nationalist revolutionary values personified in the ideology of ZANU PF. The demobilisation of ZPRA and ZANLA forces underpinned one of the pivotal roadmaps to sustainable peace in Zimbabwe. The challenges encountered in the process became the starting point of the early threats to peace in Zimbabwe.

The omnipresence of the military in Zimbabwean politics nullifies the narrow dictum of "politics leading the gun." The fraternal relationship between "politics and the gun" was symbolically expressed through the land reform which was initiated by war-veterans towards the new millennium. The resurgence of the economic decolonisation agenda led by war-veterans corrected a long-neglected injustice. With the politically negotiated terms of power, political independence was born, but it took a further militant step for economic equality to be realised. The war-veterans rescinded post-colonial policy compromises and defied the bureaucratic orders which secured interests of White monopoly capital. The land reform transformed the political landscape as Zimbabwe plunged into an economic meltdown. The rise of the MDC and the imposition of the illegal imperialist sanctions on Zimbabwe created a more hostile internal and external political environment. The rise of opposition-aligned CSOs even called for radicalising nationalist defiance.

On the other hand, before the land reform programme, Solomon Mujuru

who was at the helm of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) had already initiated confrontational proposals for the former President to exit office in the early 90s. His contribution (though not successful) signalled the formative stage of military resistances towards the former President. Mujuru's constant defiance to Cde Mugabe sharply situated the role of the military in influencing Zimbabwean politics.



From the left, General C. Chiwenga (now Vice President), General P. V. Sibanda, the late Air Marshal P. Shiri. Photo Credit: zwnews.com

The Military and ZANU PF Succession

As early as 2002, there were conspiracies around a military-brokered transition which was being engineered by the then Commander of the ZDF, General Vitalis Zvinavashe. The proposed plan was to make way for Mugabe to retire and have Cde Emmerson Mnangagwa take over. This plan did not find favourable ground as it made propositions for the MDC to be incorporated in this unitary arrangement. The lobby for this transitional trajectory might have also failed because Zvinavashe was mainly using his influence to give dictates on a type of transitional modalities which he directly desired. From this position, it is evident to

note that this move was only going to militarise the state instead of creating a mutually inclusive arrangement which would progressively merge the desired interests of politicians and the military. After failing to get the needed support for his idea, Zvinavashe quickly endorsed Mugabe's 2002 election candidature. This was probably because it had come to light that he was pushing for Mugabe's ouster and yet Cde Mnangagwa who was his targeted Mugabe successor was not keen on the idea of taking over.

Zvinavashe's declaration of allegiance to Cde Mugabe was meant to exonerate him and guarantee his safety. On the other hand, his failure to navigate a consultative transitional bargain saw wide, but unexpressed disgruntlement from senior party leaders like Cde Dabengwa, Cde Mujuru and the late Cde Edison Zvobgo. All these senior members of ZANU PF were all interested in seeing Mugabe exit office, but they did not have an alternative successor. Cde Mnangagwa, who was in Cabinet at the time, would not be dragged into the race to succeed Mugabe at the behest of a military power struggle between Zvinavashe and Mujuru.

Zvinavashe was interested in asserting an authoritative stamp as the new ZDF boss while Mujuru was exerting his erstwhile influence in the military to meddle in politics. There is no doubt that Mujuru still had a few military personnel who were loyal to his succession ambitions. However, Zvinavashe's assertive position and continued manipulation of his influence in the ZDF catalysed Mujuru's irrelevance in pushing a military-backed succession plan.

After the 2002 election, Vitalis Zvinavashe was replaced by Cde Constantine Chiwenga, Zimbabwe's current Vice President. Chiwenga's allegiance to the late former President was unequivocal. His ascension to the post of ZDF commander neutralised the military transitional project by his predecessor. Chiwenga's tenure in the ZDF was characterised by the enhanced military-backed confidence in the Mugabe's leadership. With Chiwenga at the helm, Mujuru's continued proposition for Mugabe's removal from power was robustly pacified.

Unlike Zvinavashe, whose allegiance postures were inconsistent with his manoeuvres to have Mugabe retire to make way for a negotiated settlement

with the opposition, General Chiwenga proved to be unflinching. General Chiwenga's tenure was characterised by an apt revolutionary hardliner stance. Zvinavashe's tilting towards compromising the autonomy of ZANU PF by proposing the inclusion of MDC in the succession equation had further collapsed his ambition and made him unpopular with many in the party. Cde Chiwenga's elevation to the position of ZDF Commander certainly frustrated Mujuru's anticipated meddling in the military after the Zvinavashe era.

Solomon Mujuru and the Escalation of Factionalism in ZANU PF

As already highlighted, my experience with Solomon Mujuru, otherwise also known as Rex Nhongo, dates back to the days of the armed struggle. We trained together in Tanzania under ZPRA. He was later sent to Russia for further military training. There is no doubt the young "Chimsoro," as we called him, was a brave soldier, very radical and unassuming. Even after independence, he remained a soldier that he always was in the struggle. At independence, he was a high-ranking commander. Mujuru created a strong ZANLA-centred power in the country's top defence organ. On the other hand, the joint ZANU and ZAPU cabinet meant emotive solidarity to safeguard the liberation legacy. Mujuru's elevation in the army in post-independence Zimbabwe made him a revered figure for those of us who were with him in ZPRA before he joined ZANLA. Mujuru's influence in the national army alongside other decorated ex-ZANLA seniors such as the late Josiah Tungamirai and Vitalis Zvinavashe provided strong sureties to ZANU PF's continued dominance.

As I was working for the Customs Department I cordially interacted with him because I was actively involved in facilitating customs clearance of the military wares which were imported by the national army. At this level, our relationship was largely professional and bound by mutual brotherly respect. As years advanced, both of us were elevated to the Politburo. I observed with concern that General Mujuru was highly ambitious. His military credentials became the basis of his unconcealed ambitions to take charge of decisive political processes. At the same time, he did not disguise his dislike for President Emmerson Mnangagwa.

In 2004, Cde Mujuru was amongst some senior members of the Party who were calling for Cde Mnangagwa to be investigated for corruption and mismanagement of ZANU PF investments. It was part of Mujuru's strategy to discredit him, considering that a lot of people in ZANU PF wanted Cde Mnangagwa to be Vice President. The setting up of a commission of inquiry was part of a bigger smear campaign against Cde Mnangagwa. I remember the late former General hinting that any course of succession should not lead to "Mnangagwa assuming power." I even asked him more than twice why he disliked the current President so much. Although he brushed this aside, he was consistent in arguing that: "Mnangagwa has people who are blindly following him in his pursuit of power." One would wonder what Mujuru was talking about considering that the current President was still a Minister. Constitutionally, there was no provision which allowed him to take power. Cde Mujuru was unyielding in his commitment to ensuring that Cde Mnangagwa never ascends to the presidency of ZANU PF and the Government. However, I recall telling him that we could not determine the will of the people when the right time came. Surely, my prediction was spot on.



The late Gen. Solomon Mujuru

In 2004, I was part of the commission of inquiry which was indirectly aimed at assassinating Cde Mnangagwa's career. The committee was chaired by David Karimanzira. Other members included Mujuru, Simbarashe Makoni and Thokozile Mathuthu. Mujuru managed to coax this committee to serve his incrimination drive. Even before the investigation was carried out, there were insinuations of a premeditated outcome of this report. I had to personally confront Simba Makoni and dismissed the unsubstantiated claims he had recorded in the report under Mujuru's instruction. My intervention put across an objective outline of issues. I refused to be part of a plan to tarnish the image of a fellow party cadre to satisfy some selfish interests. Thereafter my relationship with Mujuru crumbled. He viewed me as a political opponent right up to his last days on earth.

The Force behind Joice Mujuru

After failing to apply his hidden hand to compromise the ZDF and General Chiwenga's loyalty to the former President, Mujuru dragged his wife (Joice Teurairopa) into the ZANU PF succession battle. This was after the passing on of Simon Muzenda, Zimbabwe's former Vice President. The ZANU PF Women's League lobbied for Cde Muzenda's successor to be a woman. Already Joice Mujuru was among the interested contenders. Grace Mugabe was also engaged by the Women's League to persuade Mugabe to elevate a woman to the party's second most influential post. Solomon Mujuru threw in his weight to garner support for his wife. In November 2004, the Politburo motioned the amendment of ZANU PF's Constitution so that one of the party's two Vice Presidents to be a woman in the interest of gender balance. In December 2004, Joice became the Vice President of Zimbabwe and the party. The appointment of Joice Mujuru served as a key milestone for Rex as he was always keen to push away the current President from the succession matrix.

Simba Makoni and the Mujuru Backing

Three years after the appointment of his wife as Vice President, Rex was on the forefront of mobilising some disgruntled elements in ZANU PF. With the escalating tensions in the party and a possible election

knockout, Mujuru is believed to have been one of the brains behind Simba Makoni's formation of Mavambo/Dawn/Kusile Party. However, he later jilted Makoni after realising that he had insignificant political capital. Out of desperation, Dabengwa exited the pact with Makoni and formed a new political outfit, ZAPU. The fast turn of events leading to Mugabe's autonomy being challenged by individuals like Makoni, Dabengwa and Mujuru exposed the extent to which the succession issue remained a major challenge within ZANU PF. We resorted to several strategies of asserting Cde Mugabe's political traction. Individuals like the current President, Cde Emmerson Mnangagwa, spearheaded initiatives like the "One Million March" to legitimise Mugabe in the face of internal opposition. After all the stalemates and heated contestations, the negotiated transitional outcome of the 2008 election was the creation of the Government of National Unity (GNU).

The Government of National Unity

As ZANU PF narrowly escaped the fate of electoral defeat in 2008, there were sharp considerations to have the succession issue resolved once and for all. It had dawned to all of us of within the higher echelons of the party that leadership renewal was essential if ZANU PF was to survive. Though the propositions for leadership renewal were hinted on many occasions, the late former President, Cde Mugabe, did not seem keen to have the succession issue resolved. Then it was inevitable that there were hostile camps within the party which were born out of this crisis. In 2008, I was re-elected as the Member of Parliament for Umguza Constituency and I was appointed Minister of Mines and Mining Development. As indicated in the previous chapter, the indigenisation policy suffered abuse from some government officials. The role of the Ministry of Mines was undermined by certain individuals in pursuit of self-serving interests. All this happened because the characters involved had the backing of the former first family.

At the 2009 Congress, I was assigned to the post of Secretary for Economic Affairs. The country was battling to get on its feet economically. At Cabinet and party leadership level issues of economic recovery were presented for discussion and it was clear that our nation was in a fragile condition

in terms of moving towards sustainable economic advancement. In as much as we had consolidated political power, the economy was in a paralytic state. The GNU had no significant impact in addressing the economic challenges faced by the country. The then Minister of Finance, Tendai Biti, was from the opposition, but the proximity of his party to the imperialists did not help in any way to rescue the economy from declining. Instead, the adoption of the dollarisation policy repressed the potential of the growth of the Zim Dollar's value growth in the multi-currency basket.

The failures of the state in the GNU period are linked to the major players of Zimbabwean politics who were signatories to the Global Political Agreement. The New Dispensation was also aimed at revisiting the collective failures of Zimbabwe's major political parties whose footprints in the national development crisis are equally registered. The GNU consisted of ZANU PF, under Cde Robert Mugabe, and the two Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) parties, MDC-T led by Morgan Tsvangirai and MDC led by Arthur Mutambara. The 2008 election had no absolute winner on the presidential ballot. This resulted in a run-off that the opposition MDC pulled out of the race citing irregularities and violence blamed on ZANU-PF. Western countries intervened with a bias towards MDC splinter groups. However, after the GNU there were no economic turnaround strategies by the West which supported the dissolution of ZANU PF during the 2008 stalemate. Even with the fully-fledged MDCs in the GNU Zimbabwe's economy remained characterised by fiscal indiscipline, unsustainable deficits and escalating domestic debt. The mounting economic challenges at this stage should be attributed to both the ruling and the opposition. This phase was characterised by compromised decision-making. All the accrued failures which fast-tracked Zimbabwe's economic collapse were a result of the opposition and the ruling's respective roles in the GNU.

The competing interests of the opposition in the area of policy-making were evidenced by the launch of the Short-Term Emergency Recovery Programme (STERP) in March 2009. STERP was launched on the side-lines of the ZANU-PF originated Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Policy (IEEP). GNU Finance Minister Tendai Biti was

never enthusiastic about IEEP. Clearly, during this period there were competing partisan agendas which stifled the country's progress, though I would still commend the empowerment overdrive which ZANU-PF embarked on.

Against the virtues of internal democracy in ZANU PF, the succession crisis strained any possible attempts towards national economic development. The burden of the retained post-GNU hegemony did not offer any meaningful terms of national development. It was during this period that ZANU PF found itself entangled in suspensions, disciplinary hearings and dismissal of members who were directly or indirectly lobbying for the transfer of power from the late Robert Mugabe. In the process, investment was discouraged. The fights within the party saw the cabinet divided into camps of those who manipulated their proximity to the former first family to secure self-interests and those of us who were convinced in the need for a transfer of power. The calls for power shift were mainly aimed at building sustainable possibilities of breaking the monopoly which was created by the absence of a succession framework.

After the 2013 election, ZANU PF had re-established its dominance courtesy of the defiant support which some of us had given to the late former President. The period between 2007 and 2008 was very turbulent, but a select group of individuals including the current President and his two deputies remained unwavering at a time Cde Mugabe was almost deserted by many senior members of ZANU PF. Even after the purging of some officials who were aligned to Mujuru's succession plan, some remained in the system and were not fully dedicated to supporting the late former President. The unexpected death of Solomon Mujuru also presented a new direction to the succession question. Joice Mujuru could not consolidate the legitimacy for ascension which her late husband was creating for her. This allowed Cde Mugabe to directly ensure that Joice Mujuru was eliminated from the whole equation. With Joice Mujuru out of the picture, Mugabe's stay in power was secure as he was predominantly surrounded by loyalists. A few days before Mujuru and her cronies were fired, I had a meeting with the former President and he indicated clearly that he was aware of the Mujurus' political infidelity. Outside the formal reasons for my visit, on that day we discussed at

length the state of the party. I wondered why the old man kept probing me about issues of insubordination by some of my peers in the cabinet. As a matter of principle, I have always avoided being swayed into gossiping about colleagues. Beyond doubt, such tendencies grew into the toxic undermining of comrades. In any case, I knew that the former President had already made up his mind on the course of action he was going to take. He even said he was going to pull a surprise and he did. Therefore, there was no point in me adding more harm to an already embattled lot.

On the 9th of December in 2014, Mujuru and a group of eight ministers were fired from Government. These included Didymus Mutasa (Presidential Affairs), Webster Shamu (Information Communication Technologies, Postal and Courier Services), Francis Nhema (Youth, Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment), Olivia Muchena (Higher and Tertiary Education, Science and Technology Development), Dzikamai Mavhaire (Energy and Power Development), Nicholas Goche (Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare), Simbaneuta Mudarikwa (Minister of State for Mashonaland East Province) and Munacho Mutezo (Deputy Minister Energy and Power Development). This was the end of the Mujuru plan. Joice Mujuru later re-emerged as an opposition political leader.

For Better, For Worse

The end of 2014 had a very important shift of power which worked in favour of Cde Mugabe's longevity. Without doubt, Robert Mugabe had to reward the current President Cde Mnangagwa for his unflinching support to him in the most turbulent phase of his political career path. Considering Cde Mnangagwa's consistency, it was only befitting for him to become the Vice President. The military had also contributed to the preservation of ZANU PF's power by ensuring that it secured the tenure of the former President at a time imperialist forces were working flat out to remove Mugabe out of power. The then-current Commander of the Zimbabwe Defence, now Vice President, was consistent in ensuring that ZANU PF is not swallowed into alliances of short-term political convenience. Unlike his predecessor who once plotted a transition which was going to compromise ZANU PF's powerbase, Chiwenga was adamant throughout in ensuring that the military is only confined to its

constitutional role. However, he went a step further in ensuring that the place of the military in Zimbabwe was brutally aligned to the party creed. It then became quite clear that the base of our power consolidation was guaranteed against all odds. However, the rise of Cde Mnangagwa did not sit well with some individuals for whom the closing of the curtain on Mujuru was the beginning of their opportunism. The first person to destabilise the new equilibrium in ZANU PF was none other than Grace Mugabe, surrounded by ambitious cronies.



General Constantino Guveya Dominic Nyikadzino Chivenga

Operation Restore Legacy the Exit of Mugabe from Power

It is saddening to see our revolution being hijacked by agents of our erstwhile enemies who are now at the brink of returning our country to foreign domination against which so many of our people perished. The famous slogan espoused by His Excellency, The President of the Republic of Zimbabwe, Head of State and Government and Commander-in-Chief of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces, Cde R. G. Mugabe: “Zimbabwe will never be a colony again” is being seriously challenged by counter-revolutionary infiltrators who are now effectively influencing the direction of the Party.

It is our strong and deeply considered position that if drastic action is not taken immediately, our beloved country Zimbabwe is headed to becoming a neo-colony again. The current purging and cleansing process in ZANU-PF which so far is targeting mostly members associated with our liberation history is a serious cause for concern to us in the Defence Forces.

[Remarks by Retired General Constantine Guvheya Chiwenga on the 13th November 2017 at the peak of Operation Restore Legacy]

Defending the Liberation Legacy

The end of the Mugabe era was made inevitable by layered factors within ZANU PF and the Zimbabwean political landscape. Ever since my conversion to active politics, beyond my combatant past in independent Zimbabwe, I can reflect on a lot of issues which would have been engulfed the nationalist movement to its demise. However, the period towards the last days of Cde Robert Mugabe was excruciating to the cause of the nationalist movement. The fears of a

ZANU PF without Robert Mugabe was clandestinely recognised but overtly dismissed. However, the West and its proxies in Zimbabwe held on to hopes of Mugabe's exit from power. Regrettably, and inconsistent with the internal maxims of our party discipline, the open capture of the old man by Grace Mugabe in his last days made the paranoia of the post-Mugabe era even more acute within ZANU PF. To the Western-sponsored opposition and some global neo-colonial forces, Mugabe's fall and the consequent collapse of ZANU PF entailed the triumph of the protracted regime change agenda. This is substantiated by the supports we received from the opposition in the last efforts of our push to compel Mugabe to resign in November 2017. The input from the opposition, the MDC-T in particular in November 2017 is illustrative of their wish to see a defeated ZANU PF and in their miscalculation, the elimination of Mugabe from the equation of political transition entailed a success of their 'Mugabe Must Go' affirmative position upheld since the early days of the MDC's formation. After the 2013 election, ZANU PF regained its ground after several penetration efforts by Western embassies in Zimbabwe which worked directly with the Mujuru faction. ZANU PF's post-GNU recuperation suffered internal defeats which manifested in the acceleration of factionalism sponsored by political opportunists.

As such, apart from external attacks on ZANU PF, Robert Mugabe was aggressively annexed by political fortune hunters who aligned themselves to the former first lady in anticipation of quick rewards after taking over ZANU PF. These were the characters who fought to erase standing lines of power protocol to reorder their positions ahead in the post-Mugabe era. In other words, Mugabe was pushed out of power by his wife's allies who had sought to secure their interests in the event of his inevitable exit from presidency.

The weight of internal contradictions in ZANU PF had catalysed the need for the party to return to a common ideology and tradition towards a sustainable transitional path. At an institutional level within ZANU PF, there was disillusionment about the capture of Mugabe by some few opportunists in the post-Mujuru era. Those who had established themselves as proxies of the former first family relentlessly wrestled with those who were viewed as the then Vice President, Emmerson

Mnangagwa's loyalists. Unfortunately, individuals like me with no factional fancies were simplistically shoved into this category. I have never been a factionalist, but my political association has always morally grounded than it is based on personality obsessions. Experiences from my active involvement in ZAPU as a ZPRA combatant only exposed me to the reality of the unsustainable submission of allegiances to factions and the personality loyalties.

Therefore, it was not amazing that with the magnitude of internal forces of changes and contradictions in ZANU PF, the role of the military as an ideological restitutive agent became essential. As part of re-establishing the norms derived from nationalist revolutionary tradition, the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) and all Zimbabweans helped in realigning the liberation movement to its founding ideals. The New Dispensation in 2017 and the Second Republic, born out of the 2018 election, show that Operation Restore Legacy secured the foundation for ZANU PF's rejuvenation and set Zimbabwe on a path of transformative politics. Operation Restore Legacy achieved the ideological repositioning of ZANU PF; protecting the outstanding political legacy of Robert Mugabe as a revered founding father of the First Republic. While most credit goes to ZANU PF for the 2017 transition, it is equally important to acknowledge the opposition's "balance-check" role, given our liberation legacy's democracy predisposition. However, Operation Restore Legacy occurred, the change took an autonomous character without the neo-colonial terms that the opposition has fronted and unequivocally continues to posit.

The Preceding Forces to the Liberation Legacy Fracture

The edict of post-independence peace and reconciliation guaranteed economic security for the minority. As a result, the economy showed signs of functionality and yet at the same time capital flight was rife. The optimism for continued economic progress, however, dwindled towards the end of the first decade of independence. To hold back the collapse of the economy, the IMF and the World Bank were engaged. Their Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) laid out terms for recovery, but the terms only accelerated poverty. Zimbabwe was

plunged into an unprecedented debt crisis. Mass civil unrests ensued. In the process pressure groups were beginning to be reorganised in more politically defined terms.

Of note was the radical transformation of the labour movement. Most urban areas had been immensely affected by ESAP. As a result, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) became the leading social movement for economic and political advocacy. University students also became a pivotal front for challenging the Government to return to its welfarist character. This was highly impractical given the continued decline of the economy. The unrelenting politicisation of civil society accelerated antagonism between the state social movements. In as much as the Unity Accord had created some political stability in Zimbabwe, the effects of ESAP became another major drive for political tension from the mid-90s until 1999. After ESAP, the land reform programme followed and White economic monopoly was threatened. This period saw social movements politically gravitated towards the human and property rights advocacy to condemn the land reform programme as a violation of human and property rights. The birth of MDC in September 1999 was an outgrowth of these anti-establishment manoeuvres. At its formation, MDC was a White farmers' interest vanguard party whose key objective was to remove ZANU PF from power and reinstate White farmers to the commercial land they had lost.

The transition from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe suffered several structural and political onslaughts which created a favourable ground for mass dissatisfaction towards ZANU PF. On the other hand, the Lovemore Madhuku-led National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) came into being, followed by the proliferation of other NGOs. The rise in neo-liberal advocacy was inclined to proffering a political alternative sharply defined in terms of the rule of law, particularly respect to property rights. In short, the then newly found obsession for "democracy" and "rule of law" was a strategic build-up to a protracted regime change agenda in Zimbabwe. These neo-colonial machinations, however, did not erode the course of the land reform programme which had taken shape at the time.

With the MDC pushing for the protection of colonial property rights, purporting to restore imperial investor confidence and heightening employment creation, ZANUPF was forced to take a radical turn against its erstwhile liberal economic policies. The constitutional referendum outcome in 2000 showed the extent to which the efforts of the opposition and its NGO allies had gained momentum in distancing ZANU PF from the urban electorate. To consolidate its relevance, ZANU PF accelerated the land reform. In 2000, I had been appointed the Provincial Minister for Matebeleland North. The public's commitment to the transfer of economic power was so overwhelming. In some quotas of our populace, especially with the advent of opposition propaganda, the land reform programme was viewed as a ZANU PF power consolidation initiative. Whilst the opposition gained much political ground in the urban areas, the rural populace which had a first-hand experience of the land inequalities supported the seizure of White-owned excess lands.

With this pronounced departure from the liberal political culture, the radicalisation of ZANU PF gave the party support from a majority of our people who were long disgruntled by the marginal stratification effects of colonial and post-independence inequalities. With the heightened turn to nationalisation and use of state apparatus to combat opposition influence, ZANU PF received widespread international demonisation. While the opposition got its major backing from Western powers and its CSO forerunners, our desperation to defend our interest as a party was dependent on various arms of the state. Since then many have criticised ZANU PF for state conflation. Such selective amnesia ignores the extent to which the opposition was empowered by powerful countries in the West to instigate ZANU PF's removal from power. The meddling of Western powers in Zimbabwean politics is overlooked whenever ZANU PF is condemned for deploying benefits of incumbency as a nationalist movement to crush neo-colonially driven change and all its Western superpower supports. Since ZANU PF abandoned liberalism, it has been blamed for manipulating the state-controlled press and the military to protect itself from extinction. However, anti-establishment forces have been allowed to benefit from foreign financial and ideological supports. In the process, Zimbabwe continues to be highly polarised.

The Fall of Solomon Mujuru and the Succession U-turn

ZANU PF had struggled to remain intact as a result of the late General Solomon Mujuru's efforts to accelerate the pace of ZANU PF's leadership renewal in his favour. As indicated in the previous chapter, Mujuru's succession strategy desperately deployed internal and external ZANU PF forces. The elimination of the Mujuru faction in 2014 offered ZANU PF's resurrection as a strong political force. This outcome was mainly because of the support which Cde Mugabe had from some of us at a time when our detractors were maliciously interfering in our politics. The country's economic performance was at its worst. A sacrosanct post-Mujuru ZANU PF meant that the external infiltration from the West and the opposition as facilitated by Solomon Mujuru and his wife was pre-empted. The Mujuru pact had established extensive supports with various embassies in Harare. Therefore, the internal and external clout of Mujuru's powerbase had more harm to ZANU PF. I attribute the collapse of the Mujuru agenda to senior members of ZANU PF with liberation credentials who refused to be coerced into caprices of simplistic factionalism. As already indicated, I turned down many efforts and offers to be dragged into submitting loyalty to the Mujuru faction.

The regional strategic outline of the Mujuru faction made Dumiso Dabengwa the face of the pro-Mujuru succession plan in Matebeleland. Dabengwa had strong ZPRA liberation credentials which could solicit easy marketing of the Mujuru agenda. The Simba Makoni as an extension of the Mujuru takeover plan he depicted the technocratic personification of the attempt to erode Mugabe from power. In all this, there was a group of seasoned politicians who chose to remain disciplined and support ZANU PF. Above all, our loyalties to our then Head of State and the party remained consistent. Unknowingly this loyalty to our former principal was manipulated by political opportunists to discredit the guiding principles of our struggle which exalted Mugabe's illustrious legacy. The expulsion of Mujuru and her associates in 2014 was meant to be an opportunity to self-reflect for the survival of ZANU PF and to rebuild the country's economy. Instead, of using this opportunity to build a strong defence for the party, succession battles intensified.

Grace Mugabe and the Battle to Recover the Party Line

Without a formidable threat to ZANU PF's unity after the demise of the Mujurus, Grace Mugabe became the leading figure of what came to be known as the Generation 40 (G40) faction. Self-created heirs of the post-Mugabe era took centre stage with nothing but very thin political credentials. To aid their unfounded relevance in ZANU PF, they deployed several approaches to deconstruct the internal norms of the party. All this was done to disconnect the late former President from the political allies of his youth and many others who shared liberation history with him. Disconnecting Mugabe from his fellow revolutionaries and advancing an expedient succession narrative divorced from the principles of the party discipline and protocol. Eventually, this was certainly going to pave way for a total disregard of the standing succession matrices which were linked to cadres of long-standing credentials as prescribed by the party's constitution and all the unwritten virtues of ZANU PF. In common-sense terms, it was not rational for any post-Mugabe takeover to abhor and isolate individuals whom Mugabe had spent his entire career with from political rags to giant statesmanship. Pragmatically and morally, it was insensitive to have the ship of transition stirred by newcomers.

Mrs Mugabe's work as the cog of the narrow post-Mugabe transition-in-waiting certainly went against the wishes of those of us who were ideologically grounded in the liberation creed. We were not prepared to see a dynastic re-configuration of ZANU PF. On countless occasions, Grace Mugabe made it clear that her loyalties were with her husband and proved to be determined to go to extremes in defending her husband's stay in power. Her rants against those who challenged the sycophantic deification of Robert Mugabe only served as evidence of her self-serving interests. In the process, she managed to manipulate some gullible members of the party into thinking that she alone and her top allies in the party hierarchy had everything under control. She abused the revered legacy of the late former President to hold us hostage in pursuit of her self-repositioning.

Some members of ZANU PF were reduced to mere Grace Mugabe quislings in exchange of minor political favours and securities. This was

a very turbulent moment as showing any signs of defiance to Grace attracted so much victimisation. Many senior party and government officials were subjected to this for questioning where the former President's wife was deriving her command of power in ZANU PF. Our decision-making organs became conduits of expelling those who challenged Grace's authority in ZANU PF. Grace used her power to reverse all major decisions which were made by the party. One incident I remember vividly was her total disregard of the votes of no confidence which were cast against Saviour Kasukuwere who was both a cabinet and politburo member. At the height of this denigration of the party's principles, some of our senior party officials competed to give their allegiances to her. These individuals servile to Grace Mugabe became vocal about the succession issue in ZANU PF. Grace's loyalists were unfailing in their attacks on President Mnangagwa, who was Vice President between 2014 and 2017. The former President's old age allowed the G40 members to breach many institutional and constitutional orders in the party and Government.

The Succession Dilemma: Liberation Tradition versus Generational Renewal

ZANU PF's post-independence existence has been mainly sustained by its ideological wealth rooted in liberation memory. As an institution born out of one of Africa's protracted armed liberation struggles, ZANU PF's posterity is guaranteed by consistent and unequivocal adherence to the core values of the liberation. What made Grace's allies to fast-track their demise was their ignorance of this cardinal point of the party's existence. This translated to their unexpected political demise because their cause was hinged on a misplaced ideological premise. Their misplaced call for generational renewal in ZANU PF might have been justified. It was inevitable that at some point ZANU PF was supposed to deal with the issue of generational renewal. The armed struggle revolutionary generation is slowly exiting the political main stage. However, the irrational and self-serving attempt to call for the elimination of the revolutionary erudite and seasoned old guard was misguided.

This agitated many comrades especially those of us who were being victimised for our liberation credentials. The approach used to vilify war-veterans and senior party members like myself was meant to disfigure the outlook of ZANU PF's liberation orientation. By victimising senior party members who were constitutionally aligned in the hierarchical structures to lead, Grace Mugabe and her allies sought to thwart any transition which was not in their favour. To effect this, Grace championed what was dubbed Youth Interface Rallies. She used these countrywide platforms to denigrate war-veterans. She also made direct attacks on President Emmerson Mnangagwa who was still the Vice President. Members of the G40 were actively involved in smear campaigns against President Mnangagwa who was a prominent threat to G40 power capture strategy. However, there was a widely held understanding within ZANU PF that Cde Mnangagwa was the most suitable candidate to take over from Cde Mugabe who was already advanced in age.

The One-Centre of Power Crisis

Grace Mugabe's leading role in the succession battle was triggered by her fears of an unavoidable and imminent transition. Her open involvement in ZANU PF politics as the chair of the ZANU PF Women's Wing was strongly influenced by her political self-grooming desire to take over from Cde Mugabe. Her pragmatic turn to this desperate position was not premised on any national interests. Her active involvement in the decision-making structures of ZANU PF only demonstrated a persistent power crisis in ZANU PF as personality politics began to find more ground in the party. The emergence and centrality of Grace Mugabe in ZANU PF politics only served as proof of the organic ideological collapse of ZANU PF.

It was with the coming of Grace Mugabe into active politics that the rhetoric of Mugabe as the party's "one centre of power" in ZANU PF became more emphasised and exaggerated. While it is true that Mugabe personified ZANU PF's ideological clout, to reinvent his iconic role to a sole centre of power in the party was dangerous. I constantly challenged this position within the inner echelons of the ruling ZANU PF. It remains my considered view that the emphatic turn to personality loyalties is

catastrophic to the existence of any public institution. The whole idea of making Mugabe ZANU PF's centre of power was misdirected. Those who were championing Mugabe cultism were doing so based on legitimising unfounded political credentials. The key aim of this whole hegemonic reshaping of Mugabe was narrowing inclusion to make way for G40 at the top. Those of us deeply oriented in the core values of the struggle knew that the claim to easy victories and the telling of lies was only temporary.

Timing and Context of Operation Restore Legacy

By 2017, Zimbabwe was socially and politically ripe for the transition which would uproot all the anti-revolutionary elements in ZANU PF and ignite the rebirth of the liberation legacy. What happened in November 2017 was a result of many historical factors and contributions of many actors though ZANUPF spearheaded the key rituals of change. It was important for ZANU PF to be remodelled to its giant liberation personality to decimate the impact of the party's capture by internal opportunist reactionaries. In as much as the 2018 election presented an obvious external threat, we had to also reorder the party by exhuming all internal hindrances to consolidating our political space. Contrary to the unpopular belief then that the 93-year-old Mugabe was a befitting candidate for the 2018 election, rationality called for something to give in. The justification of this position was even further cemented by the internal disgruntlement in the party and outside ZANU PF. Somehow, the "Mugabe Must Go" mantra evolved to being a discursive convergence between the opposition and ZANU PF. However, there was a conservative upholding of the role of Mugabe as an enabling force of ZANU PF's existence even at the height of our contradictions.

Again, 2017 was the last lap into a new decade which had to be characterised by renewed aspirations and the reconstruction of the posterity of ZANU PF. The turn to Operation Restore Legacy was a self-introspective episode to connect the future and the guiding virtues of the past which liberated Zimbabwe from colonial bondage. There is no doubt that in the last days our adored founding father of the First Republic had slowly turned into a pale shadow of his former self and his legacy was being appropriated by

opportunists. For me, Operation Restore Legacy was a step in the right direction considering the magnitude of respect I still have for Robert Mugabe. It was important for his legacy to be rescued from opportunistic capture. There was a potpourri of long-term factors which justified the turn to the transitional route we took in November 2017, but the public platforms which Grace used to declare her succession ambitions made Zimbabwe ripe of Operation Restore Legacy in November 2017.

Pro-Grace Mugabe Succession Agenda-Setting Rallies

As a way of propagating the G40 factional propaganda, Grace Mugabe was instrumental in convening of the Presidential Youth Interface Rallies in 2017. To gather momentum, earlier in 2016 she was also responsible for organising several other rallies which openly became a platform for disparaging those she perceived as G40 opponents. The main target was then Vice President Cde Emmerson Mnangagwa. In deploying this demonisation agenda, she used certain fragments of the body of war-veterans, the youth and women's wings in the party. Grace's nationwide orchestrated rallies were given validation by former senior party cadres such as Sarah Mahoka (former ZANU PF Women's League Treasurer and Legislator), Kudzai Chipanga (ex-Youth League Secretary), and Innocent Hamadishe (ex-Youth League Commissar). These and many others became mouthpieces of the pro-Grace Mugabe succession project in ZANU PF. They used their significant share of influence to coerce ZANU PF loyalist to the former First Lady's self-serving political motives.

Mandi Chimene the ousted Minister of Provincial Affairs for Manicaland became one of the leading forerunners of the Grace Mugabe camp. Mandi Chimene also penetrated some sections of the war-veterans associations and was responsible for mobilising support on behalf of Mugabe. In September 2017, she openly demanded that Cde Mnangagwa be fired from office as Vice President because he was planning to unconstitutionally remove Cde Robert Mugabe from power. Her scathing attacks on Cde Mnangagwa resembled absolute defiance from processes of internal discipline.

The attacks on Cde Mnangagwa by G40 loyalists only exposed ZANU PF's degeneration into a chaotic political space. This is how the Mnangagwa-demonisation escapades by Grace Mugabe's allies became the rallying point of the current's President's source of public sympathy. The attacks he received accelerated his popularity and intensified the succession discourse in ZANU PF. Essentially, President Mnangagwa's victimhood projected him as a reasonable, calm and collected leader in the eyes of the public. It was at that time that my relationship with him grew even more. The G40 takeover strategy at the time only served to awaken us to the reality of an internal onslaught on the liberation legacy. It became imperative for those of us with liberation credentials to find common ground with progressive elements in the youth and women's wings of the party to challenge the G40 offensive.

I am grateful to many comrades, mainly in Matebeleland North and Bulawayo ZANU PF provincial structures, who committed to defending the preservation of the liberation agenda by ensuring that G40 was never allowed to thrive. I had a series of meetings with like-minded supporters of the party since I believed that this was the sustained path of defending the core values of ZANU PF. I became more aligned with the prevailing position to reject ZANU PF's personalisation by Grace Mugabe. Without doubt, the period immediately after the 2013 election up to mid-November 2017 was marked by pronounced contestations of power and on the merit of ideological logic, I chose not to align with G40. It was in this period that Grace Mugabe started shaping a new succession trajectory which was bound to magnify her to be a figure of vast political influence. She became a serious political attention-seeker and whenever she got the platform to make public addresses she would castigate everyone who showed signs of resenting her hardly concealed dictatorial tendencies.

The rallies convened under Grace's instruction also exposed ZANU PF's internal contradictions and that was contrary to our expected way of handling the internal affairs of the party. In terms of strategic power consolidation, Grace Mugabe became a threat to ZANU PF through the rallies she was responsible for organising. Issues which were supposed to have been dealt with in closed-door meetings as per the tradition of

ZANU PF were clumsily thrown into the public domain. This left the party exposed to the hands of our detractors. It became clear that the Presidential Youth Interface Rallies were a counter-reactionary project to abrogate ZANU PF's founding values by Grace Mugabe. On the 9th of September 2017 at the interface rally held in Bindura, she prefaced her address by denouncing Ambassador Christopher Mutsvangwa, the current ZANU PF Political Commissar, Cde Victor Matemendanda, and the Secretary for War-veterans, Cde Douglas Mahiya and Cde Headman Moyo who now deputises Cde Mahiya. Before Operation Restore Legacy, Comrades Mutsvangwa, Mahiya, Moyo and Matemendanda among others effectively executed a pro-War-veterans anti-G40 campaign. Their contribution was critical as it openly expressed the magnitude of discontent within ZANU PF. Such coordinated efforts to defy Grace Mugabe's factional interests mapped the emotions of the abandoned liberation culture. At the same rally at Chipadze Stadium in Bindura, she attacked our Secretary for Legal Affairs Cde Paul Mangwana for challenging her to adhere to the constitutionally prescribed tenets of the party. She also went further to reinforce the reversal of former minister Saviour Kasukuwere's recall from the party.

Grace Mugabe was misled by her situational proximity to our former President into thinking that she was a larger-than-life figure. At one point, after she splashed her usual venom, at a rally in Bulawayo, I directly asked her to politely reprimand those she viewed as wayward. I remember telling her that her utterances were inconsistent with the dignity of a national mother-figure. As expected, she dismissed my reaching out to her. Thereafter, she openly begrudged me and I became unpopular with some of her close allies in the party. I was not moved by how my honesty to the former President's wife was appreciated. I was not bothered by any of these antics. I had witnessed several comrades being humiliated by Grace Mugabe. Instead, I remained confident in the revolutionary guiding spirit of our struggle. It became clear that Grace Mugabe was not going to succeed as her conduct was inconsistent with our internally shared values in the ruling party. There was no way progressive forces in the party would allow her to usurp power on the narrow merit of her marital status to the former President.

The Grace Mugabe's sponsored pandemonium stretched right up to November 2017, and the final signs of her downfall were witnessed on the 4th of November at the last Presidential Interface Rally held at the White City Stadium. This was the 9th leg of the Presidential Interface Rallies and was attended by a majority of the party's senior members. I had grown weary of attending such party gatherings, but on this particular day, I could not afford to miss that particular rally. There had been covert plans to arrest Grace's mischief. Our youths had been strategically mobilised to ensure that her denigrating utterances to Cde Mnangagwa would be interrupted. Cde Mnangagwa received loud sympathetic shouts from the people before Grace took the podium. The reception Cde Mnangagwa got was electrifying and this suggested how Grace Mugabe's attacks at him became the cause for his popularity and the public affection he also attracted in the process. I remember the then President Cde R. G Mugabe saying: "We know in Masvingo there are people who claim the province does not belong to President Mugabe but Mnangagwa. The same is happening in the Midlands".

This was mainly due to the spontaneous consensus that the former President had been a victim of direct capture by his wife. It had become apparent that at that point than never before that ZANU PF needed a successor and Cde Mnangagwa embodied the leadership qualities which the party desperately needed. Regardless of the victimisation he endured, there was confidence that he carried the aspirations of many supporters of ZANU PF. Even after Cde Mugabe hinted that he was making plans to fire him from the executive, a lot of our supporters who were not aware of what was brewing behind the scenes continued to give strong support to Cde Mnangagwa.

To compensate for her humiliation at the White City Rally, Grace Mugabe convened a nationwide indigenous apostolic churches rally on the 5th of November 2017. The platform was also used to endorse Grace Mugabe for Vice Presidency ahead of the impending ZANU PF Congress. Mrs Mugabe even went further to state that the ZANU PF constitution had to be amended to accommodate a woman as one of the Vice Presidents. To assert her determination to take over, she even stated beyond the party's constitution the power to appoint rested in the President, her husband.

Throughout her speech, she insisted that Cde Mugabe was the centre of power and he had the ultimate authority to determine who leads ZANU PF and who does not. In other words, her takeover as the Vice President meant that she would have a ceremonial president appointed and wield more power for her ultimate rise as Head of State. She was bent on eliminating Cde Mnangagwa who had wide support across the majority of the party structures.

The Super Sunday rally, as it was called, pre-empted the advanced plans for Cde Mnangagwa's inevitable expulsion from the ruling ZANU PF. I followed the proceedings from television at home. At that stage, I knew the worst was coming. The best I could do was keep calm awaiting what the heavens had in store. There was no turning back. At that point than never before, I knew the fight was getting real and nothing was going to stop it.

Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa Fired

On the 6th of November, 2017 the news of Cde Mnangagwa's expulsion from the party was awash in the media. He sought refuge in South Africa. Cde Mnangagwa was fired exactly a day after the inter-denominational rally which authenticated Grace Mugabe's quest to take over from the former President. There was no point of return, nothing left but to fight. Otherwise, failure to do so would mean that the liberation legacy was going to be decimated beyond resurrection. Standing in Cde Mnangagwa's corner meant consolidating the degenerating state of the iconic liberation tradition of ZANU PF. Besides defending the legacy of the liberation struggle which I have always been committed to upholding, I also had to make sure that my safety was guaranteed. I and other senior members of ZANU PF like Comrades Kembo Mohadi, Tshinga Dube, Patrick Chinamasa, Christopher Mutsvangwa and Paul Mangwana were on the G40 expulsion list. Our loyalty to ideologically grounded transition warranted treason charges.

On the 7th of November, 2017, the former President was meant to have a meeting with the Joint Operations Command (JOC) to discuss the looming crisis. As the then Minister of Home Affairs, alongside the former Minister of Defence, Cde Sydney Sekeramayi, we were supposed to be

part of this meeting considering the security situation which the expulsion of the former Vice President had ignited. However, we were told that the meeting was cancelled and that Cde Mugabe was not in a position to be engaged in dialogue with members of the High Command.



His Excellency, The President and First Secretary of ZANU PF, Cde Emmerson D. Mnangagwa. Photo Credit: The Herald ZW

The following day, Cde Mnangagwa, wrote an open letter to ZANU PF loyalists and Zimbabweans at large giving his unwavering allegiances to the former President, his boss since 1976, when he was assigned to Cde Mugabe as his Special Assistant:

My mouth has never uttered a single foul word against the President nor have I ever contemplated bringing him harm in any way. I, therefore, find it preposterous that any sane person can lyrically direct such accusations towards me. Of late, I have been vilified beyond measure. My service to the party and government of Zimbabwe and my public and private posture towards my boss are well-known. No amount of lies and convoluted thinking can diminish my loyalty to my party and the President.

This open letter became the manifesto became the core spirit of Operation Restore Legacy. In his steadfast pledge of loyalty to Zimbabwe and the revolutionary movement, he underscored that:

I have never appointed or arrogated myself in any position in the Party or Government. I remain firm and resolute against those who plunder public funds and are used by foreign countries to destabilize the Party. These same people are brazenly protected in public by the First Lady thereby making a mockery of our public institutions. I stand prepared, once again, to pay the ultimate price in defence of Zimbabwe.

Through this letter, Cde Mnangagwa declared his commitment to seeing ZANU PF recovering its former glory from dictatorial and unconstitutional appropriation by Grace Mugabe and her cronies. It was from the contents of this letter that the direction of the progressive forces in ZANU PF was determined. The cost of freedom had to be found on the altar of self-sacrifice. Cde Mnangagwa had set the example. Those of us who believed in the course of freedom which his resolve was mapping for the future of Zimbabwe and the revolutionary party decided to remain resolute. However, there was need for caution, considering the amount of victimisation for those who defied orders from the State House. Cde Mugabe insisted that he was not in a position to engage the JOC; meanwhile, covert operations were being made by Grace Mugabe's loyalists to mobilise the party's Youth League structures to conduct countrywide unrests which would result in mass casualties.

Operation Restore Legacy: The Chronology of Events

The Military Steps In

To contain the impending G40-sponsored mass protest and its violent consequences, having also failed to engage the former President, on the 13th of November, 2017 in a press statement, the command element led by General Chiwenga expressed uttermost disgruntlement about the fragility of state security as a result of the factional fights in ZANU PF. He then declared that the military was going to intervene and ensure that Zimbabwe's political crisis was mitigated:

We must remind those behind the current treacherous shenanigans that when it comes to matters of protecting our revolution, the military will not hesitate to step in. ZANU PF's standing political virtues are a product of faithful adherence to the founding values, decorum, discipline and revolutionary protocol in the ruling Party. Party orders were strictly adhered to and whatever differences existed, they were resolved amicably and in the ruling Party's closet.

The military made it clear that its intervention was primarily automated by ZANU PF's centrality in Zimbabwe's body-politic as a revolutionary movement which brought the country's liberation. Retired General Chiwenga also stated that the ZDF's intervention was necessitated by the organ's role as a proxy of the country's liberation memory:

It is pertinent to restate that the Zimbabwe Defence Forces remain the major stockholder in respect to the gains of the liberation struggle and when these are threatened we are obliged to take corrective measures. ZANU-PF having mainly been the only Party that has ruled this country since Independence, it had become a household name to most Zimbabweans across the political divide.

This position by General Chiwenga in articulating the objectives of Operation Restore Legacy resonated with what Cde Mnangagwa had indicated in his letter directed to the people of Zimbabwe and ZANU PF loyalists. Cde Mnangagwa clearly stated that ZANU PF was not anyone's "personal property." Consequently, the coming in of the military as a leading front of the liberation tradition entailed protecting the entire institution of the anti-colonial movement in Zimbabwe.

The military's failure to intervene in the Zimbabwean political crisis would have been tantamount to exposing the liberation movement to existential threats. Therefore, in the face of an imminent overhaul of the party by political opportunists, the ZDF had to take a stand as "...an institution whose roles cut across the wider spectrum of Government support functions in the form of Military Aid to Civil Power and Military Aid to Civil Ministries, which are roles derived from Defence Instruments".

Cde Chiwenga also insisted that: “While our people may be persuaded to take what is going on in ZAN PF as internal political matters in that Party, the truth remains that ZANU-PF’s conduct and behaviour as a ruling Party has a direct impact on the lives of every citizen; hence all of us regardless of political affiliation are affected by the Party’s manner of doing business.” To this end, from the outset, the core agenda of Operation Restore Legacy was to save ZANU-PF from being hijacked by counter-reactionary forces and in the process, arresting the spill-over effects of ZANU-PF’s ideological capture. The two-fold agenda of Operation Restore Legacy to protect the tradition of the Zimbabwean armed struggle personified in ZANU PF and preventing Zimbabwe’s plunge into a political crisis simply meant that the ZDF was playing a paramount security role to usher Zimbabwe into a peaceful post-Mugabe transition. Operation Restore Legacy came at a time ZANU PF was preparing for an elective congress which was also hampered by austere factional wrangles which had kept the party fragile than never before.

On the 14th of November, 2017, a group within the ZANU PF Youth League fronted by the then Secretary of the Youth Wing, Kudzai Chipanga issued a press statement pledging loyalty to the G40 agenda. Chipanga claimed that him and his cronies were committed to ensuring that the G40 faction seized power and would not allow anyone to challenge the “one-centre of power” myth they had embraced as truth under the toxic influence of the former First Lady. This expression of defiance to the position given by the ZDF only served as proof of the G40’s mobilisation of ZANU PF youths across the country for a violent protest. However, due to G40’s crumbling support base since the famous White City rally where Grace Mugabe was booed, the idea was never going to succeed. The idea was bound to fail because of popular resistance to the G40 within the party. No amount of bribery was going to reverse a revolution whose time had come.

The Launch of Operation Restore Legacy

In the early hours of the morning on the 15th of November, 2017, the Major General, Dr Sibusisiwe Moyo, now Zimbabwe’s Foreign Affairs Minister, announced to the nation that Operation Restore Legacy had begun. In

the spirit of preserving the tradition of the nationalist movement and total respect to the legacy of the Former President, Cde Sibusiso Moyo made it categorically clear that:

We wish to assure the nation that His Excellency the President of the Republic of Zimbabwe, and commander in chief of Zimbabwe Defence Forces, Comrade RG Mugabe, and his family are safe and sound and their security is guaranteed. We are only targeting criminals around him who are committing crimes that are causing social and economic suffering in the country to bring them to justice.

The full intervention of the military in negotiating Zimbabwe's transition was sufficiently complemented by the first dialogue which the former President opened up to after his initial cancellation of the meeting with JOC, seven days before the Operation Restore Legacy was launched. The dialogue was attended by Father Fidelis Mukonori who was the Chief Negotiator and the former First Family's cleric. Government officials present were Cde Sydney Sekeramayi, the former Minister of Defence, Cde Kembo Mohadi, then Minister of State Security, Retired General Constantine Chiwenga and the then Vice Air Marshal of the Zimbabwe Airforce and Presidential Spokesperson George Charamba. External negotiators included South Africa's Minister of Defence Nosiviwe Nolutshando Mapisa-Nqakula who was accompanied by Bongani Bongo, South Africa's Minister of State Security.

The former Police Commissioner Augustine Chihuri had phoned me in the early hours of November 15 hinting that some ministers were under military siege. He also indicated that he thought the former First Family was not safe and was asking if he could deploy police officers at the Blue-Roof. I told him to be calm and not to do anything. I could feel the panic in his voice as he spoke on the other line. I am sure he was worried about his safety considering the close relationship he had established with the former First Family. His office was directly controlled from the Blue-Roof and the crumbling of Grace Mugabe's leased political autonomy also weighed into his demise.

The Culmination to a Civil-Military-Aided Transition

While this closed-door meeting was going on, at the party level we were mobilising our supporters for the nationwide citizen march to call for Cde Mugabe's resignation. Cde Mnangagwa was aware of all the developments back at home. When all was set for the nationwide protest, opposition parties also came on board. Even the Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) which have maintained a hostile position against ZANU PF found themselves taking part in the 18 November march. The ZDF ensured that the processions to call for Cde Mugabe's resignation were peaceful. This was consistent with the key objectives of Operation Restore Legacy. At this point, the combined effort of the masses and the army produced a civil-military aided transition. This affirmed inter-relational predisposition of the ZDF with the masses on the pretext of being a military organ born out of the pro-people armed struggle. Operation Restore Legacy awakened the foundational premise of the unity of the forces between civil power and the military preservation of security as well as territorial integrity. Immediately after the protests to implore the former President to leave office, the party convened a Central Committee Meeting on the 19th of November 2017 to decide the way forward.

Deciding the Fate of Robert Mugabe

I chaired this ZANU PF Central Committee meeting held at the party's revolutionary Headquarters. I led the proceedings of this meeting on the merit of being the most senior member of the party in the absence of Cde Mugabe whose expulsion from ZANU PF was the main subject of the meeting. The two Vice Presidents of the party were also out of the country due to circumstances out of their control. Cde Emmerson Mnangagwa had been fired earlier on and had left Zimbabwe to seek protection in South-Africa. Cde Phelekezela Mphoko was also nowhere to be found as he was among those whom the party's Central Committee wanted to be fired. Likewise, Ignatius Chombo the former ZANU PF Secretary for Administration was among those destined for expulsion from the party. By virtue of being the most senior member at that point, I chaired the Central Committee deliberations whose outcome unequivocally stated that our founding father had to be shown his way to retirement. This

was done in good faith. It was agreed that Mugabe's heroic status was to be preserved, but his wife and his cronies had to be flushed into annals of history as villains of the liberation legacy. Another major resolution of this meeting was to ensure that the impeachment processes were followed if the old man failed to concede to his fate as decided by the ZANU PF Central Committee. The meeting was attended by over 200 members of the Central Committee regardless of the short notice we had sent to all provinces. This was a historic moment not only to the party but to the entire nation as it was never imagined that one day ZANU PF will relieve Cde Mugabe of his duties the party's First Secretary and President. There was consensus that Cde Emmerson Mnangagwa was the most suitable person to replace Cde Mugabe and this automatically nullified his expulsion by the G40. The next process which followed was the mobilisation of the party's legislators for the impeachment as the old man kept buying time during the negotiations since the 15th.

The Impeachment and Cde Mnangagwa's Presidential Take over

All ZANU PF legislators were mobilised for the impeachment which took place on the 21st of November. This was after the party instructed Parliament to initiate all the due processes for the impeachment of the former Head of State. The opposition had also mobilised its Members of Parliament for this historic moment. The impeachment modalities created another opportunity of convergence for the ruling ZANU PF and the opposition. This led to the convening of a joint Senate and House of Assembly at the Harare International Conference Centre (HICC).

On the 22nd of November, the recently ousted Vice President returned home and was welcomed by throngs of Zimbabweans from all walks of life. I was among those who received him when he returned to give his post-Mugabe inaugural address. His message on unity, building Zimbabwe's democratic space, reconciliation and accelerating economic growth was very clear. His commitment to seeing Zimbabwe recover its lost opportunities on the economic front became the defining point of the new political trajectory he was ushering. On the 24th of November 2017, Cde Mnangagwa was sworn in as the second Executive President of the Republic of Zimbabwe as he replaced Cde Mugabe who had been in

power since 1980. The “New Dispensation” marked Zimbabwe’s turn to a new future.

The Ultimate Value of the 2017 November Transition

At the level of national governance, Operation Restore Legacy was effected to champion economic revival, ushering a new set of political and policy reforms aimed at rescuing Zimbabwe from protracted international isolation. The replacement of the old order with a new political culture was primarily linked to the need to widen the country’s democratic landscape and enhance respect to the rule of law. Within ZANU PF, the events of November 2017 were effected to realign ZANU PF to its founding objectives and the liberation tradition. Operation Restore Legacy was aimed at reinstating ZANU PF to its mass-line party status. Operation Restore Legacy was dedicated to securing the posterity of post-independence political-economy milestones and redressing the ideological shortcomings of ZANU PF in the context of the factional wrangles.



President E.D Mnangagwa’s November 2017 return to Zimbabwe. Photo credit: Herald ZW.

To save the party's legacy and preserve national interests, the New Dispensation under President Emmerson Mnangagwa was born. This out to rest the unsettled issue of succession and its effects on national development. Technically, Mugabe embodied the justification for this political transition considering how he had lost support within ZANU-PF. The weight of factionalism perpetrated by a faction linked to his wife Grace Mugabe served as a major cause to Mugabe's downfall. Mugabe remains a revered icon of the ruling ZANU PF and the continuing anti-colonial struggle. In his last days, his political reputation was stained by political opportunists who tried to disconnect him from the liberation history and ideology which shaped the base of his political career. The G40 grand plan was to disconnect Mugabe from his lifelong allies to create a ZANU PF latecomers' credence to claim power in the party. In his old age, Mugabe found himself surrounded by a clique of young Turks who capitalised on their proximity to the former first family, particularly Grace Mugabe. The G40's key aim was to remove senior cadres from the ZANU PF succession equation to cater for the ambitions of those party members who had ceded their allegiances to the former First Lady. The late nationalist Cde Robert Mugabe had presided over Government since 1980. In as much as his last days in power superficially qualify him a villain, all of us who served under Mugabe should take both the credit and blame for the country's successes and failures respectively. Operation Restore Legacy as an introspective framework for ZANU PF's continuity was also aimed at re-establishing Mugabe's legacy as a pan-Africanist of note, a nationalist doyen and champion of economic empowerment. Through Operation Restore Legacy, an effort was made to rescue Mugabe's legacy from being drowned to oblivion by opportunist succession mongers within ZANU PF.

In reconfiguring Zimbabwe's political economy and creating a new landscape for social cohesion and integration, the November 2017 stirred transition must be applauded for creating an enabling environment for the concerted revival of the liberation memory which was being buried to irrelevance in the self-serving succession expedience of the G40. The role of Operation Restore Legacy was to situate the founding values of the struggle in the contemporary political space. The key aim was to

resolve the lack of ideologically guided running of state affairs, but most importantly, the operation facilitated ZANU-PF's revival ahead of the 2018 harmonised polls. Operation Restore Legacy blocked the idea of having the succession process being contested by players with no sound credentials. The fast-paced events of November 2017 were also linked to the emotive need to rescue Mugabe's illustrious legacy from being manipulated to service simplistic succession manoeuvres by the G40.

Mugabe was not only the face of ZANU PF, but he served as an embodiment of the Party's continued fight against imperialism. Therefore, confining the motives of Operation Restore Legacy to the narrow cause of overthrowing Mugabe ignores the ideological symbol which Mugabe still is to ZANU PF and the entire anti-colonial world. Operation Restore Legacy must be located within the holistic framework of rebuilding ZANU PF and preserving the iconic status of a nationalist figurehead. The role of leadership conferred to President Emmerson Mnangagwa as Cde Robert Mugabe's successor was befitting considering his proven loyalty not only to Mugabe but to the struggle for Zimbabwe's liberation before and after independence. By the same token, the role of the current Vice President of Zimbabwe General Constantine Chiwenga cannot be over-emphasised. The fine collaboration and demonstration of leadership by President Mnangagwa and Vice President Chiwenga replicate the evidence of the sustained tradition of the unity between "politics and the gun".

As I look back, I am delighted to have been a part of Zimbabwe's long journey to independence from colonialism. In post-independence, the struggle against neo-colonialism continues and our people need to invest more confidence in the core values of decolonisation. We must assert our liberation space as a sovereign state to stand against the predatory values of imperialism. As it stands, Zimbabwe through the land reform programme and decolonial policy turns has proved that we are masters of our destiny. We need to consolidate this position by ensuring that we do not compromise the true essence of our freedom until the rest of Africa tramples on the ego on the imperialism, fascism and apartheid.

Amandla!

List of Appendices

APPENDIX 1:

10TH SESSION OF THE SECRETARIES GENERAL AND WINGS OF FORMER LIBERATION MOVEMENTS IN SOUTHERN-AFRICA

08 - 12 SEPTEMBER, 2019

KEYNOTE REMARKS

CDE. DR OBERT MPOFU

ZANU-PF SECRETARY FOR ADMINISTRATION

It is with sadness that this inordinate meeting is being convened at a time the continent and the rest of the world are mourning Cde Robert Gabriel Mugabe's elevation to glory. His untimely departure has offered the world an opportunity to appreciate how he was an effigy of every voice and institution opposed to the asymmetrical global order. In his lifetime, Cde Mugabe became an ideological mantle of our centuries of resistance to colonial hegemony, plunder and exploitation. After independence, he gave a nod to Africa's inaugural land reform programme. This substantiates the magnitude of loyalty he submitted to the liberation creed of this region and Africa at large. Therefore, the doyen pan-Africanist Mugabe here is not the person, but he is now an idea representing perennial aspirations to remodel Africa's decolonisation project.

While his realistic response to sanctions and a neo-colonial sponsored opposition falsely and narrowly projects him as a dictator, to those of us who saw the golden age he was preparing for Zimbabwe, Mugabe remains the illustrious Founding Father.

Mugabe raises to the celestial as the bedrock of Pan-African memory; as a champion and think-tank of reframing the ontological density of Blackness.

Today Mugabe is the African force of ideological retention. He is the reclamer of the unifying virtues of the late Julius Nyerere, Augustino Neto, Samora Machel, Oliver Tambo and Sir Seretse Khama. He is the embodiment of the African legacy and African heritage which slavery, apartheid and imperialism thought they had dismembered for good. His elevation to glory renders a permanent scar to the body of the pan-Africanist movement. May His Dear Soul Rest In Power.

The best service we can offer to Mugabe and other grandfathers of the African anti-colonial movement is to strengthen our return to the past in a bid to lay a solid philosophy foundation to our hallmark neo-colonial fight.

As the people of Zimbabwe, we are greatly honoured to have been led by this notable liberation stalwart and giant pan-Africanist. It is the credence of his revolutionary leadership which informs our affiliation to the fraternity of Former Liberation Movements. Furthermore, the convening of this meeting in Zimbabwe fortifies the mandate of the Second-Republic under His Excellency President Emmerson Mnangagwa to engage and re-engage the international community.

Zimbabwe's mandate to host this meeting symbolically articulates two policy pillars of envisaged national and continental development which are capsuled in the country's Vision 2030 and the African Union's Agenda 2063. Zimbabwe's Vision 2030 offers a preliminary foundation for re-crafting our domestic policy to guarantee sustainable multi-dimensional foreign policy interests emanating from the SADC region, the African Union (AU) and the world at large.

Our Second-Republic's Vision 2030 will be of no essence if it is not set in tandem with the AU's Agenda 2063 –aimed at enriching the socio-economic and political instruments

of Africa's development. This comes at a time we are also calling for the widening of Foreign Direct Investment opportunities in our country so as to further activate our subscription to the African Continental Free-Trade Area Protocol.

Our zeal to contribute to initiatives which advance the unification of Africa such as the FLMs is grounded on the Julius Nyerere's Uhuru na Ujamaah doctrine. This very same creed has been revitalised and redesigned in Thabo Mbeki's call for African renaissance.

Therefore, I ride on the shoulders of the successive merits of critical African thought to invite a reasoning amongst ourselves which is imbedded in 'African Solutions for African Problems'. The uninterrupted dialectic premise to understanding the personality of liberation movements is dissected by Amilcar Cabral (1966) who notes that:

Although the colonial and neo-colonial situations are identical in essence, and the main aspect of the struggle against imperialism is neo-colonialist, we feel it is vital to distinguish in practice these two situations. In fact the horizontal structure, however, it may differ from the native society, and the absence of a political power composed of national elements in the colonial situation make possible the creation of a wide front of unity and struggle, which is vital to the success of the national liberation movement.

Cabral benchmarks the inter-generational motive of the FLMs which is anchored on the true aspirations of the founding fathers. From the founding nationalists to the millennials the FLMs institution is an inter-generational confluence between the aspirations of yesterday and those of today. In full acknowledgement of the need for posterity of the liberation movement the late Cde Robert Mugabe's wisdom still echoes the need for regional integration as he once said:

Unity is in fact more than mere harmony. It is an active bond of aspirants who share common given political beliefs. Unity is integrative of constructive or progressive or revolutionary forces in the direction of set goals. Unity is equally disintegrative of destructive or retrogressive or counter revolutionary forces that operate against progress and against unity itself.

The words of these two revolutionaries validate the theme of this gathering as our critical mass must be perpetually biased towards "Uniting Former Liberation Movements Against Neo-colonialism Through Total Economic Cooperation, Development and Independence".

Therefore, it is my hope that our deliberations will redirect our thoughts to the shared burden of collectively grappling with neo-colonialism. The neo-colonial project has fastened its levers through championing subtle means of subjugating Africa through neo-liberal expedencies. Frantz Fanon in his seminal publication, *The Wretched of the Earth* warns today's FLMs not to be ideologically incomplete and lifeless in

order to debunk a dismembered past characterised by Africans' deprivation of the means to provide either capital and refined economic leadership to the new republic. Consequently this has subjected many of our member-states investing faith in colonial bankers' loans –their counsel and aid. This systematic tragedy of dependency has forced the new nation to remain hooked on its former coloniser just as it was during the colonial period. The realisation of this global power imbalance agitates the need for us to foster total economic freedom and re-align the discourse of democracy to the aspirations of our founding fathers. Moreover, the desire to end this material and ideological dependence on the colonial powers inspires the much needed collective path to rapidly develop a pragmatic, organic, pan-African –nationalist form of capitalism that is thoroughly diversified for the purpose of sustainable regional economic and political stability. This inevitably calls for strategic counter-measures to the clandestine manoeuvres of modern-day colonial realism.

Therefore, the establishment of the Julius Nyerere School of Ideology is a timely move which speaks to retooling the ideological facet of the FLMs. Likewise, our respective Party schools must re-tool all our wings with the much needed ideological tutelage aimed at dismantling the neo-colonialist threat to the Former Liberation movements.

Advancing and incentivising our ideological predisposition in all organs of our Parties will strategically circumvent the postcolonial repetition without change and capitulation of Anglo-Americanising our systems of state-craft. While globalisation is paraded as the trusted model for pursuing sustainable socio-economic and political development, we need to be more discerning of its linear and exploitative manoeuvres which disenfranchise the continued enhancement of enduring nationalist interests. Our interaction with Western realist modernity has taught us that our Ubuntu humanism has been met with resistance of the perpetual matrix of colonialism.

You will all recall that this gathering is a sequel of the 9th General Meeting of our Heads of State which was held in Namibia. This shows the region and the continent's commitment to curating frameworks which consolidate the incumbency of the nationalist movement in pressing towards a collective resistance to modern day imperial hegemony.

We are also grateful of the recent resolutions by the SADC to call for the immediate and unconditional removal of sanctions on Zimbabwe by the West. It is clear that Africa is now speaking together in one corner and thus reigniting the 'Injury to one and is Injuring to all' principle. We are optimistic that the SADC Anti-Sanctions resolution of setting the 25th of October, 2019 as the day with which Southern-Africa will express its displeasure on the continued imposition of sanctions against Zimbabwe will also become a historical subject of reference to the African-Union.

Fellow Comrades

Today we coalesce on the pan-African nationalist ethos of our mandate to tackle the

ever-changing complexities and complexions of colonialism. We have noted in our countries how neo-colonialism has repackaged itself through narrow Western anchored democracy and human-rights discourse in African politics. The prescriptive inclination of this democracy and human-rights ignores the existence of our regional protocols and municipal institutions which are predicated on the preservation of constitutionalism and good governance in Africa. We have also seen how sanctions have been used as a diplomatic missile to injure our self-confidence and subjecting us to unilateral terms of dictated democracy aimed at impelling regime-change and the consequent obliteration of the Former Liberation Movements.

Neo-colonial propaganda masked through the ambit of foreign-backed opposition which crudely instigates a clear agenda for change-politics in Africa. Not that there is any evil about political transitions, but there is everything wrong when the change sought is influenced by external forces with clear vendettas linked to decimating African nationalism.

Validating any change which disparages the aspirations of our shared struggle is tantamount to washing away the sacrifice of African revolutionaries. Our weapon of unity against neo-colonialism in pursuing the region's aspirations for collective socio-economic advancement and political freedom should be hinged on the monumental ethos of pan-Africanism and historically grounded nationalism.

Therefore, 'by any means necessary' we are mandated to 'organise and centralise'.

APPENDIX 2

PUBLIC LAW 107–99–DEC. 21, 2001

ZIMBABWE DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC RECOVERY ACT OF 2001

Public Law 107–99

107th Congress

An Act

To provide for a transition to democracy and to promote economic recovery in Zimbabwe.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the “Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001”.

SEC. 2. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

It is the policy of the United States to support the people of Zimbabwe in their struggle to effect peaceful, democratic change, achieve broad-based and equitable economic growth, and restore the rule of law.

SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:

(1) INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.—The term “international financial institutions” means the multilateral development banks and the International Monetary Fund.

(2) MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS.—The term “multilateral development banks” means the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Development Association, the International Finance Corporation, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the Inter-American Investment Corporation, the African Development Bank, the African Development Fund, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the Multilateral

Investment Guaranty Agency.

SEC. 4. SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND ECONOMIC RECOVERY.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) Through economic mismanagement, undemocratic practices, and the costly deployment of troops to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Government of Zimbabwe has rendered itself ineligible to participate in International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and International Monetary Fund programs, which would otherwise be providing substantial resources to assist in the recovery and modernization of Zimbabwe's economy. The people of Zimbabwe have thus been denied the economic and democratic benefits envisioned by the donors to such programs, including the United States. Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001.

(2) In September 1999 the IMF suspended its support under a "Stand By Arrangement", approved the previous month, for economic adjustment and reform in Zimbabwe.

(3) In October 1999, the International Development Association (in this section referred to as the "IDA") suspended all structural adjustment loans, credits, and guarantees to the Government of Zimbabwe.

(4) In May 2000, the IDA suspended all other new lending to the Government of Zimbabwe.

(5) In September 2000, the IDA suspended disbursement of funds for ongoing projects under previously-approved loans, credits, and guarantees to the Government of Zimbabwe.

(b) SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND ECONOMIC RECOVERY.—

(1) BILATERAL DEBT RELIEF.—Upon receipt by the appropriate congressional committees of a certification described in subsection (d), the Secretary of the Treasury shall undertake a review of the feasibility of restructuring, rescheduling, or eliminating the sovereign debt of Zimbabwe held by any agency of the United States Government.

(2) MULTILATERAL DEBT RELIEF AND OTHER FINANCIAL

ASSISTANCE.—It is the sense of Congress that, upon receipt by the appropriate congressional committees of a certification described in subsection (d), the Secretary of the Treasury should—

(A) direct the United States executive director of each multilateral development bank to propose that the bank should undertake a review of the feasibility of restructuring, rescheduling, or eliminating the sovereign debt of Zimbabwe held by that bank; and

(B) direct the United States executive director of each international financial institution to which the United States is a member to propose to undertake financial and technical support for Zimbabwe, especially support that is intended to promote Zimbabwe's economic recovery and development, the stabilization of the Zimbabwean dollar, and the viability of Zimbabwe's democratic institutions.

(c) **MULTILATERAL FINANCING RESTRICTION.**—Until the President makes the certification described in subsection (d), and except as may be required to meet basic human needs or for good governance, the Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States executive director to each international financial institution to oppose and vote against—

(1) any extension by the respective institution of any loan, credit, or guarantee to the Government of Zimbabwe; or

(2) any cancellation or reduction of indebtedness owed by the Government of Zimbabwe to the United States or any international financial institution.

(d) **PRESIDENTIAL CERTIFICATION THAT CERTAIN CONDITIONS ARE SATISFIED.**—A certification under this subsection is a certification transmitted to the appropriate congressional committees of a determination made by the President that the following conditions are satisfied:

(1) **RESTORATION OF THE RULE OF LAW.**—The rule of law has been restored in Zimbabwe, including respect for ownership and title to property, freedom of speech and association, and an end to the lawlessness, violence, and intimidation sponsored, condoned, or tolerated by the Government of Zimbabwe, the ruling party, and their supporters or entities.

(2) **ELECTION OR PRE-ELECTION CONDITIONS.**—Either of the following two conditions is satisfied:

(A) **PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION.**—Zimbabwe has held a presidential election that is widely accepted as free and fair by independent international monitors, and the president-elect is free to assume the duties of the office.

(B) **PRE-ELECTION CONDITIONS.**—In the event the certification is made before the presidential election takes place, the Government of Zimbabwe has sufficiently improved the pre-election environment to a degree consistent with accepted international standards for security and freedom of movement and association.

(3) COMMITMENT TO EQUITABLE, LEGAL, AND TRANSPARENT

LAND REFORM.—The Government of Zimbabwe has demonstrated a commitment to an equitable, legal, and transparent land reform program consistent with agreements reached at the International Donors' Conference on Land Reform and

Resettlement in Zimbabwe held in Harare, Zimbabwe, in September 1998.

(4) FULFILLMENT OF AGREEMENT ENDING WAR IN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO.—The Government of Zimbabwe is making a good faith effort to fulfill the terms of the Lusaka, Zambia, agreement on ending the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

(5) MILITARY AND NATIONAL POLICE SUBORDINATE TO CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT.—The Zimbabwean Armed Forces, the National Police of Zimbabwe, and other state security forces are responsible to and serve the elected civilian government.

(e) WAIVER.—The President may waive the provisions of subsection

(b)(1) or subsection (c), if the President determines that it is in the national interest of the United States to do so.

SEC. 5. SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, THE FREE PRESS AND INDEPENDENT MEDIA, AND THE RULE OF LAW.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The President is authorized to provide assistance under part I and chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to—

(1) support an independent and free press and electronic media in Zimbabwe;

(2) support equitable, legal, and transparent mechanisms of land reform in Zimbabwe, including the payment of costs related to the acquisition of land and the resettlement of individuals, consistent with the International Donors' Conference on Land Reform and Resettlement in Zimbabwe held in Harare, Zimbabwe, in September 1998, or any subsequent agreement relating thereto; and

(3) provide for democracy and governance programs in Zimbabwe.

(b) FUNDING.—Of the funds authorized to be appropriated to carry out part I and chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 for fiscal year 2002—

(1) \$20,000,000 is authorized to be available to provide the assistance described in subsection (a)(2); and

(2) \$6,000,000 is authorized to be available to provide the assistance described in

subsection (a)(3).

Aug. 1, considered and passed Senate.

Dec. 4, considered and passed House, amended.

Dec. 11, Senate concurred in House amendment.

WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, Vol. 37 (2001):
Dec. 21, Presidential statement.

(c) SUPERSEDES OTHER LAWS.—The authority in this section supersedes any other provision of law.

**SEC. 6. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN AGAINST
INDIVIDUALS RESPONSIBLE FOR VIOLENCE AND THE BREAKDOWN OF
THE RULE OF LAW IN ZIMBABWE.**

It is the sense of Congress that the President should begin immediate consultation with the governments of European Union member states, Canada, and other appropriate foreign countries on ways in which to—

- (1) identify and share information regarding individuals responsible for the deliberate breakdown of the rule of law, politically motivated violence, and intimidation in Zimbabwe;
- (2) identify assets of those individuals held outside Zimbabwe;
- (3) implement travel and economic sanctions against those individuals and their associates and families; and
- (4) provide for the eventual removal or amendment of those sanctions.

Approved December 21, 2001.

APPENDIX 3

**FIRST REPORT
OF THE PORTFOLIO COMMITTEE ON YOUTH, INDIGENIZATION AND
ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT**

ON

MARANGE-ZIMUNYA COMMUNITY SHARE OWNERSHIP TRUST

Presented to Parliament of Zimbabwe on Tuesday, 25 October 2016

THIRD SESSION – EIGHTH PARLIAMENT

ORDERED IN TERMS OF STANDING ORDER No. 159 THAT:

- 1) At the commencement of every session, there shall be as many committees to be designated according to government portfolios as the Standing Rules and Orders Committee may deem fit.
- 2) It shall be the function of such committees to examine expenditure administration and policy of government departments and other matters falling under their jurisdictions as Parliament may, by resolution determine.
- 3) The members of such committees shall be appointed by the Standing Rules and Orders

Committee, from one or both Houses of Parliament, and such appointments shall take into account the expressed interests or expertise of the Members and Senators and the political and gender composition of Parliament.

TERMS OF REFERENCE OF PORTFOLIO COMMITTEES S.O. No. 160

Subject to these Standing Orders, a portfolio committee shall) consider and deal with all Bills and Statutory Instruments or other matters which are referred to it by or under a resolution of the House or by the Speaker;

- b) consider or deal with an appropriation or money bill or any aspect of an appropriation or money bill referred to it by these Standing Orders or by or under resolution of this House;
- c) monitor, investigate, enquire into and make recommendations relating to any aspect of the legislative programme, budget, policy or any other matter it may consider relevant to the government department falling within the category of affairs assigned to it, and may for that purpose, consult and liaise with such a department; and
- d) consider or deal with all international treaties, conventions and agreements relevant to it, which are from time to time negotiated, entered into or agreed upon.

On Thursday, 17 January 2015, Mr Speaker announced that the Committee on Standing Rules and Orders had nominated the following Members to serve on the Portfolio Committee on Youth, Indigenization and Economic Empowerment:

Hon. Wadyajena Justice Mayor (ZANU PF, GOKWE - NEMBUDZIYA) (Chairperson)
Hon. Beremauro Godfrey (ZANU PF, Hurungwe Central)
Hon. Hon. Chibaya Amos (MDCT, Mkoba)

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Hon. Chikuni Esther (ZANU PF, PR Manicaland)
Hon. Chipanga Kudzanai (ZANU PF, Makoni West)
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Hon. Dube Siphosiphopho (MDCT, PR Matebeland South)
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FOREWORD

The Constitution of Zimbabwe states explicitly that; s3 (2)(f) The principles of good governance, which bind the State and all institutions and agencies of government at every level include – respect for the people of Zimbabwe, from whom the authority to govern is derived.

This constitutes an important obligation to all citizens to not only make good on promises of development and prosperity, but to offer leadership that is defined by transparency, integrity and accountability. Our leadership, ultimately, is in service of the people; s3 (2) (g) Transparency, justice, accountability and responsiveness.

In as much as the politicians and public representatives of the day are expected to provide solutions to the most pertinent challenges faced by the people they represent, they must, with equal fervour, admit when they have failed. This humility will allow us as a nation to not only learn and grow from our mistakes, but will ensure that the electorate is certain of the sincerity and good faith of its leadership.

The promises that the Government makes to citizens of Zimbabwe, as well as the confidence the citizens hold in the government cannot be taken for granted and must be honoured and safeguarded, always. While this inquiry brings to light damning evidence of misrepresentation and impropriety by some public officials to the people of Zimbabwe in general and the communities of Marange-Zimunya in particular, it offers an opportunity to fully hold to account those responsible for the deliberate deception to H.E Cde. RG Mugabe and the communities that agreed to erstwhile sacrifices in the name of the nation's progress.

To leave one's home, making way for development, even on the promise of a better life is neither a light feat nor an easy task. We as Zimbabweans know only too well how intrinsically bound we are to the land of our ancestors and know the spiritual symbolism of home. We must know, then, that when we beg such sacrifices from our citizens, we are morally obliged to honour all of the guarantees we make to them. It then becomes not only folly but disingenuous and treacherous for politicians and public servants alike to prejudice the good people of this nation any entitlements for personal benefit on account of the temporary position of borrowed power they exercise.

The Committee hopes that this report provides adequate basis for redress of wrongs committed against the communities of Marange-Zimunya and further hopes that the Government of Zimbabwe will take the requisite actions to restore the confidence of the people of this community and the nation at large.

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Zimbabwe's Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Programme is an endeavour by the Government of Zimbabwe to economically empower the previously disadvantaged and economically deprived majority of indigenous Zimbabweans by guaranteeing them ownership and control of the country's natural resources and the national economy. Zimbabwe's Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Regulations establish various mechanisms for delivering this broad-based empowerment, including the Community Share Ownership Trusts (CSOTs). CSOTs are established in terms of section 14B of the 2010 Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act

[Chapter 14:33] as read with the Indigenization and Economic Empowerment General Regulations of 2010 to provide surrounding communities whose natural resources are being explored by any 'qualifying business' a guaranteed shareholding in businesses that are active in their area.

CSOTs are constituted by a Deed of Trust presided over by trustees comprising Chiefs, Local Government Authority representatives and representatives from interest groups within the community. The key objective of CSOTs is to facilitate development and stimulate growth of the local economy while adding value to the wider national economy. To date, a total of 61 CSOTs have been duly registered with the Deeds Office. Of these, 60 are located in rural Zimbabwe, with one being situated in the urban area of Mabvuku -Tafara.

There has been wide-spread concern around the perceived general failure, maladministration and abuse of the country's 61 established CSOTs, including the Marange-Zimunya Community Share Ownership Trust (M-Z CSOT). These concerns arose against a backdrop of various unfulfilled commitments by qualifying businesses to provide capital that facilitate administrative and local development activities as pledged. Specifically, misgivings around the efficacy of the M-Z CSOT emanate from reports that despite the extensive mining of diamonds in the area, which is believed to be among those with the highest probable reserves globally, the local communities have not benefitted in any meaningful way. In particular, reports from community interest groups and the media alleged that the communities continue to languish in poverty and underdevelopment, unable to access the most basic services, including healthcare, schools and clean water¹. This was suggested to be, in part, as a result of six diamond mining companies not honouring a number of key commitments made to the communities, including a \$50 million contribution towards the MZ CSOT, the provision of \$1,000 in compensation to families relocated from Chiadzwa mining field and derisory land allocated to resettled families.

1.2 In accordance with its mandate to examine the administration and policies of the Ministry of Youth, Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment, and matters falling under its jurisdiction, the Committee embarked on an enquiry to establish the extent of these claims. To this end, in launching its investigations the Committee set out to achieve the following objectives:

- i) To determine the nature of the commitments made by Anjin Investments, Diamond Mining Company, Mbada Diamonds, Marange Resources, Jinan Investment Private Limited and Rera Diamonds to the Marange-Zimunya Community Share Ownership Trust; ¹ The Herald, 23 March, 2016
- ii) To understand the obligations, if any, binding Anjin Investments, Diamond Mining

Company, Mbada Diamonds, Marange Resources, Jinan Investment Private Limited and Rera Diamonds to the Marange-Zimunya Community Share Ownership Trust;

iii) To analyze the causes of the failure of the implementation and operationalisation of the Marange-Zimunya Community Share Ownership Trust; and

iv) To ascertain the nature and extent of the challenges faced by families relocated from the Chiadzwa mining fields.

This Committee Report is a culmination of observations emanating from the investigation. It presents:

- a) Background information on indigenisation and economic empowerment and the Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (ZIMASSET);
- b) Outline of issues linked to the failure to effectively implement the relocation of displaced villagers in ARDA Transau by the diamond mining companies;
- c) Summary and outcomes of oral evidence gathered;
- d) Committee findings and;
- e) Recommendations.

2.0 BACKGROUND

2.1 A number of factors motivated the necessity for this inquiry. These included, firstly, the prominence of CSOTs in the national development agenda as identified in the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Policy and the Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation. Failure to recognize the central role that CSOTs are intended to play in socioeconomic prosperity, and consequent failure to efficiently implement and operationalize CSOTs by key stakeholders provided just cause for examination. Secondly, the lack of clarity of the exact nature and extent of commitments (as well as conflicting claims of the same) made by relevant mining companies and other stakeholders towards the M-Z CSOT provided grounds for concern.

Thirdly, disturbing reports of the bitter disappointment on the part of families relocated from the Chiadzwa mining fields around the non-remittance of their compensation funds, the inadequate size of the newly allocated plots and their inability to access basic services appeared to constitute unmet obligations on the part of the mining companies. Fourthly and finally, the proposed consolidation of all Zimbabwean diamond concessions and companies and the inheritance of all assets and liabilities of existing mining companies by Zimbabwe Consolidated Diamond Corporation brought to bear the question of what the exact obligations would be in respect to the M-Z CSOT.

These issues gave basis for the pursuit of an investigation by means of oral and written

submissions of evidence by related stakeholders as well as fact-finding missions to relevant localities.

2.2 Policy Framework

The Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Policy informs and guides the coordination of the national indigenization and economic empowerment agenda primarily through the implementation of the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act [Chapter 14:33] as read with Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment regulations of 2010. The policy, if well implemented, facilitates the institution of measures to ensure participation in the economy by a broad spectrum of the indigenous Zimbabwean population. Thus, the policy drives a noble cause of economically empowering indigenous people who were historically disadvantaged before and after our independence in 1980. The Act seeks to bestow majority ownership and control of the country's resources to the black majority. More specifically, the Act advises that at least: "51 per centum of the shares of every public company and any other business shall be owned by indigenous Zimbabweans". The Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Act also provides for the creation of an Empowerment Fund to finance the acquisition of working capital, shares, and other forms of finance for indigenous people.

2.3 ZIMASSET and Community Development

The Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation not only complements the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Policy in its goal to revive the economy, but maintains indigenisation and empowerment as its core thrust. The foreword of the blueprint, penned by His Excellency, President Robert Mugabe, reads, "ZimAsset was crafted to achieve sustainable development and social equity anchored on indigenisation, empowerment and employment creation which will be largely propelled by the judicious exploitation of the country's abundant human and natural resources." Additionally, the Cluster on Social Services and Poverty Reduction directly refers to the establishment of CSOTs as a key deliverable for improved economic empowerment and indigenization. CSOTs, therefore, act as vital vehicles through which some of the ends of ZimAsset are to be met.

The M-Z CSOT was officially launched on 25 July, 2012 by President Mugabe. It is at this launch that the five companies operating in the area, namely, Anjin Investments, Diamond Mining Company, Mbada Diamonds, Marange Resources and Jinan Investment Private Limited, allegedly pledged to contribute US\$10 million each to the Trust. To date, the diamond mining companies have remitted a combined total of just \$400 000 out of \$50 million in pledges. It is against this background that the failure by diamond mining companies to honour their alleged \$50 million pledge towards the M-Z CSOT scheme is widely viewed as having stalled development programmes in the community.

2.4 Unclear Expectations

Among the factors driving this enquiry was the appearance of a lack of clarity and consistency across the five mining companies of the role they were to play in the M-Z CSOT. Anjin Investments, for instance, had previously expressed that it was not aware of the Marange-Zimunya Community Share Ownership Trust (CSOT) and that it had not made any pledges towards its implementation. This was contrary to the assertions of the former Youth Development, Indigenisation and Empowerment Minister, Honourable Saviour Kasukuwere, who accused the mining companies of dishonesty. Reports of the diamond companies' failure to pay \$10 million towards the pledged \$50 million target for Marange-Zimunya Community Trust, therefore, could not be understood, given reports and speculation that the companies were enjoying significant profits.

2.5 Relocated Community Members

The Committee was concerned with the relocation of the displaced villagers by the mining companies. Villagers were allocated land in Arda Transau but complained of being allocated one hectare plots, which were insufficient in meeting their needs. It was also reported that their compensation of \$1,000 per family has not been remitted (this was still the case as of March 2016.)

2.6 Consolidation of Diamond Concerns

The Zimbabwe Consolidated Diamond Corporation (ZCDC) seeks to amalgamate all diamond concessions in the country. ZCDC will inherit both the assets and liabilities of the diamond mining companies, including the pledges towards share ownership trusts. Minister of Mines and Mining Development, Honourable Walter Chidhakwa has stated that new diamond firm will honour the \$50 million pledge to the Marange-Zimunya Community Share Ownership Trust "The successor company will inherit both assets and liabilities of the merging companies...What this means is that companies in Marange, as is the case, took a position on the community share ownership trust... The new company will take over that responsibility and will, therefore, have to fulfil that pledge." As such the exact nature of this commitment must be established and clarified for the benefit of the communities and the ZCDC.

3.0 METHODOLOGY

In undertaking this enquiry, the Committee adopted the following methodology:

3.1 Oral Evidence Sessions

The Committee held oral evidence sessions with the following key stakeholders:-

k) The board of Trustees of the Marange-Zimunya Community Share Ownership Trust on 13 and 27 February, 2014;

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l) The Diamond Mining Companies (i) Anjin Investments (ii) Diamond Mining Company (iii) Mbada Diamond (iv) Marange Resources and (v) Jinan Investment Private Limited on 07 March 2014;

m) Honourable Christopher Mushowe, then Minister of State for Provincial Affairs, Manicaland Province on 10 April 2014;

n) Honourable Francis Nhema, then Minister of Youth, Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment on 03 April 2014 and 26 June 2014;

o) Honourable Walter Chidhakwa, the Minister of Mines and Mining Development on 12 March 2015;

p) Mr Masunga, Acting Permanent Secretary for Youth, Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment on 07 May 2015; 2 The Chronicle, 25 November, 2015.

q) Mr Chizhou, then Acting General Manager of Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation (ZMDC) & Acting Permanent Secretary for Mines and Mining Development on 7 May 2015;

r) Honourable Saviour Kasukuwere, then Minister of Youth, Indigenisation and Economic Development on 9 July 2015;

s) Honourable Obert Mpofu, then Minister of Mines and Mining Development on 30 July 2015;

t) Zimbabwe Diamond Workers Union on 14 April 2016 and;

u) Jinan Investment Private Limited on 23 June 2016

3.2 Written Submissions

The Committee received written submissions from the Board of Trustees of the Marange-Zimunya CSOT; Zimbabwe Diamond Workers Union as well as from participants on the Public Hearings.

3.3 Fact-finding Visit

The Committee undertook a fact-finding mission to Chiadzwa and the Arda Transau resettlement area from 31 March to 01 April 2016 which included:

a) A meeting with the Provincial Administrator in Mutare;

b) Visits to the Corporate Social Responsibility projects in Transau Estate, including Welling Primary School and Charasika Primary School built by Mbada Diamonds; Anjin Investments Water Reticulation Plant for villagers relocated in Transau Estate;

and

c) Visits to Mbada Diamonds Corporate Social Responsibility projects, including St. Noah College and the Chiadzwa sub-chief homestead, both built by Mbada Diamonds;

3.4 Public Hearings

The Committee conducted public hearings and evidence gathering exercises at Chirasika Business Center (ARDA Transau), Zimunya Business Center on 01 April 2016 and Bambazonke Business Center, Marange 02 April 2016.

4.0 ORAL SUBMISSIONS TO THE COMMITTEE

4.1 Marange-Zimunya CSOT Board

The Board of the Marange-Zimunya CSOT appeared before the Committee twice, on 13 and 27 February 2014. The Chairperson of the Trust, Chief Marange, informed the Committee that in June 2013, the Trust received USD 400,000 in their account. He further informed the Committee that the Trust was astonished about the amount deposited given that during the official M-Z CSOT launch, a cheque of USD 1.5 million was displayed. Chief Marange pointed out that they were surprised to receive USD 200,000 apiece from Marange Resources and Mbada Diamonds instead of the USD 50 million, USD 10 million apiece from the 5 major mining companies in the area.

4.1.2 The Trust Secretary Mr Chinaka highlighted that the Trust was facing challenges in managing the public expectations as the mining companies were not remitting funds into the Trust. He indicated that the communities were expecting projects to the tune of USD 50 million but the Trust was working with the sum of USD 400,000. Meeting public's expectation was an unattainable task, a point reinforced by Chief Marange who lamented that the rumour mill at the time was awash with stories that the Trustees were abusing the Trust funds. Chief Zimunya also questioned why the USD 1.5 million which was displayed at the launch amid pomp and ceremony had not been remitted to the Trust. He accused the mining companies of misleading and lying to the President on the amount of money to be released. Chief Zimunya further challenged the National Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Board (NIEEB) to explain to the Trust and the Committee why the rest of the money had not been released.

4.1.3 Chief Zimunya informed the Committee that there was interference by the Provincial Leadership in the operations of the Trust and within the mining companies. He alleged that this interference by the political leadership could be the reason behind the failure by the Mining companies to fulfil their pledges. He emphasised interference by ZANU PF political leadership in the Province led by Mr. Didymus Mutasa, the then Head of Manicaland Province who has since been expelled from the ruling Party. He further alleged that there were cash donations and motor vehicles donated to individuals and not to the Trust which could have contributed to the companies

not meeting their obligations. Chief Zimunya challenged the Committee to go on the ground and investigate why the funds had not been remitted into the Trust account two years after the launch of the CSOT.

4.2 Marange Resources

4.2.1 On 7th March 2014, Marange Resources made its presentation to the Portfolio Committee on Youth, Indigenization and Economic Empowerment. The company informed the Committee that it fully complied with the Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Act: that it was 100% government owned; and 100% Zimbabwean in its management structure. The company reported that 92% of profits generated was spent in the local economy, and that only 8% was used to source raw materials that could not be sourced locally. In terms of employment, the company reported that 54% personnel were recruited from Marange-Zimunya area and 46% from other areas of the country; 90% of workers were said to be males while 10% were females; and that 75% of 589 workers were youths, in the age group of 40 years and below.

4.2.2 The Committee was informed that in its socio-corporate responsibility, a total of \$22 million, between 2011 and 2013, had been disbursed of which 86% went to the relocation exercise, where out of a target of 350 houses, it built, 184 houses and relocated 116 households. Other areas of Social Corporate Responsibility include education, sport, and subsistence assistance including school feeding programmes for local schools, and distribution of food hampers and agricultural inputs to households, as well as construction of community projects which include Marange Vocational Center, Marange Hospital donations, Murwira Children's Home, and Zororai Old People's Home.

4.2.3 The Committee was informed that the company's contributions to its Corporate Social Responsibility projects had been hampered by liquidity constraints in the economy, as a result the company was facing acute shortage of working capital and capacity constraints. Consequently, it was experiencing difficulty in contributing towards the \$50 million for the M-Z CSOT. However, the company informed the Committee that it had made a contribution of \$200 000 from the 2 million dollars it was supposed to contribute towards the Trust Fund. The company further alleged that from the onset, the pledges were prorated in line with the capacity of the company. Thus Marange Resources would contribute 2 million and not 10 million. The Committee heard that there was no documentation on the pledges to be paid to the Marange-Zimunya Community Share Trust.

4.3 Diamond Mining Corporation (DMC)

4.3.1 On 07 March, 2014 Diamond Mining Corporation (DMC) made its presentation to the Committee. The Committee heard that the diamond mining company was summoned for a meeting at the Ministry of Mines chaired by the Permanent Secretary, Prof. Gudyanga, to discuss the CSOT.

The discussion centred upon a collective contribution of USD 10 million which was needed as a capital investment by the trustees on a diamond mining project on behalf of the community. The company alleged that during the discussion it was understood that a concession area was already allocated to the community by government and that capital investment was all that was needed. The company further alleged that of the USD 10 million to be paid, each company was to contribute USD 1.5 million dollars. The company informed the Committee that pursuant to the launch of M-Z CSOT, it expressed commitment to pay USD 1.5 million in small amounts. The company further mentioned that contrary to its pledge, it later learnt that USD 1.5 million was required immediately and as a lump sum, an undertaking that was not achievable for the company. The Committee learnt that the matter was brought up at several meetings held between the mining company and ZMDC wherein clarification was sought and correction was called for. The company alleged that ZMDC responded by saying that the matter was decided at a higher level and would be addressed in due course but was later advised by ZMDC not to make a contribution to the CSOT.

4.3.2 DMC further highlighted challenges of weak coordination between relevant authorities, trustees, and mining companies to see through the successful implementation of the Trust fund. It was the view of DMC that USD 1.5 million per company should be spread over smaller payments rather than being paid at once. The company reported that it had relocated 50 families, yet from the progress reports on relocation provided by the Provincial Administrator's Office, had only constructed 30 houses and relocated 30 households, out of a target of 114 households. The company also informed the Committee that it was involved in sinking boreholes, the supply of seeds, fertilizers, food packages and cash hand-outs, yet during public hearings, such schemes were said to have stopped as far back as 2012.

4.4 Anjin Investments

4.4.1 On 07 March, 2014 Anjin Investments made its presentation to the Portfolio Committee on Youth Indigenization and Economic Empowerment. The Committee was informed that the company was compliant with the Indigenization Act being a joint venture company between Afec and Matbronz on a 50:50 basis. On the payment of the pledged USD 1.5 million towards the Marange-Zimunya Community Share Ownership, the company reported that it was advised by the then Minister of Youth, Honourable Minister Kasukuwere that payment of the USD 1.5 million was supposed to be paid over a period of five years, rather than a once off payment.

The General Manager, Public Relations, Mr M Machacha emphasized that Honourable Minister Kasukuwere knew there was no money to honour the dummy cheque but insisted on the President presenting the said dummy cheque. The Committee heard that the company was not making its payments towards the Trust Fund, because when the pledge was made, the economic situation was 'good' and that the company was now facing cash-flow challenges and decreasing productivity and sales were declining. The

company also informed the Committee that in spite of the decline in productivity and sales, it had built a total of 471 houses, primary and secondary schools, clinics and a shopping centre and water reticulation for the villagers' relocation to Arda Transau at a cost of USD 80 million. Other Corporate Social Responsibility projects were said to include the provision of treatment to 800 relocatees suffering from eye cataracts and sending students to study in China.

4.5 Mbada Diamonds

4.5.1 The Committee was informed that since its inception, Mbada Diamonds had exceeded the USD 1 billion mark in its turnover and that the bulk of the money was remitted to the national fiscus. The company stated that at one point Mbada Diamonds was contributing USD 15-20 million a week into national fiscus. The Committee established that Mbada Diamonds had not pledged any contribution to the CSOT but stands ready to contribute to the fund to help improve the lives of people in the community. The Committee also noted that the USD 200, 000 dollar contribution Mbada Diamonds made to the CSOT was under its Corporate Social Responsibility programme.

4.5.2 The Committee gathered that the Chairman of Mbada Diamonds, Dr Mhlanga, was one hundred percent certain that he never pledged anything to the Trust and that Mbada Diamonds was not represented at the launch. He also dismissed as malicious fabrication of the rumour that Mbada Diamonds gave Mr M Madiro cash or vehicles or any gift whether in kind or otherwise.

4.6 Honourable Francis Nhema, then Minister of Youth Development, Indigenisation and Empowerment

4.6.1 Honourable Nhema, Minister of Youth Development, Indigenisation and Empowerment, confirmed to the Committee that there was no written agreement and/or correspondence between the Ministry of Youth Development, Indigenisation and Empowerment, and the Companies on the USD 50 million dollar pledge. The Minister alleged that the pledge was made in a meeting, and no minutes of proceedings were produced. He pointed out that he had not seen any documentation from the companies to the Ministry and vice versa, he stated that no written agreement existed although he assumed there was a "gentlemen's agreement."

4.6.2 Honourable Nhema pointed out that in any event, if he were to meet with the mining companies, the Ministry of Mines and Mining Development would be present because the companies fall under the jurisdiction of that Ministry. He expressed concern over the negotiations, noting that they were not holistic and did not involve all stakeholders. He pointed out that had all parties been present during the discussions, there would have been more transparency. Honourable Nhema informed the Committee that the Ministry had learnt that in all dealings and pledges, all interested parties must be represented so

that work is done amicably by all parties and that everything be documented to enable easy follow-ups. The former Minister further stated that the correspondence purported to have been signed by his predecessor, Hon. Minister S. Kasukuwere did not exist at his offices and even security had failed to track and locate it.

4.7 Honourable Christopher Mushowe, then Governor of Manicaland Province

The Committee was informed that on 20 august 2012, Honourable Mushowe received a letter from Hon. Minister Saviour Kasukuwere requesting him as Governor to make follow ups and ensure that the pledges made by the diamond mining companies were met for the benefit for the Marange-Zimunya Communities. The Committee established that Honourable Mushowe told some companies verbally that they should honour their pledges and that he wrote formally to Anjin reminding them to honour their pledge. He pointed out that he had written to Anjin only because Anjin was the only company that came to the launch and had presented the USD 1.5 million dummy cheque. He further pointed out that he made follow-ups via telephone reminding Anjin to deposit the amount pledged to the CSOT.

4.8 Honourable Walter Chidhakwa, Minister of Mines and Mining Development

The Committee gathered that when the Minister of Mines and Mining Development, Honourable Minister Chidhakwa, had a meeting with the mining companies they informed him that at the inception of the M-Z CSOT, there was no meeting held to discuss contributions to the CSOT. The Committee heard that the companies further alleged that no discussions were made on the amounts that would be deposited in accounts, the manner and the purpose of the CSOT and how it linked with the companies Social Corporate Responsibility. He informed the Committee that the companies had shown commitment that they were ready, willing and able to discuss with Government on the figures to be paid because the figures that were mentioned during the launch of the CSOT, were only mentioned but had never been agreed to. He further elaborated that the companies reiterated that a meeting was never held to discuss the sum that each company would pay into the CSOT.

4.9 Mr Masanga, Acting Permanent Secretary Youth, Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment.

The Acting Permanent Secretary informed the Committee that in terms of Clause 3 subsection 2 of Statutory Instrument 21 of 2010, the Minister of Youth, Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment, and the company that is exploiting the resources within various communities, have to agree to the value of share and other interests to be disposed to the CSOT taking into consideration the State's sovereign ownership of the resources being exploited. In this vein, with regards to the Marange-Zimunya Community Share Ownership Trust, he alleged the Minister responsible had met with the mining companies and pledges were made formally in spite of being unable to produce correspondence to that effect.

4.10 Mr Chizhou Acting Permanent Secretary Mines and Mining Development and ZMDC

Acting General Manager.

4.10.1 He informed the Committee that when the President launched the M-Z CSOT, there was a reported USD 50 million initial contribution by the 5 diamond mining companies in Chiadzwa. This meant that each entity was to contribute \$10 million. He further pointed out that the launch was conducted solely by the Ministry of Youth, Indigenisation and Economic Development with the ZMDC only being invited to attend the event but that it was not involved in meetings prior to the launch or preparations to the launch.

4.10.2 The Committee learnt that the Ministry of Mines and Mining Development called upon ZMDC to ensure that the diamond mining companies deposit an initial amount of USD 200,000 to the M-Z CSOT bank account. The Committee was further informed that ZMDC called for a meeting wherein companies were urged to concur with the Ministry's directive of making remittances to the Trust. In the meeting, it was noted that each diamond mining company was required to make a payment of USD 200,000 to the account with immediate effect.

4.10.3 The Committee determined that there was no correspondence from Hon. Minister Kasukuwere, the former Minister of Youth, to Hon. Minister Mpofu, the former Minister of Mines in relation to the M-Z CSOT. Mr Masunga stated that the pledges were verbally made and that there wasn't any correspondence nor existing minutes to that effect. Mr Masunga emphasised that the pledges were not in writing and they had consulted thoroughly within the Ministry of Youth and had gone through all the files but could not find any correspondence or minutes regarding the pledges.

4.11 Honourable Saviour Kasukuwere, then Minister for Youth Development, Indigenisation and Empowerment

4.11.1 The Committee heard that the former Minister for Youth Development, Indigenisation and Empowerment had engaged unnamed "Zimbabwean Principals in the joint ventures" of the mining companies.

He stressed that there was no need to sign agreements with the mining companies because government had equal shareholding in them. He further alleged that since it was government's position that the alluvial resources must benefit the communities at the local level and as such, there was no need for a signed agreement with the mining entities. He argued that the discussions with regards to the empowerment of the people of Marange were handled at Cabinet and senior levels. The Minister alleged that the Ministry of Defence was responsible for Anjin Investments, for Marange Resources initially under Mr Kurotwi, Director of Core Mining and Mineral Resources, and later by ZMDC which in turn was represented by the Ministry of Mines. He further alleged

that the Principal for the other companies was ZMDC, a Parastatal under the auspices of the Ministry of Mines. To this end, the Minister alleged that the people who had appeared before the Committee were not the ones he had entered into agreement with and he had never met them even at ministerial level.

4.11.2 The Committee heard, from Hon. Minister Kasukuwere, that a company owned by the people of Marange was set up and allocated a concession. The USD 50 million seed capital expected from the mining companies was to capacitate and capitalize this company to enable the community to mine and benefit from the resources. He pointed out that the companies might not have met their pledges because of lack of adequate funds. He further pointed out that Marange Resources had committed to paying a sum of USD 50 000 and that Mbada Diamonds had paid USD 400 000 into the M-Z CSOT when he was still with the Ministry. This, however, has proven not to be a factual assertion as the CSOT only received USD 400 000 from Mbada Diamonds and Marange Resources. He informed the Committee that he was not responsible for the dummy cheque that was displayed during the launch of the CSOT. He explained that he did not work for BANC ABC and that he did not draw up the dummy cheque.

4.11.3 The Minister reiterated that he did not discuss the pledge with Mr Machacha whom he claimed was merely a Chairman of the company. He denied ever instructing Anjin to display the USD 1.5 million dummy cheque during the launch of the CSOT. He informed the Committee that since it was government policy, Mr Machacha was instructed by the powers that be to bring the cheque, not by the Minister. He pointed out that Mr Machacha was just an employee or somebody who had been asked to stand in for the stakeholders. The former Minister further pointed out that he had discussed the pledges with Government, the shareholders.

4.11.4 The Committee was informed, by Hon. Minister Kasukuwere, that a position was taken by Government, the technical teams from NIEEB and the Ministry of Mines who discussed and agreed that although a percentile of Shares would be given to the community, and it was more beneficial for government to capitalize the fund by having a seed capital of \$10 million apiece. According to the Minister, it was a result of various discussions by Ministry officials that government reached an agreement on the amount to be paid with the Ministry of Mines who were the major shareholders of the 50-50% joint ventures. The Committee learnt that Hon. Minister Kasukuwere had not engaged General Mhlanga, CEO of Mbada Diamonds or even AFFEC shareholders who owned 50% of both Anjin Investments and Jinan mining entities. He pointed out that these entities were treated differently from the private companies because these were State linked entities. He emphasized that the understanding that \$10 million apiece be availed to the CSOT was agreed to by all officials. He, however, refused to mention the names of the so called higher offices that he consulted or had given him directives to strike some working arrangement with the Ministry of Mines.

4.12 Honourable Obert Mpofu, then Minister of Mines and Mining Development

4.12.1 The former Minister submitted that his then Ministry facilitated the actualisation of the indigenisation law but the implementation and administration fell under the purview of the Ministry of Youth. He outlined that the Ministry of Mines and Mining Development was not involved in the engagement of diamond mining companies. He maintained that he had no recollection of any kind of correspondence from the former Minister of Youth, Hon. Minister Kasukuwere, it be on the pledges made by Diamond Mining companies or inviting him to the launch of the M-Z CSOT. He pointed out that, “This is a serious decision that would require proper documentation of that arrangement and you do not discuss such major transactions verbally. If there was such arrangement, they should have been some documentation to that effect and I am not aware of that documentation”.

4.12.2 He submitted that he did not remember entering into any agreement with ZMDC on making any pledges. He further denied the existence of any agreement, documentation or discussion arrangements on the USD 10 million pledges by the five diamond mining companies nor between the Ministry of Mines and Mining Development and ZMDC. He stated that he had no recollection whatsoever of any directive that was made from the Cabinet or from anywhere to his then Ministry regarding the USD 50 million pledges by the five mining companies in Chiadzwa. He further distanced himself from the activities of Hon. Minister Kasukuwere stating that he was never invited to participate at the launch of the Marange-Zimunya CSOT which was strange considering that mining firms fell under his ambit.

4.13 Jinan Mining Private Limited

4.13.1 Mr Goronga, the Deputy Marketing Director of Jinan, informed the Committee that in accordance with the agreement of the joint venture between Marange Resources and AFFEC two percent of the joint venture company net profits shall be allocated for the funding of the CSOT.

He pointed out that pursuant to this clause Jinan had not remitted anything to the CSOT because it has been making losses since it started operations on 5 October 2012. He elaborated that the year ending December 2013 a loss of USD 56.9 million was made and the subsequent year 2014, Jinan made a loss of USD 64.3 million. Mr Goronga pointed out that pursuant to this, the 2% which was not on gross sales but net profit was not realized. He submitted that for the past two years excluding 2015, Jinan had not made a profit.

4.13.2 In response to the Committee’s enquiry on the USD 500 million which was siphoned from Jinan Mining Private Limited to BancABC Botswana, Mr Goronga advised the Committee that the issue is under the Zimbabwe Republic Police, Serious Fraud Squad Department. He further advised the Committee that the name Jinan

Mining Private Limited was used by two different entities. He expounded that the monies which were coming in for investment in Zimbabwe from AFFEC came through the account of “Jinan Mining Private Limited” which is not the Jinan Mining Private Limited in Chiadzwa.

5.0 RELOCATION OF CHIADZWA VILLAGERS: MANICALAND PROVINCIAL OFFICE SUBMISSION

5.1 During a courtesy call briefing with the Manicaland Provincial Administrator, Mr Mbetsi informed the Committee that the Local Government, Rural and Urban Development circular No. 162 dated 18th November 1991 stated that, “Any organization which intends to implement a project that displaces people must take all the necessary measures to compensate all the people entitled to be compensated in respect of all the losses suffered including loss of land”.

It was, therefore, the responsibility of the project sponsor to ensure that compensation is provided to the displaced families. The Committee gathered that when diamond mining began in Chiadzwa, Transau Estate was identified for the resettlement of the displaced families. The Committee was informed that the estate comprises 12 000 hectares, of which 500 hectares is occupied by the Grand Reef Aerodrome, leaving 11 500 hectares for the resettlement of displaced Chiadzwa villagers. The Committee heard that a committee was set up to oversee the relocation exercise process, under the Provincial Governor/Resident Minister. The resettlement committee comprised the Provincial Administrator (Chair), Agritex Department, Irrigation Department, Public Works Department,

Ministry of Lands, District Development Fund (DDF), Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA), Physical Planning Department; Ministry of Education; and Ministry of Health and Child Care. The Committee was further informed that preliminary planning activities conducted included Chiadzwa household census, planning and demarcation of Transau, valuation of Chiadzwa households immovable property for compensation purpose, construction of core houses, Blair-toilets, roads, dip tanks, and drilling of new and maintenance of old boreholes. The resettlement was also to include establishment of social and commercial facilities and more importantly, irrigation scheme that would afford relocatees sustainable livelihoods since they would depend on food handout until the completion of the scheme.

5.1.2 The Chiadzwa Household Census to determine the actual number of affected families concluded that 31 villages with a total of 4 321 households, 11 564 cattle, 17 208 goats, 1 458 sheep and 362 donkeys would be affected by the mining activities. The Committee was informed that currently, 10 villages, with 1 800 households, had been identified for relocation on the villagized model A1 scheme, and that they will take up 4 500 hectares of the 11 500 hectares available. The homesteads constructed for relocatees

would consist of 3 bedroomed core house, a traditional kitchen, and a toilet, on a one hectare piece of land.

5.1.3 The remaining balance 5 000 hectares was set aside for grazing, 1 000 hectares for the development of socio-economic infrastructure, including clinics and shops, and the other 1 00 hectares is set for potential investors. Thus, a lot still needs to be done in terms of relocation of affected households. The Provincial Administrator's Office indicated that those that are yet to be relocated have been affected by pollution coming from mines. This was confirmed by villagers at Bambazonke Business Center, on 2 April 2016, where it was revealed that Diamond Mining Company (DMC) was spewing effluent into Chenyu and Singizi rivers both of which are Save River tributaries, thereby exposing aquatic life, the surrounding villagers and livestock to contaminated water.

Table 1.0 Progress on Relocation Programme

Company	Total No. Of houses to be constructed	Total No. Of house constructed	Total No. Of households allocated housed
Anjin Investments	474	474	474
Mbada Diamonds	487	100	100
Diamond Mining	114	30	30
Marange Resources	350	184	116
Jihan Investment	350	110	31
Rera Diamonds	92	0	0
Total	1947	989	751

5.1.4 On the Marange-Zimunya Community Share Ownership Trust (CSOT), the Provincial Administrator's Office informed the Committee that the payment of the pledged USD50 million, where individual companies were supposed to pay USD 10 million each, and the USD 1.5 million that was presented as a dummy cheque when the President launched the trust in 2012, has remained elusive. Not a single company has fulfilled its pledge. As of March 2016 the following were the payments made by companies according to Provincial Administrator's Office:

Table. 2.0 Marange-Zimunya CSOT Income: March 31, 2016

Marange Resources	\$300 000
Mbada Diamonds	\$200 000
Donation - CBZ	\$500
Donation - Agribank	\$520

Interest	\$38 092
Burungwe Sec Contributions	\$3 620
Total Income	\$542 732
Expenditure to date	\$488 951
Cash at hand	\$53 781

5.1.5 The Committee was further informed that the Trust had implemented projects in all the 36 Council Wards with a minimum of value of USD 5 000 per ward. Projects implemented in the wards ranged from borehole drilling and rehabilitation, construction of classroom blocks, construction of bridges, grading of roads and purchase of school furniture. This was confirmed during public hearings at Zimunya Business Center and Bambazonke Business Center in Marange.

The Trust also financed 3 district projects Madanga Clinic (Mutare South), Matiza Clinic (Mutare West), and grading of roads in Mutare North. The Committee was also told that the Trust had no secretariat of its own and that its administration was run by the Council Administration through the Finance Department while the Council Engineer is handling its project management.

6.0 PUBLIC HEARINGS AT CHIRASIKA BUSINESS CENTER (ARDA TRANSUA)

6.1 On 01 April 2016, the Committee conducted a brief public hearing at Chirasika Business Center, ARDA Transau. The Committee was informed that Chirasika Primary School was built by Mbada Diamonds. Teachers' accommodation is inadequate. It was also mentioned that the school comprised of 7 classrooms only, hence some lessons take place in the open and/or in makeshift classrooms.

6.2 The Committee was also informed that some homesteads built were overcrowded and in some cases muroora (daughter-in-law) is compelled to share accommodation with her in-laws. The relocated villagers also complained of high water bills at \$4 per month while they paid between USD 100-150 per household for irrigation plots. The Committee was informed of severe food insecurity in ARDA Transau because their half hectare allocated plots cannot produce enough food. The villagers confirmed that during the relocation exercise they were given USD 1000 disturbance allowances.

7.0 PUBLIC HEARING AT ZIMUNYA BUSINESS CENTER

7.1 On 1 April 2016 the Committee conducted a public hearing at Zimunya Business Center. The following were the major issues raised.

7.1.2 Villagers were concerned about the USD 50 million allegedly pledged by the mining companies in the Chiadzwa area, and in particular the USD 1.5 million that was displayed during the launch of the M-Z CSOT which was never remitted.

They alleged that either the companies did not fulfil the pledge or it was paid but was then misappropriated and did not benefit local communities. Villagers, however, acknowledged receipt of the USD 5 000 from the Trust which they used to do projects, such as refurbishing of Community Hall at Zimunya Business Center.

They had hoped that money from the Trust would be handy to rehabilitate bridges destroyed by Elnino in 2000 at Nyahuni River. They were concerned that youths in the area were made to fill out forms so that they would benefit from the pledged USD 10 million from each of the companies. No such funds were availed.

7.1.3 The Committee was also informed about the DMC mining activities which pollute rivers like Singwizi yet nothing was being done to protect villagers and their livestock from contaminated water. Most speakers, especially headmen expressed concern that diamond mining companies were not employing youths from Marange-Zimunya area because they were recruiting from Mashonaland provinces. Villagers weren't amused about the location of diamond factory in Harare yet the mining was being carried out in Marange-Zimunya area, a move which denied their local youth job opportunities. A proposal was made by the villagers that diamond mining companies should have a policy of guaranteeing 60% of jobs for local youths in order to economically empower them.

8.0 PUBLIC HEARING AT BAMBAZONKE BUSINESS CENTER, MARANGE

8.1 Marange-Zimunya Development Trust, represented by Mr. M Tafirenyika, and The B-Ment Youth Organization in Marange-Zimunya represented by Eng. Nemasase highlighted the following major concerns in the communities about diamond mining: (i) that the government and diamond mining companies should explain to local communities about what happened to the purported USD

50 million pledge, and in particular the USD 1.5 million displayed at the launch of the Trust by the President in 2012; (ii) the location of diamond polishing companies in Harare while avoiding Mutare and centers like Bambazonke Business Center which marginalizes local communities who are denied employment opportunities; (iii) that it is disturbing for local communities to receive reports that alluvial diamonds were being exhausted before communities have experienced any tangible benefits such as construction of roads, schools, clinics, and the electrification projects; (iv) that there are local projects including the 1972 Bambazonke Irrigation Plan which could improve the livelihoods of locals had the Trust fund been channeled properly towards these projects; (iv) that mining activities by companies like DMC which are polluting Chenyu and Singwizi rivers, are not made accountable for their actions. Communities accused government, in particular the Ministry of Mines and Mining Development, of making a deal with the mining companies which benefited a few people at the expense of the affected communities. They further accused Chief Marange and Headman Chiadzwa of individually benefiting at their own expense since the companies donated motor vehicles and built homesteads for these community leaders.

This was reiterated by most villagers who claimed that government and the mining companies benefited while the communities serve for a few aforementioned individuals, were languishing in poverty. They demanded that a meaningful and transparent agreement amongst the key stakeholders i.e. Government, mining companies and community was needed to enable the community to claim what was due to them.

8.2 The Committee was informed that villagers were not happy that the name of the President was abused since he officiated at the launch of the M-Z CSOT and displayed a dummy cheque of USD1.5 million which has not been honoured. There was the general perception that, as expressed by Mrs Mavhunaga, the non-payment of pledged funds by the companies have abused the name of the President. She demanded that the person who misled the President should be arrested, failure to arrest the person would imply that the President himself had unwittingly made a misrepresentation to the people

8.3 The ZCDC has refused to take responsibility over what transpired between locals and former diamond mining companies regarding relocation and related issues. The community was concerned with the settlement of the salary arrears that were incurred by the mining companies in view of the recent mining companies' amalgamation. They were concerned about who would take the responsibility of settling the payments. They urged government to clarify this issue and to make arrangements that benefited the locals.

8.4 The Committee was informed of police brutality to local residents during their patrols around diamond mines. Mrs Ziduche informed the Committee that her son Fungai Ziduche sustained serious injuries leading to the loss of his testicle after he was assaulted by police.

8.5 The local traditional leadership was not happy that there was no compensation by the diamond mining companies who had destroyed local shrines, including the sacred Baobab Tree that was used as the place for rain-making ceremonies by Chief Mkwada and Chiadzwa.

8.6 The villagers could not hide their shock about the revelations made by His Excellency, President Robert Mugabe that around \$15 billion of diamond money was unaccounted for. They argued that the President must have been made aware of what was happening at the diamond fields as every Wednesday a plane would come to pick up diamonds for resale.

9.0 COMMITTEE FINDINGS

9.1 Marange-Zimunya Community Share Ownership Trust (CSOT)

9.1.1 After being reassigned to a different ministry in September 2013, Hon. Minister Saviour Kasukuwere continued to demonstrate an unusually keen interest in his former ministry, to the extent that he remained highly visible in the public media, commenting on issues related to the Marange-Zimunya CSOT well beyond his tenure. Additionally, when the Hon. Minister Saviour.

Kasukuwere finally appeared before Committee, his submission did not offer any clarity whatsoever as to the authenticity of the pledges by mining companies. Moreover, his appearance before the committee was characterized by a clear intention to obstruct the Committee's investigations and on one occasion, he made overt threats directed at the Committee Chairperson, Hon. Justice Mayor Wadyajena.

9.1.2 The Committee is persuaded to conclude that the Diamond mining companies never at any point pledged the US\$10m apiece and the nation was misled by Hon. Minister Saviour Kasukuwere. There remains neither a clear paper trail nor recorded minutes between officials from the diamond mining companies and the Ministry of Youth, Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment. The Permanent Secretary as the Accounting Officer of Ministry of Youth, Indigenization and Economic Empowerment was never at any point involved by Hon. Minister Saviour Kasukuwere. The absence of supporting documents of such a nationally significant transaction calls into question the official nature of the pledges, and lends credence to suspicion claims by both diamond mining companies and the community that the pledges were the singular creation of the former Minister, Hon. Saviour Kasukuwere. No due diligence was conducted in the development of the legal constitution of M-Z CSOT. In particular, that there are no proper written and or verbal contracts or agreements amongst the key stakeholders within the Ministry of Youth,

Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment, the Ministry of Mines & Mining Development and diamond mining companies, reflecting the amount of money that each company should pay, the terms of payments and the reporting mechanisms. This has negatively affected the capitalization of the CSOT.

9.1.3 The Committee noted the concerns of the locals in their pursuit for redress of their grievances that they anticipate will affect the community for generations to come. The Committee further noted the fear, rage, and pessimism of the Marange-Zimunya community around the perceived plundering of the diamonds themselves and the ensuing manipulation around the M-Z CSOT. The residents, are bitter that despite being one of the most lucrative diamond fields in the world, five years after diamond mining began, their area has remained poor and underdeveloped and revenues from mineral resources have failed to lift poor people out of the shackles of poverty. The communities are crippled by degraded environments, disease, perceived and justifiably so corruption in the handling of CSOT funds, general poor service delivery and dilapidated infrastructure such as poor roads network, under-rehabilitated bridges, under-equipped clinics with inadequate drug stock, and general food insecurity for the communities due to relocations from their plots, drought and general poverty. On account of non-payment of the USD 1.5 million that was displayed during the launch of the M-Z CSOT, local residents' hopes of benefiting from their local resources have been dashed, and led to speculation that Hon. Minister S. Kasukuwere and the diamond mining companies misled the President, His Excellency, Cde RG Mugabe and the Nation at large. This has severely impacted negatively on the respect accorded to the President and the Chiefs in

the area as reflected by the statements made by the Villagers.

9.2 Relocation of Chiadzwa Villagers

9.2.1 The Committee found that land at Arda, Transau is not sufficient to cater for the relocation of 31 villages with 4 321 households, yet there were no clear visible progress on the ground on the part of the Provincial Administrator's Office with regards to finding alternatively located land, except statements pronouncement that to finding alternative land was being searched outside Mutare District.

9.2.2 Five companies have not met their villagers' relocation targets: Rera Diamond Company, which was supposed to relocate 92 households have not yet began the exercise. Jinan Investments was supposed to relocate 350 households, has only constructed 110 houses and relocated only 31 households. Marange Resources was supposed to relocate 350, has only built 184 houses and relocated 116 households. Diamond Mining Company was supposed to relocate 114 households, has only built 30 houses and relocated 30 households. Mbada Diamonds was supposed to relocate 487 households, has constructed 100 houses and relocated 100 households. Only Anjin Investments met its target of relocating 474 households and constructed world class water works, clinic and schools for the community in addition to tarring roads. In Transau Estate, houses that have been built but not occupied and others that have not been completed, are exposed to theft and vandalism.

9.2.7 The handling of exhumation and reburials of the dead of the displaced villagers remains a bone of contention between Marange-Zimunya communities and diamond mining companies. While the Provincial Administrator's Office acknowledged that, nothing has been done to address this challenge.

9.2.8 There are cases of villagers, that have not been relocated being affected by mining effluent, especially in areas being mined by DMC and Jinan, and the Committee was informed by Provincial Administrator's Office that there no formally instituted medical facilities and assistance given to the affected villagers.

9.2.9 That villagers are now supposed to pay between \$100 and \$150 for irrigation plots, something which is not affordable to most villages.

10 COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The committee recommends that as an absolute priority, The Ministry of Mines and Mining Development, through the new company Zimbabwe Consolidated Diamond Company (ZCDC) must expedite the relocations and compensation of displaced villagers. This process must commence within 45days after adoption of this report in Parliament and must be completed within an acceptable agreed timeframe.

2. This timeframe must be established in consultation with the Board of the M-Z CSOT.

Additionally, the Committee recommends that consultations are held in order that relocatees are accorded the chance to address concerns around the inadequacies of their new plots and associated services.

3. A firm and written commitment by ZCDC with a clear payment plan of the \$50m must be availed and agreed to with M-Z CSOT by 11 January 2017.

4. That with immediate effect, any further recruitment by ZCDC must give priority to the employment of qualifying and trainable people from the local areas and adheres to standard labour practices.

5. In order to establish a good rapport between ZCDC and the community, the company must respect the traditional leadership, norms, values and customs of the locals.

6. Henceforth, the ZCDC should submit itself to public scrutiny in the manner of all state enterprises and parastatals to ensure it is managed with the highest levels of transparency and accountability. If this is to truly mark a departure from cloak and dagger management of the sector, then new ways of working and reporting must also be employed. With respect to community relations, it is recommended that the new company adhere to international standards of reporting around sustainability, such as GRI and ISO Standards.

7. With the findings of this enquiry revealing clear deception bordering on criminal abuse of office, the Committee calls upon the Zimbabwe Republic Police, the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission, the Auditor General and all relevant authorities to institute formal proceedings within 14 days (from the day of adoption of this report) to investigate the conduct of Hon. Minister Saviour Kasukuwere, officials from the Ministry of Youth, Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment, National Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Board as well as the diamond mining companies in relation to the M-Z CSOT.

8. The Committee further recommends The President, H.E Cde, R.G Mugabe establishes a commission of inquiry led by a Judge or any other suitable candidate to investigate the intricate web of deceit, corruption and fraud related to the establishment and implementation of the M-Z CSOT. Further, that particular attention must be paid to a likely covert strategy meant to discredit and malign the Office of the President.

9. The ZRP and responsible authorities must work towards concluding the investigation around the alleged externalization of USD \$500 million by Jinan and possibly other mining companies. The Commissioner General of Police must issue a statement by November 30th, 2016 on progress.

10. An amendment of the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act [14:33] as read with Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment General Regulations of 2010 and the Mines and Minerals Act to reflect the legal status of Community Share Ownership

Trusts, as a matter of priority.

11. In general terms, a greater culture of consultation across all stakeholder groups must be encouraged within the nations' diamond mining industry. Industry practitioners and experts, policy makers, affected communities, local and traditional leadership and the general public must be afforded opportunities to participate in and contribute towards the shaping of policy in this regard. The opacity and inadequate sharing of information only gives rise to lack of understanding, suspicion and mistrust of the industry and its custodians. Practical steps must be taken to establish platforms that allow for a two-directional exchange of information and opinion. This is crucial in establishing the buy-in on policy direction by the ultimate beneficiaries of the nation's natural resources.

